740.00119 EW/10–1645
Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, October 16, 1945, 10:30 a.m.
| Present: | The Secretary of State |
| The Secretary of War, accompanied by Colonel Charles McCarthy2 | |
| The Secretary of the Navy, accompanied by Major Correa3 | |
| Mr. Matthews |
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Atomic Energy
Mr. Patterson brought up the question of atomic energy. He said that the British have in mind the statement in the President’s message that he intends to follow up with consultations with Britain and Canada and later with others. He wanted to know what the channel would be—whether the talks would be through regular diplomatic channels or through some other procedure. Dr. Bush, he said, had informed him that Attlee was coming over and perhaps the President would discuss this with him. Mr. Patterson said that he had no preference. Mr. Byrnes remarked that he had one view on this matter, namely, the overemphasis placed on the views of the scientists. He said that he bowed to them in their ability to develop the bomb but on the question of giving information to others he thought the scientists were no better informed than he was on the construction of the bomb. Mr. Patterson said that the British and Canadians were under present Russian [Quebec?] agreement in effect junior partners [Page 60] in the business and have a good stand in their request to be consulted. Mr. Forrestal pointed out that neither have as yet the means or capacity for producing the bomb. Mr. Patterson said that he believed the British had only one pilot plant on plutonium. Mr. Byrnes said that to him the question depends entirely on our ability to inspect plants in other countries. If we are not able to inspect such plants he thought we are all agreed that we should not give information with regard to our methods of manufacture. He said that in a meeting he had asked General Marshall4 whether his experience in dealing with the Russians justified him in relying on the United Nations Organization to inspect Russian plants and in telling the American people that he could rely on such inspection. Mr. Byrnes said that he was only going on the basis of past experience and he did not feel that this justified any such confidence. Mr. Patterson said that the President, he thought, had in mind only a gradual approach and that in no event would information on the industrial manufacture of the bomb be given to others. He said that we were, however, committed to talks with the British and Canadians to a certain extent. Mr. Byrnes remarked that Oppenheimer5 had impressed him considerably and he thought that General Groves knew more about the problem than any of the people from Dupont, Union Carbide or Eastman. He said that we can’t get into Rumania and Bulgaria much less Russia and that it is childish to think that the Russians would let us see what they are doing. He added the query whether if Russia made an agreement today we would want to rely on it. He pointed in this connection to the fact that though they had a formal treaty of non-aggression with Japan the Russians, as far back as Yalta, were making definite plans for, their attack upon Japan. He added that Stalin and Molotov would probably be insulted today if you implied that they had intended to keep their solemn treaty with Hitler. By implication of the same process of reasoning, it would not be wise for us to rely on their word today. Mr. Patterson inquired whether when Attlee arrives Mr. Byrnes will take up with him the matter of channel through which the talks will be conducted. He said that he was agreeable to having it done here through the State Department or through the Combined Policy Committee on Atomic Energy. Mr. Byrnes remarked that in his opinion the principal reason Russia wants Libya has to do with uranium. He pointed to the map how a Soviet base in Libya would facilitate their access right down to the Belgian Congo. [Page 61] Mr. Patterson inquired whether the Russians are really serious with regard to Libya and Mr. Byrnes replied emphatically in the affirmative. He said it was the cause of all his troubles and mentioned Gromyko’s6 approach on this question at Potsdam.7. …
- Secretary of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC).↩
- Lt. Col. Mathias F. Correa, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy.↩
- General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army.↩
- J. Robert Oppenheimer had been Director of the Manhattan District Project Laboratory at Santa Fe, New Mexico.↩
- Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador to the United States.↩
- Presumably the reference to the Potsdam Conference is in error, but for an exchange of letters between the Acting Chairman of the Soviet Delegation to the San Francisco Conference and Secretary of State Stettinius, June 20 and 23, 1945, on this general subject, see vol. i, pp. 1398 and 1428, respectively. For discussion of this exchange of letters at the 15th Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, September 21, 11 a.m., see post, pp. 288, 297.↩