740.00119 Council/12–445
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
Mr. Wright55 called to see the Secretary at 7:30 p.m. Lord Halifax had requested an appointment earlier in the afternoon, but was unable to come at this hour as he was seeing the President at 9 p.m. Mr. Wright expressed apologies for Lord Halifax’s inability to come.
Mr. Wright said they had received an urgent message from Mr. Bevin regarding the proposed meeting in Moscow. He said Mr. Bevin feels very reluctant and that they could hardly afford to have a meeting in Moscow which would be a failure, for this would leave them in a worse position than at present. He said Bevin was doubtful about preparation for the meeting and feels it might do more harm than good. Also, as regards the atomic bomb, Bevin does not see how this matter can be discussed with Molotov when agreement has not been reached between the US, British and Canadians as to what they will present to UNO. Further, it is not clear to Bevin what is in the minds of the US people to discuss; he doesn’t see how we can leave out China and if we bring in China we cannot leave out France, [Page 594] as the French are already suspicious; and finally, Bevin was not certain what the President meant by “no more three-power meetings.”
The Secretary said he had informed Bevin of the reasons why he felt a meeting would be helpful at this time.
As regards the President’s remarks, the Secretary told Mr. Wright that in answer to a question at an informal press conference as to whether there was any plan to hold a Big Three meeting, the President [replied] that there was no such intention—the only normal and correct answer. The Secretary remarked that in this country “Big Three” has always meant the heads of the three governments—not the countries, and that at Yalta and again at Potsdam the Foreign Secretaries were referred to as “The Little Three”.
As to the inclusion of China, the Secretary stated that we are at present communicating with the Soviet regarding matters affecting China and that we have not felt that China should be advised at every stage of the negotiations; they have not asked it and do not expect it. China’s greatest hope lies in the possibility of agreement between the US, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and therefore China would not offer complaint, That being true, there would be no reason for including France.
The Secretary stated that it was the wishes of Churchill and Eden that the three secretaries should meet every three months and they proposed it at Yalta. Then at Potsdam, after the Council of Foreign Ministers had been set up, it was argued that the Council should not cause the discontinuance of the meetings of the three, and a statement to this effect was put into the Potsdam Protocol. The purpose of such meetings, as agreed to at Yalta, is to keep up contact between the three governments and discuss informally in an exploratory way matters open for settlement. It is to be a current meeting, not a conference of the heads of governments—and it is more important now than ever before.
As to harm being done by failure to agree, the Secretary stated that if they were not discussed prior to UNO they would endanger the success of that organization. The Secretary said he would not expect that agreement could be reached on all the items open for discussion, but that agreement on one or two would be progress and would make such a meeting worthwhile.
The Secretary told Mr. Wright that there is no doubt in his mind but that agreement on the atomic energy proposal between the US, Canada and the British will be reached in a few days, that there are no differences between us and it is merely a matter of implementing the statement already agreed to by the heads of the three Governments. A meeting was just held this afternoon, the Secretary stated, and there [Page 595] didn’t seem to be any differences between us. He said he hoped to tell Russia what we propose to present to UNO and thereby try to save UNO from the failure that would probably result from the group action being presented without the Russians having been informed.
Mr. Wright stated that there is another point which Mr. Bevin mentioned in his message—he has learned from Clark-Kerr that Stalin is not expected to return to Moscow before the end of December and Bevin feels that if Stalin were to be in Moscow there would be stronger reason for meeting there. Bevin hopes the Secretary will agree that talks be held between the three Secretaries in London prior to UNO in January.
The Secretary said that both he and the President felt that the Russians should be advised, and that it is our intention to advise them of the atomic bomb proposal prior to UNO. The Secretary said he sincerely regretted that Bevin has not agreed to his proposal to go to Moscow and that he is embarrassed now over the delay in answering Molotov and feels that he must not delay longer.
Mr. Wright said it is not clear in Mr. Bevin’s mind what the Secretary would expect to discuss in Moscow and what it would expect to achieve.
The Secretary told Mr. Wright he had sent Bevin an itemized statement of the nine subjects he would like to discuss, but that it was his thought that the discussion should not be limited to those items, that any question any one of the three wished to bring up should be discussed. No statement can be made that, for the meeting to be a success, agreement must be reached on all items; that if agreement were reached on two of the nine problems it would be a forward step the world would be delighted to know about. If a meeting is never held, we will never know what might have been agreed to. The Secretary said he would hope to tell to the press the facts about the meeting, that it was an exploratory, informal meeting; that the three Governments should maintain close friendly relations in peace as in war.
The Secretary stated he will be disappointed if Mr. Bevin does not agree to go, but that he intends to go to Moscow, because he approached Molotov about such a meeting, believing in the Yalta Agreement, and he must go. He said he has asked Winant to advise Bevin of his embarrassment and ask for his early answer.
Mr. Wright inquired as to the probable length of the meeting and the Secretary stated that no limit has been stated, but that he would hope, as he advised Molotov, to be back by the 25th, but that if for any reason it was necessary to stay longer he would not hesitate to do so. He would expect to be there by the 15th.
- Michael Wright, British Minister.↩