740.00119 EW/10–1045
Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, October 10, 1945, 10:30 a.m.
Present: | The Secretary of State |
The Secretary of War, accompanied by Mr. George L. Harrison | |
The Secretary of the Navy, accompanied by Mr. J. E. Geilfuss | |
Mr. Matthews90 |
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Mr. Byrnes said that he had had a long talk with Mr. Stimson just before leaving for London and had begged him not to recommend to [Page 56] the President discussion of international consultation in his message. Mr. Byrnes added that he felt himself in closest agreement with the views of General Groves and that we do not yet know enough about the whole question of atomic energy or the future world situation to discuss the international cooperation aspects. Mr. Harrison said that he agreed with Mr. Byrnes on the matter of timing of the discussion but sided with Secretary Stimson on the question of ultimate authority. Mr. Forrestal emphasized that the Navy wants to be heard at that stage and that he has definite views on the matter. Mr. Patterson said that the State Department wanted both the domestic and the international treatment of the bomb discussed in the President’s message which had been drafted by Judge Eosenman.91 Mr. Byrnes added that it was going to create difficulties for him and that he could foresee that at future meetings Molotov92 would refer to the President’s statement and ask to discuss the whole question of the control of the atomic bomb. Mr. Forrestal said that there was also great danger of increased pressure in support of international control from within this country. Mr. Byrnes said he agreed that the pressure would be both internal and from abroad and that he intended to talk further with the President. He felt that before any international discussion of the future of the bomb could take place we must first see whether we can work out a decent peace. Mr. Harrison pointed out that the British wished to discuss the matter of a common approach to the problem in the light of the President’s statement. Mr. Byrnes said he realized this and regretted public discussion of that aspect. Stettinius, he said, wanted to put in a reference to the atomic bomb in a speech he is making in London and he had told him to take out all reference to the bomb. Mr. Forrestal asked whether we were going to turn the bomb over to “a piece of paper”. Mr. Byrnes recalled that Churchill had been most determined that no one should be told about the bomb and had not even wished to talk about it with Attlee.
Mr. Byrnes said that he would be glad to meet with the committee on Saturday93 and that he would plead with the President not to push the question of consultation.
There was further discussion of the British desire to have Presidential approval to Halifax’s appointment to the committee and there was general agreement that this was not necessary. Mr. Patterson [Page 57] suggested it would be adequate to record in Saturday’s meeting the Committee’s “satisfaction” that Lord Halifax would join them.
Mr. Forrestal expressed his fears that the British might wish to utilize the committee to consider the whole question of the future of the bomb de novo and that he would be inclined to the view that it would be better to consider the Committee defunct. Mr. Byrnes suggested that the question was one to be given some thought and suggested that the three secretaries think over between now and Saturday the desirability of continuing the committee. This was generally agreed upon. Mr. Harrison pointed out that a whole chain of committees depended upon this principal one and that this factor should likewise be given thought. …
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- H Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs.↩
- Samuel I. Rosenman, Special Counsel to President Truman. For text of President Truman’s Message to Congress, October 3, 1945, see Congressional Record, vol. 91, pt. 7, p. 9322.↩
- Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.↩
- Reference is to the Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee, October 13; for extracts from the minutes, see infra.↩