Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

740.00119 Council/9–1145

United States Delegation Minutes of the Thirty-Second Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, October 2, 1945, 11:10 a.m.⁶⁰

London, October 2, 1945, 11:10 a.m.

Mr. Molotov in the Chair

Molotov: May we begin? No definite procedure was decided yesterday for our discussions today, and I want to make a suggestion. I suggest that four protocols should be drawn up, over the respective signatures of five, four, three, and two, and the protocols should embody only the agreed decisions.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, you mean all the agreed decisions?

Molotov: Only those that have been agreed upon among us. And I want to make a reservation, in order to make myself clear. The Soviet delegation will agree only to those agreed decisions which are in accord with the Berlin decision. It means that there should be no decisions, seeing that some participate with decisive vote and others participated, and others had no right to vote; and as there is no such stipulation in the Berlin decision, we cannot agree to any decisions of that sort. I have finished. Any observations?

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I agree to the first part of Mr. Molotov’s statement that there be four protocols, and that the protocols should embody the agreed decisions. We may as well be frank about it, and come down for the discussion of the question. According to the minutes we agreed to last Saturday, and according to the knowledge of everyone at the table, on September 11 there was an agreed decision. I want to know whether Mr. Molotov means that that shall not be included in the protocol?

Molotov: We can’t agree to its being included. We disagree with it, and no one can force us to agree. We can’t violate the Berlin decision.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, certainly no one can force anyone at this table to agree to a decision, and the sooner we all realize that, the better. No one can force you to agree. And no one can force the United States to agree.

In good humor, let us look at what occurred. On September 11, four of the members of the Council, pursuant to the Berlin agreement, invited China to participate in the meetings when the Italian treaty was under discussion. China did participate, and the agreed minutes⁶¹ will show that Dr. Wang was Chairman of the meeting and extended the invitation to Yugoslavia and other countries—Italy and other countries, to send its representative there, to be heard on the Italian treaty. Therefore, the representatives of many countries know that in the deliberations of this Council the representative of China was participating and was acting as Chairman during the consideration of the Italian treaty. That was the solemn agreement. That did not have to be signed.

When we at this table on the negotiations with each other agreed, certainly those agreements stand with all of our Governments behind them, and it is not necessary to have a signature That invitation was extended under the language of the Berlin agreement, reading that “other members should be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion”. The Berlin agreement further said: “The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problems under consideration”. Now the proposal is made, two weeks after the invitation was extended, accepted and signed—the proposal is made to withdraw the invitation.

I ask my friend to consider for a moment the embarrassing position we would be in. We issued a communiqué, by agreement of the Soviet representatives as well as all the other representatives back on the—what date?—on September 14.⁶² That communiqué told the world this—now I read from the communiqué: “The Council began its discussion of terms for a peace settlement with Italy. It was agreed that all the United Nations at war with Italy would be invited to submit, if they wished, their views in writing on this subject. It was also decided that the President of the session, Dr. Wang, should extend on behalf of the Council, invitations to Yugoslavia, Italy, Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand and South Africa, each to nominate a representative, if they so desired, to attend the meeting of Foreign Ministers to be held on Monday, September—etc., etc.,—frontier.”

Now what we are asked to do is to tell the world that that was not true, when in fact it was true. Of course, we can’t do that.

Then the other proposal is, when it is referred to by this—Mr. Molotov properly—as an invitation, and yesterday he suggested that at the head of each chapter referring to peace treaties there should be a notation that, in his language, we four invited the Chinese representative to take part and the Chinese representative did not participate in the decision, he was only invited to be present. Mr. Molotov further suggested that the protocols for the Balkan states should go as follows: Great Britain, America and the Soviet Union invite to be present in the discussion of the agenda with French and Chinese representatives. It would follow from this that they will only be present at the discussion of the Balkan questions, whereas the questions are to be settled by the host who had invited them.

Now that language shows that Mr. Molotov agreed that they were invited and they had the right to invite them, under the language of the Berlin agreement, because he wouldn’t have suggested putting into the record that they had been invited if under the Berlin agreement no such invitation could be extended. Now Mr. Molotov has stated to me that when he suggested that, he intended that it should be done, provided there should be a note—this September 11 agreement should be excluded from the record, or some proper notation be shown, that it was revoked. That does not affect in the slightest his belief, and my belief, that under the Berlin agreement we have the right to extend the invitation which we did extend. For these reasons, the United States have joined with the other Governments, the Soviet Union and Great Britain and France in extending the invitation. The invitation having been acted on, the world having been advised of it, now when Mr. Molotov proposes to withdraw it, I cannot agree to withdraw that invitation.

Molotov: I must add that the interpretation placed by Mr. Byrnes upon the point of view of the Soviet delegation does not correspond to its point of view. Mr. Byrnes has made a statement that it is impossible to revoke the decision, but I have before me the proposal made by Mr. Byrnes revoking these very decisions, on condition that the proposal for the convocation of the Conference is accepted.⁶³ You seem to have forgotten about the fact that you proposed to revoke the decisions. I see that Mr. Byrnes does not value very highly this proposal, but he seems to wish to obtain something for its being—as a result of its being revoked. Of course, it is a business-like approach. (Laughter)

For the good payment, Mr. Byrnes agrees to revoke—renounce this decision, and forget about China. I stand at the question [sic] of the conference in these important questions, and the suggestion is correct in principle in my opinion; but I am unable to act upon it until I have reported it to my Government in person. This is the suggestion that I want to make.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, then I have an addition to make, and the addition is this, that when my good friend, the Soviet representative, took this position which has occupied most of our time for the last ten days, in the hope of arriving at a compromise proposal I told him I was willing to agree to that proposal that he has in his hand, and from which he read, provided that it would be only a part of the proposal and the second paragraph would provide for a conference. But my friend knew the difference is that the proposal I was making was one for discussion and adoption by all members of this Council, and before it was proposed it was shown to the representative from China and the representative from France. It is an entirely different thing, asking the Council to agree on something and one man coming in and saying to the Council, “I want this resolution revoked. I want the invitation withdrawn, and therefore it must be withdrawn without agreement on the part of anybody but me.”

Now, one thing more. My friend refers to the fact that the conference proposal, which I offered, he agrees to in principle. There has not been a time in ten days that we could not have reached an agreement, if lie had agreed to accept the proposal which he says he is in accord with in principle. France and China were prepared to make sacrifices of their views. Great Britain was willing to go along. And if my friend now, having had a week to think about it, can agree to that conference proposal, then we, in the spirit of concession, agree to the proposal that he made, and this Conference can end in some harmony and some hope for the future. I wonder if there is any chance of my friend being able to reach that—make that concession if the rest of us make a concession to his proposal on the first paragraph?

Molotov: I see that you now, Mr. Byrnes, are ready to revoke this decision; but he wishes to obtain something in return. Now if I were willing to accept that—to agree—if I was—I would be willing to agree—if I was entitled to decide upon this question without my personally reporting first to my Government, (sic)⁶⁴

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, but that is true. I am willing to state—to agree to the language proposed by the Soviet representative as to the September 11, provided at the same time we say to the world that France and China and Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and every other nation that was at war could be invited. My friend understands the proposal, and in good humor I am now talking to him to see if he can reach a concession. If we can’t agree on that, then we may as well realize that we are not going to agree to withdraw the invitation or to narrow the participation of France and China without assuring them, at the same time, that they will come in before there is a peace treaty signed, in full participation or equality with all the rest of us. I think, then, we may as well agree that until there is an agreement that a conference will be called to which these Governments will be invited, there can be no agreement to change the September 11 invitation to France and China.

Molotov: I am in position to state in advance that the Soviet Government will not agree to the convocation of this conference, if the Berlin decision is violated. We are drafting now our protocols and we fail to finishing the drafting (sic), but until there are protocols signed, there are no decisions. It is impossible to prepare a draft protocol with [without] a decision. As long as the decisions have not been signed, they do not exist as decisions. The Berlin decisions, they are signed and they therefore constitute real decisions. What we are discussing now are only—is only a draft of decisions. To everybody here it should be perfectly clear that the only decisions which we can adopt are the decisions agreed to by five—by all of us. And unless a decision is agreed to by all of us, we cannot record it in the protocol and it can remain only as a draft decision, and as such let it remain there.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I want earnestly to ask my friend not to insist on that position, for this reason. If we say that there is no decision until it is signed, we put ourselves in a very embarrassing position before the world. During this Conference we decided to authorize the Chairman to send out invitations to all the United Nations inviting them to file statements of their views.⁶⁵ It happened that on that day the representative of France was the Chairman. Now, in response to that invitation which was sent as the result of the decision here, the governments of the world have already answered.⁶⁶ I have here copies of five or six answers from governments, replying to an invitation sent out as a result of our decision. Now, I only submit that we can’t well tell the governments that that letter should not have been sent out because there was no decision, inasmuch as there was no signature, and ask them to withdraw their answers.

Molotov: I have not raised and I am not raising this question.

Bevin: May I interrupt to ask a question? (Laughter) Do I understand that any decision not included in the protocol means a draft decision?

Molotov: What we have signed we will constitute a decision, and the rest will remain drafts.

Bevin: We simply leave it as a draft?

Molotov: I think everyone will guess right as to the interpretation being laid upon such a situation. Any more observations?

Bidault: The position of the French delegation is very simple. I have stated it already several times, and it hasn’t changed. We adhere to the agreement reached on the 11th of September, which has applied for a certain number of days, and if any new proposals have been made, the French delegation has never expressed any approval of them. The French delegation has stated here that it would view favorably the idea of inviting the United Nations to participate in the discussions of the peace treaties. It is in this spirit that I associate myself with what Mr. Byrnes said, concerning the maintenance of the invitation extended to China to participate in the discussion.

Molotov: Anyone wishes to comment?

Byrnes: I have no comment to make. Mr. Chairman, has the protocol committee reported?

Molotov: Last night we began the discussion of the protocols, embodying general decisions. Perhaps we may entertain that now?

Byrnes: I thought that is what we were going to do?

Molotov: I suggest that we finish this job and sign at least the general protocol, to begin with.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, what would be done with the other protocols then?

Molotov: And then let us pass on to the other protocols? In accordance with the proper procedure, as laid down——

Byrnes: (interposing) Mr. Chairman, I really don’t think there is anything in the Berlin decision to cover the protocol business. The only thing the Berlin decision says is this: It says “Its immediate, important task shall be”—“The Council shall be authorized to draw up, with the view to the submission to the United Nations, a treaty of peace.” We must stick to the Berlin treaty. And it says that the immediate task is to take up the treaty of peace. The Berlin agreement did not say plural task, it said “its immediate, important task”—one task—to take up the treaty first.

Mr. Chairman, I understand the protocol committee has completed the consideration of the other parts of the protocol and if they have, it would be good to ask if they would submit it so the delegates could see it.

Molotov: I have no objection to hearing the report of the protocol commission, but the Berlin decision stipulates that the question of the treaties of the peace should be settled by certain countries, and I suggest therefore that the report of the protocol committee should be heard by the representatives of these certain countries, and that the time of our other colleagues should not be taken up by the job we have got to do. We countries who are signatories to the terms of the armistice should not violate the Berlin decision.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I am going to make a new proposal,⁶⁷ to see if we can make any progress. Why can’t we agree to have this protocol state the actual facts as they occurred? Let the September 11 paragraph remain. On September 22 set out your statements in full, that you believe it was in violation of the Berlin agreement, therefore you object to the participation of the governments which in your opinion were not entitled to participate. Then, at the head of each one of the four protocols, have the notation that my friend suggested yesterday afternoon, as to who participated in response to the invitation, and it is not necessary for us to discuss these treaties. Let us sign those papers, when they come back here, without any discussion, and leave open, then, for decision hereafter, the question contained in the proposal submitted by Mr. Molotov with my amendment as to what shall be the future participation. Then in the protocols, four of them, there will be no one country to show participation in violation of what Mr. Molotov believes to be the right procedure.

And then, as to the future procedure, my friend says that as to the conference he wishes to personally consult his Government, and whenever he has had time to do that he can agree, or agree with the amendments. Then his proposal, with my proposal calling for the conference, would become the governing procedure for the future. In the meantime, the deputies could attend to such matters referred to them as are of a general character and do not involve consideration of peace treaties, and await advices as to our ability to agree on the two proposals to which I have referred. If we were unable to agree, then some other procedure will have to be found for making the peace. If we did agree, the deputies could go to work in accordance with the new procedure that is arrived at. That would involve no violation of the Berlin agreement but it would demand sacrifices by all.

I do not know what view would be taken of it by the representative of China and the representative of France. I would hope that they could find it possible to go along with us, once there was an assurance of a conference at which France along with other governments would participate on terms of equality—France and China.

Molotov: I suggest that we follow the tested method of drawing our protocols in Berlin, Crimea and Moscow, and at our Conference. That is the way protocols should be drawn up, embodying all the agreed decisions. I made that suggestion at the very beginning of the meeting this morning, and I regard this as the tested method of adopting decisions by our heads of Government made by the Ministers of Affairs. The only difference would be that not one but four agreed protocols would be drawn up.

I shall cite an example from the experience at the Berlin Conference, and many similar examples can be given. It was at the meeting of the Berlin Conference that the Soviet draft regarding the Ruhr area⁶⁸ was under discussion, and the decision was adopted to refer that draft to the Council of Foreign Ministers. At the last meeting of the Council, Mr. Byrnes proposed that the draft should not be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers, and the Soviet delegation agreed to this and the draft was excluded from the protocol.⁶⁹ I suggest that we follow these wide practices, and that we record in the protocols only what has been agreed upon among us: and that Ave have four protocols embodying what has been agreed upon among the five, then among four, three and two. This procedure was, up to now, followed by the preceding conferences, and I think that these practices should be kept in this Conference as well.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I think we can agree on what happens under those circumstances. At Berlin, when we were working on the protocol, not once but three or four times a proposal was made that we agree not to publish a thing in the protocol. I remember Marshal Stalin proposing, near the end of consideration of the protocol, that we leave out this sentence, and we agreed. Therefore, it was proper to leave it out by general agreement. But this is a different proposal that you have here. You want to leave something out without any agreement.

Now at Yalta, my recollection is that an entirely different situation existed, and in the discussion of reparations the other participants insisted upon certain language and the British delegation objected to the language, and Mr. Churchill said that he would have entered in the protocol his reservations. When the Soviet delegation made the proposal and wanted the statement in the protocols, the U.S. delegation was willing to go along with them. Therefore, it was set up as number—paragraph four. After setting it up, then we had his statement. The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparations Commission, no figures of reparation should be mentioned, and the Soviet delegation and the U.S. delegation insisted on the paragraph going in. The British reserved their position.⁷⁰ And that’s all that should be done here, following the wise rule that you suggested of the past.

I submit to my good friend that it would be good to follow this procedure, because it would give to him the same reservation that the British reserved for themselves at Yalta. My friend will remember that at Potsdam the Prime Minister then representing Great Britain referred to this and argued his position, so that in the future you could refer to the protocol similarly signed, and argue openly.

Molotov: I feel that the example cited by Mr. Byrnes does not suit. Everyone of us has the right to make a reservation, and that cannot be challenged. But the question is whether we are entitled to make any reservations or decisions which will run counter to the decisions adopted by the three Heads of Government. I feel that we are not entitled to make any reservations or decisions which will conflict with decisions adopted by the Heads of Government.

The reservation made by Mr. Churchill at the Crimea Conference did not meet with any objection, as it did not conflict with any agreements that were being discussed. But a different thing is being suggested here. The proposal is to record in the protocol what will conflict with the decision of the Berlin Conference. We cannot do it. We have no right to do it. Therefore, I suggest that we record only such agreements as have been agreed upon by us, and as do not conflict, therefore, with the Berlin decision. Otherwise we cannot, and decisions which have been agreed upon here by us will only be the decisions that are in accord with the Berlin decision.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, everybody agrees with that, and everybody says it is not in violation of the treaty. There is only one that says it is in violation of the agreement.

Molotov: Up to now there have been no decisions recorded at any of the conferences, which met without objection on the part of any one of us.

Byrnes: There were two of the Governments that adopted the Berlin agreement saying that it is not a violation of the Berlin agreement, and the record shows here that in the former case, when the Heads of Government were involved, when one Government did not agree with the decision, they stated their reservations, and would amply protect the view that my friend has about this matter.

Molotov: I find it necessary to remind Mr. Byrnes of what he said a few days ago. In the presence of Mr. Bevin, Mr. Byrnes said that the interpretation placed by the Soviet delegation upon the Berlin decision was a correct one, but that in addition there were certain views—in the course of the conference there were expressed certain views on which a wider interpretation could be placed; but he stated quite definitely that the interpretation of the Soviet delegation was correct, and Mr. Bevin disagreed with him.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, my friend is mistaken. I think that when we call his attention to it, he will agree. I stated that under the interpretation of that language that my friend was right to this extent, that France and China did not have the automatic right to participate when they were not signatories, without any invitation, but I called attention then, and have day after day until I am really tired of saying it, that the very next sentence in that paragraph said that other governments could be invited, and that on September 11 we had invited them, and yesterday afternoon my friend was agreed that they had been invited and was willing to have that statement made at the top of the treaty. May I add one thing more, in the hope that my friend could make the reservation, if he wished to do so, in accordance with the precedent established by Mr. Churchill.

Molotov: No one has such a right as to be able to agree to a reservation conflicting with the decisions of the Heads of Government, and no one of us is authorized to do that.

Byrnes: I doubt that it will be quite persuasive, but I did want to suggest that my friend could ask to have inserted in the protocol a statement of what occurred—which I would call substantially this: on September 22 the Soviet delegation stated that it withdrew its assent to the decision of September 11, and further stated that in its opinion the decision of September 11 violates the Berlin agreement and does not bind the Soviet delegation or the Council. Thereafter, there was no further discussion by the Council on the terms of a peace treaty during the period covered by this protocol.

Molotov: I want to make another suggestion. The suggestion is that at this meeting only one decision should be adopted. The representatives of the U.S.A., Great Britain, U.S.S.R., France and China on the protocol committee should be instructed to draw up a protocol embodying the agreed decisions of the five Ministers.⁷¹ Any observation?

Bevin: Is that the whole proposal?

Molotov: That is the whole proposal—for this meeting.

Bevin: As a preliminary suggestion, in order to try and help the settlement of this thing, there have been so many suggestions made, I wonder whether we could take the four protocols which have been drawn up strictly on the basis of the Berlin protocol, and divide it into four parts, and draft the protocol on that basis and add a general paragraph setting forth what is the dispute on procedure, and indicating whether there are any questions left unsettled on the basis to be discussed between the Heads of Governments. This is a way, I think, for the Heads of Governments to settle it. The difference in the two texts is that it is set up under the heads of the subjects, and the other one, which the difficulty is about, is drawn up on the question of the Soviet delegation, I think in chronological order. If we were agreed that this text difficulty could be referred to the Heads of Governments, I think that might be a great help to Mr. Byrnes’ suggestion, and all the other proposals could be considered. If we adopted Mr. Molotov’s proposals, we are in practically the same position that the protocol committee recommended. I make this suggestion purely tentative and preliminary.

Molotov: Anyone wishes to comment? No other observations? So we have three proposals before us. The Soviet delegation is willing to agree on one condition: namely, that we do not violate the Berlin agreement.

Byrnes: The U.S. delegation will agree on one condition, that we do not violate the Berlin agreement.

Molotov: Very happy to hear. (laughter)

Bevin: The British delegation would like to know what is the correct interpretation of the Berlin agreement? (more laughter)

Bidault: The French delegation actually have no views to express concerning the meaning and interpretation of the Berlin declaration; but, of course, it abstained from any comment on the statement which has been made here.

Wang: The Chinese delegation—(inaudible)—therefore he thinks that—(inaudible)—in this matter of procedure—(inaudible)—we shall have no objection—(inaudible).

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question——

Molotov (interposing): Who among us here has the decisive vote on the question of the Berlin conference?

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, we are all equal.

Molotov: It is news to me. Mr. Bidault has insistently been pointing out that he does not regard the decision of the Berlin conference as a decision. He was right.

Byrnes: I think I have heard him say something to that effect. (laughter) I meant those who signed the Berlin decision were equal.

I have no other suggestions to make. I would like to ask my friend if he would give us any idea how long it will take him to discuss with his Government the questions of accepting the proposals that I made as to the conference.

Molotov: I think this question should be the subject of discussion at a special meeting of the Big Three.

Byrnes: Wouldn’t my friend agree that even under his interpretation of the Berlin agreement, in convoking a conference some others should be permitted to participate?

Molotov: I can say only one thing now, that we have participated in such meetings as will be in conformity with the Berlin decision and will not violate the Berlin decision. Any other observations?

Byrnes: No.

Molotov: I suggest that we have the meeting adjourn to the next time. (laughter)

Byrnes: What time?

Molotov: I leave that to the decision of the Chairman.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, we can have some lunch here. If they are going to continue this day after day, we might provide for getting lunch.

Two o’clock?

Molotov: No objections to continue our meeting until two o’clock.

Bidault: I have, naturally, no objections to meeting my colleagues. Yet, plain, may I ask what is going to be the agenda?

Molotov: My suggestion is that we should continue discussion of the protocol affecting the five Ministers.

Bidault: In this case, might I suggest that it would be useful that the various suggestions on the table should be circulated in writing?

Molotov: I have listened to them, and I remember them very well.

Byrnes: I think I do.

Bidault: My memory is less good than yours, and I remember well the custom is that written texts should be produced, and I think in the memories of each delegation.

Molotov: Of course, it is a rightful suggestion and we are obliged to comply with it, and I shall submit my proposal in writing and ask from Mr. Bevin and Mr. Byrnes whether they will be disposed to do likewise?

Bidault: Thank you.

Molotov: It is simply my duty. There is nothing to thank for me about it.

Bevin: I didn’t make a proposal. I made preliminary remarks which I thought might provoke comment of what is needed.

Byrnes: I made two or three, but I will try and decide which one of the three is the best.⁷² (laughter)

Bidault: I only ask for the right one which you are maintaining.

Molotov: On the part of the Soviet delegation, we will transmit our proposal, which seems to be a good one.⁷³

(Meeting adjourned until three o’clock)

60. There is no Record of Decisions for this meeting. According to the British record of this meeting, not printed, the participants in the meeting were as follows: United Kingdom—Bevin, Campbell, Clark Kerr and Duff Cooper; United States—Byrnes, Dunn, Cohen, Dulles, and Bohlen; Soviet Union—Molotov, Gusev, Novikov, Golunski, and Pavlov; France—Bidault, Couve de Murville, Alphand, and Fouques Duparc; China—Wang Shih-Chieh, Wellington Koo, Victor Hoo, Hollington Tong, and Yang Yun Chu.
61. Apparently reference is to the record of the third meeting of the Council, September 14, 11 a.m., p. 158.
62. For text of the communiqué released to the press by the Council of Foreign Ministers on September 14, see Department of State Bulletin, October 14, 1945, p. 564.
63. Apparently reference is to the proposal by the United States delegation, C.F.M. (45) 84, September 30, p. 475.
64. “(sic)” appears in the source text.
65. The Council of Foreign Ministers at its fifth meeting, September 15, 1945, decided to invite various of the United Nations Governments to present their views in writing regarding the Italian Peace Treaty; see the record of the fifth meeting, p. 186.
66. For a list of countries which submitted their views regarding the preparation of the Italian Peace Treaty, see footnote 20, p. 187.
67. The Secretary’s proposal was subsequently circulated to the Council as a memorandum by the United States delegation, C.F.M.(45) 92, October 2, p. 556.
68. For text of the Soviet proposal made at the Berlin Conference on the subject of the Ruhr industrial district, see Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. ii, p. 1000.
69. For the Department of State minutes of the 11th and final meeting of the Foreign Ministers at the Berlin Conference, August 1, 1945, see ibid., p. 543.
70. For the Protocol on the talks between the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Governments at the Crimea Conference on the question of German reparations, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 978–979 and 982–983. For Prime Minister Churchill’s statement of reservation regarding the inclusion of specific figures for reparations, see the records of the Seventh Plenary Meeting of the Crimea Conference, February 10, 1945, ibid.. pp. 901–903, 909, and 914–916.
71. Molotov’s proposal was later circulated to the Council as C.F.M.(45) 88, October 2, p. 555.
72. See memorandum by the United States delegation, C.F.M. (45) 92, October 2, p. 556.
73. The Soviet proposal was circulated to the Council as C.F.M.(45) 88, October 2, p. 555.