Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

740.0–0119 Council/9–1145

United States Delegation Minutes of the Thirtieth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, September 30, 1945, 9:30 p. m,³⁸

London, September 30, 1945, 9:30 p.m.

M. Bidault in the Chair.

Bidault: Shall we continue the discussion of the protocol? The Protocol Committee has met and has reported an important quantity of matter. It is in one language—I shall translate.³⁹

Molotov: But I must draw your attention to the fact that we have proposed to begin the discussion of the Soviet proposal.

Byrnes: But, Mr. Chairman, I understood that we proposed that we begin with the Committee proposal; therefore I propose that we begin the Committee proposal. I understand that the protocol has been proposed—I understood that the Committee proposal was to be considered before that of any individual member of the Council.

Molotov: In view of the fact that the proposal of the Soviet Delegation has been deferred more than once, the Soviet Delegation are unable to participate in the discussion of the other question until its proposal has been given consideration.

Bidault: What is the wish of the Council?

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I think there must be a misunderstanding. We have a Protocol Committee; every Delegation has a member on it. My information is that the Committee has a report. If the Committee has a report, certainly the report of the Committee should be considered in preference to a request by any one Delegation.

Molotov: Unfortunately, for my part I am not able to make any other suggestion.

Bidault: Does any member of the conference wish to make any other suggestion?

Byrnes: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I wonder if there is not some misunderstanding. This Committee, on which the Soviet Delegation has a representative, just like all the other Delegations, has been considering the protocol and has agreed upon some proposal, and, if possible, would not my friend be agreeable to hearing the Committee; then, if any of us objects to anything in it, we must all of us agree that that Delegation could have a hearing.—Mr. Chairman, I only have learned now, have understood now what the motion is. And I am told that what Mr. Molotov’s motion is, is that instead of considering the protocol, we should consider the proposal that he had made with reference to peace treaties, and I know that this afternoon I agreed that tonight it should be discussed. But I certainly did not mean that it had right of way or preference over the report of the Committee. I suggest that we hear the protocol, and if there are any changes, we can give it back to the Committee. Then they can go to work, and then we can discuss the other matter.

Molotov: Before discussing the results of the work done by the Protocol Committee, the Soviet Delegation finds it necessary to again acquaint itself with the result of the meeting of the Protocol Committee. At the present—at this moment—the Soviet Delegation are not ready to discuss the results of the meeting of the Protocol Committee as they must acquaint themselves with the report.

Bidault: Does this mean that we should extend the meeting in order to enable each member to get further information on the matter raised by the protocol, or does it mean that we adjourn? What is the opinion of the [Soviet?] Delegation? I would like to have a clear idea of what they wish.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I am informed by our representative on the Protocol Committee that there is no difference in the text submitted by the Soviet Delegation and that already reported by the Committee, except a few unimportant things, and that there is agreement among all the members of the text of the general protocol affecting all five.

Molotov: In this case, I suggest that we first consider the general protocol, provided it is ready, then pass to the proposal made by the Soviet Delegation.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I agree.

Bidault: The French Delegation accepts that we should now proceed to discuss the protocol on general questions since we accepted that it be issued with the rest, but it is impossible not to agree at the same time on a formula to be inserted somewhere for the signature, on which there is a French proposal, which I read this afternoon, a Soviet proposal, and, I understand, also a proposal by the General Secretariat. I understand that Mr. Molotov agreed to go ahead with the general protocol that all five members sign. It would not cover the peace treaties.

Molotov: No objection. It is the only protocol the consideration of which was referred to the Committee. No other protocols were referred to the Committee.

Bevin: Mr. Chairman, I don’t know what was referred to the Committee; we did not know what was in the Soviet draft. We adjourned in order to consider the Soviet draft. We agreed that the whole protocol should be examined with the Soviet Delegation draft, and now it is said that only one part of it is referred to the Protocol Committee. Now that I have seen the Soviet Delegation’s draft which it referred, I am afraid I was somewhat dismayed. I agreed, Mr. Chairman, to the reference of the protocol, because I was told it was ready, but I understood from Mr. Molotov that the other drafts covering the remainder would be ready in time, and that the whole thing was to be considered by the Committee.

Molotov: The Soviet Delegation can only agree to the protocol affecting all five being discussed by the Protocol Committee consisting of the five of them. The protocol affecting four should be discussed by a protocol committee of four, and so on. The Soviet Delegation will not agree to any other procedure.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman,—

Molotov: At our general meeting the Soviet Delegation will no longer participate in the discussion—in the plenary session—of questions other than general questions. And if my colleagues disagree with this, then I suggest that the meeting be closed. There is no use our wasting time in empty talk.

Bidault: I do not think of indulging in empty talk, although we do talk much, and my recollection of what happened during the preceding meetings are not exactly so exciting as what has been said. The French Delegation is quite willing to listen to anything any Delegation has to say with the hope of avoiding having wasted all the time we have been talking in common together.

Molotov: The Soviet Delegation holds the view that during general meeting of five Foreign Ministers, we can only discuss general questions and the proposal made by the Soviet Delegation, all the other questions we cannot discuss at the meeting composed of five.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, then according to that statement [as] I understand it, the Soviet Delegation is ready to discuss the statement of the protocol as to the general proposal. This afternoon Molotov submitted the document with the protocol as he wished it considered. It has been checked, and the Soviet representative has agreed with the representatives of the other Delegations as to that general statement. I wonder if we cannot adopt that.

Molotov: I would not object to the general protocol’s being discussed.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, if that be so, as the Soviet representative on the Committee of five informed the Soviet Delegation that they have gone over the changes in checking the Soviet proposal with the Committee proposal, and have agreed on these changes, I wonder if we could not agree that that general protocol as amended could be adopted? So far as the United States Delegation is concerned, when its representative has agreed to it, I am willing to agree to the protocol as it was agreed to by our representative on the Committee. I am told that it was agreed after the Soviet proposal was compared with the Committee proposal—only very little changes. All the members agreed; therefore I think we might agree that it was adopted and that the Committee go ahead with perfecting the draft of that part.

Bidault: What is the opinion of the other Delegations on the draft of the general protocol? Is there objection?

Bevin: I have no objection.

Wang: The Chinese Delegation has no objection.

Molotov: Though I have not read the text of the protocol, I think the Soviet Delegation will raise no objection.

Bevin: Mr. Chairman, will there be an introduction?

Bidault: I would like to state the position of the French Delegation in a second. After the decision which we have just taken, we have to agree on the introduction—the preamble and text constitute a whole. I will remind you that I handed in a text which is now being modified by a Soviet proposal. The French text was:

“The above provisions have been discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers; they are signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the countries enumerated below.”

Molotov: I have another suggestion to make, Mr. Chairman. It goes without saying that the Soviet Delegation will not agree to sign the general protocol unless the proposal made by the Soviet Delegation is accepted.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I will ask my good friend what difference would there be if he agreed to sign yesterday and to sign today?

Molotov: We have already stated not for the first time that we withdraw our vote from the decision of September the 11th, and that means that this decision has ceased to exist as a decision, it is cancelled. It is obvious that if anyone withdraws his voice from a decision, this decision ceases to exist as a decision. That is plain. It could not be otherwise. We know very well that the Soviet Delegation considers the decision of September the 11th to be a mistake, and how is it possible for us after this to sign a protocol which embodies that statement? And we cannot do that, and you cannot compel us to do that, just as no one can compel anyone to say what one does not agree to. This could not be otherwise and no collective work would be possible otherwise, and any other interpretation will only mean that we do not realize what the Council of Foreign Ministers constitutes and it is high time we realized that. All the decisions contained in the protocol are only those decisions which have been agreed to by all. It could not be otherwise, and no one can make another agree to a decision to which he does not agree. We hold that the decision of September the 11th is incorrect, and we have withdrawn our vote from the decision, and we cannot sign the protocol which would contain that decision. No one of you could do that, unless he agrees. I have finished.

Bidault: Does this mean that Mr. Molotov does not wish to sign the general protocol or that he asks that the text of our protocol should be altered?

Molotov: I want to say that unless an additional decision is accepted to the effect that the decision of September 11 concerning procedure is cancelled, we shall not sign any protocol. If you disagree to this then no protocols are needed. That is all.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I don’t think my friend would want to insist on that suggestion. I have in my hands the Russian text that he distributed this afternoon. That text shows the text of the decision of Sepember 11.

Molotov: That will remain.

Byrnes: There ought to be no difficulty in showing just what the facts were—that on a certain day, I don’t know the day, but it was about the sixteenth meeting,⁴⁰ after we had had about sixteen meetings, that the Soviet representative said he thought he made a mistake in agreeing to the decision on September the 11th, and he would no longer adhere to it.

Molotov: That’s right.

Byrnes: Of course in our procedure the thing that I thought the Soviet representative would do would be to move to rescind or repeal the resolution of September 11, but he did not make that motion. If such a motion were made even now, it would be for the Council to act on the motion, and the records show what occurred. All that I am saying is that the protocol ought to show just what occurred, and if it did, there could be no reason for objection by anybody, because everybody knows the position taken by the Soviet representative now. I thought he would move to cancel or repeal it or in some way have the records show it, other than by a mere statement.

Molotov: That is what I want to say—that an error has been made and should be corrected, and the decision revoked. Otherwise, we shall not sign any protocol. Or else the incorrect item should be excluded, and no special decision would be required. Or else the decision adopted on September 11 should be deleted, and in this case no special decision revoking it would be required. I will not suggest that we exclude anything from the protocol, but unless the mistake has been put right, the Soviet Delegation will sign no protocol. No one can compel the Soviet Delegation to sign what the Soviet Delegation does not agree to, and says so openly. That ought to be clear.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, when a council adopts a resolution, acts upon it for sixteen meetings, it cannot be excluded from the record, but that does not preclude the records showing exactly what occurred and the record should show, at some place, that on September 22 the Soviet representative informed the Council that he had made a mistake in agreeing to the resolution of September 11, and that the assent of the Soviet Delegation to that decision was withdrawn. If he wants a statement of that kind, that is the fact.

Molotov: This is exactly what the Soviet Delegation stated on September 22, and the Soviet Delegation has never renounced that statement and continues to hold—to maintain that view. That is why, this is the reason for which we shall not sign any protocol unless the decision has been revoked.

Bevin: Mr. Chairman, would it not be better to say that in the protocol, and make it quite clear, because this situation is highly embarrassing to us. The situation as I recall was that on September 22 the Soviet willingness to continue under that decision was withdrawn, and the discussion on the peace treaties was postponed. And if that was done, then we would have to consider how we could resume the discussion on the peace treaties. Could we agree to put in the protocol a statement to the effect that on September 22—

Molotov: Unless this decision is revoked, we shall sign not a single protocol.

Byrnes: Is the statement of the Soviet representative not only that he make a statement, but unless the Council revokes the decision, he will sign no protocol?

Molotov: That is right.

Byrnes: Then you will sign no protocol?

Molotov: I am prepared to stop with that.

Byrnes: How about the communiqué?

Molotov: Then there will be no communiqué. There is no use working on it. Unless there is a protocol, there can be no communiqué, because the communiqué must reflect the protocol.

Byrnes: I thought the communiqué might record the record of the meetings, what had been done, even though we did not have a protocol. I would like to know the views of the other members of the Council.

Molotov: Unless there is a protocol, we shall not participate, and not be a party to anything.

Byrnes: Then, Mr. Chairman, we find out we have no protocol, and no communiqué. Then, Mr. Chairman, may I ask my good friend from the Soviet Delegation what he would let us do about the Deputies?

Molotov: They have nothing to do.

Bidault: What now?

Molotov: He who is busy should go home tomorrow.

Bidault: What are the views of the other members of the Council, who are also busy?

Bevin: I should like for the sake of our own Government to record the action of September 22, Mr. Molotov’s having said he made an error, and the fact that the peace treaties could not be discussed after that go on the record of this meeting. I should also like that it go on the record of this meeting that I suggested this, and asked in what manner we should deal with the peace treaties in the light of that decision. And that having suggested this, we were met with an ultimatum that we had to agree to this or we could not go on. Had that suggestion been considered for a few minutes, we might have gotten over this difficulty.

Molotov: I have a statement to make on this subject:

“At the general meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers composed of five Ministers the Soviet Delegation cannot participate in discussions of questions relating to the peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland, because this procedure does not conform with the decision of Berlin”.

Bidault: In the name of the French Delegation I beg to ask the Soviet Delegation what is exactly the character of this statement? Is it meant for the whole Council, or for any other use?

Molotov: I have made this statement at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and I ask that this statement be recorded in the protocol.

Byrnes: What protocol?

Molotov: In the minutes of this particular meeting.

Bidault: In that case I am obliged to say that the French Delegation adheres to the decision of the 11th of September. France, being situated in Europe, considers that nothing connected with European affairs can be settled without France. I also ask that this be recorded in the minutes.

I wonder what we should do now? I wonder whether after the discussion it might not be useful to think it over a little longer and adjourn, and have a meeting tomorrow before the departures that have been announced by several members actually take place. Anyway, the French Delegation does not feel sleepy, but it is indicated that we shorten a discussion which is not useful and may be harmful.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I only want to say that this proposal to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers was proposed by the United States at the Berlin meeting of the Heads of Governments. Remembering the unfortunate experiences following the last war it was our firmest hope that we might avoid them, and that this Council might be the machinery to enable us to avoid the pitfalls of 1919. In our opinion it was the vehicle that would promote the establishment of a lasting peace on this earth. We believed that it could do the spadework, and that, meeting as friends, we could adjust difficulties, and then call in nations that had fought, suffered, and died in this war, and have them join in our work in order that they agree to the results of our efforts.

Because of that in the last few days I have urged that there would be an agreement to call a conference in order to give the nations of the world a chance to come and see what we had agreed upon before they were asked to sign on the dotted line. We have signed the armistice terms, Great Britain, the Soviet Republics, and the United States—when we signed them, we signed some of them in behalf of the other nations of the world, and the others were signed by the three Governments in the interests of other nations. That had to be done because while hostilities were on, all nations could not be expected to sign the terms of surrender. When it comes to framing the peace that would be a just peace, and no peace is a lasting peace unless it is a just peace, when it comes to that kind of peace, the nations in whose behalf we signed the armistice terms are entitled to be heard and to be present when the treaties are signed.

I hope that we could agree to call such a conference and give hope to all the peoples of the world who love liberty and love freedom. My proposal, although offered with the understanding that if it could be agreed to, I would agree to the proposal of Mr. Molotov—but I could not secure his approval. I must say that I am disappointed because we sought only to bring to a conference table our friends and our allies, not our enemies. At Berlin the Heads of Governments never dreamed of having a paper so narrowly interpreted that it would work against the interests of our own friends. If tonight we could send word to the world that those of us who represent the larger powers were going to do the spadework on the treaty and then all people were going to be invited in to say what kind of a world we were going to have in the future, there would be happiness in millions of homes. To help in this work we have come three thousand miles across the ocean with the hope we might contribute in some part to the accomplishment of our objectives. We were disappointed, but we shall not lose our interest in the affairs of the world. We shall continue to exercise all of our efforts, use all the power that we have, to help bring about a just and enduring peace on this earth.

Molotov: The Soviet Delegation holds the view that if there is an agreement with another government, this agreement should be carried out. And the Soviet Government feels that to depart from such a practice would mean undermining the prestige of such decisions and would do harm to the governments with whom the agreements have been signed. The Berlin agreement was accepted by the three Governments, and voluntarily accepted. This agreement is intended to insure peace, and why does it happen that only the Soviet Government is defending its Government’s decision, whereas other governments ignore the fact that such a decision has been adopted? Why do these other governments not regard themselves as bound to clef end the decision of their governments? In order that other United Nations may believe our decisions and agreements, they should be carried out. If we do not respect these decisions ourselves, then nobody will respect them.

In the course of this war our three Governments—I am referring to Great Britain, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union, have held conferences and have adopted a number of major decisions. It was not immediately that we sometimes arrived at decision; there were sometimes disagreements on certain questions. Then we used to defer them until our differences had been settled, but once these difficulties were settled, and decisions were taken between the three Governments, we, each of our Governments, felt it their duty, and a matter of honor, to defend these decisions both in deed and in word, and to carry them out.

The Soviet Delegation prefers no new claims before our colleagues. The only thing that the Soviet Delegation prefers is that the decisions adopted by us in common and voluntarily should be carried out. Does that mean to ask for too much? Could we do otherwise? The Soviet Delegation is now compelled to come out in defense of the Berlin decision alone. The representatives of other Governments who participated in the conference at Berlin treat lightly these decisions and do not feel themselves bound by these decisions, but the Soviet Delegation feels that it defends a just cause and that it can defend this attitude with assurance, as this attitude is not only the attitude of our own, but also is an attitude which is recorded in the decision by the three Powers.

There may be cases when a decision recently adopted loses its meaning when circumstances have changed. Perhaps the British and American Governments think that the decision adopted on August 1 is no longer valid now because conditions have changed. If that is so, let them state that then. If it is necessary to change the Berlin decision, then this should be done by the Heads of Government. We Ministers are not authorized to do that—at least, as far as I am concerned as the representative of the Soviet Government, I have no authority to change or revoke the decision which was adopted by the Heads of Government.

If we carried out the decisions and agreements which we signed, then our word will be trusted, both within our states and outside of them, but if we do not carry them out, then no one will trust us. It is impossible to imagine a sadder situation for the course of the maintenance of a lasting peace than this. As long as the agreement exists the Soviet Government will carry it out honestly and constantly, and the Soviet Government will regard it as their duty and obligation to carry out these agreements—as their duty and their obligation to their own people as well as to other allied nations. Only along this course shall we work for the sake of lasting peace in the world. I have finished.

Byrnes: I cannot refrain from saying a word with reference to the Berlin Agreement. That Agreement, in providing for the discharge of the duties of the Council members, said that it would be composed of the members representing those states which were signatories to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy states concerned. It said further that as regards the peace settlement with Italy, France should be regarded as a signatory of the terms of surrender for Italy. And then the Berlin Agreement provided that other members would be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion. Pursuant to that language this Council met, and on September 11 the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States adopted a resolution which reads, according to the Russian text handed me this afternoon, as follows: I .first read the English text of the agreement.

“All five members of the Council should have the right to attend all meetings and take part in all discussions, but in matters concerning peace settlements members whose Governments have not been “signatories to the relative terms of surrender should not be entitled to vote.”

That was not only an invitation which was authorized by the Berlin Agreement—it was a solemn agreement on the part of the Governments at this table. It was entered into by the Foreign Ministers of five Governments; it was lived up to for sixteen meetings. I agree with what Mr. Molotov says—I quote his words of a few moments ago, “If we carry out the agreements we make, our word will be trusted, but if we do not carry them out, no one will trust us.” I speak with regret, but I cannot refrain from speaking when my Government is charged with not living up to the Berlin Agreement.

Mr. Chairman, does any one know of any reason why this Council should continue longer?

Bevin: I don’t like to make the statement, but since we are charged with breaking the Berlin Agreement—we are parties to the Berlin Agreement, and we honor that Agreement. We are, as Mr. Byrnes just said, parties to a later agreement and decision of September 11. We honor that. Both of us honor that. I regret, I might have said it the wrong way at the meeting today, I regret, but I cannot accept the view that one government can withdraw from a decision, and therefore the decision is null and void. As Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, if I entered into that agreement on September 11 with other Foreign Ministers, and then I sought to go back on it in any way, there is only one course open to me in this country, and that is for me to resign. That is the obligation that would be imposed upon me. If I submitted to an ultimatum I should lose all respect in this country. Let me turn it around the other way. Supposing any other member government had proposed a resolution of that kind, and I accepted it—then I should have felt myself, during the whole meeting and in the future whatever consequences fell upon me, obliged to stand by it at all costs, and I can’t help believing that we are being placed in a very awkward position. As I said this afternoon that a good atmosphere would be helped if we recognised each other’s position. And in Great Britain this business of Parliamentary responsibility and of Cabinet responsibility and the Secretary of State acting for them is a very serious matter indeed. And I cannot see my way clear to agree to a thing one day, and then be told that I had broken the agreement because I had declined to go away from it. In my view the Berlin Decision gave the Council of Foreign Ministers a good deal of latitude to use common sense in our work, and it was not as rigid as the position now placed upon us.

In any case under the proposal, there were two proposals set before us, one from Mr. Molotov and one from Mr. Byrnes. There was a reasonable chance of compromise which would have met the Soviet position at the same time still within the framework of the Berlin Agreement give tremendous satisfaction to the claims that Mr. Byrnes has made for the people interested. And I thought that when the first point was raised there was a chance of an amicable settlement of this without destroying the resolution of September 11 or issuing ultimatums, but by applying our minds in such a way which would have found some agreement between the whole of the Governments represented here. Therefore, we feel the United Kingdom Delegation cannot leave the matter where it is. If it is impossible to get a settlement of this difficulty here about the procedure, the only course open to us is to reopen the whole question as Mr. Molotov has suggested. When the Potsdam Agreement was arrived at the war was still raging with Japan, there have been many developments since, and I personally thought on September 11, and indeed was gratified when no objection was raised to that resolution, because I thought there was a consciousness in the Council of the necessity in the light of world events to act as a Council. Therefore I had desired to make this declaration:

“The Head of the United Kingdom Government proposes to take up the matter of the preparation of the peace treaties with the other four Governments with a view to enabling the Council of Foreign Ministers to act as a Council and to arrange for a broader participation by interested governments.”

There are two Governments represented here who were not at Potsdam, and I feel that in the light of developments, and my Government feel that there ought to be a reconsideration of this difficulty. Especially as one Government has refused to carry out its agreement of September 11, and to have the whole process, the procedure and action necessary by this Council to be reviewed by the Heads of the Five Governments. With respect to the broader participation, the discussions we have had on Mr. Byrnes’ proposal for a conference indicates in my view a grave uncertainty as to where we stand even in the words “United Nations”. If there is a United Nations organization, what is it? There are several conditions—I am not saying what it is—conditions of dispute and difference arising in each case. If we have to submit the peace treaties, to whom do we submit them? There is no indication in the Berlin Agreement, except in the words “states chiefly interested”. There is no definition of that—whether it is purely belligerents which are “chiefly interested” or what it is. And in order to do the good work that the Council must do in the future, it is in the interests of the Council that this matter should be cleared. As the Heads of Government made the Agreement they should settle this matter in the proper manner, and to consider a broader participation by the representatives of the countries. This is the only contribution that I can make, and it is a unilateral one, that the British Government, whatever happens here, proposes to take that action. Of course, in the light of all our differences, if instead of the British Government’s taking this action, the Council of Foreign Ministers should agree to take it, I should be very happy, but I don’t ask this. Therefore, we felt that without asking anyone to join us we would declare that we intended to take this step.

Molotov: When I mentioned the fact that our decisions may be revised in spite of the fact that they were adopted at one of our meetings I referred to the decisions which had not been approved and which had not been signed, but I did not refer to the decisions signed by our Governments. And moreover I stated openly that such and such a decision adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers was in conflict with the decision adopted by the Heads of Government, and that therefore it could not be any longer valid. Under normal conditions the statements made by one of us to the effect that one of our decisions is in conflict with a decision between the Heads of Government leads to the necessity of its being revoked, and indeed we made more than once at following meetings amendments to the decisions adopted at our earlier meetings. I shall give an example of a case that occurred the day before yesterday when we changed one of our decisions.⁴¹ The four Delegations had agreed that there was an understanding reached concerning a definite decision on the repatriation of Soviet nationals. One of the Delegations subsequently stated that his understanding was different, and then one of the Delegates stated that his understanding was also different, and this was Mr. Bevin, who in reply to a statement made by Mr. Byrnes, said he had changed his mind.

Bevin: No—

Molotov: We did not insist on keeping the decision to which originally the four Delegations raised no objection, and only one Delegation raised it. Many examples may be cited of the cases when in the course of a conference as this, one has to change the decisions which have not been published and signed. This is a simple question.

But I must thank Mr. Bevin for his sincerity. He has made it clear now. He has explained the meaning of the proposal he made on September 11, and the proposal we originally accepted. The meaning of this proposal is that he considered this proposal to be the first step to alter the decision, the Berlin decision, but he did not say so when he suggested his proposal on September 11. But the fact itself is interesting and then that the British Government in the person of Mr. Bevin has made this statement—that the British Government stands for an abrogation of the Berlin decision. This question has not been raised before the Soviet Government in the past. It is only now that this question of the revision is being raised before the Soviet Government and is made public here in the presence of representatives of other governments. This constitutes a blow at our common agreement arrived at in Berlin, and can only serve to weaken the unity of the three powers which was observed in Berlin and in continuation of the course in which we had been engaged for four years. It is there that the meaning lies of what Mr. Bevin called this afternoon “the New Britain”. This should be made clear, because it is the first time that Mr. Bevin stated that the British Government was dissatisfied with the decision adopted two months ago and signed by the Heads of Government, and published throughout the world.

Bevin: This is the last time I will speak tonight—or this morning—but I can’t let misrepresentation go by. I did not go back on the decision about the Soviet nationals. I only questioned the draft protocol. In order to get agreement I did make a suggestion in regard to the drafting, which I did not press, but I did not go back on the decision. And to suggest that I went back on my decision is a wrong statement. There were three words Mr. Molotov wanted to take out, and I wanted to put them in. In regard to the Berlin decisions, I have stated on more than one occasion that I will observe them as long as they stand. In the course of this conference difficulties have arisen regarding which the Head of my Government proposes to consult other members, and what is wrong in stating it here quite frankly.

Furthermore, I have been willing in the discussion which has taken place to go through and finish the peace treaties on any basis in order to get peace, provided there was accord on the proposal that Mr. Byrnes put forward that I thought was reasonable. Everything is refused, and everything is rejected.

I put forward this proposal, and I am immediately charged with wrong motives and a desire to go back on decisions. What decisions, treaties and other things in this world, that as time goes on are not changed by mutual agreement. I mentioned that mistakes had been made that had to be changed. I don’t mind being approached on that basis. The Council could not go on unless we had an agreement. My concluding word is this: to ask you to do something is one thing—to tell you you must do something is another thing. And I want to ask for cooperation in this Council, and so does the party I represent. I am not wasting time in this Council, or raising points of order or anything at all, and I would like that to go on record. My reputation is based on the fact that once I have given my word, I never break it. And I stand on that now, and will always stand on that. And if this Council thinks I am wrong, no one will submit to that decision more readily than I.

Bidault: As Chairman of this meeting—the French Delegation has something to say, but I think the fact that I am the chairman makes it incumbent upon me to hear other delegations first. If no one wants to speak, I want to speak—I feel entitled to.

The position of the French Delegation is well known. I have often stated it, not only about the Potsdam decision but also concerning the agreement that was reached on the eleventh of September. The French Government had willingly accepted to participate in this conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the hope that in cooperation with the other governments it could work usefully for the preparation of peace. The first experience of this Council, although the Council reached some agreements, has not altogether been crowned with success, which the French Government deplores, perhaps more than any other. The French Delegation hopes that this experience which has not been altogether happy will not stop the great powers in their efforts for peace. And it is in this spirit that the French Delegation is ready to examine favorably any ideas for calling together with the great powers the other United Nations which have participated in the war and which always have approved any effort for international solutions, and solutions of justice, of solidarity.

Wang: I think whatever differences may exist between us tonight, we are conscious of the greatest responsibility which falls on the Council, and on the shoulders of everyone. The Chinese Delegation has no suggestion or contribution to make, but would favor that further efforts should be made to see if we can’t find a way out of this deadlock. Mr. Molotov suggested twice that a time should be set for the closing of the session, but his suggested proposals were not acted upon. May I suggest that the date of the closing of this session be set on Tuesday next,⁴² and we try to see whether in the next two days we can find a solution? If we agree on this suggestion, I shall leave the time of the calling of the meeting to the next chairman. I hope that Mr. Molotov and all my other colleagues will consent. The two days may not be fruitful, but in that case we will have only lost two days after the weeks we have been here.

Bidault: What is the opinion of the other members as to this suggestion made by the Delegate of China? Do we agree to have another meeting next Tuesday, or don’t we?

Wang: I suggested that if we agreed to have another two days, that the time of the calling of the Council be left to the next chairman.

Bidault: I am sorry I misunderstood. The proposal of the Delegate of China is therefore that we should fix a date for the closing of this Council and that it should be next Tuesday.

Bevin: I said I would not speak again, but I am as anxious as anybody in this room to see this Council a success, and as far as I am concerned, I am perfectly willing to spend tomorrow and through consultations see whether any solution might be found. Then the Council could wind up.

Bidault: Any objections?

Molotov: The Soviet Delegation has no objection to this proposal on the condition that all parties regard this as desirable, but the Soviet Delegation wishes to state once again that they ask not to be placed in such a position that would compel the Soviet Delegation to agree to the decision of September 11, which the Soviet Delegation regards as incorrect and conflicting with the Berlin decision.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, from what has been said, I do not think it would serve any useful purpose, but if the other members of the Council think they would like to spend the day here, I would like to spend the day here. Mr. Chairman, if a day could be spent, I think it might be well to meet tomorrow night or the next morning.

Bidault: The Council could meet tomorrow afternoon at a reasonable hour, say 5 o’clock.

Bevin: Would it be wise to leave the time open and try to get a settlement of this and to give us time for consideration later on to fix a definite time. Could it be left open?

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I think if we are going to stay, I think it would be well if we could announce a meeting at some time. I think it would be better to fix a time, even if we said nine o’clock unless called earlier by the Chairman.

Bevin: I suggest six.

(There was no objection)

The meeting adjourned.

38. For a list of participants at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, supra.
39. Apparently reference is to the report of the Protocol Committee, C.F.M.(45) 87, September 30, p. 508.
40. For the American minutes of the Council’s 16th meeting, September 21, see p. 371.
41. Molotov’s reference is presumably to the amendment of the Record of Decisions of the 12th meeting of the Council; the amendment was proposed by the British delegation and agreed upon in the course of the Council’s 27th meeting, September 29, 11:30 a.m.; see the American minutes of the 27th meeting, p. 441.
42. October 2.