Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

740.00119 Council/9–1145

United States Delegation Minutes of the Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, September 29, 1945, 3 p.m.⁸⁵

London, September 29, 1945, 3 p.m.

Mr. Wang in the Chair

Wang: The meeting is open. We will now discuss Article 16.

Molotov: I should like to ask that the following proposal of the Soviet Union should be discussed. I am going to read out the draft proposal: “Notwithstanding the decision of the Council of Ministers regarding the participation of the members of the Council adopted on September 11 in the drawing up by the Council of peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, only members of the Council who are or were under the Berlin Agreement deemed to be signatories to the surrender terms will participate unless and until the Council takes affirmative action under the Berlin Agreement in order to invite the participation of other members or governments directly concerned in them”.⁸⁶ I shall not dwell at length on the reasons for these proposals as I have already talked with each of the Foreign Ministers on this subject and we, all of us, know well that this proposal of the Soviet Delegation is prompted by the desire to place all the Foreign Ministers on equal footing on the questions which they discuss and decide, and on the other hand by the desire to give effect to the reservation contained in the Berlin decision. The proposal of the Soviet Delegation is prompted only by their desire to abide by the Berlin decision.

Bevin: I suggest that this be adjourned and we finish the protocol——

Wang: I think we proceed to the unfinished part of the protocol——.

Molotov: With respect to the proposal made by the Soviet Delegation, it is prompted by the fact that we are now discussing the records of our meeting and in one of them a decision is recorded which we challenge and which we suggest could be canceled. It is well known that the records of the meeting of September 11 contain a decision which the Soviet Delegation proposes should be changed and in view of the fact that we are now discussing the records we propose that we should settle it.

Bevin: The only discussion in the record is what we have agreed already.

Molotov: I want to distribute now the text of the proposal that I have now read and suggest that we adjourn for ten minutes in order to give ourselves the opportunity of familiarizing ourselves with it.

Bevin: I object—I object to this proposal. We were discussing the protocol before lunch and I object to this practice of jumping in with another proposal before we have completed the part we were on. I am quite willing to consider anything any delegation puts before us but when we are in the middle of considering another subject these things just waste time. I think it is a wrong attitude and I ask Mr. Molotov to be as fair to us as we have been to him. Every time we try to go on with our agenda or to leave a thing behind, every other delegation has agreed to it, and no objection. I do think an attempt to force us into this at this time is a wrong thing.

Wang: As the Chairman, I think Mr. Bevin’s suggestion is to finish the unfinished part of the proposal on the agenda and proceed to finish the other matter.

Molotov: I agree with the proposal made by the Chairman and Mr. Bevin and I make the following amendment to my proposal: I suggest we complete the examination of the records beginning with the twentieth meeting and proceeding further on and then when we have come to examine the records of the fifteenth [fifth?] and sixteenth meetings, which have not been agreed upon, I suggest we examine the first meeting, then coming to the fifth meeting and meeting sixteen.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I only want to offer a suggestion. Should we not continue to go through this record. If we reach any point that Mr. Molotov wishes to pass over for the time being, we will pass it, then go on through to dispose of the point. If Mr. Molotov wishes to go back and consider No. 1, No. 5 or No. 16, or whatever, it can be done.

Molotov: The Soviet Delegation does not object to continuing examination of the points which we have not yet completed, but the Soviet Delegation asks to bear in mind the fact that the Soviet Delegation will not be able to sign the record unless the question of changing one of the points recorded in the protocol in No. 1 has been considered.

[Here follows a discussion, begun at the previous meeting, of the records of decisions of the first 26 meetings of the Council as set forth in C.F.M. (45) 66, September 29, page 456. The Council amended and approved the Records of Decisions of the 20th Meeting, September 25, the 22nd Meeting, September 26, the 5th Meeting, September 15, and the 16th Meeting, September 21. For the texts of these Records of Decisions, see pages 359, 384, 186 and 298, respectively. Amendments agreed upon by the Council are indicated in annotations to the texts of the Records.]

Wang: Now we have finished the protocol. There are reservations on the protocol. The Soviet Delegation has asked for a discussion of the record of the first meeting.⁸⁷

Molotov: Now at last the time of the record of the first meeting has come.

Bevin: I take it that Mr. Molotov agreed that the document of the record of the first meeting was correct as to what was done. What we are asked to discuss now is not the first day’s record of the protocol but as to whether we will make a new decision for our future procedure.

Molotov: In other words we made a mistake and we want to put it right. That is the only thing that is required. As for myself, I am ready to admit that mistake. We have violated a decision of the Berlin Conference and we have no authority to do this as far as I am concerned.

Bevin: I want to be quite clear that this protocol actually goes to the governments exactly as it is up to this point.

Molotov: I hope that the English text of the proposal as well as the Russian text of the proposal has already been circulated to my colleagues.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to offer an amendment to the proposal of Mr. Molotov, adding to the second paragraph the following: I asked that it be distributed. The Council will convoke a conference under the provision of II 4 (ii) of the Berlin Agreement for the purpose of considering a treaty of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland consisting of the five members of the Council which also constitute the five (continues reading text⁸⁸).

Molotov: May I suggest—Mr. Byrnes has made a new proposal which will take some time to study. I appreciate that his proposal is worthy of the closest attention. His proposal is intended to include our work and its results, but I must say it is a new proposal that we have received and the Soviet Delegation is unable to give a reply without first studying it. And therefore the Soviet Delegation proposes that we first discuss the proposal submitted by the Soviet Delegation and then fix the date when we shall discuss the other proposal.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, the amendment which I have offered has two paragraphs—the first one is the amendment, a copy of which I gave Mr. Molotov yesterday.⁸⁹ The only new thing is the last 4 lines and those 4 lines say only this: “After full hearing and discussion by the invited states the final approval of the terms of the treaties of peace will be made by those of the invited states which were at war with the enemy states in question.” I asked that it be considered as an amendment; it would be impossible for me to consider the first proposal unless the second one is considered at the same time. Therefore, I suggest that the first paragraph be set for consideration on the same day that the second paragraph is set for consideration. Because there is a change I could not insist that Mr. Molotov consider it today, but we can fix some day next week when the two can be considered together.

Molotov: The Soviet Delegation must state that Mr. Byrnes has raised new questions in his so-called amendment and the Soviet Delegation is unable to reply without communicating with its Government.

Byrnes: The whole thing is a new question. If Mr. Molotov wants to communicate with his Government and if Mr. Molotov wants time to consider, it is entirely agreeable to me. I have only said that I want the two considered at the same time. They are the same proposal.

Molotov: It will be hardly possible to dispose of the question without my reporting personally to the Government.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I think it would be entirely proper if we adjourn until Mr. Molotov can communicate with his Government, then we can take the question up.

Bidault: The French Delegation desires to make a declaration: The French Delegation maintains and adheres to the procedure adopted in common at the Council of Foreign Ministers on the 11th of September, a procedure which can only be modified by the unanimity of the members of the Council. The French Delegation cannot express its opinion on any modification of an agreement reached without referring to its Government. It desires only to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the extreme seriousness and gravity of the question raised at the end of the session and to the consequences of a settlement on the continuation of our work. That is all.

Wang: Both of these proposals are new. The Chinese Delegation cannot agree to any change in the procedure adopted without consulting its Government.

Molotov: I am unable to express my observation on Mr. Byrnes’ proposal as a whole. I have already stated that I can do so only after my personally reporting to my Government on the subject, but I have a preliminary observation to make now. I consider that the proposal of Mr. Byrnes runs counter to the Berlin decision and it is based on the procedure of discussion of peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Finland different from that adopted in the Berlin decision. In as much as this proposal conflicts with the Berlin decision the Soviet Delegation cannot agree to accept it for consideration.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, the proposal I recently submitted does not conflict with any provision of the Berlin agreement. The Berlin agreement provides that the Council may convoke a formal conference of the states chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem. The only question, therefore, that could be raised at all is whether or not states invited would be states chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem. The problem presented is the making of a peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland, and I think all will agree that the provision that the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council participate is within the language in the intent of the Berlin agreement. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are charged with maintaining peace in the world and certainly they are chiefly interested in any peace settlement which they must hereafter protect. And another group invited to this conference would be European members of the United Nations and certainly the states of Europe that are members of the United Nations are interested in any settlement growing out of the second war because two world wars have proven to them that they are interested whenever a war starts in Europe. The third group are all non-European members of the United Nations which have supplied substantial military contingents against the European members of the Axis. I have no doubt in my mind that the Heads of Government who arrived at the Berlin agreement would say that the nations outside of Europe that gave up men to fight and die are interested in any settlement in Europe. And what do we offer them? Nothing more than the opportunity to come and be present at the final discussion with reference to a peace treaty. For it provides in the last paragraph that after hearing a discussion by the invited states the final approval of the terms of the treaties of peace will be made by those of the invited countries who were at war with the enemy states in question. No government will advocate that a settlement can be made between an enemy state and a United Nation and not submit the treaty to the states that were at war. What does the Berlin agreement say? It says the important task of this Council is to draw up what? To draw up with a view to their submission to the United Nations treaties of peace with Italy and these other governments. That is what the Heads of Government said the Council should do—to draw up treaties that could be submitted to the United Nations. That is all that my amendment seeks to do—to convoke a conference so that in accordance with the Berlin agreement the treaties that were drafted by the direction of this Council shall be submitted to the United Nations who were at war. Today in the minutes we were approving invitations to be extended to some nations to have an opportunity to come and present their views. Why not convene this conference and give to the nations that are chiefly interested an opportunity to come and sit with us and express their views about treaties that are to affect the lives of their peoples? I respect the views of the representative of the Soviet Government with reference to the Berlin agreement. On the 11th of September we agreed to ask the 5 members of the Council to participate though they could not vote as to these peace treaties. On Sept 22 he stated that he could not continue because he believed that it was a mistake on his part and that it was in violation of the Berlin agreement. The Berlin agreement authorized the Council to invite members but my good friend from the Soviet Republic says that he does not consider that the action on the 11th was an invitation and cannot see his way clear to do it now. In the course of that, I made this proposal. I submit that it does not violate the Berlin agreement and it would give us an opportunity to broaden the list of governments participating instead of narrowing it. And the people of many nations who are called upon to fight wars—they believe that those nations ought to have something to do with making the peace. Today the world is expecting us to act—is expecting us to reach an agreement, and we cannot leave this conference without reaching an agreement that will give the people of the world confidence in the settlement which is made.

Molotov: Mr. Chairman, in connection with the observations made by Mr. Byrnes I would like to say as follows: Mr. Byrnes raised the question of the peace treaties. This is worthy of being discussed and is in harmony with the Berlin decision. I have only stated that the Soviet Delegation would find it difficult to express their views until the question has been personally reported to the Government. I have not objected to convoking a conference which follows from paragraph 4 of the Berlin decision. I have only made a preliminary observation concerning the procedure for consideration of this question and I hold that the proposal made by Mr. Byrnes concerning the procedure is in conflict with paragraph 3 of the Berlin decision.

Will you please read the Berlin decision, items A and B? Under this decision the preparation of the peace treaties will be entrusted to definite states whereas Mr. Byrnes suggests differently. Under the Berlin decision a conference can be convoked, and is to be convoked, as well as the question of convoking the conference should be decided by those states who are engaged in the preparation of peace treaties and Mr. Byrnes suggests a different procedure which runs counter to that established by the Berlin decision. The Soviet Delegation holds that the question of convoking a conference should be decided by those states which are signatory to the surrender terms. Does not Mr. Byrnes agree with the fact that the question of convoking a conference should be decided by those states who are signatories of the terms of surrender? If Mr. Byrnes agrees with this then the Soviet Delegation associates itself with him. But if Mr. Byrnes suggests a different procedure, then the Soviet Delegation cannot participate in this question. I think that it has already been stated we have raised the question for discussion at the Council in as much as the question raised by Mr. Byrnes should be settled by the states who are signatories to the terms of surrender. I cannot offer advices to Mr. Byrnes since he knows the state of affairs as well himself, but if I could give advices to him then my only advice to him would be to withdraw this from discussion.

Byrnes: If I were asked to agree that the Berlin agreement would authorize the calling of the conference by the entire Council, I answer “yes”. Let me read the words of the agreement. “The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problems under consideration”—not the Council excluding one or two members, but the Council, which Council was established by the Heads of Government as composed of five members, it says “in some cases it may hold its own preliminary discussion prior to the participation of other interested states,” and it says, “in other cases the Council”—not part of the Council, or half of the Council, but the Council—“may convoke a formal conference of the states chiefly interested in seeing a solution of the particular problem.” Now the Berlin agreement does say in the paragraph to which my friend has called attention that in the preparation of treaties for instance, that the Council will be composed of members representing states that were signatory of the terms of surrender. Now the first paragraph should meet your proposal. Provision would be made for doing your preparation of the treaty—for preparing the treaty in accordance with the view which my friend has heard. The calling of the conference is an entirely different thing and when the Berlin agreement said the Council may convoke a conference of the chief states interested, no one certainly will contend that it is intended here by that language that the Council could invite states outside, yet could not ask its own members. And last of all certainly the Council could invite the five permanent members of the Security Council—the Council that will be charged with preserving the peace and what harm would it do to invite the permanent members of the Security Council and the members of this Council to sit in with a conference with a number of states that are interested in the peace settlements? I submit to my good friend that the Council call the conference and we are talking now about our friends—about those who are allied with us in winning this war and when we could fight in a common cause I can’t see why we can’t ask these United Nations who were at war in a common effort to make peace?

Molotov: I can go on. I want to reach an understanding on this question. There may be disagreement among us or we may hold different views, but there must not be any misunderstanding on what we have accepted together. Why does the Berlin Conference—Why did the Berlin Conference stipulate that the preparation of peace treaties should be entrusted to the states that were signatories to the terms of surrender? That seems to me to be clear. It is only the states that participated in the discussion of the surrender terms. Other states may be wiser but they have not participated in these discussions. The decision of the Berlin Conference was based on the assumption that the working out of peace terms should be entrusted to those states who took part in the preparation of the terms of the surrender. It will be difficult for those states to participate in the preparation of peace treaties which have not participated in the working out of surrender terms. They are not acquainted with many details and not through fault of their own it will be difficult for them to. Mr. Byrnes has agreed with my proposal to entrust the preparation of peace treaties to those states that are signatories to the surrender terms. I am grateful to him for his agreement. My opinion is that if we agree to entrust the preparation of peace treaties to those states that are signatories to the terms of surrender they must decide when the Conference should be convoked; that it will be very difficult for those states who have not participated in this preparatory work to decide the question of when and how the Conference should be convoked. We shall assign a very hard task to them if we make them responsible for the settlement of a question in the preparation of which they have not participated. To sum it up we have to reach an understanding as to who will be charged with the preparation of peace treaties. I base myself upon the understanding reached with Mr. Byrnes that this task should be assigned to the states who are signatories to the terms of surrender. If this is so then I think that the settlement of the question of when and what conference should be convoked for consideration of peace treaties should be settled by the Governments who have been engaged in the preparation of the peace treaties. That is why I suggest that the question raised by Mr. Byrnes be withdrawn from discussion at this meeting.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I want to clear up one matter: that is that the statement that I am agreeing to the proposal offered by Mr. Molotov. I thought I had made it clear I would not do it unless he agrees to the proposal that I have offered. I object to the consideration of the first proposal offered by him at any time unless at the same time my proposal is considered. I do not desire to prolong the discussion. I am entirely willing that the matter be deferred until tomorrow or to some time when Mr. Molotov would be disposed to discuss the second paragraph.

Bevin: Mr. Chairman, I almost made myself a promise during the week I would discuss procedure no more like the French Delegation, but I could not let this discussion go by without making just a couple of observations. As I understand Mr. Molotov stands strictly on paragraph A 3(2). When people put legality in such a tremendous position then compromises become very difficult. Whatever may be the legal view of those two paragraphs taken out of their context from all the others, the moral right of the decision on the eleventh stands out quite clear from all the discussion we have had this afternoon. But whatever our views may be about paragraph 3 I can’t help think Mr. Molotov was absolutely wrong with respect to the other paragraph with regard to convoking the conference. If we could agree that when it comes to the conference stage where it is a matter of finally settling peace, whether it comes under one set of treaties or another, when we get to that stage the Council I thought under the paragraph drawn up at Berlin could act; and therefore if there is a doubt about the legal aspect of paragraph 3 we might be able to resolve that; but to be asked to give way not only on 3 too but [if?] then you have taken all the powers away from the Council to convoke a conference, it seems to me to place us in a very difficult position at this time.

There seem to be three phases that must be cleared up for the future.

1) Is it the Council that has got the power to convoke the conference?

2) Should a conference be called? We agreed a conference should be called.

3) Should we finish the peace treaties under the strict legal definition—of the preparatory work—under A 3(2).

If that could be cleared up, I don’t know whether it can or not, I am not going to show how it can be done. I am merely going to pose it as I see it. We have followed the procedure for all these days until it is now decided to change it then I think it is reasonable that we should come to a conclusion so that this problem will not arise again. We can consult our Governments. I am better off than anybody. I can consult my Government here. That does not mean I will not get into difficulties when I do consult them.

Byrnes: In as much as we do not seem to be able to agree tonight I suggest that we might consider authorizing the Communiqué Committee to prepare a communiqué so far as the Council has agreed today on this record and then we adjourn until tomorrow afternoon at 3:00 to see if by that time we can agree.

Molotov: I want to answer the questions of Mr. Bevin. The first question is whether the conference should be convoked by the Council Yes, the conference should be convoked by the Council, if it is convoked as laid down by Article 3, paragraph 2. The second question is whether this Council should be convoked. This will be decided by the Council composed as indicated. The third question is whether the preparation of the peace treaty should be conducted in strict accordance with paragraph 3 of the Berlin decision and the answer is self-evident. Yes, it must be done in accordance with the Berlin decision as this constitutes our mutual agreement. The Soviet Delegation feels that the moral requires of us to carry out the decisions of our own.⁹⁰ If it is in accordance with the Berlin decision then the Soviet Delegation will participate in the further discussion of the question. A different view of this matter can serve only to repeating and deepening the mistake which was made.

Bidault: I have taken, Mr. Chairman, no share in the day’s discussion of the interpretation of the text about which I do not know under what conditions and to what extent they were adopted by the other members of our Council. The only rule to which I can associate is the one which is laid down by our decisions of the 11th of September. I insist on the extreme importance which the French Delegation attaches to the participation of peace in Europe. No alteration could be taken to our decision of the 11th of September—could be acceptable to us without the decision of our Governments—but I don’t know when the decision of the French Government can be taken. It is highly probable that by tomorrow morning that will not have taken place. For the time being the French Delegation cannot participate in the discussion—it does not consider itself authorized.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I renew my suggestion that in as much as we have gone through the minutes that we instruct the communiqué committee to go to work on the preparing the communiqué based on whatever has been agreed to this morning. Then if that were done then we could meet at 3:00 tomorrow afternoon. We could consider whatever that committee reports and we can at least finish that work—go as far as we can.

Molotov: I have another suggestion to make. I think the preparation of a communiqué should be proceeded with when the protocol has been made.

Byrnes: I agree then at the meeting tomorrow morning we can take up the protocol.

Molotov: Even in accordance with the decision of the 11th of September we ought to prepare several kinds of protocols—a protocol of three concerning the Balkan treaties, then the protocol of the four concerning the peace treaty with Italy, then a protocol of two concerning Finland, then a protocol of the five concerning all the remainder. It is not my fault that the decision of September 11 provides that not all the colleagues have equal rights in the Council of Ministers because some of them decide where others only discuss. We must carry out our decision of September 11. At least to the extent to which it does not run counter to the Berlin decision.

Bevin: I think this Conference ought to move from here to a musical hall and forget about the decision adopted.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I think really we ought to have the Protocol Committee meet. A mere statement of the differences—so that it is important that we should have this Committee meet because certainly we are not going to adjourn without making an effort to get together on the protocol. We have done so little that we ought to tell the world what has happened. The Protocol Committee could meet tonight. I think that, as my friend suggests, that the Protocol Committee can find a way of stating that it is thought desirable as to certain matters only certain members of the Council vote on it but I don’t know that I would seriously urge having three of [or] four protocols. We could put in one protocol just what the facts are. My recollection is that at Berlin the Communiqué Committee met along with the Protocol Committee and this saved a lot of time. Let us appoint members if we have to. They could meet tonight so that they could give us something to do tomorrow.

Wang: We shall put it that the Protocol Committee and the Communiqué Committee shall meet together. I suggest that the Deputies meet tomorrow at 10:00 to complete their work.

Molotov: May I speak? I feel that the protocol must be signed by the respective ministers. Am I right in my understanding? Is that acceptable for that purpose? Then we must indicate the names of those who were present at the deliberation and the protocols must be signed as regards Finland by two, as regards the Balkans by three, as regards Italy by four, and as regards the remaining questions by five ministers.

Bevin: I think the protocol should be drawn up and we should consider the problem of signing tomorrow.

Molotov: The Soviet representative will be guided by the observation I have just set forth.

Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, may I understand if they could meet then we could think over how it should be signed whether if the protocol noted that only Great Britain and the Soviet Republics participating in the vote in regard to the treaty with Finland then we can decide when the United States signs except as for items numbers so and so on which it did not vote.

Bevin: I suggest the text of the protocol be drawn up and then we discuss the methods of presentation to the Governments tomorrow.

Molotov: I have found it necessary to make known the view of the Soviet Government.

(It was decided that the Communiqué and Protocol Committees should meet that evening at 10:00 and the Deputies the following morning at 10:30 and the Council the following afternoon at 3:00.)

The meeting adjourned.

85. For the list of participants at this meeting, see Agreed Record of Decisions of the 28th meeting, supra.
86. For the full text of the Soviet proposal as circulated to the Council, see C.F.M. (45) 83, September 30, p. 474.
87. Record of Decisions of the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, September 11, annex 1 to C.F.M. (45) 66, September 29, p. 458.
88. For the full text of the United States proposal, see C.F.M. (45) 84, September 30, p. 475.
89. For text of the proposal by the Secretary of State, September 28, handed to Molotov on that date, see p. 438.
90. The British record of this meeting (not printed) contains the following version of this sentence: “M. Molotov added that as regards the morality of this decision, the Soviet Delegation felt that morality required them to carry out the decisions of the Berlin Conference.” (Council of Foreign Ministers Files: Lot M–88: CFM London Minutes)