740.00119 Council/9–2645
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
| Participants: | The Secretary |
| Mr. Dunn | |
| Mr. Bohlen | |
| Mr. Molotov | |
| Ambassador Gusev | |
| Mr. Pavlov | |
| Mr. Bevin | |
| Sir Ronald Campbell | |
| Mr. Dixon | |
| Mr. Payton-Smith |
The Secretary said he had asked for this meeting to have another discussion in regard to the question of procedure. He said President Truman had told him that he had had a message from Marshal Stalin33 in which the latter fully supported the position taken by Mr. Molotov; however, President Truman was of the opinion that it would be unfortunate if the Council should suddenly reverse its procedure and hoped something could be worked out here. The Secretary added that he felt that since our Three Heads of State had been unable to agree on this, it was up to the Foreign Ministers here to try and find a way out. He would therefore like to know if Mr. Molotov had any suggestions.
Mr. Molotov replied that his suggestion remained the faithful execution of the Berlin agreement. He said he wanted to add that his Government had been greatly surprised at the attitude of the United States and British Governments in regard to the control commission for Japan. He said his Government wondered whether their representatives in Japan were needed any longer, and whether they should not be recalled.
The Secretary replied that last Saturday when Mr. Molotov had talked to him about a treaty he had explained to him as he understood it, the present situation in regard to Japan. He said that he had already repeated a number of times that he had no authority to take any decision in regard to Japan at the Council of Foreign Ministers; that he did not have the necessary experts or materials here, and that he did not contemplate attempting to get President Truman’s views during this session. He added, however, that he had made it plain that he would be glad again to discuss in full with Mr. Molotov the entire Japanese question.
Mr. Molotov replied that he had not posed a formal question, but that they were unable to understand why it was impossible to discuss this question during this meeting. He inquired whether or not the one to two billion dollars of gold which the newspapers said the Americans had found in Japan had anything to do with this situation.
[Page 382]The Secretary replied that he had never heard of any such gold, and that Mr. Molotov should know from his experience with Americans that if any gold or similar valuables were taken by the United States forces in Japan a strict accounting would be made of it.
Mr. Molotov replied that in Europe they had had an understanding about the disposal of German gold.
The Secretary repeated that he had felt he had explained our point of view to Mr. Molotov, but would be glad to talk with him further.
Mr. Bevin remarked that in regard to Japan the British Government had no objection to discussing the question of the control council, but it had not wished to do so within the narrow limits of the present Council since some of the Dominions, and in particular, Canada and Australia, who were Asiatic powers, had made strong representations concerning their right to participate in any such talks.
The Secretary added that in regard to Mr. Molotov’s statement about making Japanese soldiers prisoners, that in Article VIII of the Potsdam Declaration which was signed by the U.S., China, and Great Britain, and subsequently adhered to by the Soviet Government, and which in fact had formed the basis of Japanese surrender, it was expressly stated that the Japanese troops should be demobilized and allowed to go home. He said that he must state that the United States considered itself bound by that provision.
Mr. Molotov said the Soviet Union had agreed to the Potsdam Declaration, but there had been subsequent instruments, namely, Order No. 1, and the Act of Capitulation, which he felt had equal, if not greater, validity. He said the actual terms of surrender were more severe than in the case of Germany, and that in taking the Japanese prisoners in Manchuria, the Soviet Government felt that they were supporting and not violating these agreements.
The meeting then turned to the question of procedure.
The Secretary read his informal proposal (copy attached), and added that, although he had not put it in writing, he envisaged that the three Foreign Ministers of the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. could meet either before or during the Conference in accordance with the provisions of the Berlin Agreement and discuss a common position in regard to these treaties. He pointed out that paragraph 5 of his proposal suggested a conference of all nations at war with the respective satellite countries for consideration of the treaty. He felt that this should be done, since we were obligated to submit these treaties to all such states in any case, and it would be better to do it once and for all in a conference. He said he had not put that in writing as he did not wish to emphasize the special position of the Big Three.
Mr. Bevin said that he had not had time to study this, but that he thought it had merit. He also agreed that it was a mistake to emphasize publicly in any way the position of the Big Three.
[Page 383]Mr. Molotov said he would study the proposal.
Before leaving, Mr. Molotov again reverted to the question of Japan, and asked whether there was any point in the Soviet Union’s leaving its representatives in Japan at the present time. He said he had in mind General Derevyanski34 who had signed the surrender for the Soviet Union and had stayed on in Japan.