Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

740.00119 Council/9–1145

United States Delegation Minutes of the Twentieth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, September 25, 1943, 11 a.m.

London, September 25, 1943, 11 a.m.

M. Bidault in the Chair

Bidault—The first point on the agenda is the formula regarding repatriation¹⁶ which was discussed yesterday.

Molotov—Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that we have been anxious to discuss the question raised by the Soviet Delegation yesterday, whether there should be placed on the agenda the question of the establishment of control machinery in Japan.

Bidault—As far as I remember the decision taken was that the question would be examined at some later date, and I am not sure that we have fixed a date.

Molotov—The decision was that this question of the control machinery should be discussed now at the beginning of this meeting and then we will pass to the question of the draft resolution on the repatriation of nationals. I have that draft here and it is being translated into English.

Bidault—It seems to me that we have no objection to that proposal since the only decision taken was that we should discuss this at some later date which means any day following yesterday’s discussion.

Molotov—Then I suggest that we now pass to the resolution on the question of the repatriation of Soviet nationals and afterwards turn to the discussion whether we are to place on the agenda the question of the control machinery.

Bidault—The French Delegation will circulate a memorandum on the question we discussed yesterday.

Molotov—The Council of Foreign Ministers takes note of the statement made by the British and French and American Delegations to the effect that all necessary measures will be taken to accelerate the repatriation of these nationals and to facilitate the accomplishment of this task.¹⁷

Bidault—Is it the draft which was read yesterday?

Molotov—That is right.

Bidault—At that time the French Delegation read a paragraph which they proposed to introduce and which is exactly parallel to that read: “The Council takes note of the declarations made by the Soviet Delegation that the Soviet Government will take the necessary measures to speed up the repatriation of French citizens in particular Alsatians and Lorrainians.”¹⁸

Molotov—I think that this is another matter which cannot be compared with the question raised by the Soviet Delegation. As to the question raised by the French Delegation, it is for us to find who fought with arms in their hands against the Soviet armies. Our proposal deals with another matter, and I therefore propose that we examine the Soviet proposal and then turn to the question raised by the French Delegation.

Bidault—With regard to the French, we see no objection that the two subjects be combined, since it is a question involving righting under pressure, as was the case in other circumstances in other countries, and we must insist that the French proposal should in any case be included in the final communiqué of the Conference, but I do not insist that there should be full parallelism.

Molotov—I should like to ask that the question raised by the Soviet [French?] Delegation be discussed tomorrow because we will need to acquire some information from Moscow as regards the details.

Bidault—With regard to the French Delegation, we feel too that it is very important that there should be reciprocity. In my opinion the agreements should be discussed simultaneously, and we have information to supply right away, but I know for certain there is an important number of French citizens from Alsace-Lorraine. I wish that at least the principle should be included in our agreement, and that there should be some formula in these agreements as regards citizens from Alsace-Lorraine.

Molotov—The question raised by the French Delegation is the question of the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine and calls for a special study, because this question is not covered by the terms of the Franco-Soviet Agreement. I raise this question as it was covered by the French-Soviet, Soviet-American and Soviet-British agreement. I have no objection that we look into this question raised by M. Bidault, but it would be well for us to wind up one question and to give us twenty-four hours to obtain the necessary data required by the question raised by the French Delegation.

Bidault—I am afraid that I cannot agree with M. Molotov as there was the agreement signed on June 29, 1945 regarding all Soviet and French citizens. I raised no difficulty today as regards the definition of Soviet citizens and I had never heard it mentioned that there was any question of the definition of French citizens. I could not think that acts of Hitler in the case of French citizens would ever be perpetuated by Allied Governments.

Molotov—I am not raising the question of what French nationals are and I think it is not proper here to discuss such questions in the Council of Foreign Ministers, but it is one matter when nationals are concerned who served in the Allied forces and it is another matter when nationals are concerned who served the German armed forces. The Soviet Government is prepared to view the question raised by the French Delegation with sympathy, but it is necessary for us before we try to discuss this question to obtain certain information, and therefore we suggested that the question raised by the French Delegation be discussed tomorrow. As to the question raised by the Soviet Delegation, this question has been fully discussed, and I think we should continue it today.

I should like to ask that we not put off the question of repatriation of Soviet nationals, as the facts prove its urgency. I am now in possession of these new facts: in a town in Algiers, the commander of a battalion selected 36 Soviet nationals and sent them to serve in a replacement center in Shansi for transportation further into China.¹⁹ I wonder if such facts can be passed by in silence and whether we could afford to postpone putting an end to these intolerable facts.

Bidault—I don’t want to prolong this dispute or to add anything to it so far as I am concerned. We also have some information as regards a number of events, but since I do not wish to continue this—what I want to say is that the case of French citizens from Alsace-Lorraine should be examined, and that the legitimate feeling of those who wish to go home should be taken into account. This is also valid for any other country. Although this question is important, I agreed that examination of this matter should be postponed until tomorrow, then the Council will be in a position to examine the situation, and it will have in its hands the information received. May I say in conclusion that the position of the French Delegation is final, and I wish to give you the proof of our good will and our desire for understanding in the matter of so much importance to us.

Molotov—I am grateful to Monsieur Bidault.

Bevin—I would accept the resolution if a few words were added: in the third line after the words “governments will” add the words “continue to take”.

Molotov—I agree.

Bevin—In the last line but one, I could agree with “the repatriation of Soviet nationals and to facilitate by mutual agreement the conditions of carrying out that task”.

Molotov—I agree.

Bevin—I would also circulate before the Conference breaks up and get in all the figures I have received concerning the situation in Germany, Britain and other parts; and, in view of the proposal yesterday, I take the opportunity of circulating this. In regard to Vlassov’s men—I submitted the question of this only a few days ago when the matter was submitted—I raised it with the military, and I understand that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington are affected with this question and I am awaiting their reply with respect to the transfer of these men. And I am asking for an expediting of the situation.

Byrnes—I have no objection to the two amendments offered by Mr. Bevin. Yesterday I stated our position in reference to this matter, and I do not want to agree to the proposal of the Soviet Delegation without an understanding of what it means. We have frankly stated our difficulties to the repatriation of Soviet nationals. Now in this paper there is nothing to indicate our view as stated yesterday. It would serve no good purpose to agree to something that might be the cause of misunderstanding in the future. For instance, the words that disturb me are the words “Soviet nationals” without a statement showing the difference of opinion expressed at this table. That does not mean that the United States accepts the definition contended for by the Soviet Delegation as to what constitutes a Soviet national. The fact is there was no meeting of minds on that question. And therefore the paper, which purports or is meant, or can be construed thereafter, as a meeting of minds when there was no meeting of minds would only cause irritation between us. I have stated my willingness and my desire to straighten that out through diplomatic channels, and have asked for a copy of the treaty between the Soviet Government and Poland. When it is received, we will try to find some way of arriving at a settlement of some of the perplexing questions. In order to avoid misunderstanding I have to observe that after the word “repatriation” in line 4 there should be added “all persons considered by their governments to be”, so that it is agreed that it means the repatriation of persons considered by their governments to be nationals.

Molotov—I think that the proposal made by Mr. Byrnes has been prompted by some misconception. If the American Government agrees to discuss with the Soviet Government the question of what constitutes an American national, then we shall agree to discuss with the American Government the question of what constitutes Soviet nationals. Such questions are decided only on the basis of reciprocity. I suggest that we should not discuss this question, but that we should strictly be guided by the agreements which were concluded between the Soviet Union and Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States, and between the Soviet Union and France. As to the remaining question, that should be taken up through diplomatic channels.

Bevin—This is a preliminary thought, and I only make the suggestion: this difficulty of Poland and the Eastern line—I am very much in the same position as Mr. Byrnes, and I am also in the same difficulty with the Polish army and so on. It is not a clear-cut line. This transfer of people is a difficult problem, and it is also difficult for Britain which has always given all people the right of asylum. We did it in the days of the Tsars, when we gave refuge to Russian citizens here who later became leaders of Soviet Russia, and I do want to be careful what we do; and therefore I wondered, Mr. Byrnes, if we get to settle this point of what is a Soviet citizen through diplomatic channels, we are not discussing Soviet citizens proper, on which everybody is agreed, but only those from disputed territory and the claims of other governments upon us in this matter with whom we are in discussion now. Could you say therefore if the thing were pursued, as I understood we agreed, through diplomatic channels we ought to get over this business providing we could say something to the world that would safeguard us on this point. Mr. Molotov has objected to that and regards it as a challenge. Supposing, for instance, we decide to send a person back from Great Britain who did not want to go back and who claimed that he was not a Soviet national; he can take us to the courts and we will be in a difficulty. At least if something can be said that would be a determination as to the people coming within the category for repatriation, as mention of pursuing it through diplomatic channels I think it would help us.

Molotov—I should like to make it clear that Mr. Byrnes has raised a complex question and I should like to say that we should not pursue the question now. I continue by citing an example: take for instance Sweden. This country recognizes as Soviet nationals the inhabitants of Lithuania, Latvia, and Soviet citizens of the Ukraine and White Russia. There may be one point of view regarding this in Great Britain and another point of view in some other country friendly to ours. But I think that we should not go deep into this and other questions connected with the question under discussion. I suggest that all these questions should be taken up through diplomatic channels.

Molotov—That being so, permit us to turn to the question raised by the Soviet Delegation as to the question of the establishment of the controls—

Control Machinery for Japan

Bidault—Yesterday we discussed whether the question of the establishment of an Allied control commission will be put on the agenda.

Byrnes—Yesterday I stated that we ought to have an agreement to refer some subjects to the Council of Ministers for consideration and stated further there could be added matters upon which the Council was agreed—that the Governments were agreed—that this matter is one which was not included in the agenda, which I made no preparation to consider, which my Government has not agreed to put on the agenda, and therefore I am not going to discuss its being placed on the agenda; for placing the matter on the agenda pre-supposes action, and I am not prepared to discuss the matter, and therefore any action taken upon it at this meeting.

Molotov—Mr. Byrnes is right when he says that we should put questions on the agenda by our mutual agreement. This is what I am asking for, I am asking for this mutual agreement to place this question on the agenda. But I feel that the reservation entered by Mr. Byrnes is not fully justified. Mr. Byrnes asserts that if we place a certain question on the agenda that will presuppose an action, a decision, but I do not feel that by placing on this agenda we would have to accept some detailed decision on the question. We could well discuss this question and then continue its discussion later, but in my view this question is much more urgent than all the questions on the agenda we are discussing now. Yesterday Mr. Byrnes inquired whether we read the statement made by President Truman concerning the policy toward Japan. But yesterday I had to say that I had not read that statement. Now I am able to state that I have read the statement. Mr. President has made a statement on the policy of the United States of America toward Japan, but I wonder what happens if tomorrow, for instance, Mr. Attlee, then General de Gaulle, and perhaps in a day or two Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek or Generalissimo Stalin makes a similar statement. It may well happen there will be a difference of opinion in their statements, and I wonder if that will be a good thing. It may be that the American Government have consulted, say the Government of Great Britain, the Government of China, in drawing up this statement; but the Soviet Government have not been consulted by anyone, and consequently we are not bound by any common policy toward Japan. The question arises of the sort of policy being pursued now toward Japan—whether this is the policy of the Allies or is it a different policy that is being pursued irrespective of the views and wishes of other Governments. We have agreed views as regards the policy being pursued toward Japan. I have in mind the Order No. 1 issued by General MacArthur after consultation with the Soviet and other Governments.²⁰ We have also the act of surrender of Japan signed also by the Soviet Government and other Governments, and these acts constitute a good basis for an agreed policy toward Japan. If we compare the act of surrender for Germany signed on the 8th of May with the act of surrender of Japan,²¹ of the Japanese armed forces, we shall see that the act of surrender for the Japanese armed forces refers to the surrender of the Japanese forces to the Allies in more definite terms. Nevertheless, when the act of surrender for Germany was being carried out, German troops were taken prisoner by the Allies, whereas in Japan when the act of surrender was being put into effect the Japanese armed forces were not taken prisoner by the Allies. Only the Soviet armies took the Japanese armies prisoner in the territories which they had taken. I have said that there are two basic acts concerning the surrender of Japan. The first is the Order No. 1 of General MacArthur, and the second is the act of surrender for Japan. In virtue of these two acts, the Allied Commander-in-Chief is obliged to take the Japanese officers and soldiers prisoner, but it is only the Soviet armies that are doing this whereas the Allied armies for some reason have not done the same, and I think that we ought to carry out what we all have decided. The Japanese soldiers and officers have been returned to their homes, but they constitute a ready and trained military force. The Japanese guard ammunition dumps, but they are not our friends to whom we can entrust this. The Japanese openly say that they are keeping big steel industries, and civil aviation. The Americans do not close them. The Japanese continue to maintain large numbers of gendarmerie and police and no one is interfering with this. The Soviet Government has fears that such a situation is dangerous, that it is likely to lead to the renewal of the Japanese aggression in the near future. The Soviet Government cannot bear the responsibility for this situation before the public opinion of the world.

That is why the Soviet Delegation asks that this question be placed on the agenda at the present series of meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, that it be not postponed, that it be examined. In this connection we suggest that we should discuss here the establishment of a control council in Japan composed of Allied representatives. We practically suggest the same as was suggested in the Memorandum of the British Government which was sent to the Soviet and the United States Governments about four weeks ago.²² The Soviet Delegation suggests that this question be placed on the agenda, not necessarily today, but after the discussion of all other questions has been completed, and I hope that Mr. Byrnes will be no less informed in regard to these questions than any one of us.

Wang—The Chinese Delegation were much interested yesterday in listening to the Soviet proposal to place questions relating to the control of Japan on the agenda of the present conference of Foreign Ministers and to the comments made by other delegations on it. Our own view is that in principle they see no difficulty in endorsing the proposal since it is their understanding that the Council of Foreign Ministers is competent to discuss any question which may be agreed upon by its members.

The questions relating to the control of Japan during the period of military occupation are certainly of great importance to peace and security in the Far East. At the same time, the Chinese Delegation realize that these questions are of wide range and complex in character. We are of the opinion that whether the conference of Foreign Ministers at this stage of its work can give them its full attention and whether it would be more advisable to take them up for discussion at another session, require careful consideration. We have no objection, however, to the questions being considered at this session if all the other delegations favor it.

In regard to the situation in Japan, the Chinese Delegation believe that the conditions under which General MacArthur has been working to carry out his mission are exceedingly difficult. He has to disarm an army of considerable size which remained intact at the time, and this task is still under way, though good progress has already been achieved. We share the view of the Soviet Delegation that the principal Allied Powers must take such political, economic, financial and other measures in Japan as will bring about the complete annihilation of Japanese militarism and the creation of conditions which would eliminate every possibility of a new aggression on the part of Japan. We were gratified to hear at Monday’s meeting a reaffirmation of this aim in the instructions of President Truman to General MacArthur referred to by Mr. Byrnes, although we on our part had entertained no doubt about it. For it was clearly outlined in the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, addressed to Japan by China, the United States and the United Kingdom, and subscribed to by the Soviet Union.²³

But to achieve this purpose calls for the formulation of policies and devising of measures based upon the principles enunciated in the Declaration. This task can be best accomplished by an Allied body composed primarily of the Powers which played a leading part in the war with Japan. Normally this body should be established in Japan. But in view of the special conditions under which the Allied military occupation of Japan has been effected and the fact that the disarming of the Japanese army in Japan has not yet been completed, the Chinese Government readily accepted the proposal of the United States Government to set up an Allied advisory body in Washington for the purpose. This acceptance was prompted by a desire to try a new experiment of Allied cooperation in the case of Japan in view of the problems confronting the inter-Allied Control Commission in the case of Germany.

This is, however, without prejudice, in the view of the Chinese Government, to the adoption of a new course of action if experience in the future should point to such a need. For this reason, the Chinese Government desires to see the aforesaid inter-Allied advisory body set up as soon as possible in order that inter-Allied consultations on necessary measures of various kinds, such as political, economic, financial, etc., could be put into effect without delay. The results of such a procedure can be reviewed from time to time to determine whether it serves the united aim and purpose upon which the Allied Powers have agreed in regard to Japan, or whether a different type of control machinery should be set up in its place.

Bidault—Any further comments? The question is whether this matter will be placed on the agenda.

Bevin—I am not in a position to give an answer. I am opposed to putting it on the agenda in view of the difficulties that have arisen in regard to procedure. The other countries affected would be excluded.

Molotov—How are we to find a way out, and to safeguard concerted policy of the Allies toward Japan? It seems to me that we have got to do our best to have a concerted policy toward Japan. My understanding of the statement made by the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs was that China is in sympathy with the proposal that this question be included on the agenda in this series of meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and I want to recall that China and the Soviet Union are nearest to Japan and we are interested in this question, and we are anxious to see that this question be agreed upon between the Allies. Is it really impossible to achieve this, and is it really possible that any question of procedure may interfere with it?

Wang—The Chinese Delegation has no objections to taking this up at this session if all the delegates are in favor of this.

Bidault—As regards the French Delegation, I have already stated that it will not intervene in questions of procedure, and therefore we adopt the same attitude as the Chinese Delegation. I do not object to placing any question on the agenda, including the one now before us. The Council is sovereign in the matter of its agenda, but naturally this takes mutual agreement, and therefore we have to determine whether such agreement exists. Personally I have some doubts about this.

Molotov—What shall we state to the press with regard to the discussion on this question.

Bevin—Nothing.

Molotov—We shall keep it secret? The question is whether everybody agrees to this.

Bidault—There is a committee to decide what goes in the communiqué.

Byrnes—I thought that communiqués were to be limited to decisions or announced decisions. I think it ought to rest with the Communiqué Committee to consider the question of whether to include in the communiqué an announcement of a discussion on whether a question should go on the agenda. Mr. Chairman, as I first said, I believe that the press committee is responsible for deciding what should appear in the communiqué.

Bidault—It goes without saying that this should be done.

Molotov—I agree with any recommendation that may be made by Mr. Byrnes.

Byrnes—On what subject?

Molotov—On whether anything will be mentioned in the communiqué or not.

Byrnes—I have in mind that the Communiqué Committee will consider this without interrupting our consideration of matters on the agenda. The agenda does not show at this stage any discussion by the Communiqué Committee. It has several items and should be considered in the order in which they appear. I cannot agree for a change of the agenda to hear a Communiqué Committee at this time, but will be glad to when the time arrives.

Bidault—That was decided. We are to pass on to Paragraph 7 on Austria, or shall we do this at the afternoon’s meeting?

Bevin—Is there any report on Austria?

Bidault—There has been no meeting of the Deputies this morning. I ask that this question be examined at this afternoon’s meeting. The meeting adjourned.

16. Molotov’s formula regarding the repatriation of Soviet citizens is included in the minutes of the 19th meeting of the Council, p. 349.
17. As circulated in the Council as C.F.M.(45) 51, September 25, 1945, the draft resolution by the Soviet delegation entitled “Acceleration of the Repatriation of Soviet Nationals” read as follows: “The Council of Foreign Ministers take note of the declaration of the United Kingdom, French and United States Delegations that their Governments will take all necessary steps to accelerate the repatriation of Soviet nationals and to facilitate conditions for the accomplishment of this task.” (Council of Foreign Ministers Files: Lot M–88: CFM London Documents)
18. According to the British minutes of this Council meeting (not printed), the proposed French resolution regarding French nationals in Soviet hands read as follows: “The Council takes note of the statement by the Soviet Delegation that the Soviet Government will take all necessary measures to accelerate the repatriation of French nationals, including those from Alsace and Lorraine.” (Council of Foreign Ministers Files: Lot M–88: CFM London Minutes)
19. According to the British minutes of this Council meeting (not printed), Molotov said, “Thus, in Algeria the Commander of a Battalion had selected 36 Soviet nationals to be sent to a Replacement Centre for onward passage to Indo-China.” (Council of Foreign Ministers Files: Lot M–88: CFM London Minutes)
20. Regarding General Order No. 1, see footnote 89, p. 338.
21. For texts of the acts of military surrender for Germany signed at Rheims, May 7, 1945, and at Berlin, May 8, 1945, see Department of State Bulletin, July 22, 1945, pp. 106–107. For facsimile of the instrument of surrender for Japan, signed in Tokyo Bay, September 2, 1945, see ibid., September 9, 1945, pp. 364–365.
22. For text of the British proposals for post-surrender control of Japan, see aide-mémoire from the British Embassy, August 30, vol. vi , section under Japan entitled “Surrender of Japan …”, Part I.
23. For text of the proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan, approved by the heads of Government of the United States, China, and the United Kingdom, July 26, 1945, and later subscribed to by the Soviet Union, see Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. ii, pp. 1474–1476.