Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

740.00119 Council/9–1145

United States Delegation Minutes of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, September 21, 1945, 4 p.m.

London, September 21, 1945, 4 p.m.

Mr. Bevin in the chair

Balkan Governments

Bevin wished to say a few words on this problem and first of all in regard to Greece. Whenever there had been differences in the Council of Foreign Ministers, the illustrations of Greece had already been brought in. He pointed out that in Greece there was no censorship. The leader of the Communist party had recently held a great meeting, had advocated civil war in that country, and was allowed to do it.⁴⁴ The British had tried with their advice and that of France and the United States to get free elections in Greece. Unfortunately Greece had not been allowed to settle down because of agitation directed from outside the country in the hope he supposed that other governments would be led to change their policy. There would be no change of policy. Greek elections would be free and there would be free speech and a free press. He did not pretend that the Greek Government was representative in the sense of having been elected. It was a caretaking Government to see the elections through. As they had had a care-taking Government in Great Britain followed by very satisfactory results, he hoped that they would have the same results in Greece.

Turning to Rumania the British Delegation felt just as Mr. Byrnes did on this question. They felt that this was a government that was created and that it was impossible that it could conduct free elections. Mr. Molotov had said he wanted a government friendly to Russia but Mr. Bevin did not suppose Mr. Molotov would say he wanted a government subservient to Russia alone. Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Molotov had been very frank in their discussion that morning and he used the word subservient not to make accusations but because that was what people felt and he thought it better to be clear in these matters.

It seemed to be the fate of these Balkan states to get into difficulties which caused differences between large states and that was something that they must avoid at all costs now. They all accepted the view that there should be governments in these states friendly to Soviet Russia but he assumed also that they should be friendly to their neighbors and to all the United Nations. Being friendly to one did not mean being unfriendly to the others. Therefore their conduct must be such that it would not create suspicion between large states. The documents he had read and the speeches that morning led him to believe that the situation was that the governments of these countries, even if accepted as friendly by one government were such that other governments found they could not believe in their sincerity and that it was impossible to accept them as signatories to a treaty or, he supposed, consider that they could qualify to enter the United Nations. Knowing the opinion of at least three of the powers was it possible for the Council of Foreign Ministers to demonstrate its statesmanship to the world and find a solution to this problem which would inspire general confidence. The problem was simple. The Soviets wanted a government there which would not threaten its security, and [which would] carry out the armistice and be friendly to the Soviet Union without intrigue or menace to the Soviet Union interests. Other governments felt that having regard to the Yalta decisions, that these governments would not fulfill the understanding arrived at at that meeting. He asked if their purpose was to secure some machinery or whether it was to arrive at a solution and to remove this problem for all time.

Bidault said that he had derived one advantage from their various differences. He learned a lot here. There had been an exchange of letters at San Francisco about which France had known nothing. The meeting had shown France that there had been an agreement on a subject in which France had not taken part.

In Rumania a special diplomatic situation was reserved for France on which he did not want to insist here but it was not the same as that of the other states represented at the conference. He did not wish to enter into a discussion of the political character of such and such a government. What was important and, as in the case of France, was that there should be elections and that they should take place in such conditions that they could not be questioned. He agreed with Mr. Byrnes that they should proceed on the basis of the tripartite agreement. In February 1945 a conference had met in the Crimea. In paragraph 5 of the agreement at that conference a communication had been addressed to the French Government inviting it to associate itself with the Declaration on Liberated Europe.⁴⁵ The French Government asked for information as to the means by which the states concerned would implement these decisions. He remembered that when he had signed the French reply it had been in the affirmative, but France had received no reply to its letter.⁴⁶ Although this decision had been taken without France, they accepted it. He thought a solution might be found in the frank statements made in the debate. That was why he asked them to recall the Yalta Declaration which he proceeded to read.

Point c said that the three governments would assist the peoples of the liberated states to form democratic internal governments. Point d said that they would facilitate the holding of elections. France had been asked to associate itself with this and the answer was in the affirmative and it would not be withdrawn. He hoped that on the basis of the Yalta Declaration they could settle the problem of the governments of those states.

Molotov said the Soviet Delegation recommended the statements made by Mr. Bevin and M. Bidault.

Bevin asked if they could proceed to give effect to the suggestion he had made. Was there any proposal for any steps that should be taken to attain the object they desired.

Molotov said that so far as Greece was concerned he had no suggestion. As for Rumania his suggestion was that the situation should be studied on the spot with the greatest impartiality. He knew that there were 17 American correspondents including Hearst’s as well as British and others there. There were also political representatives of Great Britain, the United States and France as well as a Control Commission. The representatives there could study the matter and report in order to enable them later to discuss the question in the spirit of the Yalta decision.

Byrnes pointed out that he had said before lunch he would not care further to discuss the Rumania situation but to keep the records straight the information of the United States Delegation was not the same as that of the Soviet Delegation in regard to United States correspondents. The political representative of the United States in Rumania⁴⁷ had been sent for in order that Mr. Byrnes could check up on the statement just made that there were 17 American correspondents in Rumania. He advised him that as of September 13 there was a single American correspondent who had come into Rumania to report the situation there. His statement was that soon after he had arrived in Rumania in November of last year the first application for the clearance of an American correspondent had been filed with the Allied Control Commission. Subsequently other requests had been made and repeatedly followed up with the ACC but no affirmative action had been taken until September 10, 1945. Then 11 of the 14 applications were approved. In the meantime most of the 14 had been obliged to go somewhere else as they had other things to do in life than to wait for action on their applications. The single application still standing was that of Mr. Brewer of the New York Times. He was in Sofia. On the date when the United States political representative left Rumania Mr. Brewer had still been unable to obtain clearance from the ACC in Bulgaria to leave that country. Before 1944 and September 10, 1945 two groups had been allowed to visit Rumania. The first group had been flown in by the Soviet Government at the end of March after representation had been made personally to Mr. Vyshinski.⁴⁸ They stayed one week and went anywhere they wanted but after their first experience with the censor they gave up trying to send out complete reports. Nevertheless the first full story was sent by one of these correspondents, Mr. White,⁴⁹ from Rome. It was sent six weeks after he left Rumania. The second set of correspondents which consisted of two journalists, arrived in Rumania without the consent of the ACC. They traveled about freely and after their first attempt to get agreement with the censor they decided to wait until they arrived at Rome to send their stories. That was the information given by the American political representative and on which the United States Delegation must base its conclusion.

Molotov said lie had no grounds for not trusting the facts he had at his disposal. He would furnish Mr. Byrnes with a list of correspondents in Bucharest. He had not checked up their citizenship nor their racial origin but they were American correspondents. He also wished to say that Mr. Byrnes might be right so far as the past was concerned and he would do his best to check up on the facts given him by Mr. Byrnes. But to speak of the past Mr. Byrnes had said that in the past year as well as at the beginning of this year certain restrictions had been imposed on correspondents in Rumania. This was true but they must remember that there was a war at that time. Not only Japan but Germany had not been defeated. The Soviet Government felt obliged to impose certain restrictions on correspondents during the period of the war. At Berlin President Truman and Mr. Churchill had stated that there were complaints on this subject and there was no pretense that there were not such restrictions at that time. Generalissimo Stalin had said that measures to bring about conditions favorable to correspondents would be taken. These measures had already been taken and he could assure Mr. Byrnes that there were 17 American correspondents in Rumania which was several times the number of Soviet correspondents there.

Byrnes said he would be glad to receive these names and to check them with the United States political representative and to advise Mr. Molotov about them.

Bevin said he had tried his hand at a suggestion without consultation with anyone and he put it to the Council to see if it offered a possibilty for a solution of their problem. It was as follows:

“The Council hereby invoke the Yalta Agreement and agree to consult together regarding the question of the Roumanian Government, the holding of elections, and the steps to be taken to secure the free and unfettered decisions of the people in the choice of their Government. The Council accordingly resolve to appoint a Commission to examine the whole problem on the spot and make recommendations to the Council for decision. Meanwhile, steps shall be taken to remove censorship and give free access to representatives of the Press”.

Byrnes said the United States would agree with the proposal.

Molotov said that there were enough commissions in Rumania. They had political representatives of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and the United States. There was a Control Commission. Let them check and report. What was the use of sending a new commission. These were official representatives from the different countries and they were capable of giving them information. Let them give more full information to enable his colleagues to form a more impartial judgement. His suggestion was that they consult their representatives. If it were proposed to supervise the Rumanian Government that was contrary to the principles of the Yalta Declaration. The Allied Powers represented on the Council had interfered too much in the internal affairs of Rumania. There was a Control Commission to control the affairs of the Rumanian Government. To go further and to establish a new form of control would conflict with the Yalta Declaration. They should decrease and not increase their interference in Rumanian affairs.

Bevin said he had tried to give effect to what he thought Mr. Molotov had proposed, namely, an impartial inquiry that would inspire confidence. Now he proposed to write a letter to our representatives to send in their views. The trouble was that all of them had been sending in their views but they had not been getting together to concert the results of their inquiries. He urged Mr. Molotov to accept the proposal which would not involve more control but only investigation.

Bidault said he had prepared a shorter proposal than that of the British Delegation. He could agree however to accept the British text except that France was not a party to the Yalta Declaration and did not want it to be mentioned. That was a matter of form.

The problem was a two-fold one. It was one, whether these representatives would have enough power and two, whether they would be able to reach common conclusions. They could entrust the matter to their own representatives on the spot who could form the commission but they must have power to discuss the matter. If as the French hoped, they agreed, their representatives could send in their agreed recommendations. If not they could send in separate recommendations.

Bevin said the words he had used were Yalta Agreement. Could they take the resolution in two parts?

Molotov asked what is being suggested.

Bevin replied that they were considering the resolution he had read out and that they could later determine the character of the Commission.

Molotov pointed out that he had already given reasons why the Soviet Delegation would not wish to send a commission to Rumania. An unfavorable interpretation would be placed on this by the Rumanians themselves. They should seek the opinion of their own representatives.

Bevin said if it was a question only of their opinions, they already had these, but they had never sat as a commission to check their information together.

Bidault said it was a question of whether they send a special commission or ask their representatives on the spot to do the work being provided with sufficient power. He thought it sufficient for their representatives on the spot to be empowered to get together and form an association and to get to work under the Council’s instructions. He believed the problem could be quickly solved.

Byrnes said the United States was satisfied with the proposals of both the British and the French. If there was no agreement he suggested that they go on with the agenda as this matter was not on the agenda.

Bevin said he would accept the French proposal that their representatives on the spot form a commission to send in a report that would be unanimous if possible but if not they would send in a majority-minority report.

Molotov said he had just received a telegram which contained information on the question of correspondents in Rumania and Bulgaria. In Rumania it mentioned only the names of two British correspondents there, Gede [Gedye] and Harrison.⁵⁰ He read a list of the American correspondents in Bulgaria and said that on August 25 applications had been received from three other correspondents to enter Bulgaria. Permission had been issued on August 30. On September 10 applications had been received for a new group of foreign correspondents and permission had been issued on September 12. He would obtain additional information in regard to the 17 American correspondents in Rumania.

The Soviet Delegation had confidence in their representatives in Rumania and saw no need to send new ones. They had an Allied Control Commission and saw no reason to set up another.

Bevin said agreement was apparently impossible. They tried to meet Mr. Molotov on every point but he always put up a new reason.

Molotov said he thought he was among friends but he was on the defense. An offense was being conducted against him except [especially?] on the subject of Rumania. If the information at their disposal did not enable them to reach a conclusion now he thought they should take steps to obtain more detailed information.

Bevin said he had not tried to put Mr. Molotov in the dock but as chairman had tried to get him [out?] of the dock he was in by making suggestions.

Molotov said he did not complain that he was in the dock. This had been said by Mr. Bevin. If he had left the dock he was wise. Mr. Molotov said he had said he was on the defensive and this was a different matter.

Bevin said he did not mind being in the dock as he was a docker.

Molotov remarked that both he and Mr. Bevin were not of gentry origin.

Bevin said that before they passed on he noted that on this resolution all other Delegations he thought were in agreement but the Soviet Delegation would not accept it.

Treaty With Bulgaria

Bevin said memoranda had been received from the Soviet, British and United States Delegations.⁵¹ Which would they desire to take as a basis of discussions?

Molotov said the Soviet Delegation requested that the Soviet draft be taken and that the British and American amendments be examined. He could accept paragraph 2 of the British paper.

This was agreed to.

Molotov said in regard to Article 7 that this would be subject to further study.

Molotov said he thought paragraph 3 of the British paper was a correct proposal.

This was agreed to.

Molotov said in regard to paragraph 4 that this should be dealt with as it was in the case of Rumania.

Molotov asked in what way British paragraph 5 differed from that in the Rumanian draft treaty.

Bevin said that in the Rumanian treaty they had provided for communications with Austria. This was not necessary here.

Molotov thought it should be considered by the so-called Deputies.

Byrnes did not see what they would refer to the Deputies.

Molotov said he had no objection to this paragraph 6 being accepted.

This was agreed to.

Bevin suggested that paragraph 6 go to the Deputies.

This was agreed to.

Molotov proposed that the whole of paragraph 7 be dealt with as was the similar paragraph in the Rumanian treaty.

Bevin said there was one question left over from the Rumanian treaty that appeared in this paragraph. This was the provision relating to the regime of the Danube. He wished to make a statement. It had been stated yesterday that it would be unduly harsh to force a country to accept blindly any obligations of an agreement to be concluded by the Allied powers in this matter. He had investigated and found that the same action had been taken in the last war. He did not mind it being known that it was the United Kingdom Delegation that had insisted if anybody’s amour propre was to be offended. The character of these regimes would be discussed thoroughly when they got to the American proposal. There had been an international regime for the Danube since 1856. The British Government was a participating power until 1940. At the last peace treaty Bessarabia was taken away from Russia and Russia was excluded from the regime of the Danube. In the British view that was a mistake. But it was also a mistake when the Soviet Government had made arrangements with the German Government in 1940 by which the British were excluded from the arrangement. Both of these settlements in their view were wrong. For good relations he thought they should be put right now. A few weeks ago he did not hesitate to give his views to put right the situation in regard to Tangier. Therefore if and when the five powers agreed to an international waterway agreement he did not think some Governments should be left in a position to hold them up. It followed that this clause be put in both the Rumanian and Bulgarian treaties.

Byrnes said he could only report what he had said the day before. If after the last war Allied nations were able to reach agreement on this question they ought to be able to do so now. He did not think it would be offensive to Rumania and it was very important to have this assurance.

Molotov said the Soviet Delegation was not ready to discuss this question in connection with Bulgaria and that it would not relate only to Bulgaria and Rumania. In any case he could not associate himself with the proposal of Mr. Bevin nor with the motives he had used.

Bevin said he had not used any motives.

Byrnes pointed out that in the Soviet proposal it was provided that Bulgaria would cooperate with the Allied powers and would take any measures they adopted for the maintenance of universal peace. He submitted that this was broader language than the paragraph under discussion which was limited to the regime of the Danube. He asked if Mr. Molotov would interpret the language in his proposal as governing the international regime of the Danube.

Molotov said that the paragraph cited merely repeated a paragraph in the American proposal and as that paragraph related to the Danube then this paragraph would relate to the Danube. This was a standard paragraph in all the draft treaties and he did not know whether or not it covered the Danube.

Bevin said the U.K. Delegation preferred a specific provision and observed that the spirit of the present conference led to long debate. Molotov observed that Mr. Bevin was a good chairman.

Bevin asked if he agreed that the provision go in the treaty.

Molotov replied that he had already said that this question should not be decided in connection with the Bulgarian treaty as it was a wider question.

Bevin noted that they could not agree.

Bevin pointed out that paragraph 8, which was the next item, had not been included in the Rumanian treaty.

Molotov thought there was no need for the proposed paragraph 8 as a treaty on this matter was already in existence.

Bevin said he would not insist but thought it would be helpful to have the powers who would sign this treaty agree as to what was done.

Molotov pointed out that this had not been asked for.

Byrnes said he thought that if there was no disagreement as to substance he hoped that they could agree on the language in regard to boundaries. They had done this in the Italian treaty for the good of everyone concerned. In the treaty there was a declaration in regard to new frontiers and he drew attention to the American draft which indicated what the frontiers were.

Molotov did not think it necessary to encumber the treaty with such questions.

Bevin said they would come to the point sooner or later when they would have to recognize boundaries arrived at. If there was no agreement now they could let it go. If there were later disputes he thought the United Nations organization would have to deal with it. It was the fact that there were frontiers not officially recognized that prompted him to make this suggestion in order to be of assistance.

Molotov suggested that they not create artificial questions and therefore that all territorial questions raised in the American and British proposals would become the subject of discussion if included. For example, in paragraph one of the American draft Dobruja was mentioned although this was a controversial question. The second paragraph dealt with Tsaribrod which was a town on the border of Yugoslavia. How could they deal with this without summoning representatives of Yugoslavia? He thought they should be more careful in dealing with Allied powers. He understood that when they engaged in settling the frontier between Yugoslavia and Italy they had done so because it was their duty to be of assistance but when there were no controversial issues why should they interfere. Let them keep to the questions they had to settle.

Byrnes pointed out that in the armistice terms it was provided in Article 2 that Bulgarian authorities would withdraw from Greek and Yugoslav territories. That provision was not included in the draft treaty. If nothing was said in the peace treaty he was afraid that it would continue to be a source of controversy in the days ahead of them. He thought it was really only a question of the wisdom of settling a problem at this time. At Potsdam their principles had been in agreement that there would be no settlement of territorial questions until there was a peace treaty and that these questions would be settled then. If there had been an agreement and everyone was satisfied, it would be better to include it in the treaty and let everyone know that it was settled.

Molotov said that if it were a question of Tsaribrod it would be necessary to summon the Yugoslav and Bulgarian representatives and have a discussion with them. Why should they do this when there was no controversy. Would they really have to deal with such small questions between neighbors? If these neighbors found it necessary in 10 years time to transfer a village from one country to another why should the Council question it. Did they not have enough serious problems to deal with?

Bevin proposed that they adjourn the meeting.

The meeting was adjourned.

44. Presumably reference here is to a speech in Salonika by Nicholas Zachariades, leader of the Greek Communist Party.
45. For text of the communication of February 12, 1945, from the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union to General de Gaulle, see Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 948.
46. Regarding French questions on the matter of the Declaration of Liberated Europe, see the aide-mémoire from the French Embassy to the Department of State, February 17, and the Department’s response of February 19. vol. iv, pp. 669 and 671, respectively.
47. Burton Y. Berry.
48. Regarding the representations made to Deputy Foreign Commissar Vyshinsky at Bucharest on March 1, 1945, relative to the necessity for taking measures promptly to ensure freedom of the press in Rumania, see telegram 151, March 1, from Bucharest, vol. v, p. 489.
49. Leigh White of the Chicago Daily News.
50. In a memorandum designated C.F.M.(45) 50, September 25, 1945, entitled “British Press Correspondents in Roumania” (not printed), the United Kingdom delegation stated that applications for Mr. Gedye of the London Daily Herald and Mr. Harrison of Reuters to enter Rumania had been outstanding since March 1945, and while the applications had frequently been brought to the attention of the Soviet Government and the Allied Control Commission for Rumania, Soviet authorities had been unable to say whether permission for correspondents to enter Rumania could be granted. The memorandum further recorded that one British correspondent was in Rumania, and two others had been there but had withdrawn because of the censorship. In a memorandum designated C.F.M.(45) 81, September 30, 1945, entitled “British Press Correspondents in Roumania” (not printed), the Soviet delegation stated that permission for Gedye and Harrison to enter Rumania had been given, that correspondents for eight English newspapers and news agencies were in Rumania as of September 28, and that foreign correspondents in Rumania had recently been exempted from having to submit their telegrams to the censors for examination. (Council of Foreign Ministers Files: Lot M–88: CFM London Documents)
51. Memorandum by the Soviet delegation, C.F.M. (45) 6, September 12, p. 148; memorandum by the United Kingdom delegation, C.F.M.(45) 22, September 17, p. 221; memorandum by the United States delegation, C.F.M.(45) 35, September 19, p. 263.