Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

Council of Foreign Ministers Files: Lot M–88: CFM London Minutes

Record of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Lancaster Home, London, September 20, 1945, 11 a.m.

London, September 20, 1945, 11 a.m.

C.F.M.(P) (45) 13th Meeting

Present

U.K.	U.S.A	U.S.S.R
Mr. Bevin	Mr. Byrnes	M. Molotov
Sir R. I. Campbell	Mr. J. Dunn	M. F. T. Gousev
Sir A. Clark Kerr	Mr. B. V. Cohen	M. K. V. Novikov
Mr. A. Duff Cooper	Mr. J. F. Dulles	M. S. A. Golunski
Sir O. Sargent3	Mr. C. E. Bohlen	M. V. N. Pavlov

France	China
M. Bidault	Dr. Wang Shih Chieh (Chairman)
M. Couve de Murville	Dr. Wellington Koo
General Catroux	Dr. Victor Hoo
M. Alphand	Dr. Hollington Tong
M. Fouques Duparc	Mr. Yang Yun Chu

1. Procedure: Publication of Decisions of Council

(Previous Reference C.F.M.(P) (45) 1st Meeting, Minute 1)

M. Molotov said that the decision taken by the Council on the previous day about the Yugoslav-Italian Frontier and Trieste (C.F.M.(P) (45) 12th Meeting, Minute 1) had been published without his consent.⁴ He proposed that, for the future, communiqués regarding the work of the Council should not include information about decisions taken unless the Council had agreed that those decisions might be published.

Mr. Bevin referred to the discussion about Press arrangements at the First Meeting of the Council (C.F.M.(P) (45) 1st Meeting, Minute 1, paragraph (f)) and explained the circumstances in which the communiqué had been issued the previous evening by the Press Communiqué Committee. He considered that no blame attached to the Committee.

Dr. Wang Shih-Chieh said that according to the procedure decided at the Council’s first meeting all communiqués should be agreed. If decisions of the Council were to be contained in such communiqués, their publication should of course be agreed also. The question had been raised by whom they should be agreed—by the Press Communiqué Committee or by the Council. His interpretation was that they should be agreed upon by all the members of the Press Communiqué Committee and, if difficulties arose on that Committee, the matter should be referred by them to the Council.

The Council:—

(1) Agreed that future communiqués should not announce decisions reached by the Council unless the Council had agreed that those decisions might be published.

(2) Endorsed the view that no blame attached to the Communiqué Committee for having published the terms of the Council’s decision on the problem of the Yugoslav-Italian frontier and Trieste.

2. Finland: Peace Treaty

The Council agreed to examine the proposals for a Peace Treaty with Finland set out in memoranda by the Soviet Delegation (C.F.M.(45) 7) and the British Delegation (C.F.M.(45) 25).⁵

Mr. Byrnes recalled that the United States, not being at war with Finland, would not be a signatory to the Peace Treaty; and the United States Delegation did not desire to express any views on these proposals. It should, however, be understood that any decisions taken by the Council on the Peace Treaty with Finland, either on the substance of the Treaty or on the procedure for its preparation, must not be regarded as establishing any precedent for the Treaties with the other satellite States.

M. Bidault said that in substance he agreed with Mr. Byrnes. France also was not at war with Finland. While the Council was concerned with the settlement for Europe as a whole, the Peace Treaty with each of the four satellite countries should be examined independently on its merits, on the basis of the historical and political circumstances of each case.

In the discussion which followed, paragraphs 3–8 of the memorandum by the British Delegation (C.F.M.(45) 25) were discussed seriatim; as follows:—

Armaments (Paragraph 3)

M. Molotov asked why the British Delegation proposed that Article 4 of the Armistice Terms with Finland should be taken as a basis for provisions in the Peace Treaty restricting the peace-time military establishments of Finland.

Mr. Bevin explained that, in the view of the British Delegation, all the Peace Treaties with ex-enemy satellite States should contain provisions for restricting their peace-time military establishments. The Council had already accepted in principle similar provisions for the Peace Treaty with Italy.

M. Molotov said that it was necessary to distinguish between Germany and Italy, the great ex-enemy Powers, and small countries like Finland. It could not be supposed that Finland could threaten the peace of Europe. The Soviet Union, which was the country most directly concerned with the possibility of Finnish agression, had not asked for any restrictions on her military establishments in the Treaty made in 1940,⁶ and did not think them necessary now. Finland would never undertake a war of aggression without some powerful Ally such as Germany; the correct policy was, therefore, to prevent Germany from becoming capable of further aggression, rather than to make demands upon Finland which were not justified by necessity and would affront her national pride.

Mr. Bevin said that the United Kingdom Delegation could not accept this view. It was not enough to say that a small country like Finland could not maintain such forces as would constitute a threat to peace: the Council should look to the peace and security of Europe as a whole. The British Delegation must stand by the principle that limitations on the military establishment of ex-enemy States must be included in the Peace Treaties with those States. His acceptance of other provisions in the proposed Treaty for Finland would be conditional upon an agreement satisfactory to the British Delegation regarding this proposal for the limitation of military establishments.

Continuance of Military Facilities (Paragraph 4)

M. Molotov agreed that, on the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, facilities of a military nature would no longer be required of the Finnish Government.⁷

Return of Allied Vessels (Paragraph 5)

M. Molotov said that further consideration must be given to the suggestion of the British Delegation that the Peace Treaty should contain some provision on the lines of Article 18 of the Armistice, concerning the return of Allied vessels, etc. The Soviet Delegation did not think this necessary, since they believed that, before the time came for the Treaty to be concluded, Finland would have carried out her obligations under this Article. If the British Delegation had any reason to doubt this, however, he would agree that the point should be further considered.

Mr. Bevin said that, while he hoped M. Molotov’s belief would prove to be correct, he would like this point to be further examined.

Resumption of Diplomatic and Consular Relations (Paragraph 6(i))

M. Molotov asked why it was suggested that the Allied Powers should have “the right to appoint Consuls at such places and in such numbers as each might decide”. It had not been suggested that any such demand should be made of Italy.

Mr. Bevin explained that the object of the proposal was to ensure that no obstructions were placed in the way of the appointment of Allied Consuls in Finland. He would not press that this should be expressly covered in the Treaty, if the substance of his requirement was met, either by a suitable assurance or perhaps by the insertion in the Treaty of some other provision which would cover it—e.g. a clause dealing with the restoration of Finnish sovereignty on the lines of that accepted by the Council for inclusion in the Italian Treaty.

(Later in the meeting Mr. Bevin offered to withdraw the second sentence of paragraph 6(i) of C.F.M.(45) 25).

Position of International Organisations (Paragraph 6 (ii) and (iii))

M. Molotov said that the proposals that Finland should accept the liquidation of the League of Nations and Permanent Court of International Justice, and should recognise the authority of the United Nations Organisation, were in his view covered by the Soviet proposal that Finland should be required to co-operate with the Allied Powers and execute such measures as they might adopt for the maintenance of world peace (C.F.M.(45) 7, paragraph 3).

Mr. Bevin agreed that the proposals in paragraphs 6 (ii) and (iii) of C.F.M.(45) 25 should be considered in connection with the proposal in paragraph 3 of C.F.M.(45) 7.

Position of Existing Treaties (Paragraph 6(iv))

M. Molotov suggested, and Mr. Bevin agreed, that further consideration should be given to this proposal, in order to specify which Treaties Finland should be required to keep in force and which Treaties she should abrogate.

Bill of Rights (Paragraph 6(v))

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation accepted in principle the proposed provision that Finland should maintain a Bill of Rights on the lines already accepted for inclusion in the Italian Peace Treaty. He suggested, and Mr. Bevin agreed, that the details of such a clause would require examination.

War Graves (Paragraph 6(vi))

In reply to M. Molotov, Mr. Bevin said that the British Delegation regarded it as important that the Peace Treaty should contain provisions regarding the war graves of Allied Nationals in Finland. It was agreed that this proposal required detailed consideration.

Procedure for further study

M. Molotov recalled that at their first meeting the Council, departing somewhat from the terms of reference laid down at the Berlin Conference, had agreed that all five members of the Council should participate in all discussions, whether or not they were all directly concerned. The present discussion concerned only two members of the Council and the other three members had not in fact taken part in it. This suggested that the best procedure for dealing with those matters requiring further study would be to refer them, not to the Deputies as a whole, but to a special committee comprising representatives of the British and Soviet Governments only, whose function would be to examine in the light of the discussion which had just taken place the proposals put forward in the memoranda by the British and Soviet Delegations, and to make recommendations to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Bevin said that this proposal would establish a precedent for the Treaties with the other ex-enemy Satellite States, and he was not prepared to accept it. He had suggested that the proposals in both memoranda should be referred to the Deputies for further consideration, subject only to his reservation on the question of armaments. He would now go further and, if M. Molotov would agree that the Deputies should consider the proposals in the United Kingdom memorandum, including those on economic and financial questions in paragraph 7, he would be prepared to withdraw the proposal, to which M. Molotov had taken exception, regarding the appointment of Consuls (paragraph 6, sub-paragraph (i), second sentence).

M. Molotov agreed that the economic and financial proposals in the United Kingdom memorandum required further consideration. He still thought, however, that his proposal for future procedure was the most practical one. If Mr. Bevin was not prepared to accept it now, he would revert to it again at a later meeting.

Admission to United Nations Organisation (Paragraph 8)

Mr. Bevin referred to the statement in the Soviet memorandum (paragraph 3) that “the Allied powers will support Finland’s candidature for membership of the United Nations Organisation”. If this meant that the British Government were expected to commit themselves to such support in advance, he could not accept it. He had the highest regard for the Finnish people and his Government were determined to do all in their power to assist Finnish recovery. A general understanding between the Allied powers that they would at the appropriate time support an application from Finland to join the World Organisation was one thing, but he could not accept a suggestion that his Government should enter into a hard and fast obligation in advance.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation must then enter a similar reservation with regard to Italy.

The Council agreed that further discussion of the Finnish Peace Treaty should be adjourned.

3. Sir Orme Sargent, Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.
4. For text of the communiqué released to the press by the Council of Foreign Ministers on the evening of September 19, see Department of State Bulletin, October 14, 1945, p. 565.
5. C.F.M.(45) 7, September 12, p. 148, and C.F.M.(45) 25, September 18, p. 228. According to the American minutes of this meeting, Molotov began the consideration of a draft treaty with Finland in the following words: “Molotov said that proposals had been put forward by the Soviet Delegation, but that the British Delegation had also distributed proposals. The substance of the Soviet proposal was that the armistice terms be transformed into a peace treaty. These armistice terms should, of course, be redrafted where required and completed by including such clauses as were required. The British proposals were for a peace treaty with Finland. Molotov thought they should take as a basis the armistice terms subject to the modifications necessary. He proposed that as a basis for their discussions of the peace treaty with Finland they take the proposals made by the Soviet Delegation, and that while discussing them they should also consider the proposals made by the British Delegation.” (740.00119 Council/9–1145)
6. For a translation of the text of the treaty of peace between Finland and the Soviet Union signed at Moscow on March 12, 1940, see Department of State Bulletin, April 27, 1940, p. 453. For documentation on the Winter War and the negotiation of the treaty of peace, see Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. i, pp. 269 ff.

7. The United States delegation minutes of this meeting of the Council do not record any agreement by Molotov to point 4 of the British proposal (C.F.M. (45) 25). According to these minutes, the following exchange took place at this point in the meeting:

   “Bevin proposed that they postpone consideration of the Finnish treaty.

   “Molotov did not wish to change the procedure of taking up items in order. They could put off discussion of point 4 of the British proposal until a later meeting, but they could proceed with the discussion of other points in the Finnish treaty, as had been done in the case of Italy.

   “Bevin reserved his position until the end of the discussion on the treaty when they would have received an answer on this point.” (740.00119 Council/9–1145)