Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

740.00119 Council/9–1945

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

[London,] September 19, 1945.

Participants:	The Secretary
	Mr. Dunn
	Mr. Bohlen
	Mr. Molotov
	Ambassador Gusev
	Mr. Pavlov

Mr. Molotov said he had come to see the Secretary in order to inquire what the prospects were for the discussion concerning the Balkan treaties.

The Secretary replied that, as he had told Mr. Molotov on Sunday, he was prepared then, but would have to state his position which Mr. Molotov knew; namely, that they could not sign treaties with the governments that they did not recognize. He said it was still his hope that some solution would be found which would permit us to clear up this troublesome question.

Mr. Molotov said that he wished to make it clear that the Soviet Union looked upon the treaties with all the Axis satellites including Italy in the same way. The Soviet Government could not discriminate in any way against these various satellites. He said in regard to Rumania, Finland, and Hungary the United States was already a signatory, and that the Soviet Government was proposing nothing new. He said he was forced to tell the Secretary that if the United States refused to sign the treaties with Rumania and Bulgaria, the Soviet Union could not sign the treaty with Italy.

The Secretary said that he had come to see Mr. Molotov on Sunday in order to discuss privately this difficult question. He said he had nothing to add to what he had said then; the President had made his opposition clear at Potsdam, and that we had since then looked into the question more fully, and had become more than ever convinced that we could not recognize these governments. He was sorry that this was so, but he knew that if he was to present a treaty with these governments for ratification to the United States Senate, they would immediately ask whether he could assure them that these governments were representative. That he would be unable to do, and the Senate would not ratify any treaty under those conditions. He added that in regard to Finland and Italy, the situation was quite different and demonstrated how impossible it was to consider all these states in one category. He said in these countries it appeared to us that the governments were representative and imposed no restrictions on political life. He said in Bulgaria and Rumania, however, we were denied the opportunity of obtaining the necessary information on which to convince ourselves concerning these governments. He said in regard to Hungary, we were still conducting our investigation as to the character of that Government. He wished, he said, to repeat what he had said on Sunday: that the United States had no desire to see the formation of governments hostile to the Soviet Union in these countries.

Mr. Molotov replied that he did not believe this was so.

The Secretary said he must believe it, and that he must also understand that our Government had to take cognizance of the Senate in our own country. If we were to recognize these governments, our people would consider that we had acted contrary to the spirit of the Yalta Declaration. If some changes could be made which would render these governments representative, the elections held—this would be greeted with joy in the United States, and it would permit him to defend the Soviet position as he would like to be able to do.

Mr. Molotov answered that since he knew less than Mr. Byrnes about the Senate of the United States, he would not comment; but that he did know well enough the internal situation in the Soviet Union, and he could assure Mr. Byrnes that if they signed a treaty with Italy and not with the neighboring satellite states, the Soviet Union would not accept it. He added he was unable to understand the Secretary’s position since it was obvious that the Rumanian government was more democratic than the Italian. He added that he had looked into the matter of United States correspondents in Rumania, and discovered that there were seventeen, aside from British correspondents, whereas there were only two Soviet correspondents. He said that if the Rumanian Government could not satisfy all the whims of the United States correspondents, that could only be a pretext for our displeasure. The most important thing was the feelings of the people, and the people were overwhelmingly for their present government. He said the only reason that he could find for our attitude was that the present government was friendly to the Soviet Union, and that the United States did not want that. If that were true, it was very sad, but the Soviet Union could never tolerate a hostile government. He pointed out that the United States and Great Britain had supported the former government of Radescu which had been hostile to the Soviet Union, but was unwilling to support the friendly government. He said if this was the attitude of the United States, it was better to say so frankly.

The Secretary replied emphatically that there was not a grain of truth in that, and that we had not recognized the Groza Government because of the manner in which it had been established and its subsequent actions, and had no reference whatever to their attitude toward the Soviet Union. He recalled that Mr. Vyshinski had given the King two and a half hours to install Groza. He said there had been no change in the view of the United States Government since that time. He went on to say that he felt one of the troubles was that Soviet representatives on the spot provided Mr. Molotov with different information than the United States representatives sent him. He said if he had any such ideas of hostility to the Soviet Union that he himself would not be having this friendly talk with Mr. Molotov nor entertain the feelings of friendship he had for the Soviet people. Just because it was impossible for our countries to agree on one question, it was entirely unjustified to attempt to read into that hostile intentions. He recalled that for weeks and weeks after Yalta we had discussed Poland and had eventually reached a solution which gave various parties in Poland adequate representation. He said no one would be happier than he if some such solution would be found in this connection. He said he thought of no one connected with the Italian Government nor with the Rumanian Government, and that it was not a question of the people in authority but of representative temporary governments. He continued that when he came into the Department he was new and did not know our representatives, and he had wondered whether some of the reports might not be colored. But since then he had checked with the reports of our military members of the Control Commission, with the press, and with all our State Department representatives, and he found that they all coincided, and therefore he had naturally come to the conclusion that they were accurate. He emphasized that the United States desired nothing but friendship with the Soviet Union since we were convinced that the whole future of the world rested on us two. And he wished to plead with Mr. Molotov to endeavor to find some representative Rumanian figures who would at the same time be friendly, and thus permit this matter to be straightened out.

Mr. Molotov replied that possibly the Secretary had Maniu⁸⁷ and Bratianu⁸⁸ in view when he spoke of “representative” Rumanians not in the government.

The Secretary replied that he had no particular individuals in mind, nor any particular party.

Mr. Molotov replied that he would like to submit for the Secretary’s verification his next statement if he had any doubts; namely, that when the Groza government was formed Maniu and Bratianu had been invited to join, but had refused on the grounds that they had not been offered enough posts. The Social Democrat, Peasant, Communist, and Liberal Parties representatives as well as non-party people were in the government.

The Secretary said all he was trying to say was that in our view this government had been imposed upon Rumania over the King’s objection by our good friend Mr. Vyshinski, and that furthermore according to our information, when the Agrarian Party, for example, attempted to hold meetings and put forward its candidates, the militia broke up the meetings and put forward persons not representative of the party. He said he did not believe the Soviet Union would care to be associated with such actions.

Mr. Molotov said that was true. He went on to say in regard to Poland it had been a different question: there were two governments and the discussion finally came down to two figures, Mikolajczyk⁸⁹ and Arciszewski,⁹⁰ and he would like to know who in Rumania the Secretary had in mind. He repeated that Maniu and Bratianu had been offered a place but had refused. He said with respect to his colleague Mr. Vyshinski, he had been pleased to hear the Secretary’s expression of friendship for him, but felt that he exaggerated his role in Rumanian affairs. He said that in confidence he could say it was true that Mr. Vyshinski had helped in the formation of the Government; that had even been published, but that if the Soviet Government had not helped the Rumanian, there was very serious danger of disorder and civil war. He said he seemed to recall that the United States and Great Britain had acted the same way in Italy without any protest from the Soviet Government. He went on to say that he had not noticed that the United States had in any way interfered with Great Britain when she established an entirely undemocratic government in Greece, but had even agreed to be connected with the elections and thus covered with its broad back the undemocratic actions of the Greek Government.

He added that the United States was helping Britain in every way in all sorts of dubious and unlovely affairs. He repeated that the Polish formula was not suitable. He then said that if the Secretary felt it necessary to express his views on the Government in Rumania, then the Soviet Government would have no alternative but to express its views with regard to the policy of the United States toward Rumania.

The Secretary said he could have no objection to Mr. Molotov’s saying what he wished.

Mr. Molotov replied that he did not wish to do so, but that the United States left them no alternative.

The Secretary stated that such a discussion would give him no pleasure, and that was why he had come to see Mr. Molotov privately in order to discuss these matters calmly and avoid public discussion on matters on which we were not in accord. He added that the whole world knew our position in regard to the Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments, and that he was therefore adding nothing new, and that there therefore had been no change in American policy.

Mr. Molotov suggested why not wait until after elections and then there would be a government with which these treaties could be concluded. He said that the present attitude of the U.S. Government was in distinction of that of President Roosevelt, who had been friendly to the Soviet Government.

The Secretary repeated that there had been no change, and that our position in regard to Rumania had been set soon after Yalta.

As to Greece, he said that President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill had reached an agreement at Yalta in respect to policy in Liberated Europe in which we had agreed to help in the conduct of elections in order to insure a representative government. He said that we had agreed to help supervise the elections in Greece not from any desire to serve Britain’s interest nor for any other reason except to redeem the pledge given by our late President, and that we were sending in the best people we could find, of the highest character who would report nothing but the truth. He repeated that it was only in conformity with our agreement at Yalta that we were sending people to Greece.

Mr. Molotov asked why we were demanding the reorganization of the Rumanian Government, but not of Greece which was much less democratic. He repeated that we were backing the British in every way, and that there had been a change in policy from that of Roosevelt’s.

The Secretary repeated that there had been no change, and that we had agreed to help supervise the Greek elections in accordance with the pledge made by President Roosevelt himself.

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Union had refused to be involved in the dirty business in Greece, and concluded that he would not burden the Secretary further.

87. Iuliu Maniu, President of the Rumanian National Peasant Party.
88. Constantin Bratianu, President of the Rumanian Liberal Party.
89. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, Prime Minister in the Polish Government in Exile at London, June 1943–November 1944; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity from July 1945; leader of the Polish Peasant Party.
90. Tomasz Arciszewski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile at London from November 1944.