SCI Flies1
Minutes of a Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee 2
| Present: | |
| Members: | The Secretary of War,3 Chairman |
| Dr. Vannevar Bush4 | |
| Sir Ronald I Campbell5 | |
| Mr. C. D. Howe6 | |
| Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson7 | |
| By Invitation: | Sir James Chadwick8 |
| Major General L. K. Groves9 | |
| Joint Secretaries: | Mr. Harvey H. Bundy10 |
| Dr. William L. Webster11 |
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. The French Situation.
The Chairman made the following statement:
“Sir John Anderson12 has informed us that there is grave danger that the French, through Mr. Joliot,13 or possibly through De Gaulle14 instigated by Joliot, may press for immediate participation in the T.A.15 Project. It is not known whether this request will include only industrial aspects or whether it will also be for military participation.
“Neither the United States nor Great Britain want any question about this project raised at this time with France and Sir John Anderson thinks some assurance to Joliot will have to be given in order to bring about a postponement of the issue and thereby protect against[Page 3]political explosion by the French with or without collaboration with the Russians, with possible danger to security.
“I understand that it has now been suggested through Sir Ronald Campbell to Sir John Anderson that he make a statement along the following lines to Mr. Joliot:
‘Since it is inadvisable to attempt detailed discussions as to arrangements with France in the field of nuclear sources of power until the termination of hostilities, the Government of the United Kingdom is prepared, in view of this postponement, to assure the French Government that upon the termination of hostilities it will discuss further with the French Government fair treatment of any claims of the French Government relating to commercial or industrial applications of nuclear sources of power.’
“I have stated to Sir Ronald Campbell that in view of the fact that all contacts with the French have been with the British, I am not prepared to recommend to the President that the United States make any commitment now to the French in regard to these matters.
“I understand the British authorities feel that the treatment of the French relation to this whole project is very much affected by certain inventions and patent rights which the French claim and on which the French have been filing claims in various places throughout the world. I should appreciate it if Sir Ronald Campbell would state more fully this phase of the question.”
Sir Ronald Campbell then made the following observations:
“One of the factors which may have to be borne in mind in considering the French problem is the fact that the French Government hold certain patents or patent applications in the T.A. field to which they attach considerable importance.
“In 1942 the opinion of legal counsel was sought in London on the bearing of patent applications known as A and B on T.A. development. It seems probable that A and B would be held valid in England and, if valid, that they would be master patents controlling the working of many later patents.
“This conclusion does not necessarily hold for the United States, owing to the differences in the patent practice of the two countries.
“If the above estimate of the strength of the French applications A and B is correct and if importance is attached to the building up of a strong patent position in the T.A. field, it seems desirable that the British and U.S. Governments should acquire control over these two patents in all countries in which the Governments are interested in the development or control of the T.A. project.
“It might be advisable to begin now to offer to negotiate an agreement on patents, with the object of acquiring for the British, United States and Canadian Governments jointly the world rights, outside France and the French Empire, in patents arising from the French applications. The question of what would constitute an equitable patents agreement, or one which would satisfy the French, is not easy to answer. It might require the assignment to the French Government of exclusive rights for France and the French Empire in some, [Page 4] or even all, Nuclear Pile inventions within the powers of disposal of the three Governments and it might involve the disclosure of information contained in such United Kingdom and United States patents. This is a matter which would require very careful examination.
“Any commercial or industrial rights arising from the world rights ceded to the three Governments under such a patents agreement would be disposed of in accordance with the Quebec Agreement.
“The advantages of an agreement on patents would be firstly, and chiefly, to convince the French Government that it could safely leave the T.A. arrangement to follow its present course of development, so avoiding a demand for immediate discussion and settlement of policy between them and the Governments concerned or seeking satisfaction elsewhere, and, secondly, to lead Joliot to desist from pressing his patent applications all over the world as he is now doing, with some danger to the security of the T.A. project.
“The Governments of Great Britain, the United States and Canada have taken the view, as far as their own countries are concerned, that T.A. is not a suitable project for commercial exploitation for private profit and all patent applications taken out in the T.A. field in these countries are allocated to the respective Governments.
“It might be desirable, in order to prevent private exploitation in other countries of the world and to keep T.A. development under suitable supervision and control, to try to acquire all rights in the French patent applications outside France and the French Empire.”
Dr. Bush expressed serious doubts about the importance of these French patents to the future of the project as a whole, partly because ownership of patents would not prevent development under other Governments, and partly because high cost would probably constitute a more effective barrier to the development of T.A. for ordinary commercial purposes. He pointed out that American active desire to obtain control by the U.S. Government of patents, relating to this project, had been based largely on the wish to avoid difficulties which would arise inside the U.S.A. if a profusion of patents remained in private hands. At a later stage, this motive was reinforced by the thought the Government control of patents would facilitate agreements between the U.S. and other Governments which might emerge. Dr. Bush reported that the U.S. Government authorities concerned were paying careful attention to patents held independently within the U.S.A. but did not feel that action on these could usefully be pressed beyond what was “reasonable.”
With reference to this French situation, the Chairman, referring to Article III of the Quebec Agreement, stated that high policy on the disclosure of information to other Governments was a matter for the determination of the signatories of that Agreement. An extended discussion took place during which it was accepted that the present action of the Committee should be limited to security aspects. This discussion necessitated a consideration of the Committee’s competence [Page 5] on matters in which are interwoven (as in the case of contacts with the French Government) political as well as technical and security issues. While it is not contemplated that the C.P.C.16 will take formal action outside its terms of reference or the special competence of its members, it is expected that important problems arising from the project and affecting C.P.C. countries will be discussed at Combined Policy Committee meetings, even though not requiring formal action by the Committee, in order that the members of this Committee may present such views as may be pertinent, and that the individual members of the Committee may be in a position to report to their respective Governments views expressed by the members.
The Committee agreed that negotiations with the French regarding patent rights would involve serious danger of disclosure of information diminishing the general security of and increasing the risk of sabotage to the existing co-operative project already committed to its charge.
It was finally decided to record as the sense of the meeting that the Committee noted the dangers reported by Sir John Anderson which might arise from the French pressing for consideration of their interest in the T.A. Project. The Committee was also unanimously of the opinion that the proposed statement which, as the Chairman had reported, might be made by Sir John Anderson to Professor Joliot, amended by the insertion of the words “with the Axis powers” after the two occurrences of the word “hostilities” would not be objectionable from the standpoint of security. The Committee, however, was unanimously of the opinion that any more extensive discussions of negotiations with the French as to their interest in the project would be undesirable from a security standpoint.
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William L. Webster
- Office of International Scientific Affairs, Department of State.↩
- This Committee was established under the terms of the Roosevelt-Churchill “Articles of Agreement governing collaboration between the authorities of the U.S.A. and the U.K. in the matter of Tube Alloys” (i.e., atomic energy research and development) signed at Quebec, August 19, 1943 (Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2993; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST), vol. 5, p. 1114).↩
- Henry L. Stimson.↩
- Director, Office of Scientific Research and Development.↩
- British Minister, Washington.↩
- Canadian Minister of Munitions and Supply.↩
- Head, British Staff Mission, Washington.↩
- Chief Scientific Adviser to the British Government on Atomic Matters.↩
- Commanding General, Manhattan Engineer District (code name for the atomic bomb development program).↩
- Special Assistant to the Secretary of War.↩
- Of the Office of Scientific Research and Development.↩
- British Chancellor of the Exchequer.↩
- Jean Frédéric Joliot, Director, French National Center of Scientific Research.↩
- Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the Council of Ministers, Provisional Government of the French Republic.↩
- Tube Alloys.↩
- Combined Policy Committee.↩