Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 99: UNCIO Cons Five Min 25

Minutes of the Twenty-Fifth Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed Amendments, Held at San Francisco, June 19, 1945, 9:30 a.m.

San Francisco, June 19, 1945, 9:30 a.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of names of participants, including members of delegations of the United States (12); United Kingdom (4); Soviet Union (5); China (2); and France (3).]

Mr. Stettinius called the meeting to order at 9:30 a.m., explaining that this meeting had been called at the request of Ambassador Gromyko.

Ambassador Gromyko stated that before the Conference it had been agreed to consult on all important amendments submitted by the sponsoring governments or any other countries.³⁶ He wished now to discuss an important amendment being presented in connection with Chapter XII, paragraph 2, Transitional Arrangements. This amendment offered by Greece, he understood, was to prevent enemy states from having the right of recourse to the General Assembly and to the Security Council before the treaty [treaties?] ending the war became effective.³⁷ If inserted in Chapter XII, the enemy states would not have the right of appeal to the Security Council or to the General Assembly. Until now, he said, no provision of such a kind had been included. It was not included in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. The previous day, during the discussion in Committee III/3,³⁸ the Committee almost came to a vote on this question. Ambassador Gromyko said his representative had arisen to ask that the question be studied further before a vote was taken. Ambassador Gromyko stressed that this was a very important question.

Senator Vandenberg did not think there should be such an amendment to the Charter. Ambassador Gromyko said he had taken it for granted until now that there should be no such amendment. Ambassador Halifax indicated that the history of this proposal was that Committee III/2 had approved it in principle by a substantial majority³⁹ stating that the matter of enemy states required clarification. It was then referred to Committee III/3 as relating to paragraph 2 of Chapter XII. Mr. Johnson explained that Committee III/3 had not finished its consideration of this question. The matter was referred to last night when the revision of paragraph 1, Chapter XII was proposed to the Committee. At this time, he said, the Greek Delegate offered his amendment.

Mr. Stettinius asked if we wished to establish a common position with respect to this amendment. Ambassador Gromyko stated that it was not correct to grant the power of appeal to enemy states. If so, they would use this opportunity to raise many questions that should not come up before the Assembly. Mr. Stettinius asked what the Greeks were asking for. Mr. Johnson stated that the Greek amendment to paragraph 2 of Chapter VIII, Section A, read: “It is understood that the enemy states in the present war shall not have the right of recourse to the Security Council or the General Assembly before the treaties which end this war have been made effective.” Ambassador Gromyko explained that when the treaties were made effective the enemy states would have the right of appeal.

Mr. Stettinius asked Ambassador Halifax for his position on this matter. Ambassador Halifax indicated that it would be difficult to open up this question at this time in the committees, but since it had already been raised, we should perhaps agree on some such wording as the following: “It is understood that the enemy states in the present war shall not have the right of recourse to the General Assembly or the Security Council until the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council so decides.” Mr. Stettinius said he liked this proposal. Mr. Jebb indicated that in any event the Coordinating Committee had been asked to prepare a definition of “enemy state.”⁴⁰

Mr. Dejean said that in fact this amendment had nothing to do with Chapter XII, paragraph 2. The first thing was to disassociate it from this Chapter. He said the French intended to move this. He suggested that, after consideration of paragraph 2, Chapter XII had been completed, the Greek amendment could be considered. This was a very important question with serious implications.

Senator Vandenberg questioned whether anything on this matter should be said in the Charter. He thought it would be best to cross the bridge when it was ultimately reached.

Mr. Stetttnius said that the Conference must get on with its work. President Truman was leaving Washington that day and would arrive in the West tomorrow. It was necessary to proceed quickly in dealing with this question.

Ambassador Koo pointed out that long discussion would be provoked if this amendment was considered now. He thought that paragraph 2 of Chapter VIII, Section A covered the question. If an enemy state brought a matter up, it was the responsibility of either the General Assembly or the Security Council to decide whether to consider it or not. For the time being Ambassador Koo thought it would be a wiser course not to raise this question. He asked his colleagues if they would not be willing to drop it. Ambassador Halifax said he had no objection to leaving the matter alone. It had been braised, however, and it might not be possible to get away without considering it. Mr. Johnson stated that Mr. Hickerson had been instructed by the United States Delegation just this morning to try to get the Greeks to withdraw their amendment. There could then be a declaration in the Committee indicating that it was understood that the General Assembly and the Security Council would not receive appeals from enemy states under the present circumstances.

Ambassador Halifax explained that there were three alternatives: (1) to drop the amendment altogether, (2) to include a declaration on the question in the Committee report, and (3) to amend the Greek suggestion as he had previously suggested. Of these three alternatives Ambassador Halifax said he preferred the first.

Ambassador Gromyko asked whether Ambassador Halifax meant that the enemy states had the right of appeal.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that it would be better not to include a formal reference to this matter in the Charter. We should instruct our representatives to try to get the Greek amendment withdrawn. ‘If we failed, we might try to get an interpretation along the lines suggested.

Ambassador Gromyko stated his understanding was that enemy states should not have the right of appeal to the Security Council or to the General Assembly on matters under paragraph 2, Chapter XII. This would mean that any condition with which enemy states were not satisfied could not be raised by them in the General Assembly. Mr. Stettinius said this interpretation was satisfactory to him.

Mr. Dulles stated that he concurred in the Ambassador’s statement so far as it related to Chapter XII—to conditions under the surrender terms. He did not think we should say, however, that the enemy states, for example Italy, forever had no right of appeal to the General Assembly or the Security Council. Ambassador Koo said that this interpretation was agreeable to him and Ambassador Gromyko agreed that it was the right solution. Ambassador Gromyko stated that his understanding was that enemy states should not have the right of appeal under the provisions in the Chapter on transitional arrangements. Mr. Dejean and Ambassador Halifax agreed with this statement.

Ambassador Gromyko indicated that the interpretation might provide that enemy states should not have the right to appeal to the Security Council or the General Assembly as long as they were under the special status imposed on them by the surrender terms or, alternatively, as long as they were subject to the control measures imposed on them as enemy states.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that Mr. Johnson draft an interpretation to be submitted to the group for its consideration. He then asked if there were any other items to be raised at this time. Mr. Boncour stated that Committee III/3, except for the Greek amendment, was finished with its work. He suggested that the Chairman of Committee III/3 should be asked to read his report today so that it could go before the Commission. Otherwise, there would have to, be another meeting of that Committee.

Mr. Stettinius stated that a message should be immediately sent to Committee III/3 requesting that the report be read today and the work of the Committee completed.

Ambassador Halifax stated that there was one point which the Soviet Ambassador had brought to his notice that he thought should be made at this time. It concerned the unsatisfactory nature of the report in Committee III/1 on the veto chapter. He indicated that there was considerable pressure in the Committee to have this section of the report redrafted to correspond more exactly with the developments in the Committee.⁴¹

Mr. Webster stated that the report as it stood was quite unacceptable to the British Delegation. An effort had been made to amend it. It had been moved that a Subcommittee be established to put the draft in better form. It was not yet certain, however, that the changes could be gotten through the full Committee. Mr. Stettinius suggested that Mr. Rockefeller should see the Rapporteur who was from El Salvador⁴² and ask for his cooperation in order to avoid holding up further the work of the Conference.

Mr. Stettinius asked if there were any other points to raise. He asked whether there would be any other points that the heads of the Delegations would wish to bring up before the close of the Conference. Ambassador Halifax said he had none to raise. Ambassador Gromyko remarked that for the time being he did not have anything to discuss but that it would be difficult to say whether he would have something later. He said he could not contemplate what might arise, noting that he had known nothing about this proposed amendment to Chapter XII until the previous evening. Ambassador Koo said he had no further matters to raise.

Mr. Stettinius stated that Mr. Pasvolsky had told him that twelve chapters were in draft and that, as soon as the questions on Chapter XII were settled, the remaining drafts could be completed, so that the Charter would be in draft form by the following evening.

Mr. Stettinius said the Soviet Ambassador had advised him that he would need three days for clearance of the text with his Government. It was therefore very important to complete the work as soon as possible. He thought he might have more to say on this matter by the following afternoon.

Ambassador Halifax indicated that there was likely to be some difficulty with the arrangements for speakers for the final session when this matter was discussed in the Executive Committee. He hoped some reconsideration of the arrangements could be given at a suitable moment.

Mr. Stettinius stated that these arrangements had been discussed and he thought settled, in the meeting with the four Presidents and France. Ambassador Halifax thought we could anticipate a great deal of discussion at the Executive Committee. Mr. Stettinius asked whether objections had been raised by others than Australia. He noted that with the Canadian Prime Minister possibly returning, it was likely that he would request to speak.

Ambassador Halifax explained that he had had a meeting with the Dominions at which Field Marshal Smuts had expressed the view that it was unwise to have a representative of the Arab states speak as this might excite the feeling of the Jews. Everyone, he said, recognized the undesirability of everybody speaking at the final session. The suggestion had found favor among the Dominions, informally, that the four sponsoring governments and France should speak, with Field Marshal Smuts representing the rest. However, the possibility had been considered of selecting one or two representatives from different regions, although it was recognized that such selection might create difficulties. He had himself taken the position that such a basis for selection would be troublesome.

Mr. Stettinius said the Executive Committee was meeting the following afternoon and that he should perhaps appoint a Subcommittee to make a recommendation to the Executive Committee on this matter. He wished to nominate Ambassador Halifax as Chairman of the Subcommittee. Ambassador Gromyko thought the decision should be made at this meeting. Mr. Stettinius thought it was too late to make a change in the proposal that had been recommended by the four Presidents since this was already before the Executive Committee. Ambassador Halifax agreed that the discussion on this question would have to take place henceforth in the Committee. Mr. Rockefeller suggested that if Ambassador Halifax had a suggestion for new arrangements it might be convenient to have it in the offing. Mr. Stettinius agreed, but felt that we could not now withdraw our earlier proposal. He did not believe there would be great difficulty in reaching a final settlement of this matter in the Executive Committee.

Mr. Johnson, at the request of Mr. Stettinius, introduced the draft that he had prepared for insertion in the report of Committee III/3 on the question of the right of enemy states to appeal to the General Assembly and the Security Council. Mr. Johnson read as follows: “It is understood that the enemy states should not have the right to appeal to the Security Council or the General Assembly under Chapter VIII, Section A, paragraph 2, with respect to action taken or authorized under Chapter XII, paragraph 2.” Mr. Johnson suggested that the phrase “Chapter VIII, Section A” might properly be omitted so that the statement would be in a general form. Ambassador Halifax indicated that this statement was all right with the British Delegation which would agree to the omission of the phrase “Chapter VIII, Section A”.

Mr. Stettinius indicated that no statement at all in the Committee report would be best, but that, if this solution is not possible, then the interpretation just read could be presented in the Committee report. Mr. Dulles noted that the statement would in effect be a five-power declaration. Mr. Boncour agreed with the statement as read by Mr. Johnson and suggested that Greece propose the declaration itself as a substitute formula for its amendment. He thought this would be proper tactics in order to allow Greece to defend its amour propre as an author of the original proposal.

Ambassador Gromyko said he thought this interpretative statement would be a good thing. He suggested, however, adding at the end of the statement as read by Mr. Johnson “and regional arrangements directed against enemy states”.

Mr. Stettinius said these regional arrangements were included under paragraph 2, Chapter XII. Ambassador Gromyko said that there were two types of arrangements against enemy states: the arrangements under Chapter XII, paragraph 2 and regional arrangements, and he thought that both of these should be mentioned.

Mr. Stettinius indicated that the United States Delegation could not agree to the inclusion of the reference to regional arrangements at this point, since they were already covered. He was afraid that to mention them would open up an issue that had long since been settled. Ambassador Gromyko insisted that they were not covered by the present wording and that the phrase should be added “and regional arrangements directed against enemy states”.

Ambassador Halifax said he would like to hear Mr. Dulles’ viewpoint on this question. Mr. Dulles stated that Ambassador Gromyko had a point. Chapter XII dealt in substance with surrender terms and the interpretation as it now stood meant that enemy states had no right of appeal from the surrender terms. At the moment, the interpretation removed the right of appeal on questions relating to the surrender terms. To extend this restriction so that enemy states would not have the right of appeal under regional arrangements directed against the removal [renewal?] of aggressive policy on the part of such states would change the character of the interpretation. This would be true because regional arrangements would have no limit in time. If we knew about the regional arrangements that would be created in the future it would be one thing, but there might be a whole series of them, and there was no way in which we could define them at this time. The enemy states might be permanently deprived of the right of appeal if we gave a blanket underwriting for all regional arrangements, the terms and character of which could not now be foreseen.

Ambassador Halifax said it might be possible to add to the draft a provision reading “or otherwise for the prevention or removal of aggression”. Mr. Dulles said that off-hand he would not be too keen about this addition.

Mr. Stettinius said he strongly hoped that this issue need not be opened at this time. Ambassador Halifax thought the statement as read by Mr. Johnson was good enough. Ambassador Gromyko insisted that it did not cover regional arrangements.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that in view of the fact that this matter was now about to come up for a vote in the Technical Committee,⁴³ Mr. Johnson had better go down now to the Technical Committee and see that the matter did not come to a vote.

Ambassador Gromyko suggested the addition of the phrase “or under regional arrangements directed against the removal [renewal?] of aggressive policy by enemy states”.

Senator Vandenberg asked whether the word “existing” could be added. He did not believe we should write a blanket immunity for all regional arrangements.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that if Ambassador Gromyko had an amendment to make he should offer it in writing. Ambassador Gromyko replied that he had already suggested wording for an amendment. He said he could not understand why there was an objection to including the reference to regional arrangements. He did not feel it was wise to limit the immunity to existing treaties since new treaties might be concluded that would not be any less important than the arrangements under paragraph 2, Chapter XII, and that would be directed particularly against the enemy states. He asked why reference should be made to one type of arrangement and not to another. Senator Vandenberg stated the reason was that we knew about one type of arrangement but we did not know about the other type.

Mr. Stettinius stated that all the members of the group had meetings which they had to attend and that it was time to reach a decision on the question under discussion. It was agreed, he said, that there would fee no reference to this matter in the Charter. He suggested that an interpretation be worked out by a small subcommittee to which each of the five Delegations would appoint a member. He appointed Mr. Dulles to act on that committee with full authority to act for the United States Delegation. He urged that agreement be reached upon a simple and clear-cut interpretation.

Ambassador Gromyko indicated that he would appoint his regular representative on Technical Committee III/3. Ambassador Koo and Ambassador Halifax agreed to the procedure suggested by Mr. Stettinius.

Ambassador Gromyko asked what had been decided with respect to the Rapporteur’s report of Committee III/1.⁴⁴ He said if this report was read over the radio it would cause considerable trouble, in view of the bad interpretation given to the discussion on the voting question.

Mr. Rockefeller noted that the report was at this moment being rewritten.

Mr. Stettinius commented that all members of this group were agreed to changing the report. Ambassador Gromyko said he was glad that this agreement had been reached so that the report could be revised to reflect more accurately the actual situation in the Committee.

Ambassador Gromyko stated that Committee I/2 was preparing a report which the Rapporteur wished to read directly in the plenary session without prior review in the Committee. He questioned whether this procedure was a good one.

In view of the fact that it was not the normal procedure, and since the report contained a statement on withdrawal⁴⁵ which included two bad sentences, he felt it would be better if these sentences could be omitted in the course of the Committee discussion of the report. He objected, in the first place, he said, to the sentence: “If, however, a Member, because of exceptional circumstances, feels constrained to withdraw, and leave the burden of maintaining international peace and security on the other Members, it is not the purpose of the Organization to compel that Member to continue its cooperation in the Organization.” The phrase “leave the burden of maintaining international peace and security on the other members” should, he felt, be omitted, since it did not take into account the idea of voluntary withdrawal. According to this sentence any member that left the Organization would be blamed for transferring the burden of maintaining peace on other members, and would be so blamed in advance. This provision would not take into account the real reasons why a state might withdraw.

Ambassador Gromyko continued with the statement that the second sentence that bothered him was as follows: “It is obvious, however, that withdrawals or some other form of dissolution of the Organization would become inevitable if, deceiving the hopes of humanity, the Organization was revealed to be unable to maintain peace or could do so only at the expense of law and justice.” Ambassador Gromyko indicated that this provision conflicted with the earlier one. It put upon the Organization full blame for withdrawal by suggesting that when a state withdrew the Organization was dissolving or in any event had deceived the hopes of humanity.

Mr. Stettinius said he hoped that the heads of the five Delegations could now stick together. It was the eleventh hour, and for this problem to be opened up again after the great debate that had already taken place would be disastrous. Ambassador Gromyko said he would like to have his proposal discussed on substantive grounds.

Mr. Stettinius asked why Ambassador Gromyko had not raised this question when the Committee had approved the statement on withdrawal.⁴⁶

Ambassador Koo said he would like to offer the suggestion that Mr. Rolin be invited to go over the phrasing, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission, and see if perhaps he could modify it.

Ambassador Halifax said he did not suppose the withdrawal statement could be drafted to the complete satisfaction of everyone. Since, however, there was general agreement on the right of withdrawal with no basic differences in principle on this question, the prospect of its being reopened now filled him with despair.

Mr. Rockefeller indicated that the material that Ambassador Gromyko was criticizing was not simply in the Rapporteur’s report, but was part of a resolution that had been carefully worded and thoroughly worked over and passed by the Committee. Senator Vandenberg said that if this question was reopened at this time we would be in for six weeks of debate. He pointed out that we had objected to some of the language but had been voted down. He said that, unless we now stood on the language agreed upon, we would he confronted with a bad situation. There were many who wanted a frank withdrawal clause in the Charter, but they had consented to this way of handling the matter in an interpretation in the Committee report. He pointed out that the Soviet Ambassador had made an eloquent appeal before the Committee had arrived at its position. He felt if this matter was now opened up again and an attempt made to rewrite the declaration the Conference would not close for many weeks.

Mr. Dejean agreed that it would be difficult to make any changes since this was a definite resolution passed by the Committee.

Ambassador Koo agreed that this statement to which Ambassador Gromyko objected had been debated and debated and that it would be very difficult to reopen the matter at this time. Ambassador Gromyko wondered why the language could not still be improved by the omission of the two objectionable phrases.

Senator Vandenberg indicated that we had had our day in court. The question had been debated in Committee and a vote taken. Mr. Stettinius noted that the vote on the declaration had been 38 in favor to 2 against, with 3 abstentions.

Mr. Rockefeller indicated that the declaration had been accepted only after 17 hours of debate. Ambassador Gromyko stated that the Soviet Government had abstained in the vote. Ambassador Halifax felt it was hopeless to reopen this issue at this time. Ambassador Gromyko said that, since the four Delegations did not agree, there remained nothing more for him to do. He had no other choice but to let the matter go. The language was bad, he said. The provisions in the declaration are conflicting.

Ambassador Halifax felt that there was nothing that could be done at this time. Mr. Stettinius agreed with the British Ambassador.

Mr. Johnson said he had just received a telephone call from Committee III/3 and that our representatives on that Committee had worked out the following statement for insertion in the report of Committee III/3: “It is understood that the enemy states in this war shall not have the right of recourse to the Security Council or the General Assembly until the Security Council gives them this right.” Mr. Dulles asked if this meant that the enemy states would not have recourse on any matter. Mr. Johnson explained that the decision as to when the enemy states would have recourse would be made by the Security Council. Mr. Stettinius, Ambassador Gromyko, Ambassador Halifax and Ambassador Koo indicated that this phrasing for the report was satisfactory. Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the matter was then closed.⁴⁷

Mr. Stettinius adjourned the meeting at 11:05 p.m. [a.m.].

36. See minutes of the second meeting of the Informal Organizing Group, April 10, 3 p.m., p. 235.
37. Doc. 1089, III/3/49, June 19, UNCIO Documents, vol. 12, p. 536.
38. Ibid.
39. Doc. 321, III/2/9, May 15, UNCIO Documents, vol. 12, p. 24.
40. For a definition of this term, see report of Committee 3 to Commission III on chapter XII, Doc. 1095, III/3/50, June 19, ibid., p. 560.
41. Doc. 1085, 111/1/60, June 19, UNCIO Documents, vol. 11, p. 630; for the Rapporteur’s report relating to chapter VI, section C, see WD 359, III/1/55, June 16, ibid., p. 604.
42. Hector D. Castro.
43. Doc. 1111, III/3/51, June 20. UNCIO Documents, vol. 12, p. 546.
44. Doc. 1083, III/1/59, June 19, ibid., vol. 11, p. 642; and WD 401, III/1/61, June 19, ibid., p. 648.
45. Doc. 1074, I/2/76, June 18, UNCIO Documents, vol. 7, p. 292.
46. Doc. 1086, I/2/77, June 19, UNCIO Documents, vol. 7, p. 267.
47. Doc. 1095, III/3/50, June 19, UNCIO Documents, vol. 12, pp. 558–560.