Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 96: US Cr Min 71

Minutes of the Seventy-First Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Thursday, June 14, 1945

San Francisco, June 14, 1945

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of names of persons (37) present at meeting.]

Announcements

. . . . . . .

The Secretary declared that he wanted to report that he had had a serious conversation with Mr. Padilla.⁴⁶ In the frank discussion which they had held the Secretary had expressed disappointment over the voting record of the “good neighbor to the south.” Padilla had called a meeting of the Foreign Ministers and The Secretary declared that he could assure the Delegation that it could have Latin American votes when they were needed. This applied specifically, The Secretary said, to the question of amendments. Mr. Padilla now had a thorough understanding of the situation and was aware that the United States could not join the Organization unless it had a veto over the amendment process. The Secretary remarked that Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Rockefeller were going to have a meeting to consider what the overall voting situation was.

The Secretary called the attention of the Delegation to a statement made in the Senate on the previous day by Senators Burton and Fulbright.⁴⁷ Appreciation had been expressed for the service performed by the Delegation and each member of the Delegation had been singled out for individual praise. The Senators had praised the Charter as representing the highest common factor of the divergent views which came together at San Francisco. Senator Burton particularly defended the veto power as it had been passed by Committee III/1 on the previous day.⁴⁸ However, Senator Burton had expressed the hope that the large powers would waive the right of veto on matters of peaceful settlement. Senator Fulbright had stressed the need for future amendment of the Charter to bring it into line with changing situations and Senator Burton agreed to this position. Senator Burton thought that the unanimity rule with respect to amendments should be restricted to amendments on that part of the original Charter which dealt with the veto of major powers.

In strictest confidence The Secretary reported to the Delegation that the situation with respect to inviting Italy to the Conference was under control and that it would not be necessary to discuss the matter any further in the meetings of the Delegation.

Tentative Conference Schedule

The Secretary reported that it had been tentatively decided that the Conference should end on Saturday, June 23. In order to meet this deadline the Secretary outlined the following requirements:

1. The closing session must be held on Saturday afternoon, June 23.

2. The signing of the Charter must take place in the afternoon and evening of Friday, June 22, and during the morning of Saturday, June 23. The Secretary remarked that the President was anxious to be present at the time the Charter was signed. This would be impossible, the Secretary thought, in view of the fact that eight hours might be required for the entire process of signing the document. The minimum time, the Secretary thought, would be three hours and forty minutes. However, the United States Delegation could affix its signatures in the presence of the President on Saturday morning, June 23. The Secretary remarked that he wanted to consult with the Delegation concerning the program tentatively established for the President’s stay in San Francisco.

3. The last working Plenary session would have to be held on the morning of Friday, June 22.

4. The Steering Committee would have to conduct its final review of the Committee on Thursday, June 21, taking the entire day if necessary.

5. The final meetings of the four commissions would have to be held not later than Wednesday, June 20.

6. The final drafts of the Coordination Committee’s texts would have to be ready by Tuesday, June 19.

7. All the technical committees must finish their work by Friday evening, June 15. The Secretary explained that it had been agreed that there should be permitted a twenty-four hour time lapse between the conclusion of the work of the committees and the consideration of their reports by the four commissions. The Secretary reported that the following committees still had to finish their work:

a. Committee I/2, for which Commander Stassen was the United States Delegate, had to consider the expulsion, amendment, withdrawal, and connected topics.

b. Committee II/1, for which Representative Bloom was United States Delegate, would have to reconsider the question of the election of the Secretary-General after Committee III/1 concluded its deliberations on this subject.

c. Committee II/4, for which Commander Stassen as the United States Delegate, would have to conclude its consideration of Section A of the trusteeship chapter.

d. Committee III/1, for which Senator Connally was the United States Delegate, would have to complete its consideration of the problem of the election of the Secretary-General.

e. Committee III/2, for which Commander Stassen was the United States Delegate, would have to conclude its deliberations on the pacific settlement of disputes.

f. Committee III/3, for which Senator Connally was the United States Delegate, would have to conclude its work on Chapter XII.

Mr. Dulles thought that Committee I/1 should be added to this list because it had not completed its consideration of the domestic jurisdiction clause, although it had voted in favor of the Australian amendment.⁴⁹ The Secretary observed that in order to finish the work of the technical committees on schedule it would be necessary for the Delegation to go into action in small groups in order to reach decisions on the outstanding issue[s]. The Secretary thought that these matters could not be left to open debate in the committees because such a procedure would consume too much time. The Secretary declared that he was at the disposal of the Delegation and would be glad to help on any issues that might arise. Representative Bloom remarked that some of the Committees had not been scheduled to meet that day and he thought that if the work of the committees was to be finished by the following evening it would be necessary to call meetings for that day and the next. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that the committees would still have to answer a number of questions which might be submitted to them by the Coordination Committee. The Secretary declared that the Committee of Jurists and the Coordination Committee must have concluded their work by June 19. This, The Secretary declared, might mean joint consideration by the two groups on some of the questions which they had to consider in common. The Coordination Committee might also have to work with the Chairmen of the technical committees and with the Secretariat in order to expedite its work. The translations would have to be undertaken simultaneously with the work of the Coordination Committee and the Charter would have to be set in type by sections even before it was finally approved if the Conference was to meet the deadline as it has been established. [At this time, 9:20 a.m., Senator Connally arrived at the meeting.]^49a

Secretary Stettinius declared that the Secretariat seemed to think the Conference could be concluded by June 23, but they were of the opinion that it would be an awfully tight situation. The Secretary declared that nothing could be allowed to go wrong because with the situation “as tight as a drum” any untoward developments would throw the entire Conference off schedule. The Secretary declared that he realized that this was an unreasonable schedule for the Coordination Committee and observed that a tremendous burden would be placed on that group. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that he hoped that this schedule would not be unreasonable to the Charter. He thought that the Coordination Committee would require at least one additional day if a good Charter were to result. Mr. Pasvolsky declared the Secretary could have no idea of the enormity of the job to be faced by the Coordination Committee. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that the Coordination Committee must have until Wednesday night to finish its work and, even then, some of the steps would have to be telescoped.

The Secretary declared that he had asked Mr. Hiss to join the meeting to discuss this situation with the Delegation. He declared that it had been his understanding that meetings of all the committees had been called in order that they might finish their work by the deadline established. Mr. Notter thought that it would be necessary to bring tremendous pressure to bear on the Latin American states on all the issues still before the Conference if the Conference deadline were to be met. The Secretary suggested that Mr. Warren outline the situation for the Delegation. The latter declared that he did not subscribe completely to Mr. Notter’s observations. Mr. Warren thought that the vote would turn out favorably on the question of the Secretary-General and also on the matter of domestic jurisdiction. The only difficult problem, Mr. Warren thought, would be the question of the unanimity rule with respect to the ratification of amendments. On this question Mr. Warren was certain that the Latin American states would go along with the big powers and would even vote as a hemisphere bloc if necessary.

Secretary-General

Senator Connally declared that Committee III/1 had cleaned up all the items on the agenda with the exception of procedure for recommending the Secretary-General for election by the General Assembly.⁵⁰ Senator Connally remarked that Ambassador Gromyko had been putting pressure on him to speak in favor of the unanimity procedure. Senator Connally declared that Professor Webster had spoken for the British and that Ambassador Gromyko had spoken in favor of the unanimity rule and that the French Delegation had spoken in favor as well.

Senator Connally pointed out that this question had been considered originally by Committee II/1⁵¹ and that Representative Bloom had voted in favor of a strictly procedural vote for the nomination of the Secretary-General. However, it had been decided that Committee II/1, dealing with the General Assembly, would not have the authority to decide the voting procedure whereby the Security Council would nominate the Secretary-General. As a result, the matter was now before Committee III/1 for its decision. Representative Bloom pointed out to the Delegation that he had taken his instructions from the Delegation and hence had voted in favor of the procedural vote.⁵² Senator Connally declared that this was correct and that the Delegation had reversed its position. Representative Bloom remarked that he had made his mistake in going along with the Delegation on this question. Secretary Stettinius thought that the United States Delegation would have to stand by the five-power position. Senator Connally remarked that small powers were disturbed by the outcome of the veto question and were taking this opportunity to attempt to win a victory over the major powers. Commander Stassen thought that the Delegation would have to support Senator Connally. Any change of position by the Delegation would be viewed seriously by the other major powers, especially in view of the fact that Russia had been defeated on the matter of the deputy Secretaries-General and would undoubtedly be unable to reverse the decision. Secretary Stettinius said that Mr. Warren and Mr. Hickerson would go into action and The Secretary said that he presumed that the Delegation would not want to change its position.

Representative Bloom asked why it was necessary for him to consider this question of the Secretary-General and Mr. Hickerson pointed out that the question would undoubtedly be referred once again to Committee II/1 after Committee III/1 had reached its decision. Mr. Hickerson observed that some of the smaller powers had served notice that if they were defeated in their opposition to the unanimity rule for the nomination for the Secretary-General, that they would reopen the question of the term of office of the Secretary-General when the whole matter was referred back to Committee II/1. Mr. Warren asked why it was not possible to have the Steering Committee consider this matter in view of the jurisdictional conflict between the two committees. Representative Bloom observed that as he understood the matter he would not be required to do anything until Senator Connally’s Committee finished its deliberations.

Amendment Procedure

The Secretary asked whether there was any emergency business to be considered by the Delegation. Commander Stassen declared that he should like to bring up the matter of amendment procedure and related problems which were likely to become the pressing focus for attack by the opposition. Commander Stassen urged that Mr. Armstrong, who had been working with the problem involved more closely than he had, present the question to the Delegation.

Mr. Armstrong declared that he wanted to make clear that he had not been handling the problem at all but merely had been helping Commander Stassen. Mr. Armstrong then reported that Mr. Evatt had called him that morning and had indicated that there was a certain amount of support for the proposal to insert in the report of Committee I/2 the statement which had been discussed at the meeting of the Big Five the previous afternoon.⁵³ The Mexican Delegate had indicated that he would not oppose the wishes of the United States on the unanimity rule with respect to the veto power. The Mexican Delegate had indicated that his proposal to omit any mention of procedure with respect to amendment was intended to simplify the question for the big powers as well as for the smaller states. However, Mr. Armstrong thought that the report of Committee I/2 was likely to run into “hot water”. Mr. Evatt had urged that there be incorporated in this report a statement that every nation was free to withdraw from the Organization if an amendment were accepted by the General Assembly but failed of ratification because of the exercise of the veto power by one of the Big Five.⁵⁴ Colonel Capel-Dunn had seemed to approve of this suggestion. He had suggested as an appropriate wording “or if an amendment duly accepted by the necessary majority in the Assembly fails of ratification necessary to bring it into effect.”

Mr. Armstrong declared that the smaller powers appeared to be worried about China, which might break up into a group of small segments controlled by war lords or might fall completely under Soviet domination. Mr. Evatt had told Mr. Armstrong in the telephone conversation that morning that he had received instructions from his own government to stand for a revisionary convention which would be free of any restraining veto power whatsoever. However, Mr. Evatt had indicated that it would not be necessary to hold such a convention within five years and had indicated that ten years would be soon enough.

Mr. Armstrong declared that Mr. Evatt had told him that his proposal to add to the Committee report a statement establishing the right of a member state to withdraw from the Organization if an amendment failed of ratification was “off hand and incidental” and was not to be considered as the Australian position on this question. Mr. Evatt had thought that the entire question should be handled in the text of Chapter XI, paragraph 3. However, Mr. Evatt indicated that the Australians did not want to raise any big issue at this stage of the Conference, and for this reason would not press for inclusion of phraseology making clear the right of withdrawal in the Charter itself. Mr. Evatt had asked Mr. Armstrong whether he did not think that it would be worse to incorporate a clause in the Charter or include a statement in the Committee report making clear the right of withdrawal than to permit a Revisionary Convention to make its own rules of procedure.

[Here follows discussion of the time schedule and future progress of the Conference.]

Withdrawal

Commander Stassen urged that the Delegation grant to him and to Mr. Armstrong and to such other members of the Delegation as might work on the problem of withdrawal freedom of action to work out a satisfactory solution. Commander Stassen pointed out that, as a result of the failure of the major powers to reach agreement, the United States now had freedom of action, and he thought that it was essential that he be granted license to work out an appropriate solution. Commander Stassen declared that it might even be necessary to adapt Senator Rolin’s draft statement to be included in the report of Commission I. Commander Stassen thought it might even be necessary to concede if all the other nations seemed to want specific language in the Charter in order to gain acceptance for the other parts of the Four Point Program which he had outlined for the Delegation at previous meetings. Commander Stassen declared that the Delegation should make a decision as to whether, it would accept such a solution. The Commander pointed out that the United States might be forced into a situation where it would lose on the question of withdrawal and at the same time lose the initiative on the other parts of the program. Commander Stassen suggested that the United States:

(1) Press strongly for the re-insertion of a clause on expulsion.

(2) Press strongly for the ratification of amendments according to the unanimity procedure.

(3) Attempt to get the Soviets to agree to ratification by a two-thirds majority, plus the five major powers, rather than a mere majority plus the five major powers as had been the occasion originally. Commander Stassen pointed out that this was a problem of chief concern to the smaller states, and he thought that the United States should allow them to make this decision or should at least not bring pressure to bear against whatever, decision they might reach.

(4) Press for a clause providing for placing a Revisionary Convention on the agenda of the General Assembly after ten years.

(5) Attempt to revise Senator Rolin’s statement on withdrawal and, if necessary, even accept the insertion of wording in the Charter itself.

Mr. Armstrong observed that he was not certain that it would be necessary to give in on the question of withdrawal. Commander Stassen agreed with Mr. Armstrong but said that he thought the small states should be given complete freedom of action with respect to the right of withdrawal. By this he meant that the United States should not attempt to influence the decision reached. Commander Stassen thought that the United States should not attempt to force through its position if by so doing it would prejudice a successful outcome with respect to the other closely related issues. Commander Stassen pointed out that there was no five-power position on withdrawal. Apparently the USSR favored a clear statement of the right of withdrawal. However, there was no clear position among the smaller powers.

Mr. Armstrong asked what the situation would be if the last half of paragraph 3 of Chapter XI were to be omitted. Specifically, Mr. Armstrong wondered whether the ratification of amendments passed by a Revisionary Convention would be provided for under the original amendment procedure of the Dumbarton Oaks draft. There was general agreement that the original language would cover amendments passed by a Revisionary Convention, but Commander Stassen pointed out that any change in the Four-Power Amendment would require referral to Moscow. Commander Stassen thought that in any event, if a suitable solution could not be worked out that day in the Committee, it might be necessary to submit the question to a higher level on the following day. Mr. Armstrong declared that he would favor giving some consideration to Mr. Evatt’s proposal that the right of withdrawal be recognized when an amendment failed of ratification as well as when an amendment is passed which a state was unable to accept. Mr. Dulles agreed that Mr. Evatt’s proposal, although it had since been withdrawn, was an excellent suggestion. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out, however, that the question required careful consideration. He asked what would be the case if the United States refused to ratify an amendment by which additional responsibilities and obligations would be imposed upon the United States. Under Mr. Evatt’s proposal any state could withdraw from the Organization under these circumstances, and upon the United States would fall the onus of having broken up the Organization. Mr. Pasvolsky expressed the opinion that too much of a “smoke screen” was being laid with respect to the ability of China and France to assume the obligations of big powers. Commander Stassen thought that the question should be considered realistically. Commander Stassen pointed out that in his opinion if there were sufficient pressure in the Organization to cause a breakup, the Organization would dissolve. This would be true with respect to the situation which Mr. Pasvolsky had outlined. Commander Stassen thought that the United States could not insist on acceptance of all its demands and still attempt to force the other members of the Organization to remain in the Organization. Mr. Hickerson agreed that, if the United States opposed an amendment which all the other nations were in favor of, then the United States, under Mr. Evatt’s scheme, would have to bear the responsibility for smashing the Organization. Commander Stassen thought that Mr. Evatt’s proposal was a sound one in as much as it constituted a kind of sanction by the United Nations on the use of the veto power by the major powers. He thought it was a completely unobjectionable provision. Mr. Pasvolsky asked Commander Stassen whether he thought acceptance could be gained for the elimination of the last part of paragraph 3, leaving only the first sentence thereof. Commander Stassen thought that acceptance would be gained but that it would probably require two weeks of negotiation and approval. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that, if the second half of the paragraph were to be dropped, there could be no doubt of the applicability of the original phraseology of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Commander Stassen urged, however, that there would be little chance of gaining approval for such a revision in less than a week, but Mr. Pasvolsky replied that approval would have to be gained for the other alternatives also. The Secretary remarked that the closing days of the Conference were approaching, and he thought it was necessary to give latitude to Commander Stassen and his associates. The Secretary thought that there had been adequate discussion by the Delegation to acquaint Commander Stassen with the position of the American group. Therefore, he suggested that the entire matter be put in Commander Stassen’s hands and that Commander Stassen be permitted to work out a solution within the broad lines of the discussions in the Delegation meetings.

Senator Vandenberg asked whether Mr. Evatt was the key to the difficulties. Mr. Dulles pointed out in reply that the Australian amendment to the domestic jurisdiction clause in Chapter II, paragraph 7 had been carried solely as a personal tribute to Mr. Evatt. Mr. Armstrong thought that an attempt should be made to reach an agreement with Mr. Evatt to drop the second part of paragraph 3 of Chapter XI,⁵⁵ and then the decision should be pushed through among the other major powers. However, Commander Stassen pointed out that this change could not be made without submitting the entire matter to Moscow.

Senator Connally asked what the result had been on the question of the Deputy Secretaries-General. Mr. Notter replied that it had been decided by a vote of 30–1 to omit any reference to the Deputy-Secretaries-General, However, Commander Stassen corrected Mr. Notter and declared that the vote had been 20–19 on a roll call.⁵⁶ Senator Connally thought that the best solution might be to maintain the veto with respect to the nomination of the Secretary-General and to allow that official to appoint his own deputies.

In Senator Connally’s view, a straight withdrawal clause was to be desired. However, he declared that he would accept the insertion of a statement in the records of the Committee, Senator Connally declared that it had always been his opinion that the Delegation should meet this issue “face to face”. Representative Bloom asked what kind of withdrawal clause Commander Stassen was being instructed to adopt. Commander Stassen replied that there were two alternatives. It had been suggested that a complete withdrawal clause be included in the Charter. It had also been proposed that reference be made in the Commission report to the right of a state to withdraw from the Organization under certain circumstances. The Secretary asked what conditions would be imposed under this second alternative. Commander Stassen declared that the state would be entitled to withdraw from the Organization if the Organization failed in the performance of its functions or if an amendment were passed with which a member state could not agree. The Secretary asked whether the Delegation would be satisfied to permit Commander Stassen to attend the meeting of the Committee with full freedom to work out a solution within the limits set by the discussions of the Delegation.

Mr. Hickerson observed that it would be helpful to the Political Advisers to have a complete statement of the program of the absolute requirements of the United States. The Secretary declared that he thought such a list would already have been available. Mr. Hickerson declared that such a list was not available and pointed to the question of amendment. It had been suggested that the Delegation accept the first sentence of paragraph 3 of Chapter XI, with the omission of the rest of the paragraph. The Secretary asked whether there was any doubt that the United States must insist on a veto over amendments. Mr. Dulles remarked that he was not in agreement with the Secretary and declared that he wanted his position clarified for the sake of the record although he knew there was no possibility of changing the position of the Delegation. Mr. Dulles pointed to the statement of Senators Fulbright and Burton, which had been read to the Delegation earlier in the meeting. Mr. Dulles thought that the inflexibility of the amendment procedure would be a focal point for attack. Senator Vandenberg declared that the two Senators mentioned would vote in favor of the Charter even if “it gave the United States to Ethiopia”. Representative Bloom thought that these two Senators had not thought the matter through completely.

Mr. Dulles thought that the failure of the United States to maintain a veto over amendments passed by the Organization would not be very disastrous to this country because of the great prestige of the United States and because of the obvious necessity of the cooperation of the United States in making the Organization a success. However, it might be possible for China to oppose an amendment in which case the situation might be such that China could merely be permitted to drop out of the Organization. If such a situation were to arise, it would be possible to form a new organization just as the new World Court which was being formed eliminated some of the states which had been members of the previous court. Mr. Dulles thought that it would be advantageous to find some way of expressing this possibility in the Committee report. It was important, Mr. Dulles thought, to make clear that the “dead hand” of one of the major powers need not necessarily be continued in perpetuity. For this reason, Mr. Dulles declared that he recommended Mr. Evatt’s suggestion because it said in effect that a new organization could be formed at any time when one of the major powers was no longer capable of exercising its responsibility. The world, Mr. Dulles pointed out, is a living thing and cannot possibly be held by a “dead hand” in spite of the language of the Charter. Mr. Dulles urged that the present Conference was dropping Japan and Italy from the ranks of the Organization despite the fact that these two nations had held permanent seats on the Council of the League of Nations. Mr. Dulles thought that some way should be found to point to this fact and to point out that the Conference was not necessarily accepting the idea that the five major powers would retain a permanent veto power.

Senator Connally asked whether pressure was still being maintained for the establishment of a fixed time period for holding a Re-visionary Convention. Commander Stassen declared that there was still pressure for the establishment of a period between the fifth and tenth year of the operation of the Organization. Commander Stassen declared that the major powers were attempting to defeat this proposal, and he pointed out that Mr. Evatt had indicated his willingness to accept a ten year period. Commander Stassen thought that Mr. Dulles’ presentation had been good, but he voiced the opinion that it would be impossible to make any reference such as Mr. Dulles had proposed in a Committee report. Commander Stassen then outlined the matters on which the Delegation had agreed as follows:

1. The Delegation had agreed to support re-insertion of provisions for expulsion in the Charter.

2. The Delegation had agreed on the unanimity requirement for the ratification of amendments. Secretary Stettinius pointed out that there was unanimity of the major powers on this subject.

3. The Delegation had agreed to propose a definite time period and to support a provision which would place the calling of a Revisionary Convention on the Agenda of a General Assembly in its tenth year of operation. Commander Stassen thought that the Soviet would come through on this question. Mr. Rockefeller disagreed with this, and Commander Stassen declared that, in that case, the United States would have to vote against the other members of the Big Five. Mr. Rockefeller thought that this was a realistic position. The United States had been voting consistently according to the Big Five positions and had gained a reputation for voting for things in which it did not believe. However, on the previous day the Russians had voted against the five power agreement.

4. The Delegation had still to decide whether it would grant to Mr. Armstrong and Commander Stassen latitude to work out a withdrawal provision in order to obtain acceptance for the remainder of the program.

Secretary Stettinius declared that he agreed with the position stated a few moments previously by Mr. Dulles. However, he thought this would take five months of negotiation, and he expressed the opinion that it would be impossible to obtain the agreement of the British to such a proposition. Mr. Dulles declared that he was not proposing a substantive change in the Charter. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the Russians were in favor of the recommendation of a general right of withdrawal and he asked why a statement recognizing this right should not be placed in the record. Commander Stassen declared that his position would be to accept Mr. Evatt’s proposal if agreement could be reached among the major powers. Mr. Dulles thought that the United States should take a more positively favorable position on Mr. Evatt’s proposal. Mr. Hickerson pointed out that Mr. Evatt had agreed to a provision for a vote on the question of calling a Revisionary Convention after ten years. Mr. Hickerson thought that Mr. Evatt would accept phraseology without any reference to a procedural vote. Mr. Hickerson thought that this Government could now sell any position it wanted to maintain. Commander Stassen thought that there had been a misunderstanding on the amendment question. He pointed out that there was nothing in the Charter which provided for a veto over a Revisionary Conference. The veto applied only to the ratification of an amendment passed by such conference. There had been, he thought, a great deal of misunderstanding about this question. However, the Delegation was unanimous that there must be a unanimity rule with respect to any amendment passed by the Organization. Mr. Hickerson declared that in this case it would be impossible to accept Mr. Evatt’s proposal and Commander Stassen agreed. Mr. Hickerson declared that so long as this position was made clear to him, he could insure its acceptance by the smaller powers. [At this point, 10 a.m., Secretary Stettinius and Mr. Hickerson left the meeting.]⁵⁷

Expulsion

Mr. Hackworth asked why the Delegation should stand so strongly for the re-insertion of the provision on expulsion. Mr. Hackworth pointed out that the Organization could suspend a recalcitrant member indefinitely. This, he thought, would have the same practical effect as expulsion. Commander Stassen declared that this was the Soviet position and no change could be effected without first clearing the question with Moscow. Mr. Armstrong asked whether the United States could not afford to lose on this question, but Commander Stassen replied that in his opinion the question could be carried. Commander Stassen thought that it would not be desirable to have Russia overturned too often during the last few days of the Conference. Mr. Notter remarked that there had been no change in the Delegation’s position as a result of that morning’s meeting.

Commander Stassen asked what his instructions were. Senator Connally declared that it was his understanding that Commander Stassen, Mr. Armstrong, and Mr. Dulles were authorized to work out an acceptable solution. However, Senator Connally was of the opinion that the Delegation would prefer the insertion of a clause on withdrawal in the report of the Committee rather than a clause tied to amendment procedure. [At this point, 10:15 a.m., Mr. Pasvolsky and Mr. Hackworth left the meeting.]^57a

Trusteeship

Commander Stassen reported that there might be a slight modification in the draft of Section A of the Trusteeship Chapter, which the Delegation had considered on the previous day.⁵⁸ Commander Stassen remarked that he had been having difficulty with the French, the British, with Mr. Evatt, and with the Philippines. He declared that he would keep in touch with the military advisers and would make certain that the interest of the United States would be safeguarded. Commander Stassen pointed out that, if agreement among the disputing powers were not reached before the Committee met, there would be a “grand battle” in the final meeting of the Committee.

Senator Connally asked the Military Advisers whether they were satisfied with the trusteeship draft and with the course of the discussions which were then underway. General Fairchild replied that the Military Advisers had no reason to be dissatisfied since most of the questions they had considered were not military at all but were of a political nature.

[Here follow remarks by Mr. Rockefeller on the problem of lining up votes and remarks by Commander Stassen on the question of referring parts of the Charter to Congressional Committees.]

Domestic Jurisdiction

Mr. Dulles declared that there would be a tremendous argument on the subject of domestic jurisdiction at that day’s meeting of Committee I/1. Mr. Dulles declared that, unless adequate support were obtained from Mr. Rockefeller, the major powers would be defeated. There was an attempt to re-insert in the paragraph on domestic jurisdiction the wording “disputes arising out of matters which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction …”. This wording had been in the original Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, and a great deal of support was being enlisted to re-insert it. Mr. Dulles declared that he did not like the wording and thought it was nebulous. Mr. Dulles asked the Senators whether they thought it was essential that this phraseology be kept out of the Charter. Senator Vandenberg thought that there would probably be a reservation if the words were included.

Mr. Rockefeller declared that he was having a meeting with Commander Stassen at 2:30 that day to attempt to obtain an over-all picture of the entire situation. Mr. Dulles asked if it would be helpful for him to present a memorandum stating the United States position on domestic jurisdiction and outlining the reasons for this position.⁶⁰ Mr. Rockefeller declared that such a statement would be very helpful and should be in by 2:30 p.m.

The meeting was adjourned at 10:23 a.m.

46. Memorandum of conversation, June 13, not printed.
47. Senator Harold H. Burton, of Ohio, and Senator J. W. Fulbright, of Arkansas.
48. Doc. 967, III/1/48, June 14, UNCIO Documents, vol. 11, p. 512.
49. Doc. 976, I/1/40, June 14, UNCIO Documents, vol. 6, p. 494; see also memorandum by Mr. Evatt (Doc. 969, I/1/39, June 14) which was circulated at the meeting of Committee I/1, June 11, 8:45 p.m. (Doc. 926, I/1/36, June 12), ibid., pp. 436 and 421, respectively.
50. Brackets appear in the original.
50. Doc. 975, III/1/50, June 14, UNCIO Documents, vol. 11, p. 545.
51. See report of the Rapporteur of Committee II/1, Doc. 666, 11/1/26(1) (a), May 30, ibid., vol. 8, p. 452.
52. Doc. 328, II/I/13, May 16, ibid., p. 331; see also minutes of the meetings of the United States delegation, May 14, 9:05 a.m., ante, p. 707; May 15, 6 p.m., p. 740; and May 17, 8:30 a.m., p. 768; see also reports of the drafting subcommittee of II/1, Doc. 471, II/1/A/1, May 21, UNCIO Documents, vol. 8, p. 532, and Doc. 560, II/1/A/2, May 25, ibid., p. 540.
53. See minutes of the Five-Power meeting, June 13, 2:30 p.m., p. 1280.
54. Summary report of eighth meeting of Subcommittee I/2/E, June 13, 10:15 p.m., not printed.
55. See amendments to chapter XI proposed by the four Sponsors and by Australia, UNCIO Documents, vol. 3, pp. 628 and 544, respectively; for consideration of chapter XI by Committee I/2 on June 14, 4:15 p.m., see Doc. 991, I/2/66, June 15, ibid., vol. 7, p. 209.
56. Doc. 974, I/2/64, June 14, ibid., p. 204.
57. Brackets appear in the original.
58. Brackets appear in the original.
58. Minutes of the seventieth meeting, June 13, 9 a.m., p. 1273.
60. For Mr. Dulles’ explanation of the view of the four Sponsoring Governments on domestic jurisdiction, see Doe. 1019, I/1/42, June 16, UNCIO Documents, vol. 6, p. 507.