Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 99: UNCIO Cons Five Min 21

Minutes of the Twenty-First Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed Amendments, Held at San Francisco, June 13, 1945, 2:30 p.m.

San Francisco, June 13, 1945, 2:30 p.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of names of participants, including members of delegations of the United States (23); United Kingdom (4); France (6); China (3); and the Soviet Union (4).]

Mr. Stettinius called attention to the tentative conference schedule, and said that everything possible was being done to bring the conference to an end on June 23, 1945. …

… He said that there had been some misunderstanding yesterday afternoon regarding the decision reached with respect to the language texts. He had understood that there had been agreement on the Smuts-Koo proposal to end the conference on June 23,³⁸ all delegations to sign the English text, and to sign such other texts as were available on that date. Mr. Boncour had given assurance that the French text would be available. He wished to say again that such a procedure involved no change in the decision of the conference that there should be five official languages. Such texts as were not signed here could be signed later in Washington.

Ambassador Gromyko said that agreement had not been reached yet. Ambassador Gromyko said that his recollection of the agreement was not entirely in accord with Mr. Stettinius’ statement. Instead of saying that if the several texts were ready, they could be signed, it was his understanding that it had been agreed to give instructions to the Secretariat to have the five texts ready. His suggestion had been to give instructions to the Secretary General to prepare the official versions in five languages. The Soviet Delegation would give all possible assistance so that the Russian version would be ready by the end of the conference. He thought it was quite possible to do this.

Mr. Stettinius remarked that it would have been helpful if this could have been made entirely clear yesterday. We thought that agreement had been reached on the other procedure. If the other four official texts were not ready, the signature would proceed on June 23.

Ambassador Koo agreed with Mr. Stettinius’ version of the agreement.

Mr. Hiss said that the principal problem was whether the fifty delegations would accept the texts prepared by the Secretariat and reviewed by the language panels.

Ambassador Gromyko remarked that if other states did not agree they could sign later. Mr. Stettinius inquired whether the Ambassador would be willing to accept the International Secretariat text and sign the Spanish and Chinese texts without having them checked by his own experts. The Ambassador replied that he thought that a sufficient check could be made in San Francisco to satisfy his delegation.

Mr. Hiss inquired whether it might be possible to sign the English and French texts in San Francisco, to hold the other text[s] open here for signature by those willing to sign, having other states sign later in Washington.

Lord Halifax inquired what would happen if his government found fault with the text. He thought that there ought to be agreement to finish ion June 23, and that the Secretariat should be instructed to do its utmost to have the five texts ready.

Ambassador Gromyko agreed not to fix a rigid rule at present. Mr. Stettinius thought that we must either set a schedule to finish on June 23, or contemplate the possibility of having the conference run on for two weeks longer.

By way of résumé, Mr. Hiss suggested the following:

1. June 23 should be set as the date.

2. The English and French texts should be ready by that date.

3. The text in the three other official languages should be completed and checked so far as possible by that date.

4. If any state refused to sign a text, then there should be a decision as to the method of signature. There might be either a partial signature or no signature at all.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that agreement be reached to fix June 23 as the closing date, and that the Secretariat be instructed to produce five texts. All states should sign the English and French texts. We would hope to sign the other three, but if some states wanted to check and sign later in Washington they should be permitted to do so.

Ambassador Gromyko said that he did not want a procedure which would divide the text in two groups. He thought that the goal should be to have all five texts ready for signature. Mr. Stettinius suggested by way of conclusion that all delegations be invited to sigh all five texts. If any asked for further time to check any one of the five texts, they could sign later. This was agreed to.

Lord Halifax pointed out that if some delegations were unwilling to sign, it would be difficult for other delegations to introduce change. Perhaps in such event the changes proposed by a delegation could be submitted and circularized to all the others.

Mr. Stettinius said that he thought the discussion had clarified the agreement. He wished to announce that the Technical Committee had approved the Yalta voting procedure by a vote of thirty in favor and two opposed, with fifteen abstaining, and three absent.³⁹ He wished to pay personal tribute to Senator Connally for handling this matter for the United States.

. . . . . . .

1. Chapter XII, Paragraph 1

Mr. Stettinius said that this item on the agenda had to do with transitional arrangements and read the text of Chapter XII, paragraph 1. He asked Mr. Pasvolsky to comment on this question. Mr. Pasvolsky said that this matter had been referred by the Five Powers to the subcommittee of five. Differences had arisen concerning the interpretation of the language of the Dumbarton Oaks text. The subcommittee had agreed yesterday on a text with the understanding that it would be placed before the several delegations. The text is as follows:

“Pending the coming into force of the such special agreement or agreements referred to in Chapter VIII, Section B, paragraph 5, as in the opinion Of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Chapter VIII, Section B, paragraph 4, the States parties to and in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of the states parties to that Declaration, should consult with one another and as occasion arises with other members of the Organization with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

“No provision of the Charter should preclude action taken or authorized in relation to enemy states as a result of the present war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.”

Senator Connally thought that the proposed draft would meet all of the complaints made in the committee. He said that there had never been any divergence on the substance but a wide difference on the language of the text.

Mr. Boncour found the text fully acceptable, as did also Lord Halifax. Mr. Stettinius, for the United States Delegation, confirmed the view stated by Senator Connally.

Ambassador Gromyko said that this matter was very important and he would like to study the text and communicate with his government.

Ambassador Koo indicated his agreement with the text.

Mr. Stettinius inquired when Committee III/3 could complete its labours. Senator Connally said this was the one remaining item on the Committee’s agenda. Mr. Stettinius accordingly asked Ambassador Gromyko to communicate with his government as promptly as possible. The Ambassador said that he thought that he might have an answer in a day or two.

2. Military Staff Committee Consultations With Regional Agencies

Mr. Pasvolsky said that the question here was whether the word “consultation” implied approval or disapproval.⁴⁰ It was the view of the United States, United Kingdom, the Chinese and the French Delegations that the approval or disapproval was not implied. The Soviet Delegation thought there might be an implication of approval or disapproval. Accordingly, the subcommittee of five had agreed on the words “an exchange of views” as a possible substitute for “consultation.” Mr. Pasvolsky said it was the opinion of the political advisors on the American Delegation that opening this question in the Technical Committee would cause very great difficulty.

Ambassador Gromyko said that the word “consultation” does not necessarily mean agreement. It would be quite possible that the result of consultation would be disagreement. The Soviet Delegation would like to have a draft which would show clearly that the final decision rests with the Military Staff Committee. In his view, the present text left the matter in some doubt and uncertainty. He would like to see an improvement in the language. He suggested the possibility of adding “however, this consultation does not interfere with, the right of the Military Staff Committee to make a final decision.”

Mr. Dejean said that his Delegation would have no objection to the additional language.

Lord Halifax assured the Soviet Ambassador that he would not conceive the word “consultation” to imply any possible doubt of the final authority of the Military Staff Committee. As to the proposed addition, he saw no objection. However, if the matter were reopened now, considerable time would be wasted and he thought it was not worth the effort.

Mr. Stettinius said that for the United States Delegation he wished to say that he felt to reopen the matter would be most unwise and embarrassing.

Ambassador Koo had no doubt of the final meaning of the word “consultation.” Ambassador Gromyko thought “exchange of views” would be an improvement.

Mr. Hickerson said that the Latin-American states had accepted the word “consultation” and that they knew what it meant. He wished to enter a plea that the subject not be reopened in a Technical Committee.

Mr. Stettinius inquired whether it would be possible to have the meaning of the word made clear at the time the Committee reported to the Plenary Session.

Ambassador Gromyko said that this procedure would be satisfactory if the rapporteur or Chairman made a statement in the Plenary Session as to the meaning of the word “consultation.” He added this would not change the Soviet view that the word was not clear. It was his understanding that the rapporteur or Chairman should say that the present text means that final decision shall be taken by the Military Staff Committee.

3. Right of the General Assembly to Discuss Any Matter Within the Sphere of International Relations (Chapter V, Section B, Paragraph 1)

Ambassador Gromyko said that his Delegation attached great importance to this provision. If the phrase “within the sphere of international relations” were retained it would give the Assembly too broad a power of discussion.⁴¹ The Assembly could discuss not only matters relating to peace and security, but any matter within the whole sphere of international relations. Such a provision would serve no useful purpose and might cause considerable harm. He would like a reconsideration of the matter by the proper Committee.

Mr. Stettinius said he would like to call attention to the emphatic action of the Technical Committee on this provision.⁴² It represented only a minor concession to the small nations and he thought that to reopen it would cause the greatest resentment. He asked Senator Vandenberg to make a statement for the American Delegation.

Senator Vandenberg said that he and Professor Webster were members of the Technical Committee. Frankly, in his opinion no question of substance was involved. The Four-Power amendment had provided for the discussion of any situation regardless of origin. The Committee had repeatedly been assured that it was free to discuss anything, and that it was in effect the “town meeting of the world.” As a matter of strategy and morale he thought to reopen this matter would be a terrific error.

Mr. Boncour agreed with Senator Vandenberg’s statement and Lord Halifax inquired what the Soviet Ambassador had to say in view of the facts recounted by Senator Vandenberg.

Ambassador Gromyko said that the principal purpose of the Organization is to maintain international peace and security. If the phrase in question were included there would be no limits upon the Assembly. As to the question of reconsideration in the Technical Committee, he pointed out that this had been done in other cases.

Professor Webster asserted that there was no chance of the Committee altering its view. He thought that there would be no difference in result if the restricting words were added, as he regarded paragraph 6 as broad as the provision in paragraph 1. On the verge of the struggle on the questions of amendment and revision it would be a great mistake to reopen the matter. Mr. Stettinius endorsed Professor Webster’s statement saying that we still had a great hurdle to get over on the question of unanimity on amendments. To open this matter now would be “full of dynamite.”

Ambassador Koo agreed that it would be impolitic to reopen the matter.

Ambassador Gromyko expressed the view that the provision was in conflict with the domestic jurisdiction provision. There would be no limit on the discussion of any question.

Mr. Stettinius said that we were going over ground discussed at great length and that he could not agree to support the reopening of the question.

Lord Halifax said he hoped that after hearing the discussion, the Soviet Ambassador would not find it necessary to reopen the matter in the Technical Committee. He was impressed with Mr. Stettinius’ statement concerning amendments and thought the fight on this question would be serious. As to the question of domestic jurisdiction, he thought that the Soviet Ambassador would be able to make his position clear on this point.

Ambassador Gromyko announced that he would raise the question in the Executive Committee and in the Steering Committee.

Mr. Stettinius said that the United States position was clear. It could not associate itself with the Soviet view. Lord Halifax agreed, as also did Mr. Boncour and Ambassador Koo.

Mr. Stettinius said that the five Delegations had, therefore, agreed to disagree, and each would be free to follow its own course. Consultations on this matter were ended. Ambassador Gromyko said that he had nothing to add. He regretted that it had been impossible to reach an agreement. He would be obliged to take the matter up in the Executive Committee and the Steering Committee.

Lord Halifax reiterated his hope that the Soviet Ambassador would not find it necessary to do this. He hoped that he might find it possible to make his view known in a public meeting at an appropriate time, and that he would not press for its consideration in the Executive and Steering Committees.

4. Withdrawal

Mr. Armstrong reviewed the discussion in the subcommittee⁴³ on the subject of withdrawal with relation to the question on amendment. He recalled the statement which had been included in the Committee report on motion of Mr. Rolin.⁴⁴ It had been agreed to handle the question of withdrawal by an interpretative statement. The debate had been full, careful and exhaustive. When the Chairman had been about to put a vote on the question of amendment, Mr. Armstrong said, he had brought forward the proposal with respect to the statement linking withdrawal with amendments. This had had a favorable reception.

Mr. Armstrong said that Mr. Rolin had agreed to accept the statement as rephrased in the draft before the group dated June 13, 1945, reading as follows:

“The Committee adopts the view that the Charter should not make express provision either to permit or to prohibit withdrawal from the Organization. The Committee deems that the highest duty of the nations which will become Members is to cooperate within the Organization for the preservation of international peace and security. If, however, a Member for good and sufficient reasons feels constrained to withdraw, and leave the burden of maintaining international peace and security on the other Members, it is not the purpose of the Organization to compel that Member to continue its cooperation in the Organization. Also, the absence of any express right of withdrawal would not prevent a Member withdrawing if its rights and obligations as a Member were changed by Charter amendment in which it has not concurred and which it finds itself unable to accept.

“Nor would it be the purpose of the Organization to compel a Member to remain in the Organization if its rights and obligations as such were changed by Charter amendment in which it has not concurred and which it finds itself unable to accept.

“It is for these considerations that the Committee has decided to abstain from recommending insertion in the Charter of a formal clause specifically forbidding or permitting withdrawal.”

Mr. Rolin had said that the body of the statement had represented a more concise statement of his views and he would be willing to present the matter to the Committee. The Soviet Delegate had said in the subcommittee that he would prefer a formal withdrawal clause. Mr. Armstrong had told the Soviet Representative at the end of the meeting that he had not understood that the Five Powers had agreed to separate action on this matter.

Lord Halifax said that he recalled that when this matter had last been discussed,⁴⁵ the Soviet Ambassador had reserved his position, and said he was prepared to review the question in view of the position of the other Delegations. He thought the draft now before the group represented an improvement and he liked it. He did hope that the Soviet Ambassador could associate himself with this draft. Lord Halifax himself did not regard the matter as of great importance.

Ambassador Gromyko said that it was his understanding that when this matter had been discussed previously, the Five Powers had not reached agreement. The Soviet Government had reserved its position.

Ambassador Koo said he had been left under the impression that the matter would be considered further by the Five Powers.

Lord Halifax said that he recalled saying to the Soviet Ambassador “you have your freedom now, but I hope you will not use it.”

Ambassador Gromyko said that his Delegation would back any Delegation which supported or brought forward a formal withdrawal clause.

Mr. Stettinius said that this closed the consultation on this subject and that each government would have freedom of action.

Ambassador Gromyko agreed with his statement, but he still thought that a formal withdrawal provision would be preferable.

Mr. Armstrong said that the debate showed that it was the intention of many to make the Organization a fluid and temporary one. He thought that a formal withdrawal provision would give support to those who took this view. He understood that the Five Powers would now have freedom of action. Mr. Stettinius confirmed this view.

Mr. Stettinius said that for any one of the Five at this late date to bring forward a withdrawal clause would be a very serious matter. He thought it would have a very adverse psychological effect on the conference. Lord Halifax agreed.

Mr. Stettinius adjourned the meeting at 3:45 p.m.

38. See minutes of the twentieth Five-Power meeting, June 12, 6 p.m., p. 1266.
39. Doc. 967, III/1/48, June 14, UNCIO Documents, vol. 11, p. 518.
40. See minutes of Five-Power meeting of June 4, noon, p. 1145; see also Doc. 881, III/3/46, June 10, UNCIO Documents, vol. 12, p. 512.
41. See minutes of the Five-Power meetings of June 3, 4 p.m., and June 4, noon, pp. 1120 and 1145, respectively.
42. Doc. 686, II/2/34, May 30, UNCIO Documents, vol. 9, p. 108.
43. Seventh meeting of Subcommittee I/2/E, June 13, 11 a.m. (US I/2/E, Doc. 7).
44. Doc. 538, I/2/34, May 24, UNCIO Documents, vol. 7, p. 95.
45. See the minutes of the Five-Power meeting, June 11, 3 p.m., p. 1256.