Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 99: UNCIO Cons Five Min 19

Minutes of the Nineteenth Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed Amendments’, Held at San Francisco, June 11, 1945, 3 p.m.

San Francisco, June 11, 1945, 3 p.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of names of participants, including members of delegations of the United States (17); United Kingdom (3); Soviet Union (5); China (3); France (3); and the International Secretariat (1).]

Mr. Stettinius opened the meeting at 3:00 p.m.

Mr. Stettinius announced that there were three special matters to discuss, the first of which was the authorization of the Secretariat to take up informally with the members of the Executive Committee the draft on the Interim Arrangements of June 9, 1945.

Senator Connally said he would like to say a word before he had to leave for the Technical Committee meeting of III/1.¹⁰ Probably there would be no vote today on the interpretation of the voting procedure. It was such a vital matter, however, that he hoped all of us could exert our influence to gather up votes and put over the interpretation that we had labored at so long and finally arrived at.

Mr. Stettinius stated that there was nothing more important. He said each one of the delegations should do what was in their power to line up countries and win the position taken by the Big Five on voting procedure. He felt we should let it be known that, unless this voting formula was accepted, there would not be an organization at all. We should go into action on this.

Mr. Stettinius said he had taken inventory of the time table for closing the Conference and that, if the present tempo was continued, some committees would not finish this week. Since the Coordinating Committee could not finish drafting until the committees had finished their work, there might be some delay. The work of the Coordinating Committee was an important one which needed great care. Moreover, the Charter would have to be reviewed to be sure all delegations were content. There were the problems of translation, duplication, and the cabling of the entire text to the home governments. He was getting concerned, he said. The low point had been reached last week, and now it was necessary for the sponsoring governments and France to exert a strong leadership in order to conclude the Conference with success.

[Here follows discussion of ways to speed up the work of the Conference Committees.]

Mr. Stettinius called on Ambassador Koo to present his views.

Ambassador Koo indicated that he agreed with the other members of the group that the work of the Conference must be pushed to a successful conclusion. He questioned whether it would do much good to get the chairman of the committees together and get their views on how to expedite the work of the Conference. He would prefer having the Chairman make a suggestion as to how to hurry the work along.

Mr. Stettinius proposed that the chairmen of committees and the four presidents of commissions be invited to his apartment to discuss this question. Ambassador Halifax suggested that it was most important to have the chairmen of the committees that had not finished their work, come. Mr. Rockefeller pointed out that, if we could get a real settlement of the amendment problems in this group, then Committee I/2 would be able to end its work promptly. Mr. Stettinius agreed that this was one of the Steps that was necessary. He added that he assumed that, after the committers completed their work, it would be necessary to have a number of commission meetings. He asked Mr. Hiss how long this stage would take. Mr. Hiss replied that the commissions would have to approve the Coordination Committee texts and that no final plenary session was possible until the commissions had finished their work. Ambassador Halifax asked whether it was expected that issues settled in committees would be opened again in the commissions. Mr. Hiss replied that the statements in the commission meetings would be primarily for the record. He thought that any issues raised would go to the Steering Committee rather than to the technical committees. Ambassador Halifax wondered whether there would be a plea in the Steering Committee to refer, matters back to the technical committees. He thought that from the action already taken by the Steering Committee it Would not be permitted to constitute itself a court of last appeal. Mr. Hiss pointed out that it was only the action in the Executive Committed that had cast, doubt on the powers of the Steering Committee and that unquestionably the right to review the Charter remained as ah unimpaired power, of the Steering Committee.

. . . . . . .

Mr. Stettinius asked if there were any objections to the June 9 draft of the preparatory commission (Interim Arrangements Concluded by the Governments Represented at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, June 9, 1945).¹¹

Mr. Boncour said he had no objections to this draft. Ambassador Gromyko said this draft had not been discussed by this group before. Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that the Subcommittee of Five had discussed this draft and had suggested that it be submitted for discussion to other members of the Executive Committee. It was felt, however, that authority to start discussing the draft informally with other members of the Executive Committee ought to come from the heads of the five delegations. Ambassador Halifax said it was satisfactory to him to have the draft discussed. Mr. Stettinius said the United States was agreeable to placing the draft before other members of the Executive Committee for discussion. Ambassador Gromyko and Ambassador Koo indicated their approval of this procedure.

Mr. Stettinius then called on Mr. Pasvolsky to present the second item on the agenda—abstention from voting in the Security Council.

Mr. Pasvolsky said that the question had been raised as to what abstention of the permanent members meant in counting the vote on the Security Council. This he said was a question of interpretation which had been discussed at great length at Dumbarton Oaks, at which time consideration had been given to the possibility of including a special provision on abstention. Following careful consideration it was decided, however, not to allow abstention for the permanent members, but to require that all vote on all important matters. He said that our understanding of paragraph 3 of the Yalta formula was that abstention was equivalent to a negative vote. If abstention of the permanent members was permitted, then it would be possible for the Council to take a decision with only a few of the permanent members voting. This question had now been asked the major powers, and since it was a matter that raised questions of interpretation, it had been thought wise to bring the matter up for discussion at this meeting, Mr. Stettinius asked Mr. Pasvolsky what his recommendation was. Mr. Pasvolsky indicated that he would prefer to stand on the interpretation that abstention by a permanent member is equivalent to a negative vote. Mr. Golunsky indicated that this would not be true when a permanent member was party to a dispute under Section A, Chapter VIII. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that of course he had not been talking in terms of automatic abstention under Section A, Chapter VIII. He had been speaking, he said, only of cases in which abstention was not required.

Ambassador Gromyko indicated that the understanding by the Soviet Delegation of this issue was similar to that presented by Mr. Pasvolsky, and that abstention should be regarded as a negative vote. Ambassador Halifax indicated his agreement. He thought this must be the interpretation unless the voting clause was going to be redrafted. Since this was not possible there was no doubt in his mind that we should stand on the interpretation that, if one of the permanent members abstained, it would block action. Under those conditions it would not be possible to have the necessary concurring votes of the five permanent members. Mr. Hoo agreed with this interpretation.

Mr. Boncour disagreed and stated that in no parliament in the world would abstention mean a negative vote. If a state abstains, he said, it means simply that they did not wish to give an opinion on a matter.

Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that the fact was that there was no provision for abstention in the document as it stood. Abstention was equivalent to obstruction. The theory was that the permanent members should take positive responsibility for decisions.

Ambassador Halifax pointed out that there was a difference between parliaments and the Security Council. If abstention was permitted, he said, it would be possible for the Security Council to take action without the complete unanimity of the Five Powers. He pointed out that we would be cutting away the ground from under the position we had taken in justifying the veto power, namely, that all important decisions required the unanimity of the Five Powers.

Mr. Boncour stated that, if a state does not vote negatively, it should not be interpreted to have voted negatively. If a state abstained it was not expressing its opinion in opposition to the issue. If a state wanted to vote negatively it could.

Mr. Pasvolsky indicated that the vote for the Security Council was based on the principle that a certain number of members, including the five permanent members, was necessary in order to constitute the majority. There was no provision that the vote should be taken by a certain majority of those present and voting. He pointed out that the special provision in the Yalta formula for the concurrence of the five permanent members meant that abstention by the permanent members was not contemplated. Mr. Boncour asked then whether abstention was definitely suppressed for the permanent members. Ambassador Gromyko indicated that abstention meant a negative vote. Mr. Pasvolsky agreed and said that the basic theory of the Dumbarton Oaks document was that abstention was not possible for the permanent members. Abstention by a permanent member meant that the Council could not proceed.

Mr. Stettinius stated that there was no such thing as abstention for the permanent members, in effect, but only the absence of an affirmative vote.

Mr. Boncour said that he would agree with the others as long as it was understood that there was no right of abstention for the permanent members and so long as it was clear that the Security Council could proceed in the settlement of disputes when a permanent member party to a dispute abstained.

Mr. Stettinius called on Mr. Armstrong to present the third item on the agenda, the problem of withdrawal.

Mr. Armstrong said that a serious question had arisen in Committee I/2 that was known to all the delegations. He wished to suggest that it was important to consolidate the position of the Five in order to ward off opposition. In the first place, there was the problem as to whether we wanted to deal with the question of withdrawal from a general point of view or linked with amendments. The second problem was to make sure that the special conference called to review the Charter was not left free to determine its own rules of procedure and the method of ratification. Third, the question still had to be dealt with as to the time for the holding of the conference in view of the vote already taken in the subcommittee that the conference be held within a five- to ten-year period. In the fourth place, the question of the retention of a provision for expulsion remained open. Mr. Armstrong explained that it was agreed that all these questions were interlocked and that it was time to adopt a procedure that would make it possible for us to get the most that we wanted.

Mr. Armstrong stated that this matter had been thought over and discussed by the American Delegation at considerable length. The views of the five delegations were not yet fully clear with respect to the matter of withdrawal. The United States Delegation had put forward the suggestion that the date for the calling of the conference might be handled by placing the subject on the agenda of the tenth Assembly if previous to that time a conference had not been held. Moreover, he said, it was understood that some states wished to link the withdrawal clause to the amendment procedure by a statement in the committee report. In the light of this possibility a statement had been prepared. (This statement was then distributed to the members of the group, Withdrawal: Suggestion for Text of Committee Report, June 11, 1945.¹²)

Ambassador Gromyko said he would prefer to consider the two questions separately. In connection with the question of withdrawal he had already proposed that a withdrawal provision be put in the Charter, tied up with the amendment process. He said that he had been asked whether he would agree to including a general withdrawal provision in the Charter. He had explained that this question was a new question, a new angle, and that he would have to think it over. At that same time the other delegations had said that they were not ready to express their final opinion. He said he would like to hear their opinion at this time. He did not feel that the questions of withdrawal and amendments were necessarily tied together.

Mr. Armstrong explained that it was important to get a basis for the general settlement of the questions under consideration in Committee I/2. The United States Delegation thought that the question of withdrawal played an important part in such a general settlement. Although some Latin American states had indicated a desire for a withdrawal provision in connection with amendments, there was evidence that they were strongly opposed to a general withdrawal provision. In fact some of them had favored an amendment to prohibit withdrawal. Mr. Armstrong stated that the most important thing was to defeat the attempt to override the veto provision on amendments and also to defeat the setting of a definite date for the calling of the conference to review the Charter. These defeats could not be accomplished, he said, unless an integrated proposal was developed.

Mr. Stettinius said he agreed with Mr. Armstrong’s presentation of the problem and asked how the heads of the other delegations felt. Ambassador Gromyko said he had suggested that a general withdrawal provision be included in the Charter and asked that he receive some reply on this question from the other delegations.

Ambassador Halifax said he recognized that the questions were inter-connected and that he was quite prepared to express his view on either withdrawal or amendments or on both of them. He thought that the only effective way to handle the withdrawal problem was to include some reference to it in the report of the Committee. He said he had given a good deal of thought to this question and definitely did not want a withdrawal provision in the Charter. If the withdrawal provision had to be included in some form, he said he would much prefer it in the Committee report. He was afraid that a provision for fixed review of the Charter together with an express withdrawal provision, would certainly give the impression that the Charter was impermanent. The British Delegation view was clear, he said, that two such provisions would give the organization a temporary character. If it was necessary to put a provision for withdrawal in the Committee report, then Ambassador Halifax said that the text before the group struck him as an improvement over the earlier text. It was simpler and more direct. However, he said he did not like the last sentence which blurred the clarity of the rest of the statement.

Mr. Stettinius said he was very grateful that Ambassador Halifax felt that the major portion of the statement was agreeable to him. This was the way the United States Delegation also felt about the text and it agreed that to put a provision for withdrawal in the Charter would tend to give the Organization a temporary character. He indicated that the United States Delegation did not attach great importance to the last sentence which could easily be dropped. Mr. Armstrong explained that the text before the group was a suggested text to be substituted for the one already adopted by the Committee. The earlier text had in it considerable flamboyant language and this sentence represented only the little that had been retained in order to please the original author.

Ambassador Gromyko indicated that he would like to hear from Mr. Hoo and Mr. Boncour.

Mr. Hoo said he agreed with Ambassador Halifax and also felt that the last sentence was unsatisfactory.

Mr. Boncour said he did not see the utility of the last sentence. He did not see how if a state wanted to leave it would be possible to prevent it. The two-year notice provision in the League Covenant was no use, he said.

Ambassador Gromyko agreed that the proposal was worth attention, but in the Soviet view it was not enough. The Soviet Government would have to reserve its right to act in accordance with its own views. Whereas the Delegation had no definite text to offer on withdrawal for the Charter, such a text would be easy to get.

Ambassador Halifax said he hoped that, if the Soviet Ambassador reserved his right, he would not use it.

Ambassador Gromyko asked why, if the heads of the other delegations agreed in principle with the right of withdrawal, a provision on withdrawal should not be put into the Charter. Ambassador Halifax said it would have been one thing to introduce a provision for withdrawal at the time of the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations. To introduce it now however would sow doubt in the minds of the public. He hoped very strongly that no effort would be made in this direction.

Ambassador Gromyko said it was impossible to keep a state that wanted to withdraw, in the Organization. He would have to reserve the right to act according to his views. Mr. Armstrong said that in this event there was nothing to do but to go ahead in the Committee on this basis.

Ambassador Gromyko asked what chance there was to avoid mention in the Charter of a definite date for the calling of a conference. Mr. Armstrong replied that something would have to be offered if we were going to get a reversal on the five- to ten-year period and that is why the United States Delegation favored the putting of the calling of the conference on the agenda of the tenth Assembly.

Mr. Stettinius stated that it would create a bad impression if any indication was now suddenly given that a state might want to get out of the Organization. Ambassador Gromyko pointed out that the question of withdrawal had been mentioned at Dumbarton Oaks. Mr. Armstrong explained that, if an amendment for the inclusion of a provision for withdrawal was now brought forward, the public would interpret it as a sign that the major powers were suspicious of each other. This would create great uncertainty. Mr. Stettinius agreed it would be a bad development. Ambassador Gromyko commented that the inclusion of such a provision in the Charter would not alter the situation, as under the interpretative statement states had the right to withdraw anyway.

Mr. Dulles indicated that the matter had to be approached from the psychological standpoint. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were silent on the question of withdrawal. They neither permitted it nor forbade it. Without changing the general psychological situation the Committee report permitting withdrawal had been adopted. In adopting this interpretation the omission of a provision for withdrawal from the Charter had been deliberately decided upon. Once an effort was made to actually change the text of the document, however, the whole world would focus on this problem and the world would question why this last minute development. He said it was perfectly consistent with our earlier position to interpret the existing text. If a change was made in the Charter, it would be difficult not to draw the conclusion that something had happened to cause this change.

Ambassador Gromyko said that the Soviet view was that any mention of the time for holding a general conference should be avoided, so that the only change in paragraph 3 of Chapter XI would be the change from a three-fourths vote to a two-thirds vote in the calling of the conference. (The document Chapter XI, Amendments, Paragraph 3, June 11, 1945,¹³ was distributed at this time.)

Mr. Armstrong stated that we had been defeated on the position stated by Ambassador Gromyko. This position by itself, he said, would not work and was unrealistic.

Ambassador Halifax said it was very important for the Five Powers to stand together on these questions, and that for his part, if Ambassador Gromyko would come along on the withdrawal interpretation, he would not greatly mind taking his luck on the fight against the five- to ten-year term. He said he would be with the Ambassador if the Ambassador would come with us. Mr. Stettinius commented that this was a case of secret deals openly arrived at.

Mr. Rockefeller stated that we already had to reverse two votes, on expulsion and on the deputy secretaries general. He wondered whether it would not be wise to make some moderate concession in order, to improve our position. Such a concession, he felt, would be the provision for putting the calling of the conference on the agenda of the tenth Assembly. This concession would create a beneficial reaction as indicating that we were quite willing to compromise. Ambassador Gromyko said he definitely preferred the four-power amendment on the general conference. He indicated, however, that he would agree to the proposal for putting the calling of the conference on the agenda of the tenth Assembly if the other delegations would agree with him on his withdrawal proposal.

Mr. Armstrong said that we would have to stay in this meeting until these issues were settled as they were becoming in a dangerous way the focus of the revisionist forces. Mr. Armstrong said that in large part the problem was now one of tactics.

Representative Bloom indicated that if the Subcommittee report came up to the Committee in an adverse form it was important to have an alternative to present when the report came to a vote. Mr. Armstrong agreed that we should be in the position of offering a substitute for the report of the Subcommittee to the Committee, particularly since it was quite likely thatths Subcommittee report would not obtain a two-thirds vote in the Committee. In addition to our concession of a two-thirds rather than a three-fourths vote in the calling of a conference to review the Charter, he said we might make two other concessions: (1) the placing of the calling of the conference on the agenda of the tenth General Assembly, and (2) addition to the Committee report of a statement on withdrawal.

Mr. Boncour questioned whether the provision for placing the calling of a conference on the agenda of the tenth Assembly was really a concession since it was clear that under the existing provisions, such a conference could be called anyway at any time. He wondered whether it would not give greater hope to those who wanted such a conference if no date at all was indicated, since then the Conference could be called earlier.

Representative Bloom urged that we would have to formulate a program so that we would have something concrete to offer as an alternative to the Subcommittee report when that report Jailed to obtain a two-thirds vote.

Mr. Boncour urged that, if no date was fixed, new hope would be stirred that the conference could be called at an early date. Ho thought we should put ourselves in the place of the small states.

Ambassador Halifax pointed out that, the Committee had already voted in favor of a provision for the calling of a conference within a five- to ten-year period.¹⁴ The real danger now was that the Committee would vote to leave the conference free to decide its own procedure and to determine the procedure of ratification This, he said, we could not accept. Therefore, he felt it was ordinary prudence to include a provision with respect to the agenda of the tenth Assembly. We would be getting away with something without giving much. As had already been said the Assembly had it in its power to call the conference at any time anyway. Mr. Stettinius said he agreed with Ambassador Halifax and Mr. Boncour also expressed agreement.

Ambassador Gromyko said it was desirable to defend the four-power amendment on paragraph 3 of Chapter XI, with the change to a two-thirds vote. He would agree, however, if circumstances turned out to be unfavorable and if it looked as though it would not be possible to exclude the provision for a five- to ten-year period, that we should then act according to the circumstances. We could then decide on the spot what we should do. He preferred, however, not to act on the additional sentence of paragraph 3 in a hurry.

Representative Bloom said he wished to make himself clear. He felt it was very important not to present our proposed amendment to the Subcommittee until we knew how the Committee would vote on the report. Mr. Armstrong agreed that it was well not to make the concession now but to hold it in abeyance as an alternative to a bad report from the Subcommittee.

Ambassador Gromyko indicated that this was a matter of tactics. Representative Bloom urged that we had to have something in our hand to win with. Ambassador Gromyko said he would authorize the use of this additional sentence under paragraph 3 as a counter-proposal, if necessary. When the report was discussed before the Committee he thought we should defend the whole amendment, and then, only if the situation became unfavorable, put forward a counterproposal. He suggested that we should not become softer at this moment. Mr. Stettinius said he understood that all the group was in agreement on this tactic.

Ambassador Gromyko said he had read in the Chronicle a story stating that the Soviet Delegation had issued a statement on the voting procedure in the Security Council and that this statement had been given over the radio on June 9. Ambassador Gromyko wanted to make it clear that this statement was a complete fiction and that the only statement made by the Soviet Delegation on this question had been made here in this group before the heads of the other four delegations.

Mr. Stettinius said he had not known the details of this situation but would ask Mr. Stevenson to investigate it. Ambassador Gromyko said Mr. Poynton had called to ask whether the Soviet Delegation had issued a release and had been told there was no such release. Ambassador Gromyko indicated that he wished to make it clear that this release was a complete fiction.

Senator Vandenberg remarked that he had an important announcement to make. Committee III/4 had completed its labors unanimously.¹⁵ Upon the unanimous acceptance of the rapporteur’s report, he said, he had taken the liberty of suggesting that he hoped this unanimity was a good omen that the United Nations would learn to live together under the new Organization in spite of differences.

The meeting was adjourned by Mr. Stettinius at 5 p.m.

10. Doc. 922, III/1/44, June 12, UNCIO Documents, vol. 11, p. 454.
11. Not printed; see draft of June 11, UNCIO Documents, vol. 5, p. 514.
12. See minutes of the sixty-eighth meeting of the United States delegation, June 11, 12:06 p.m., pp. 1236, 1249–1251.
13. Not printed.
14. Subcommittee I/2/E, at a meeting on June 8, 10:30 a.m., approved a proposal that a revision conference be held between five and ten years after entry into force of the Charter; the vote of 9 to 6 included Norway and France with the Sponsoring Governments in the negative. (US I/2/E Doc. 4)
15. Doc. 916, III/4/15, June 12, UNCIO Documents, vol. 12, p. 730.