Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60D 224, Box 96: US Cr Min 68

Minutes of the Sixty-Eighth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Monday, June 11, 1945, 12:06 p.m.

San Francisco, June 11, 1945, 12:06 p.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follow list of names of persons (34) present at meeting, and preliminary announcements by Secretary Stettinius.]

Italy

The Secretary asked whether a background paper had been prepared on the Italian situation in order that the Delegation might evaluate the recent request transmitted by the Italian Ambassador to Washington for the admission of Italy to the present Conference. Mr. Hickerson replied that a paper had not been prepared on the question. The Secretary declared that he wanted some one to present to the Delegation a factual analysis of the Italian request. The Delegation was referred to the text of the statement of the Italian Council of Ministers addressed to the San Francisco Conference, as follows:

“The Italian Council of Ministers deems it its duty to express the sense of deep disappointment of the Italian people at the exclusion of democratic Italy from a Conference destined to lay the foundation of a peaceful life among nations.

“The Council of Ministers recalls with deep emotion the words pronounced in June 1944 by the great President Roosevelt: We want Italy’s help and we count on Italy’s help for the building of a lasting peace.’⁹⁰

“This help Italy has given for eighteen months and is still giving to the extent allowed her and with all the means at her disposal. This help she is ready to give also in the future, whenever the cause of democracy has still to win its battles. Her fleet, her air forces and her regular and partisan units have contributed to victory, and her people are organizing themselves under the rule of liberty and democracy, despite the tremendous destructions and the hard armistice terms still in force and binding. This help Italy is ready to give also in peace time, for the work of reconstruction to which President Roosevelt called her.

“On behalf of that help given and offered, on behalf of her millenary civilization, on behalf of the moral principles that the United Nations have written on their flags, democratic Italy, standing before all the United Nations, great and small, with many of which she has very close cultural and blood ties asks for the right and reaffirms her will to take part in the work for world reconstruction, whose foundations are now being laid iii San Francisco”.

Representative Bloom asked whether the Italian request might not be the result of propaganda originating within this country favoring the admission of Italy to the Organization. Mr. Hickerson declared that he would present a brief oral analysis of the background underlying the Italian request. The Secretary requested Mr. Hickerson to do this but remarked that he would have thought that a memorandum would have been prepared. Mr. Hickerson remarked that the Delegation had discussed the question of Italy briefly in its meeting of May 19.⁹¹ The Secretary thought, however, that Mr. Hickerson should go back further and explain the history of Italo-American relations since the fall of the Mussolini Government.⁹².

Mr. Hickerson explained to the Delegation that a most anomalous situation existed between the two countries. The United States and Italy, Mr. Hickerson declared, were still technically at war in view of the fact that no treaty of peace had been consummated. The Secretary added that Italy was under military occupation and Mr. Hickerson agreed that this was true, adding that the United States and the United Kingdom exercised joint control over Italy. However, there was a legitimate Italian Government which the United States had been trying to bolster. The Italians had declared war on Germany and had been fighting with the Allies against the Axis since September, 1943. Mr. Hickerson reported that President Roosevelt had been holding out a helping hand in strengthening the Italian Government and in attempting to broaden its base. At the beginning of the Conference, the Italian Government had indicated a desire to participate in the work of establishing a world organization. However, the United States had discouraged this attempt on the grounds that the United States, even though it was a friend of Italy, would be unable to be of assistance and Italy was urged not to press the matter because it would redound to her disadvantage. The Italian Ambassador had dropped the matter for the time being.

Senator Vandenberg asked how it was possible for the Italians to have an Ambassador to Washington.⁹³ Mr. Hickerson replied that this was an anomaly and as far as he knew was entirely unprecedented. The Italian Ambassador was the personal representative to this Government of the Italian Government in Rome. Similarly, the United States was represented in Italy by Ambassador Kirk. Senator Vandenberg asked whether Ambassador Kirk had been confirmed by the Senate and Mr. Hickerson declared that he had been confirmed. Mr. Hickerson reiterated that a most unusual situation existed inasmuch as the United States was still technically at war with Italy but nevertheless exchanged ambassadors with her. In reply to a question, Mr. Hickerson declared that he thought that the Italians also had an Ambassador to London. Mr. Dulles remarked that there was nothing technical about the fact that Italy was still under joint control of the United Kingdom and the United States.

Mr. Hickerson remarked that the decision the Delegation would be called on to make that morning would not require any background material. The only matter before the Delegation was a decision as to whether it should consider the Italian request. Mr. Hickerson reported to the Delegation that the Italian Ambassador had been informed that it would be necessary to obtain the concurrence of the other sponsoring governments for the issuance of any invitation. It had been carefully explained to the Italian Ambassador that a real setback to the advancement of the Italian cause might result if the matter were to be considered prematurely and if the reaction were very unfavorable. However, partly as a result of internal propaganda within the United States, the question had been raised again and the Delegation considered the admission of Italy briefly on May 29.⁹⁴ At that time Mr. Dunn had been authorized to undertake careful conversations with the other sponsoring governments with a view to sounding out the reception which might be tendered to a proposal to invite Italy to the Conference. Mr. Dunn had undertaken to carry out these conversations, and in line with the instructions of the Delegation, had approached the United Kingdom first on the matter, in view of their more immediate interest. Professor Webster had been completely uncommunicative and no answer, whatsoever had been received. It had been decided as a result of this abortive attempt to sound out the British that communications should be undertaken with the State Department in Washington concerning the advisability of attempting to gain a position on this question from London. This was done and no answer had been received as yet.

On May 29, two notes⁹⁵ had been received by the Secretary, one in his capacity as Chairman of the Delegation and one asking that he circulate the memorandum in his capacity as President of the Conference, from the Italian Ambassador in Washington. Secretary Stettinius asked what action was taken with respect to these messages. Mr. Hickerson replied that he and Mr. Dunn had talked over the matter and had decided at that time to await the results of Mr. Dunn’s attempt to discover the attitude of the other sponsoring governments. Mr. Hickerson declared that Mr. Dunn and himself had been at a loss as to what reply to give the Italians. A most important consideration was the fact that, despite many disagreements, the Italo-American groups in this country were in complete agreement that Italy should be invited to the Conference. These groups were represented at the Conference by Mr. William Allen of the A. F. of L. Mr. Dunn spoke to Mr. Allen on this question and expressed the opinion that a presentation of the Italian paper to the Conference would affect the Italian cause adversely. Mr. Allen had spoken to the Italian representatives and attempted to persuade them to recede from their position.

Mr. Hickerson reported that it had become necessary for Mr. Dunn and himself to ask Mr. Hiss to circulate this paper among the various Delegations of the Conference while the Secretary was away for the weekend. This sudden decision had been necessitated, Mr. Hickerson avowed, by the fact that the Italians had indicated that they were going to release their statement in Home and, as a matter, of fact, they did release the statement. Therefore, Mr. Hickerson thought, there was no alternative to circulating the memorandum as the Italians had requested. The Secretary declared this action of Mr. Hickerson’s in authorizing circulation of the Italian request opened the entire question to full consideration by the Conference. The Secretary thought if it had been held over some agreement might have been reached. However, Mr. Hickerson asked how it would have been possible to hold up the Italian request in view of the fact that the Italians had threatened to publish the text in Rome. The Secretary thought that it would have been possible to state that the sponsoring governments were considering the question and for this reason were not willing to have it circulated at that time. Mr. Hickerson pointed out, however, that the Italians had specifically requested through their Ambassador in Washington that this memorandum be circulated at the Conference. Mr. Hickerson thought that this Government’s hand had been forced. He added, however, that in his opinion it would not be a good idea to raise the matter at that time and he thought that Mr. Allen had been convinced of this. Representative Bloom remarked that it was not Mr. Allen who was behind the legislation currently before the Congress.

Mr. Hickerson declared that the action taken on behalf of Secretary Stettinius in circulating the Italian request did not in any way affect the Secretary in his capacity as Chairman of the United States Delegation. This request could very well have been forwarded directly to Secretary-General Hiss, and the Secretary had merely acted as International Chairman. The Secretary asked Mr. Hickerson what course he would recommend that the Delegation follow, and Mr. Hickerson replied that the Delegation had to make a decision as to what it would do. The Secretary asked Mr. Hickerson again what he would recommend as an appropriate course of action and Mr. Hickerson replied that personally he should like to see Italy invited to attend the Conference, but because of existing circumstances he could not recommend such a course of action. Mr. Hickerson’s recommendation to the Delegation was that it take no action whatsoever. Representative Bloom thought that as a result of the act of circulating the Italian request, Secretary Stettinius had practically sponsored the Italian desire. Mr. Hickerson said that this was not true inasmuch as the request had been circulated without any recommendation. The Secretary thought, however, that the mere act of submitting the request under his name gave the movement “a nice lift”. There would have been no harm he thought if the request had been submitted over Mr. Hiss’ signature but since it was submitted over his own name he thought that the impression would be created that he favored inviting Italy. Mr. Dulles asked who was responsible for this action. The Secretary declared that since he had been out of town Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Dunn had acted rightly in taking the matter into their own hands. Mr. Hickerson asked on what grounds it would have been possible to decline to transmit the memorandum as requested by the Italians. The Secretary declared that if he had been present he would have called a meeting of the Steering Committee to consider the matter. Mr. Hickerson thought however this would have the effect of giving more importance to the matter than it deserved. It was much better he thought merely to have circulated the document. The Secretary asked whether each member of the Delegation had received a copy of the Italian statement and Mr. Sandifer replied that this Delegation had received no copies as yet. The Secretary asked that this statement be duplicated immediately in order that the Delegation might study the Italian request.

Representative Bloom remarked that the Italian question had arisen in connection with the Delegation discussion on inviting Denmark to the Conference. At that time it had been urged that the United States Delegation should be prepared for the raising of the Italian question.

Mr. Hickerson reiterated that Secretary Stettinius had received the memorandum in his capacity as President of the Conference and that it had been distributed to the United States as weir as to all the delegations. Representative Bloom asked how the United States could possibly refuse to sponsor an invitation to Italy. Representative Bloom pointed out that Congress was at that time considering legislation requesting the President to take action to permit the acceptance of Italy on equal basis with the United Nations. Representative Bloom thought that it would be impossible to refuse to support the Italian request, especially in view of the large Italo-American population. The Secretary asked Mr. Hickerson on what ground he based his belief that Italy should be invited to the Conference. Mr. Hickerson said that he wanted to make it clear that he did not recommend this course of action. The admission of Italy, he declared, could not be recommended without the support of the United Kingdom and Mr. Hickerson did not think it would be possible to get that support. It was essential, Mr. Hickerson thought, that the United Kingdom and the United States move together on this issue in view of the fact that they were in joint occupation. The United States had been trying for some time to influence the British to take a more liberal position with respect to Italy because of the fact that the present repressive policy would throw the country into the arms of the Italian Communists. It had been this Government’s policy to support the existing Italian Government on the grounds; that this would save the country from Communism. Representative, Bloom asked how any proposal to invite Italy to the Conference would be received by Greece and Yugoslavia and some of the other nations of Europe. Mr. Hickerson replied that there was no doubt that these two nations particularly would oppose violently any invitation to Italy. The Secretary remarked that if Italy were to be considered for invitation, the question of Albania and Korea and the other matters which the Delegation had been trying to avoid might come up. Mr. Hickerson agreed with the Secretary’s position and declared, for this reason, it would be impossible for the United States to support an invitation to Italy. Representative Bloom asked how the Delegation could “lay down the torch” at that time in view of the fact that the Italian memorandum had been circulated over Secretary Stettinius’ signature. Mr. Hickerson replied that this had been done in the Secretary’s international capacity as President of the Conference and for this reason no one “was carrying the torch”. Mr. Hickerson declared, however, that the United States could support the Italian cause if it wanted to. The Secretary then conducted an imaginary conversation which was concluded by the Secretary being asked what he had done to follow up on the Italian situation. Mr. Hickerson remarked that the Secretary could reply in such an event that he had asked that conversations be held with the sponsoring governments with a view to determining their reactions to inviting Italy. This, Mr. Hickerson declared, had been done and he did not think that concurrence would be obtained from the other sponsoring governments for extending an invitation to Italy. Mr. Hickerson observed that the Secretary would have been in a worse position if the Italians had published their memorandum in Rome, together with a statement that the Secretary had been asked to circulate the memorandum and had not done so. The Secretary declared that he would have called for a meeting of the Executive Committee if he had been there. Mr. Hickerson replied that the Italians had not asked for any such thing and had requested only that their paper be circulated among the other delegations at San Francisco. The Italians, he declared, would have made public a statement in Rome to the effect that their memorandum had been submitted to the Secretary for circulation, if the paper had not been circulated at the Conference.

Senator Vandenberg remarked that there was nothing that could be done about circulating the paper since this had already been accomplished. The question before the Delegation, Senator Vandenberg thought, was what action the Delegation should take since the Italians’ request had already been circulated. Mr. Armstrong asked whether Mr. Hickerson thought that the Russians would oppose a move to invite Italy to the Conference. Mr. Hickerson declared that one of his chief fears was that the Russians might jump at the proposal and attempt “to carry the ball”. Representative Bloom declared that he was personally willing to follow out the Secretary’s instructions on this question, no matter what they were, but he was afraid that the A.F. of L. would get all the credit for pressing this issue, whereas it was not they who were responsible at all.

The Secretary requested Mr. Hickerson to prepare a paper outlining all the background material that would be necessary sometime that afternoon and if necessary call the Department in Washington to have the paper prepared. The Secretary declared that he wanted all the facts of the situation and that he thought that all the members of the Delegation should be acquainted with the situation. The Secretary then asked Mr. Hickerson what his immediate recommendation would be. The latter replied that he thought the Delegation should do nothing at all. Mr. Hackworth thought that the situation was not so serious as it had been made out. Mr. Hackworth pointed out that the Secretary had acted in a ministerial capacity, and thus had undertaken no obligation whatsoever. He added that if an organization such as the A.F. of L. had asked the Secretary to circulate a memorandum, there would have been no question about it. The Secretary declared that all previous circulation had been done by Mr. Hiss. Mr. Hickerson repeated that the Delegation should take no action and he expressed once again the fear that the Russians might take up the proposal and make political capital of it. Mr. Rockefeller pointed out that the Secretary had an advantage in the fact that he was Chairman and, as Chairman, would be able to present the question to a meeting of the Executive or Steering Committee without taking any position on the matter one way or the other. Mr. Hackworth repeated that the Secretary had acted in a ministerial capacity and Mr. Hackworth remarked that this sort of thing happened all the time. He said that he himself frequently passed on matters to the Conference. The Secretary declared that it seemed the recommendation to the Delegation would be to do nothing at that time. The Secretary declared that he wanted an analysis of the situation as soon as possible encompassing the relation of the present situation to the surrender terms and explaining all the other intricacies of the situation. The Secretary declared that this was a situation the Delegation could not act on itself without the approval of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other interested parties of the Government. Senator Vandenberg agreed that the Delegation could not make a decision and he declared that he personally wanted to have nothing to do with the Italian situation. Mr. Pasvolsky added that, in his view, the Secretary should take no action whatsoever in his capacity as Chairman. He thought that the Secretary should wait for some other state to raise the question or ask that it be put on the agenda.

Representative Bloom then read the Resolution which had been introduced in Congress by Representative Vito Marcantonio on May 24, 1945. The Resolution read as follows:

“Requesting the President to use his good offices to the end that the United Nations recognize Italy as a lull and equal ally.

• “1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives
• 2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
• 3 That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby
• 4 requested to use his good offices to the end that the
• 5 United Nations recognize Italy as a full and equal ally”.

Representative Bloom declared that there had been a previous resolution introduced. Representative Marcantonio had requested that Italy be recognized as an Ally for purposes of lend lease, and the like. Senator Vandenberg thought that the resolution read by Representative Bloom proved conclusively that this question was not the business of the Delegation. Representative Bloom replied that whether it was or not the Delegation was faced with the immediate question.

At this point, 12:27 p.m. Senator Connally arrived at the meeting.

Coordination Committee

The Secretary remarked that he was certain that Mr. Pasvolsky would be happy to hear that from that time Mr. Pasvolsky could spend all his time working with the Coordination Committee and he would be excused from future meetings of the Delegation. The Secretary thought that the only hope of bringing the Conference to a close during the middle of the following week would lie in the Coordination Committee working day and night.⁹⁶ The Secretary declared that there were certain reasons why the Conference would have to end during the middle of the following week. Senator Vandenberg thought that the most important reason for bringing the Conference to a speedy conclusion was the very health of the Conference. Senator Vandenberg thought that the Conference should not be allowed to “dawdle”. Senator Vandenberg remarked that all the Delegations were getting very tired and were getting cross with each other and as a result all the committees were bogging down. Senator Vandenberg reported that Senator Styles Bridges ⁹⁷ had made a very bad speech in the Senate that morning expressing the belief that the Conference could not succeed. Senator Connally thought that the rest of the work of the Conference would be done by the heads of delegations and he urged that pressure should be brought on them and that conversations should be held with all heads of delegations to stress the necessity for getting the work done. The Secretary declared that he had been thinking of inviting all the heads of delegations to a talk without their advisors and in this conversation discuss future remarks [reforms?] of procedure and other questions bearing upon speeding up the work of the Conference. Senator Connally remarked that there were a number of insignificant things holding up the work of the Conference whose elimination would speed up the work of the Conference immediately.

Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that the speed with which the Coordination Committee could accomplish its job would not depend upon him. The work of the Coordination Committee he declared depended upon the technical committees finishing their tasks. The work of the Coordination Committee had not been detailed [delayed?] by too few meetings but rather by the fact that the Coordination Committee did not have enough material to work on. It was obvious, Mr. Pasvolsky thought, that the Coordination Committee must have material to work on before it could accomplish anything.

Voting

The Secretary asked Senator Connally whether he had anything to report to the Delegation on the question of voting. Senator Connally replied that he had been having a difficult time in Committee III/1. Saturday morning he had been fortunate in having the Subcommittee of III/1⁹⁸ report the four-power interpretative statement to the full Committee as an adequate answer to the questionnaire. The full Committee had met at 8:30 p.m. Saturday evening⁹⁹ but it had been thought unwise to insist on a vote at that time because there had been a great deal of debate on the matter. Senator Connally declared that he was handicapped by the fact that Mr. Evatt released all his statements to the press whereas the United States did not. Senator Connally declared that he had been told that the Chairman of the Committee had authorized the release to the press of a resume of the four-power position, but Senator Connally declared that he had not seen any reference to this résumé in the press.

It had been decided not to force a vote at the Saturday meeting. Senator Connally declared that he had opened the meeting with a strong appeal which had received a favorable reception. However, Senator Connally thought that Mr. Evatt’s speech, delivered shortly after, had received greater applause than his had. Senator Connally declared that a number of the small Latin American Countries had been making trouble in the Committee. Senator Connally declared that he intended to deliver a strong speech in which he would make clear to the small states the position of the United States. Senator Connally declared that it was imperative that the votes of the small states be lined up on this issue. Senator Connally thought that finally it would be possible to defeat the opposition but he did not think there would be a vote on this question that day. It was possible he thought that two more meetings would be required. Senator Connally declared that he had been trying not to seem to be using steam-roller tactics, and excellent support had been received from the British and other large powers. In addition, Norway and South Africa had sided with the great powers on this issue. Belgium, however, had been strongly opposed to accepting the four-power statement. The Secretary asked how many Latin American states were opposed to acceptance of the statement. Senator Connally declared that he thought many of them were applauding one way and woiild then vote the other and Mr. Rockefeller agreed with this interpretation. Senator Connally observed that Mr. Evatt was a big stumbling block in the work of the Committee. Representative Bloom asked what the position of El Salvador was and Senator Connally replied that they were “off the reservation” because they claimed that one of the questions had not been answered. The Secretary declared that he understood that Colombia and Cuba would vote against the Yalta language. Mr. Warren declared that they might abstain from voting but would not vote against acceptance. Mr. Rockefeller declared that there were five Latin American countries which would abstain from voting on the Australian amendment. This, Mr. Rockefeller thought, was as good as a favorable vote. Mr. Rockefeller declared he had not pressed the Latin American countries on this position with respect to the Australian amendment because he did not want to give the appearance of an inter-American bloc, inasmuch, as a number of those states had expressed themselves against the Yalta formula. Colombia and Cuba, he declared, would abstain from the final vote on the adoption of the language of the Yalta formula. Mr. Rockefeller thought that the Latin American countries had shown great integrity and great statesmanship in recognizing the need for renouncing their earlier positions. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that abstentions were not at all satisfactory inasmuch as they would reduce the number of votes necessary to carry the Australian amendment. He pointed out that if ten states abstained from voting, six less favorable votes would be required than if those 10 had voted. However, Mr. Rockefeller replied that abstention was better than a negative vote. Mr. Rockefeller declared that he had taken the position, with which he was certain the Secretary was in agreement, that the United States did not intend to club the small powers into line. The Secretary said that the time had come for Mr. Rockefeller to take more vigorous action and Mr. Rockefeller replied that he was taking the course which was in his opinion best suited to the interest of the United States in the long run.

The Secretary asked whether the Latin American countries were going to abstain from voting on this matter even after the concession by the United States on the question of regional arrangements. Mr. Rockefeller remarked that this concession had really been in the interest of the United States. He thought that the agreement by some of the Latin American countries to abstain from voting was really a tremendous concession on their part in view of their domestic situations and in view of the fact that they had pledged to support the Australian amendment. The Secretary declared that he had not known there was such a pledge and Mr. Rockefeller replied that about three weeks previously the Australians had succeeded in gaining commitments from a number of the Latin American countries to support the Australian proposal. Mr. Rockefeller thought, however, that the Yalta formula would be carried by a wide margin. The Secretary declared that he wanted a consolidated list of how the various countries were expected to vote on this question. Mr. Hickerson urged that only one copy be prepared of that list because it would be embarrassing to Mr. Dunn and himself if the tabulation were to become public. The Secretary declared, however, that he wanted Senator Connally to see the tabulation prepared and Mr. Hickerson declared that this would be acceptable to him. Mr. Hickerson remarked that among the European countries the Netherlands was opposed to the Yalta formula. However, Mr. Hickerson thought that the Netherlands may have been influenced to abstain from voting. The Secretary asked the Delegation whether it thought it would be harmful or whether it might be misunderstood if he were to invite the fifty heads of delegations to the Penthouse for a glass of sherry and a short discussion. Mr. Rockefeller declared that he would be opposed to such a movement. The Secretary, he said, had made an excellent presentation to the Latin American countries several days previously and there had been no objection voiced since that talk by the Secretary. The Secretary declared, however, that he wanted to take a different tack this time. He had succeeded in holding together the Latin American countries at the lowest point in the development of the Conference. Now he intended to point out that the Conference had been going on for about seven weeks and it was important that the work be finished shortly. The Secretary declared that he would point out that a great risk would be run if the Conference were to be prolonged longer. The Secretary added that he and the President had plans for the future and it was essential that the Conference be completed in the least possible time. Mr. Armstrong pointed out that there were some matters on which the Delegation had not fixed its position and the question of withdrawal which would become the focus of all the dissatisfaction about the veto question was one of these. Mr. Rockefeller urged that there were only four countries which were speaking out strongly against the veto and it would be necessary only to speak to the representatives of these four nations. Senator Connally thought that the Secretary had been thinking in terms of talking to the heads of delegations on other matters besides the veto. Mr. Dulles remarked that although a meeting of all the heads of delegations might be useful it couldn’t accomplish very much. He thought that in addition to such a meeting the Secretary should make the United States position very clear to those three or four who were obstructing the progress of the Conference. In this connection, Mr. Dulles mentioned Mr. Evatt, Senator Rolin, Mr. Fraser and the Egyptian Delegate.¹ Mr. Dulles thought that the Secretary should tell these four groups very clearly that they were jeopardizing the success of the Organization. Mr. Dulles thought that perhaps the Netherlands might be added to that group. Dr. Bowman interposed that these people should be met individually, not as a group. The Secretary declared that the alternatives seemed to be meeting all of the heads of delegations for a glass of tea for a half-hour at the Penthouse or to see a few individuals at fifteen minute intervals. Mr. Dulles and Dr. Bowman both agreed that the latter course would be advantageous. The Secretary thought that if this were not successful that afternoon he could still attempt the other procedure on the following day.

Withdrawal

The Secretary asked whether there were any recommendations on the subject of withdrawal. Mr. Dulles presented the following draft which had been approved by Mr. Dulles, Mr. Armstrong and Mr. Pasvolsky:

“The Committee adopts the view that the Charter should not make express provision either to permit or to prohibit withdrawal from the Organization. The Committee deems that the highest duty of the nations which will become Members is to cooperate within the Organization for the preservation of international peace and security. If, however, a Member for good and sufficient reasons feels constrained to withdraw, and leave the burden of maintaining international peace and security on the other Members, it is not the purpose of the Organization to compel that Member to continue its cooperation in the Organization. It is obvious that if contrary to our hopes and expectations and those of mankind the Organization proved itself unable to maintain peace consistent with the principles of justice, some possibility of withdrawal would become inevitable.

“While the fact that the Charter is silent on the question of withdrawal does not eliminate the possibility of withdrawal, that possibility would have to be determined in any particular case in the light of the surrounding circumstance of the time. It would, in any event, be incumbent upon the Member State desiring to withdraw to make a full statement to the world of its record in the performance of its duty to cooperate in the preservation of peace and security. Also, the absence of any express right of withdrawal would not prevent a Member withdrawing if its rights and obligations as a Member were changed by Charter amendment in which it has not concurred and which it finds itself unable to accept”.

The Secretary read the draft to the Delegation. Mr. Pasvolsky observed that the draft had been done very quickly and he thought that the last sentence of the first paragraph should be dropped and the last sentence of the second paragraph substituted for it. The Secretary thought that the Delegation should not consider drafting matters at that time but should consider broadly whether it wanted a clause on withdrawal in the Charter, or whether it wanted to adopt the course of incorporating a statement in the report of Committee I/2. Mr. Pasvolsky , however, thought that the change he had suggested was very important. The Secretary declared that the fundamental issue was whether the Delegation wanted to include a withdrawal clause in the Charter. Mr. Dulles agreed with the Secretary that the drafting could be worked out by the advisers once the Delegation’s position had been set. The heart of this draft was the language which had been suggested by Mr. Hull, to whom Mr. Dulles had spoken over the week-end. Mr. Hull’s suggestion was to be found included in sentences 2 and 3 of the first paragraph. Senator Vandenberg remarked that this was certainly quite different from the draft considered by the Delegation at the previous meeting.² Mr. Armstrong observed that the sentence to which Mr. Pasvolsky objected had been taken from the previous draft prepared by Senator Rolin. The intention had been to attempt to meet Senator Rolin’s objection by using his own wording and make the Belgian feel that this was merely an adaptation of his proposal. Mr. Hackworth agreed with Mr. Pasvolsky that the sentence in question was a poor one because it implied the breakdown of the Organization. Mr. Dulles observed that this sentence had already been adopted by Committee I/2. Mr. Armstrong thought that an attempt should be made to have the sentence omitted. If this were impossible, it would have to be left in.

Senator Vandenberg remarked that at a previous meeting the Delegation had decided to support an honest withdrawal clause. Senator Vandenberg had notified Lord Halifax to this effect. Now he wondered if he should tell Lord Halifax that the Delegation had reversed its position. Mr. Pasvolsky replied to objections raised by some members of the Delegation that the method under question incorporating an interpretative statement in the report of the Committee was subterfuge and declared that the question really was one of emphasis. If the language were to be incorporated in the Charter it would constitute a specific authority for a State to withdraw from the Organization. This, Mr. Pasvolsky thought, was stronger than a recognition of this right under certain circumstances in an interpretative statement accompanying the Charter itself. Mr. Dulles remarked that he would have preferred a withdrawal clause in the original Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. However, he thought that an attempt to incorporate such a clause at this stage of the Conference would create great difficulties. However, Mr. Dulles declared that if the temper of the Conference were found to be favorable to the inclusion of a real withdrawal clause he would strongly favor such a course. Mr. Dulles thought that the Delegation might have guessed wrongly with respect to the position of the other Delegations. Senator Vandenberg remarked that it would appear that the Russians favored a full withdrawal clause and Mr. Dulles indicated his satisfaction with this. Senator Vandenberg declared that in his opinion, candor was preferable to subterfuge but he told the Secretary that if agreement were reached on subterfuge it would be acceptable to him. Senator Connally declared that it had been his interpretation that the Russians had tied in their proposal for withdrawal with the amendment procedure but Mr. Armstrong declared that at the end of the meeting in question the Russians had seemed to favor a universal withdrawal provision. Mr. Hickerson declared that the Canadians had taken the position that they would not object to a clause allowing a state to withdraw from the Organization if it could not accept any amendment passed according to the procedure established. However, the Canadians had indicated that they would favor a provision allowing a state to withdraw from the Organization if one of the major powers were to block an amendment.

Abstention

The Secretary remarked that Lord Halifax had indicated a desire to hold a Big Five meeting for the purpose of agreeing on an interpretation with respect to abstention from any vote. Mr. Pasvolsky agreed that this matter would have to be talked out among the Big Five. Senator Connally remarked that the position had been held that if one of the major powers, party to a dispute, were not permitted to vote on a decision concerning the dispute in which it was involved that would constitute a block upon the unanimity necessary among the five powers. The Secretary declared that this was a ridiculous interpretation and urged that an exception had been established with respect to unanimity, in a case where one of the major powers was party to a dispute.

Mr. Pasvolsky declared that there was another question which should be considered before the Secretary left the meeting. The four questions which had been referred by the Steering Committee to the Technical Committee were coming up for a vote shortly. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that the Delegation should consider the necessity for lining up a vote if it did not want to be defeated. Mr. Rockefeller remarked that the Latin American vote had been assured on all these matters but Mr. Hickerson declared that the outlook was not so encouraging with respect to the European nations. The Secretary declared that there would be a meeting of the Big Five at 3:00 p.m. that afternoon. At this time, 1:10 p.m., the Secretary left the meeting.

Withdrawal

Mr. Hackworth observed that the Delegation seemed to have agreed to omit the last sentence of paragraph 1 of the new text on withdrawal. He asked what the situation was with respect to the last sentence in paragraph 2. Mr. Dulles agreed with Mr. Hackworth’s observation concerning the sentence to be omitted but pointed out that the Delegation was dealing with an item which had already been accepted by Committee I/2. However, if the position of the Committee could be changed it would be acceptable to Mr. Dulles to drop the last sentence in paragraph 1. Mr. Armstrong thought it should be dropped from the draft under consideration at that time. Mr. Armstrong thought he should speak first with Senator Rolin before submitting the draft for the consideration of the Committee.

Mr. Hackworth referred to the second sentence in paragraph 2 and declared that in his opinion it would be the Organization rather than the State withdrawing from the Organization which should make a full statement to the world. Mr. Dulles observed that the intention of this sentence had been to require adequate justification if a state wanted to withdraw from the Organization. Senator Connally , however, pointed out that if a state were required to justify its conduct it would leave the Organization open to a great deal of criticism. In such a situation the state involved would have sufficient reason in its own view to withdraw from the Organization. However, in order to justify its position it would probably search for all the excuses it could find and would criticize the Organization unduly. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that the intention had been to make withdrawal from the Organization as difficult as possible. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that if a state had to make a declaration of its reasons for withdrawing from the Organization it would be less likely to withdraw. Mr. Dulles thought that in view of the uncertainty which existed in the Delegation it would be best to omit the sentence.

Senator Vandenberg declared that the question was still a “floating nimbus.” Senator Vandenberg declared that he was afraid of the reaction of the American people and the Senate to this unrealistic way of recognizing the right of withdrawal. Mr. Dulles remarked that there might very well be a Senate reservation to the Charter making the right of withdrawal more explicit. Senator Vandenberg remarked that the sentence under consideration seemed to make the right of withdrawal more definite and remarked that it would seem as if he should support it for that reason. Mr. Sandifer reported that this sentence was an attempt to control the type of statement which would be made in view of the fact that any state withdrawing from the Organization would have to make a statement of some sort anyhow. Senator Connally thought the difficulty could be resolved by adding a clause making possible a statement by the Organization. Dr. Bowman pointed out that both the Organization and the withdrawing state would have the right of making a public statement in any event. For this reason, he thought that the sentence could very well be omitted. Mr. Dulles agreed with this omission and the Delegation agreed to delete the second sentence in paragraph 2.

Mr. Armstrong observed that the question would come up that afternoon. He said that it seemed that the smaller powers would be willing to accept this solution as part of a general program in which the United States had made a two-thirds concession.

[At this time, 1:17 p.m., Commander Stassen arrived at the meeting.]³

Dr. Bowman observed that the Delegation had already agreed to stand by the four point program proposed by Commander Stassen ⁴ at a previous meeting. Mr. Armstrong thought, however, that the Delegation had not agreed to the method of handling the withdrawal question which it had just considered. Senator Vandenberg asked whether the Delegation would authorize him to tell Lord Halifax that it was the Delegation and not Senator Vandenberg which had changed its position. Mr. Rockefeller thought that Mr. Armstrong had made a good point and he suggested that the Delegation clarify its position with respect to the four point program. Mr. Pasvolsky asked how much pressure there was evident in the Conference favoring a withdrawal provision. Mr. Pasvolsky was certain that there was a great deal of opposition among the Latin American countries to such a proposal. Mr. Armstrong declared that he could not answer this question. He did know, however, that the Russians had made a proposal that a specific withdrawal clause be incorporated in connection with amendment procedure. Mr. Rockefeller declared that he could understand Mr. Pasvolsky’s interest in the amount of pressure developing. Mr. Rockefeller declared that although a number of the Latin American nations had taken a strong position opposing the withdrawal clause the veto question had caused them to feel that the Organization should develop as had the United States Constitution. There was also a domestic question involved. In order to obtain ratification for the Charter a number of the Latin American countries wanted to substitute a withdrawal provision for liberalization of the veto power. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that it was important to draw the distinction between a general withdrawal clause and a limited clause connected closely with amendment procedure. Mr. Sandifer reported that Mr. Tomlinson, who had been working on the problem, was of the opinion that there was no sentiment whatsoever favoring a withdrawal provision. In fact, Mr. Sandifer declared, Mr. Tomlinson thought that the introduction of such a proposal might create an unfavorable reaction. Senator Connally said that it was his feeling that the small nations wanted to be able to withdraw from the Organization if an amendment were passed with which they were not in agreement. Mr. Rockefeller urged that the statement for inclusion in the records of Committee I/2 would be a safeguard acceptable to the smaller powers. Mr. Dulles thought that if it proved to be necessary to insert a withdrawal clause in the Charter the Delegation would favor such a move. Senator Vandenberg declared that Ambassador Gromyko was opposed to using the method of incorporating a statement in the Committee report.

Regional Arrangements

Senator Vandenberg declared that Committee III/4 was meeting⁵ for a final decision on the Rapporteur’s report.⁶ Senator Vandenberg declared that the Latin Americans might go along with this report because of a statement which had been made by the head of the Colombia Delegation, Alberto Camargo, and also because of an interpretation presented by Senator Vandenberg. However, the last meeting of the Committee had ended on a note interjected by the Russians that individual interpretation carried no weight whatsoever.⁷ Senator Vandenberg wanted to know whether there was any rumor of an attempt by the Latin Americans to insert an interpretation in the Rapporteur’s report. Mr. Rockefeller replied that he had no knowledge of any such movement. Mr. Hickerson declared that Mr. Lleras Camargo had asked that his interpretation be included in the record of Committee III/4⁸ and thus it was already in the Rapporteur’s report. Senator Vandenberg declared that the Russians could not raise any complaints about this but he was worried about the possibility of a revolution in the Committee.

Mr. Pasvolsky declared that there was a potentially dangerous situation created by Mr. Camargo’s interpretation. Senator Vandenberg replied that he had made every effort to keep in the clear and had made certain that his interpretations had been labelled as unilateral interpretation and he thought that in this way all others would receive the same significance. Mr. Rockefeller thought the entire matter could be allowed to pass quietly by. Mr. Pasvolsky observed that if Mr. Camargo’s interpretations were to be allowed to get into the Rapporteur’s report a bad situation would be created. Senator Vandenberg declared that he would meet the question as it arose.

Commander Stassen’s Program

Mr. Rockefeller asked where the Delegation stood on Commander Stassen’s four point program. He pointed out that the amendment question was very “hot” at that time. Mr. Dulles remarked that the entire matter would have to be dealt with that afternoon. Mr. Rockefeller thought that it would be possible to effect an understanding on the basis of the paragraph considered by the Delegation with respect to withdrawal in exchange for settling a specific date for the calling of a revisionary convention. Mr. Rockefeller thought that the Delegation would be very fortunate if it could get away with a reference to placing a revisionary convention on the agenda of the General Assembly during its tenth year of operation. Such a matter could be placed on the agenda anyhow without specific provision being made. Commander Stassen thought that in the final analysis this solution for the withdrawal problem would be accepted if it were to be tied in with the rest of the program. However, Commander Stassen thought that there was no point in gaining a concession on one issue only to have the small powers shift their attack to some other point. Commander Stassen insisted that it would be necessary to maintain a cohesive program. Mr. Dulles declared that it was unfortunate that the willingness of the United States to concede on the vote required for the calling of a revisionary convention and on the question of the time period had been made public without any bargaining advantages having been derived from it.⁹ Mr. Rockefeller thought that the text on withdrawal would balance off the other obligations of the smaller powers.

Mr. Armstrong asked Representative Bloom’s advice on the best procedure to insure acceptance of the counter proposition on withdrawal. Mr. Armstrong pointed out that the Subcommittee would report its approval of the proposal advanced by Senator Rolin. Representative Bloom declared that the proper procedure would be to ask for an amendment to the report of the Subcommittee and attempt to have that amendment considered first. Another possibility would be to offer a substitute proposal in place of the Subcommittee report. In either event, it would be necessary to have the United States proposal prepared for distribution at the start of the meeting. Mr. Armstrong thought that the Subcommittee report would be considered as a whole and would be voted on as a whole. This, Mr. Armstrong thought, would preclude the introduction of an amendment to part of the report by the United States. However, Representative Bloom thought that the Committee could not possibly consider the Subcommittee report as a whole and he indicated that it would be necessary for a vote to be taken on each paragraph individually.

Commander Stassen declared that he thought the Delegation’s position was clear with respect to the program it would present to the Big Five. This program included the withdrawal language just approved by the Delegation; a proposal for reinserting the power of expulsion; a proposal that the calling of a revisionary convention be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly after ten years; insistence upon maintenance of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council for ratification of amendments.

Italy

Representative Bloom asked whether there was any possibility that the question of inviting Italy to the Conference might arise in the Big Five meeting. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that there was that possibility in view of the fact that the Italian statement had been circulated.

The Delegation agreed to meet at 9:00 a.m. the following morning. The meeting was adjourned at 1:34 p.m.

90. For radio address by President Roosevelt on the occasion of the liberation of Rome by the Allies, June 5, 1944, see United States and Italy, 1936–1946: Documentary Record (Department of State publication No. 2669), p. 84.
91. See minutes of the forty-seventh meeting of the United States delegation, May 19, 9 a.m., p. 803.
92. The resignation of Prime Minister Benito Mussolini and his Cabinet was announced by King Victor Emmanuel on July 25, 1943. For documentation on the situation in Italy in 1943, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. ii, pp. 314 ff.
93. Formal diplomatic relations between the United States and Italy were resumed December 7, 1944, but the Italian Ambassador did not present his credentials until March 8, 1945. For documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. iii, pp. 996 ff. For remarks of Ambassador Tarchiani upon presentation of his letters of credence, March 8, see Department of State Bulletin, March 11, 1945, p. 422.
94. Minutes of the fifty-seventh meeting of the United States delegation, May 29, 9 a.m., p. 954.
95. Neither printed.
96. See memorandum entitled “Conference Procedure on Drafting Final Charter”, approved by the Steering Committee on May 10 (Doc. 243, ST/8, May 11, UNCIO Documents, vol. 5, p. 222).
97. Senator from New Hampshire.
98. Doc. 883, III/1/B/4, June 9, UNCIO Documents, vol. 11, p. 823.
99. Doc. 897, III/1/42, June 10, ibid., p. 430.
1. Pasha Badawi.
2. See minutes of the sixty-seventh meeting, June 9, 9:02 a.m., p. 1222.
3. Brackets appear in the original.
4. See minutes of the sixty-seventh meeting of the United States delegation June 9, 9:02 a.m., p. 1222.
5. Doc. 916, III/4/15, June 12, UNCIO Documents, vol. 12, p. 730.
6. Doc. 904, III/4/13(1), June 11, ibid., p. 737.
7. Doc. 889, III/4/12, June 9, ibid., p. 704.
8. Doc. 576, III/4/9, May 25, ibid., p. 680.
9. See minutes of the sixty-sixth meeting of the United States delegation, June 8, 9:02 a.m., p. 1197.