Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 99: UNCIO Cons Five Min 12

Minutes of the Twelfth Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed Amendments, Held at San Francisco, June 2, 1945, 10 a.m.

San Francisco, June 2, 1945, 10 a.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of names of participants, including members of delegations of the United States (23); United Kingdom (4); Soviet Union (4); China (3); and France (6).]

The meeting was called to order by Mr. Stettinius, who called the attention of those present to the agenda which had been distributed (copy attached⁶⁰) and then asked Mr. Pasvolsky to begin discussion on point 2.

2. French Proposal—Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 2.

Mr. Pasvolsky stated that the U.S. Delegation had been considering the matter in the light of the discussion of the previous evening, and recognized the desirability of taking French necessities into account. He proposed that this be done by accepting the original four power amendment to paragraph 2 of Chapter VIII, C, only changing the words “by consent” to “on request”, and then adding the following language:

“After the Organization is charged with the responsibility above indicated, nothing in this Charter will prevent the continued existence of such regional arrangements subject to the requirement for the Council’s authorization for the taking of enforcement measures.”

Lord Halifax remarked that if anything the new language was better and clearer than the French Proposal, but Ambassador Gromyko replied that his first impression was that it is worse rather than better, as it contradicts the language in the earlier part of the paragraph. To him there was an essential difference in that under the French Proposal the Council would take over part of the responsibility for the maintenance of peace, leaving some of the responsibility to the signatories of the bilateral pacts, whereas, the U.S. language would give the Security Council all of the responsibility. Lord Halifax did not agree and Mr. Pasvolsky went on to explain that the whole of paragraph 2 is based upon the concept that the Security Council should authorize enforcement action. The issue in discussion at the previous meeting had been whether the agreements or arrangements themselves must disappear once the Council was charged with the responsibility. The purpose of the U.S. Proposal was to make it clear that while enforcement measures will be subject to Security Council authorization once the Organization has taken over, the treaties will continue in force.

M. Paul-Boncour then announced that the sentence appeared acceptable to him if the words “for the prevention of aggression” were added at the end.

Mr. Stettinius and Lord Halifax, after informal consultation with members of their delegation present, indicated an acceptance of this addition. Dr. Koo stated that on first impression he thought the United States sentence was an improvement on the original and added that he had no obj ection to the French Amendment.

Ambassador Gromyko, after the others had indicated acceptance of the amended sentence, stated that he desired to study it more thoroughly, commenting that the U.S. Delegation had studied the French formula for several days.

Mr. Armstrong inquired why we could not go ahead on a four-power basis, but his question went unanswered as the discussion moved on to the following point.

5. Voting in the Security Council

Secretary Stettinius announced that the U.S. Delegation had given careful consideration to the Soviet interpretation which had been presented by Ambassador Gromyko the previous evening and he now wished to state that U.S. could not accept the Soviet interpretation that the veto should apply to discussion. In the statement which he had issued March 5 in Mexico City and in that which Mr. Grew had published on March 24, the United States had given its interpretation that the decision of the Security Council to discuss disputes or situations brought to its attention should be made by a procedural vote. The U.S. Government, he said, could not participate in an Organization in which the veto would apply to discussion.

Lord Halifax then stated that his government has given great thought over a long period to this problem. It had been their understanding that under the Yalta formula consideration or discussion of a dispute would not be subject to veto by one of the five permanent members of the Council. Therefore, he associated himself with the U.S. Delegation; the Soviet position was not acceptable to his government.

Dr. Koo stated that his government, like the British, had studied the Yalta formula for some time. While he could not state what was intended by the Yalta formula—since China had not been represented at that Conference—as between the two interpretations the Chinese Delegation considered that contained in the May 26th draft of the proposed statement as preferable. Among other reasons for this position, he said, was the fact that the U.S. interpretation would meet the spirit of the Conference as a whole and be more satisfactory to people outside the Conference whose support is necessary for the success of the Organization. The Chinese Delegation therefore supported the position that consideration and discussion of an issue should not be subject to the veto.

M. Paul-Boncour announced that he was inclined to fall in with the views of the U.S., U.K. and Chinese Delegations but did not wish to make any definite statements as he has not yet read the French translation of the Soviet text.

Mr. Stettinius commented that, in view of the reactions of the other Delegations, perhaps the Soviet Ambassador would wish to consult his government, to which Mr. Gromyko replied that naturally he would present to Moscow the views expressed by the others but he wished to make it clear that the Soviet Government is in favor of the Yalta formula as it stands. He added that the interpretation made by the U.S. Government in March had been unilateral and not agreed to by the other governments. The U.S.S.R. considers this interpretation a retreat from the Yalta formula and wishes to remain absolutely firm in its position.

Mr. Stettinius reminded the group that he had made it clear on several occasions that it is the policy of the U.S. Government to abide firmly by the Yalta formula. He regretted that Mr. Gromyko had used the term “retreat” because it is completely contrary to the U.S. view that its interpretation is a retreat. He pointed out that U.S. records of the Yalta Conference, which had been carefully examined, showed that at no time had there been agreement there on whether consideration and discussion should be subject to a qualified majority, although this matter had been the subject of some discussion.

Ambassador Gromyko replied that the Yalta decision provided that there should be unanimity of the permanent members on all matters except when a permanent member was involved under Chapter VIII, Section A. To this Mr. Stettinius replied that it was absolutely not clear to the United States that this was the case. The United States regards the Soviet interpretation as new and as out of keeping with the spirit of Yalta.

Sir Alexander Cadogan , saying that Lord Halifax had asked him to speak on the subject in view of the fact that he had been present at Yalta, remarked that in fact there had been little detailed discussion at Yalta of the question now under consideration. In general, the participants in that Conference had focused their attention primarily on the issue of whether a permanent member of the Council party to a dispute should have the right of veto under Chapter VIII, Section A. Although the British Delegation had not searched its record as had the United States, he believed it correct that at Yalta they had provided for consideration and discussion under a procedural vote. Secretary Stettinius announced that Sir Alexander’s statement was a correct one with which he entirely agreed, and Lord Halifax commented that he wished Mr. Gromyko to believe that the U.K., in taking the position it did, did not place any less importance on unanimity than did the Soviet Delegation. He believed that both the public opinion of the world and the dictates of justice make it necessary not to have a veto over consideration and discussion of a dispute. To this Ambassador Gromyko replied that the decision as to whether or not to consider and discuss a dispute or situation, is a very important link in the chain; from discussion decisions might flow.

Senator Connally (speaking at Mr. Stettinius’ request) said that he had not been at Yalta but he had the text of the Yalta formula before him. He agreed thoroughly with Lord Halifax on the necessity for unity among the five permanent members but considered it fundamental that, since states under Chapter VIII, Section A, paragraph 2, are entitled to bring disputes to the attention of the Council, it should follow that the Council must at least hear their appeals. He asked what point there was in permitting a dispute or situation to be brought to the attention of the Council if the Council could not consider it. It is apparent to him that it is implied—even stated—in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals that the Council can consider a dispute. It is after consideration has taken place that unanimity is necessary. He pointed out that there is great resistance to the Yalta formula and unless the interpretation of May 26 is adopted, it may not be possible to obtain approval of the Yalta formula at the Conference, and added that he personally could not accept the “impossible” and “extravagant” interpretation given in the Soviet note.

Lord Halifax added that Senator Connally could have made his case even stronger if he had referred not only to paragraph 2 but to paragraph 4 of Chapter VIII, Section A, under which parties are under obligation to refer their disputes to the Security Council if they cannot themselves settle them by peaceful means of their own choice. Remarking that, once the dispute has been brought before the Council under this paragraph, the Council is to decide whether to take action under paragraph 5 or itself to recommend terms of settlement, he asked Mr. Gromyko how the Council can decide if it is unable to consider a dispute.

Ambassador Gromyko then called attention to and read in full the paragraph in the Soviet draft in which it is stated that “there are no grounds whatever to fear that the sponsoring powers, when they have become permanent members of the Council, would actually use the rights conferred on them by the Charter to block the discussion by the Security Council on any international dispute affecting the interest of states not members of the Council …”

Mr. Pasvolsky said that if that was the case, then there is no danger in permitting discussion and consideration as a result of a procedural vote, and Mr. Gromyko quickly replied that on the contrary there was no danger in granting the right of veto.

Secretary Stettinius then said that the United States Delegation had stated its position and added that he was confident that the United Nations represented at San Francisco would not accept a Charter which contained a great power veto over discussion. He added that the Senators present could speak for themselves. To this Senator Vandenberg replied that such a formula would be unacceptable to the Senate. There would be difficulty enough in obtaining acceptance of the Yalta formula anyway, he said, even though Senator Connally and he would, of course, support it vigorously. If free speech were suppressed, the Senate would have no part in the Organization. Senator Connally commented that, although he might not go as far as Senator Vandenberg, he knew there would be general resistance to this formula and danger that the Charter would not be accepted. Thanking Lord Halifax for his comments on paragraph 4 of Chapter VIII, A, he stated that the veto should not apply to discussion—“The Senate would never on God’s earth tie itself to an organization of that kind in perpetuity.” He hoped Ambassador Gromyko would see his way to accepting the position of the other powers. He (Connally) would, of course, stand by the Yalta formula to the full but he thought a veto on discussion inconsistent with paragraphs 2 and 4 of Chapter VIII, Section A, and if the Council cannot discuss a matter after it is referred to it, then those two paragraphs should be struck out.

Secretary Stettinius pointed out that the meeting had other important business but before proceeding with the agenda, he wished to call the attention of those present that the work of several committees is held up because of the lack of agreement on voting procedure, and therefore frank discussion is necessary as to how the delay will affect the Conference. He inquired what we should say to the Conference on Monday and how the Conference business could proceed.

Senator Connally replied that we either ought to get agreement or go ahead and each put in his own interpretation. Mr. Stettinius then asked Ambassador Gromyko whether he would consult his government, to which Ambassador Gromyko replied that he would, of course, inform his government of the views of the others but he wished to emphasize that the Soviet position was absolutely clear. He added that he could not agree that the other United Nations would not accept the Soviet interpretation if it was properly explained to them—if it was made clear to them that five-power unanimity is necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security and therefore in their own interest. With respect to Senator Connally’s statement, he felt it important that the five should have agreement before going before the Conference. To this Senator Connally said that he did not mean that the Soviet Delegation would not be absolutely free to present its views.

Mr. Stettinius then stated that there was no need for further discussion at this time and the meeting turned to the following item.

3. Chapter XII, paragraph 1—(Transitional Arrangements)

Mr. Pasvolsky presented the problem with respect to Chapter XII, pointing out that it had been criticized by some delegations as lacking in clarity. The United States Delegation, however, is in favor of maintaining it as it stands. Ambassador Gromyko said he fully agreed with the U.S. Delegation, thinking the present text very good; he added that he would like especially to hear the view of the U.K. Delegation since he had heard that the U.K. representative in the technical subcommittee had suggested some change in the language without prior consultation with the other four.

Mr. Dejean, speaking as acting chairman of the subcommittee, reported on what had happened there⁶¹ and then announced that the French position is that the language is perfectly clear. Lord Halifax, in reply to Mr. Gromyko’s request, said that he understood that Committee III/3 did not like the original language,⁶² that the subcommittee to which it had been referred had first thought it had found better language and then reversed itself. If that is indeed the case, the U.K. Delegation has no objection to sticking together. All five Delegations agreed to stand by the present text, and Secretary Stettinius commented on this manifestation of complete unanimity.

4. Amendments: Conference for Review of Charter

Stating that he understood this question was a very important one in the minds of certain other countries, Mr. Stettinius said he hoped the five could agree on a common position today. In replying to his inquiry, the other four heads of delegations said they had no further comments. Mr. Stettinius reminded them that at the previous meeting of the five they had expressed somewhat different views; it is important to reach one position which we can all agree on. What procedure should we use for this purpose since the subcommittee of the five has now adjourned?

Dr. Pasvolsky stated that the issues are clear. He doubted that it is a matter of drafting but considered that a political decision at the high level is necessary, both on the question as to whether the vote in the Assembly shall be two-thirds or three-fourths and as to whether anything should be said about the right of a state to withdraw in case it finds itself unable to accept an amendment to the Charter.

Lord Halifax said that as he saw it there were three issues: (1) whether any time for the holding of a Conference should be mentioned; (2) whether there should be three-fourths or two-thirds vote in the Assembly; and (3) the right of a state to withdraw in the event of unpalatable amendments. With respect to the last, Mr. Pasvolsky interjected that there is no question of writing any right to withdraw into the Charter; it is merely whether or not there should be written into the record the interpretation that that right would exist.

Lord Halifax suggested that we take his three points one by one. As to the first, the U.K. Delegation favored language permitting a Conference to be called at any time after 7 or (10) years. Mr. Pasvolsky said that the U.S. position is that the Conference should be held not less than 7 nor more than 10 years after the Organization is started. After Mr. Armstrong had remarked that the members of the technical committee⁶³ would probably regard Lord Halifax’s suggestion as more restrictive than the present language, rather than less so, the British Ambassador said that he preferred his suggestion but did not feel too strongly on the matter and could see the force of Mr. Armstrong’s argument. Ambassador Gromyko preferred to stand by the text of the four-power amendment.

Dr. Koo favored provision of a definite period within which the Conference should be held and emphasized the importance of preserving the principle of the unanimity of the permanent members. Upon Mr. Stettinius’ remarking that he liked the proposal made at the previous meeting of the five by Dr. Koo and requesting the latter to repeat it, Dr. Koo said that it was in brief that if a definite period for the calling of the Conference were to be fixed the majority should be two-thirds, but if no period were set then there should be a three-fourths majority.

In reply to Mr. Stettinius’ request for his opinion on this, Mr. Armstrong said that he had no comments on the merits of Dr. Koo’s proposal but that he had no doubt that the preference of the Committee’s membership would be for the setting of a specific date with provision that the Conference should be called by a smaller majority. He emphasized that the problem confronting the Five at this moment was: How would they vote this afternoon? Upon being asked by Mr. Stettinius for his recommendation, Mr. Armstrong said that he favored fixing a date between 7 and 10 years after the establishment of the Organization and allowing the Conference to be called by a two-thirds vote; we might propose the former but should not propose the latter, merely going along if it was proposed by someone else.

Lord Halifax asked if Mr. Armstrong would accept this rather than stand by the words in the draft under consideration. Mr. Armstrong said that he would because the alternative appeared to be the acceptance of Evatt’s proposal that a specific date be set for the Conference, with the clear implication that the present Organization is to be transitory. There ensued a discussion between Lord Halifax and Mr. Armstrong, in which the former said he could not see why Mr. Armstrong’s proposal for a 7 to 10 year period, which to him seemed more restrictive than his own, would satisfy the Committee.

M. Paul-Boncour remarked that he did not understand precisely the relationship between this provision for a conference and the general right to introduce amendments; if amendments can be introduced at any time, why was it necessary to make provision for a conference as well? Mr. Pasvolsky explained that the new paragraph does not affect the present text on amendments, which will remain, and that its introduction was for the purpose of making the amendment procedure more acceptable to the small powers.

Mr. Stettinius, in order to clarify the discussion, suggested that the Five agree to meet the Committee’s desire to the extent of providing for a two-thirds vote instead of three-fourths and then point out to the Committee that all other votes of the Assembly on substantive matters are by two-thirds majority and we should not restrict it more. In this case we would stand on the rest of the draft on [in] the discussion. After Lord Halifax had indicated his acceptance of this proposal, there ensued some disoussion in the course of which Mr. Rockefeller emphasized how important it was to other delegations that it should not be too difficult to call a conference, and suggested specifically that we might give the Secretary General the power to do so. Thereupon Mr. Armstrong, at Mr. Stettinius’ request, pointed out that he had stood firm on the present text as the Soviet representative on the Committee would certainly tell Ambassador Gromyko, but that the Five had only been supported by one or two delegations, particularly Norway, as against a large majority on the other side.

Then Mr. Stettinius, in an endeavor to reach a decision, began a canvass of views. Lord Halifax repeated his preference for making no change except to replace three-fourths by two-thirds, but before any opinions were expressed by other heads of delegations, Mr. Armstrong remarked that if this was the only change made, the Five would be defeated. In reply to this Lord Halifax proposed that the Five agree to stand on the four-power amendment with this one change and then, if defeated, to try another formula. The French and Chinese Delegates were agreeable to this, but Ambassador Gromyko said he must stand on the four-power amendment and could not, therefore, accept the two-thirds vote in the Assembly. After the Soviet Ambassador had reiterated this position, Mr. Stettinius suggested agreeing to stand on the four-power amendment, with the provision for a three-fourths vote, and if defeated, reserve the right to appeal to the Steering Committee. Dr. Koo then commented that the demand of the small powers was to make some provision for the review of the present Charter and that there were therefore two points which had to be met: (1) the desire for a conference to furnish an opportunity for review, and (2) the question of unaiiimity of the permanent members. Senator Connally pointed out in this connection that the issue is not over the difficulty of review but over the fact that all five permanent members have to ratify any changes. Upon Mr. Stettinius’ inquiring whether there was any other solution than that which he proposed and suggesting that a possible alternative might be for the Five to agree that they would have liberty of action, Mr. Armstrong reiterated that if we stood on the four-power amendment we would be beaten.

Ambassador Gromyko said that he liked the four-power amendment. If the Five were defeated they could consult again but he thought that the need was for an explanation which would prevent such a defeat. To this Mr. Armstrong replied that both he and the Soviet Delegate in the Committee had been unsuccessful despite their best efforts in convincing the Committee. When Mr. Stettinius repeated his proposal, Mr. Armstrong insisted that it would stiffen the opposition of the small powers to the Five and might possibly lead to a series of defeats in Other Committees because if the small powers felt they could not obtain a review with some ease, they would oppose the Big Five on many other points more than they otherwise would. Congressman Bloom remarked that there would not be a chance to vote on the four-power amendment. The only chance the Five had was to present an amendment to [of] their own to it. M. Paul-Boncour and Mr. Stettinius agreed with Mr. Armstrong; so did Lord Halifax but he thought the situation was a difficult one and wondered whether Mr. Armstrong could not prolong the debate in order to give the Five more chance. Mr. Armstrong requested that if he did so he should receive support from the representatives of the other four powers. At Mr. Stettinius’ suggestion a group was appointed to work with Mr. Armstrong on this matter over the week-end as follows: Colonel Capel-Dunn, Mr. Zarapkin, Dr. Hoo, M. Gorse. At the end of the discussion, Lord Halifax inquired if he was correct in understanding that the Five would look at some revised language and then plan their strategy accordingly. When Mr. Armstrong said that we might tell the Committee we were trying to meet their views, Ambassador Gromyko replied that it would be better merely to remark that the Five were consulting. There being no objection, this course was approved.

(At this point Mr. Stettinius left the room and Lord Halifax took the Chair).

Item 6–12

The next item on the agenda was that of voting in the Security Council which had already been dealt with and Mr. Pasvolsky, at Lord Halifax’s request, therefore took up the next six items all of which related to matters which had already been dealt with in Committees. He pointed out that an intention to have items 6, 7 and 9 put on the agenda of the Steering Committee had already been expressed but said that he thought it would be a mistake to have the Steering Committee meet at the present time. He said that the U.S. Delegation is prepared to support reconsideration by the technical committees of the questions of the Secretary General, of expulsion, and of items 10 and 11. As for the election of judges, it was his understanding that this has been voted on twice, both in Committee IV/1 and Committee III/1. The U.S. Delegation believes that decision should stand, that there should be no qualified vote in the election of the judges especially in view of the fact that the court will have no compulsory jurisdiction.

Lord Halifax suggested that instead of taking all these topics as a group we discuss them one at a time beginning with the election of judges.

Election of Judges—Lord Halifax restated Mr. Pasvolsky’s comments about the effect of the optional clause. The U.K., Soviet, French and Chinese Delegations then indicated their agreement with the U.S. position that a simple majority of seven should control.

Secretary General—As to the Secretary General, Mr. Pasvolsky stated that the U.S. still supports the four-power amendment.⁶⁴ When M. Paul-Boncour said that as he understood it the Assembly is free to reject the Security Council’s choice, Lord Halifax agreed with him and then said that there were two issues: (1) Is the Assembly free to reject? and (2) what is the vote in the Security Council to be? He proposed discussion of the second point. Ambassador Gromyko said he thought the Committee’s decision that the Secretary General should be elected by a majority of any 7 members of the Security Council was inconsistent with the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, as the election of the Secretary General is not a procedural matter. Moreover, Committee II/1 is not competent to decide what the vote in the Council should be as this is within the competence of Committee III/1 only. He expressed pleasure that the U.S. Delegation agreed with the Soviets that the decision of Committee II/1 should be reconsidered. The French Delegation also thought the wrong Committee had dealt with this problem whereupon Congressman Bloom pointed out that it was not the fault of the Committee but of the Conference.

On the question of substance Lord Halifax said he agreed with the position of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. but was not so insistent on this point, not regarding it as a matter of first importance if the Five should be defeated. Dr. Koo stated that in view of the responsibilities and powers of the Secretary General, he should not be elected by a procedural vote and M. Dejean concurred. All five agreed election should not be by procedural vote.

There ensued discussion as to how to obtain reconsideration, in view of the fact that the matter had been referred to the Steering Committee, while really within the competence of Committee III/1 which had not yet acted on it. It was finally agreed that this question should not be discussed in the Steering Committee until Committee III/1 had acted upon it and that a joint recommendation should be made to III/1.

(At this point Mr. Stettinius returned and Lord Halifax informed him as he took the Chair again that they had agreed on two points. Actually three had been agreed upon including the joint recommendation to Committee III/1).

Next Meeting

There ensued some discussion as to when the next meeting will take place and 5:30 p.m. was finally agreed upon, in order to avoid conflicts with Conference Committee meetings which members had to attend.

Statement to Press on Voting Formula

Lord Halifax then raised the question of the position which should be taken vis-á-vis the press respecting the voting formula. He pointed out that the press would doubtless hear soon of the situation and suggested that agreement be reached on a statement. Mr. Stettinius agreed, remarking that he might be authorized to make a statement, and asked Lord Halifax’s reaction to this suggestion.

Lord Halifax said that the difficulty was that it is impossible to say that we are still discussing the question, and the only alternative therefore appeared to be to state openly that there is disagreement on the application of the Yalta formula and then leave each delegation free to make its own position clear. Senator Vandenberg supported this suggestion and commented that the truth would do less harm than anything else. Senator Connally desired the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to make a statement on its behalf.

Lord Halifax, stressing the need for the Five to stick together, then remarked that it would be a mistake to magnify the extent of our disagreement. He thought no good would be done if all kinds of things are said and written. Mr. Stettinius said that there was bound to be harmful speculation in the press and we should therefore issue a simple clear statement. After Dr. Koo had commented that the safest approach was to leave the matter to the discretion of the Chairman, Lord Halifax inquired whether we couldn’t say something like this: The four powers have been asked to present a statement on the voting procedure. They have reached a large measure of agreement, but disagree on one crucial point—the application of the unanimity rule to the discussion and consideration of disputes. Four of the delegations agreed that unanimity should not apply on this point but the Soviets do not. The basis for each delegation’s position should be stated and then it should be announced that discussions are still proceeding and that an immediate answer could not be expected.

At this point Ambassador Gromyko said that if the other four wished to make a statement he would not object but he wished to reserve the right to speak out at any time to make the Soviet position clear.

Summing the discussion up, Mr. Stettinius said that all had agreed to Lord Halifax’s proposal but Ambassador Gromyko had made this one reservation. Lord Halifax having remarked that it is of great importance to be objective and to keep the temperature down, Mr. Stettinius concurred, pointing out that we are in the middle of a negotiation and public discussion makes negotiation difficult. He then inquired whether anyone felt that the disagreement could be kept from the press.

Mr. Dulles commented that the difference is one in theory, not in principle, and called attention to the last two paragraphs of the second numbered point of the Soviet draft. Mr. Stettinius thought this important, believing that the main consideration is the need for keeping the matter open for discussion. Lord Halifax then asked whether it would be possible to hold off the press until after a further meeting and in the meantime to have a statement prepared for consideration.

After Lord Halifax had said that to speak of “satisfactory progress” would give the wrong impression, it was agreed that Mr. Stevenson should say for the moment that consultation is proceeding, and should prepare a draft statement to the press for consideration subsequently.

The meeting was adjourned.

60. Not printed.
61. WD 68, III/3/A/2, June 1, UNCIO Documents, vol. 12, p. 651.
62. Doc. 704, III/3/36, May 31, ibid., p. 400; see also Doc. 765, III/3/39, June 3, ibid., p. 419.
63. For discussion of proposals on Chapter XI, see Doc. 683, I/2/48, May 29, UNCIO Documents, vol. 7, p. 154; record of meetings of Subcommittee I/2/E on May 30 and 31, not printed.
64. For text of the proposed Four-Power amendment and proposals of other delegations with resect to the election of Secretary General, see Doc. 238, II/1/8, May 11, UNCIO Documents, vol. 8, p. 502.