RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 96: US Cr Min 62 (Exec)

Minutes of the Sixty-Second Meeting (Executive Session) of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Saturday, June 2, 1945, 9 a.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of names of persons (26) present at meeting.]

The Secretary called the meeting to order at 9:00 a.m. and asked Mr. Gerig whether there was anything which the Delegation should consider before it met in Executive Session at the Penthouse.

French Treaty Amendment

Mr. Gerig suggested that the Delegation consider the question of the amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2, affecting regional arrangements. The Secretary asked whether there was any new wording and Mr. Dulles replied that the Big Five had maintained the language considered by the Delegation at its earlier meetings, with the addition of a new sentence on the order of “such regional arrangements may exist subject to the enforcement machinery of the Organization.” Mr. Dulles thought that this wording was acceptable as an addition to the existing phraseology. The Secretary asked whether it was thought that the French would accept this addition. Commander Stassen thought that the new wording appearing in a separate sentence was a most acceptable addition because it would allay the fears of the French concerning the status of their regional pacts but would still make it certain that they were to be subject to the enforcement authority of the Organization once the Security Council had assumed jurisdiction. All the members of the Delegation agreed to the new phraseology as amended by Mr. Dulles, as follows: “Such regional arrangements may subsist as part of the enforcement machinery of the Security Council”. The Secretary agreed that this was a suitable phraseology but asked that final decision be delayed until the language could be cleared with Mr. Pasvolsky who was not present at this time. The Secretary asked Mr. Raynor to check with Mr. Pasvolsky.

Amendment Procedure

The Delegation was informed that there was no need to consider the question of amendment procedure which had been settled by the Delegation. The statement of the Delegation’s position appeared in the document Position On Important Open Questions, US Gen 209a, in which amendment procedure appeared as the fourth item. The Secretary declared that this Delegation’s position had been established and that the matter was under discussion among the five powers.

At 9:10 a.m. the Delegation adjourned to meet in the Penthouse for an Executive Session ten minutes later.

[Page 1088]

The Secretary convened the Executive Session at 9:30 a.m. in the Penthouse. Secretary Stettinius urged that this meeting be considered as a “truly Executive Session” of the Delegation. He remarked that the Advisers of the Delegation, in all of whom the Delegation had confidence, had been invited as observers and guests.

Yalta Voting Formula

The Secretary reported in the strictest confidence that he had had long conversations with the President and with former Secretary Hull earlier that morning on the subject of the Eussian position on voting procedure. The Secretary declared that he had done a great deal of thinking on this subject since the Eussian delegates had released their bad news in the Big Five meeting on the previous evening. The Secretary observed that in his view the situation was not so bad as might be thought in view of the absurdity of the Eussian position. The Eussian proposal, he declared, was entirely contrary to anything which had been considered previously at Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, or anywhere else. The Secretary urged that the Delegation must turn its attention to thinking and planning on how to handle the Conference and to keep up the morale of the various delegations in the light of this latest development. The Secretary remarked that it was almost certain that the Russian position would receive widespread attention in the press over the weekend and one of the most pressing matters before the Delegation would be the problem of holding the Conference together.

The Secretary reported that he had called former Secretary Hull early in the morning and had spoken to Mr. Hull just as the latter finished breakfast. The Secretary and Mr. Hull had held a long leisurely conversation. Mr. Hull had expressed extreme disappointment at the news and said that he had thought that everything was progressing favorably. Mr. Hull had expressed the opinion that the American public and the United States Senate would not accept this new Russian interpretation of the Yalta voting formula. The Secretary reported that Mr. Hull had stressed the importance of not allowing this matter to be released to the press in an unfavorable light. Mr. Hull urged that if the press should get wind of this development it should be presented in a dignified manner with the United States position being made clear.

The Secretary reported that he had next called the President who had a crystal clear understanding of the issues at stake. It was apparent, The Secretary declared, that the President had been studying carefully the daily despatches on the Conference and had a thorough appreciation of the significance of the various positions. The telephone conversation, Mr. Stettinius declared, had consisted of “real meat”. The President had expressed the opinion that this latest [Page 1089] interpretation proposed by the USSR was “something neither I nor you nor the American people can ever take”. President Truman had expressed the opinion that the Russian interpretation was something completely new which had never been considered before and he thought that this interpretation was completely unacceptable to the United States. The United States, the President had declared, could never be a party to this interpretation.

The Secretary reported that he had told the President that the latest developments might alter considerably the time schedule for the rest of the Conference and might extend the business of the Conference for a considerable period. The President said that he understood the difficulty and although he was disappointed that his plans for arriving in San Francisco some time around June 12 or 14 would have to be altered, the President declared that he would stand by for the conclusion of the Conference, whenever that might be. The Secretary reported that he had promised to the President that a Charter would be produced. He had declared that it might become necessary for the United States to make reservations to the Charter and some of the other nations might have to join the Organization at a later date, but he had expressed the opinion that a majority of the peace-loving peoples of the world would be able to agree on a Charter here in San Francisco.

The Secretary expressed the opinion that the Russians could not be serious about this interpretation and he pointed out that the Russian Delegation had been extremely cooperative on all the other issues which were under discussion. The Secretary remarked to Senator Vandenberg that the Russians had been willing to cooperate with respect to those questions which had been of particular concern to the Senator. Representative Bloom asked whether it was not possible that this cooperative attitude with respect to some of the other problems under consideration might not be part of the game the Russians were playing and The Secretary agreed that this might be possible. Mr. Dulles asked whether any interpretation had been placed on Mr. Sobolev’s return to Moscow. The Secretary remarked that there were two possibilities, that Mr. Sobolev was returning for consultation, or that he had been unable to get along with Ambassador Gromyko because of his cooperation with the United States Delegation. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that the first interpretation was plausible in view of the fact that Mr. Sobolev had been chosen to report to Moscow on the results of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. Mr. Sobolev, Mr. Pasvolsky declared, had been ordered to report to Moscow en route to London at the end of the Conversations last fall.

Senator Vandenberg asked whether Harry Hopkins had been informed of the latest developments. The Secretary replied in the negative and declared that there had been no communication between [Page 1090] Washington and Moscow. Furthermore, The Secretary declared that Mr. Hopkins’ mission56 had nothing whatsoever to do with the San Francisco Conference.

Senator Connally urged that the Delegation would have to take a firm stand, not “blustering”, but firm. The Senator declared that he favored the Yalta formula because the United States was committed to it. However, Senator Connally did not support this ridiculous interpretation. Senator Connally declared that there would be a very slight concession involved between the Russian position and the position of this Delegation and he expressed the view that the Russians were taking a very unreasonable stand.

Secretary Stettinius asked whether the Delegation would be agreeable to the suggestion he was about to propose. The Secretary thought that he should state to the Russian Delegation “calmly and firmly” that the United States Delegation had studied the Russian interpretation over-night. The Secretary thought that this Government should take the position that the Russian statement was an entirely new interpretation and that the United States would find it impossible to join in any Organization under which discussion could be cut off in the Security Council by the veto of any one nation. The Secretary thought that this position should be accepted by the Delegation and that no further discussion of the matter would be necessary.

Mr. Dulles observed that the position stated by the Secretary would not be a new one for the United States. Under Secretary Grew had held a similar position in his statement of March 24 and Senator Connally added that Secretary Stettinius had stated a similar position in his interpretation of the Yalta formula at Mexico City.57 Mr. Pasvolsky thought that in presenting the United States position to the Russians it should be made clear that this was not a new position for the United States and that the views of this Government had been made clear ever since Yalta.

Mr. Dunn remarked that the Russians had seemed to be of the opinion that this very matter had been discussed at Yalta. Mr. Armstrong remarked that one of the Russian delegates had indicated that he had been present at a meeting at Yalta where it had been agreed that discussions could be held by the Security Council without the veto power being applicable. One of the members of the Delegation commented that Secretary Stettinius himself had been present at that meeting and The Secretary replied that he remembered very well.58

In reply to a question concerning the position that would be taken by the other major powers, The Secretary declared that Lord Halifax [Page 1091] would support the position of the United States. The position France would take was uncertain, The Secretary thought, in view of the political situation existing between France and the USSR. The Secretary thought that there could be no doubt that the Chinese would support the United States on this issue, but The Secretary declared that he would call the Chinese Delegation to make certain.

Mr. Pasvolsky raised a question concerning the procedure which should be followed. He urged that the Secretary not plunge into the matter of voting at the very start of the Big Five meeting. Mr. Pasvolsky observed that all the parties concerned were in negotiating positions and he thought that this question should he taken in its order on the agenda, probably ten minutes after the start of the meeting. In that time, Mr. Pasvolsky declared, it would probably be possible to satisfy the French on the regional question and in that way make possible French support for the United States position. Mr. Pasvolsky then asked whether the Delegation would agree to a new wording he had prepared for the sentence to be added to the amendment of Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 2. The new sentence reads as follows: “After the Organization is charged with the responsibility above indicated, nothing in this Charter will prevent the continued existence of such regional arrangements subject to the requirement for the Council’s authorization for the taking of enforcement measures.”

This revised wording was acceptable to the Delegation. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that it was highly important to satisfy the French on this issue because they would play an important part in the decision on the voting formula.

Representative Bloom thought that the Delegation should release a press statement making clear its position on this issue before the opposition released its position to the press. Representative Bloom thought that the Secretary should make clear the United States position. Senator Vandenberg did not think that the United States should hasten the release of its position. Mr. Hackworth concurred, adding that a statement at this time would freeze the positions of the various parties to the controversy and would make negotiation more difficult. Congressman Bloom repeated that he thought there would be an advantage to be gained by beating the Russians to the punch in stating a position on this latest interpretation. The Secretary declared that he had not thought in terms of releasing a statement to the press, but Senator Vandenberg remarked that he was quite certain that the press would get wind of this important controversy which would be most difficult to keep secret. Senator Vandenberg thought that the Secretary’s hand would be forced and he would have to make a statement eventually The Secretary remarked [Page 1092] that the United States’ position on this question had been clear from the beginning and he requested Mr. Stevenson to prepare a statement to be ready some time during the morning.

At this time, The Secretary declared that he would have to leave the meeting for a few minutes to call the Chinese to ascertain what their position would be.

Commander Stassen remarked that the question under dispute was a matter of interpretation and did not involve a change in the Charter itself. The need for interpretation had been raised by the presentation of the questionnaire on voting formula. Commander Stassen thought that the issue was not necessarily crucial in view of the fact that there would probably be need in the future for many interpretations. Commander Stassen thought that the Big Five could accept the language of the Charter without necessarily agreeing to an interpretation. Interpretation of the language agreed upon could be left to the future.

Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that the famous question 19 was involved and once the United States agreed to a unanimous vote of the permanent members of the Security Council for procedural questions, the battle would have been lost. Question 19, Mr. Pasvolsky thought, was dependent upon the answers to some of the other questions which were covered in the four power statement.

Senator Connally urged that if the Russian position on the interpretation of the Yalta formula were to be established as the position of the Big Five, the small powers would unite in an effort to defeat the phraseology in the Charter and Senator Connally thought that there was danger that they might succeed. The Secretary asked how the Delegation felt about the position he had stated earlier in the meeting. The Delegation agreed unanimously to the firm position taken by the Secretary.

The Secretary reiterated that it was of the utmost importance that the work of the Conference be continued. It would be impossible, he declared, to stall for another week waiting for instructions from Moscow. The Secretary declared that he would discuss with the Big Five that morning the procedure that should be followed in order to keep the Conference going. Mr. Armstrong thought that the United States might follow the course, established the previous evening in the Big Five discussion, of retaining full freedom of action in the Committees and in the Steering Committee. This, he thought, involved risks because the United States might be stuck with an undesirable decision. It was suggested that freedom of action be retained only in the meetings of the Steering Committee in order that pressure might be brought to bear on the heads of delegations without bringing in the less important members of the various delegations [Page 1093] here in San Francisco. Mr. Dulles remarked that it was apparent that none of the major powers would accept a majority decision of the Steering Committee on an important issue.

Mr. Rockefeller submitted that the amendment question which was under consideration in Mr. Armstrong’s committee was an important one in insuring the tranquility of the smaller states and to make possible their acceptance of the Yalta formula. The Secretary replied however, that it was his intention to consider the problems of the agenda one by one, in their turn.

Senator Vandenberg emphasized that the Conference must not be allowed to bog down at this time under any circumstances. If the net result of the disagreement over the interpretation of the Yalta formula were to be to speed up the work of the Conference, it would be an indication that the major powers had risen above their difficulty or perhaps even gotten around the cause for previous delay.

At this point, 9:57 a.m., the Secretary left the meeting to call Ambassador Koo.

Mr. Pasvolsky urged that the Delegation should not press for the establishment of a final date for the Conference. He thought that if a final date were set it would be a signal for the Russians to adopt a stand-off attitude. The Russians, Mr. Pasvolsky thought, seemed to think that they would out-wait the Delegation, but Mr. Pasvolsky assured the Delegation that they could not. Commander Stassen agreed with the position taken by Mr. Pasvolsky and thought that if the Delegation made it clear that it would not leave San Francisco until a Charter had been agreed upon, even if that took until Christmas, it might speed up matters in the long run. Senator Vandenberg thought that if the Conference were to be kept waiting for two weeks awaiting a decision on this issue it might never get started again in high gear.

Mr. Pasvolsky declared that he should like to adopt the strategy of clearing up all the other issues first. Then this Delegation could declare to the Russians that it would be impossible to consider reopening the closed issues until the voting matter had been settled. Admiral Hepburn asked whether in Mr. Pasvolsky’s opinion the Russians were willing to negotiate on the voting question. Mr. Pasvolsky replied in the affirmative and declared that the Russians were in a negotiating position.

At this point, 10:00 a.m., Secretary Stettinius returned to the meeting.

Senator Connally thought that it was distinctly possible to stand on the Yalta wording without adopting a five power interpretation. Secretary Stettinius announced that his telephone conversations had been satisfactory and Lord Halifax would back the United [Page 1094] States’ position and the Chinese would back the British statement. The Secretary was asked what position the French were likely to take and he replied that in Mr. Pasvolsky’s view the French would support the United States if the regional matter were settled first. Dean Gildersleeve thought that for a change the United States was in a very favorable position. The Russians were now in the reactionary spot whereas previously they had managed to maneuver the United States into that position. Mr. Armstrong thought that the Delegation should face the fact now that the long range propaganda of the Russians would be that the USSR had been maneuvered into the necessity for insuring protection of its interests by the emergence of the struggle between Communism and Fascism. The Secretary remarked that this condition would be alleviated by Mr. Rockefeller’s arranging a new Argentine government during the next week.

The meeting was adjourned at 10:02 a.m.

  1. For documentation on the Hopkins Mission to Moscow, see Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. i, pp. 21 ff.
  2. See Department of State Bulletin, March 25, 1945, p. 479, and ibid., March 11, 1945, p. 395.
  3. See Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 661667 and 711712.