Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

500.CC/5–3145

Memorandum by the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stettinius) of a Conversation With the Acting Chairman of the Soviet Delegation (Gromyko), Held at San Francisco, Thursday, May 31, 1946, 12:25 p.m.

San Francisco, May 31, 1946, 12:25 p.m.

[Informal Notes]

Participants:	U.S.A.—Secretary of State, Mr. Dunn, Mr. Pasvolsky
	U.S.S.R.—Ambassador Gromyko, Mr. Sobolev, Mr. Golunsky

In opening the conversation, the Secretary said that he had felt it would be helpful if he and Ambassador Gromyko were to have an informal and frank talk in order to take inventory of the situation at the Conference. He said that there was a growing feeling that the Big Five were not showing the proper leadership in the Conference. As a result, the situation appeared to be drifting away fast and they would have to act quickly and decisively to get things back into their own hands. This meant taking strong leadership in bringing the Conference to as rapid and successful a conclusion as possible.

The Secretary said that there was much talk to the effect that if the Big Five could not quickly agree among themselves at this Conference, then how could the proposed international organization—depending as it did upon their continuing unanimity—hope to be successful. He said that he himself was very much disturbed by the situation and for that reason thought that an informal talk regarding the problems now facing the Conference and the Big Five might be helpful to both Delegations.

Accordingly, the Secretary said that he wanted Mr. Pasvolsky to review briefly for them the major issues upon which decisions of the Big Five were necessary.

Major Issues Requiring Decisions

Mr. Pasvolsky said that the major issues yet remaining before the Conference appeared to be as follows:

1. An interpretation of the voting procedure in the Security Council.

2. The method of election of the Secretary-General.

3. The method of election of judges in the Permanent Court of International Justice.

4. The manner in which amendments to the charter might be approved.

5. Whether or not a provision for expulsion should be included in the charter.

6. The French amendments on the agreements covering the provision of armed forces under Chapter VIII, Section B, paragraph 5.

7. The French amendment on regional arrangements in Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 3.

8. The proposal for a preparatory commission.

9. Trusteeship.

Mr. Pasvolsky indicated that, while Conference Committee action had already been taken on the questions of the election of judges and of expulsion, there might have to be a reconsideration of the Committee action. In so far as the proposal for a preparatory commission was concerned, this had not yet been discussed in detail among the deputies of the Big Five. The last item—trusteeship—was being handled by Special arrangements and did not, he believed, present a special problem.

Ambassador Gromyko suggested that to this list should also be added the following problems:

1. Proposed changes in Chapter XII. He said that consideration of clarification of this Chapter was now under way in Committee 3 of Commission IV.

2. Major issues pending before Committee 2 of Commission II covering the powers of the General Assembly to—

(a) Consider annual or special reports of the Security Council and to approve or disapprove such reports, and

(b) Exercise supervision over the Security Council so as to determine whether or not the Security Council was carrying out its functions properly.

To these latter problems with respect to powers of the General Assembly, Mr. Pasvolsky added—with Ambassador Gromyko’s approval—the question of the additional powers proposed for the General Assembly in Chapter V, Section B, paragraph 1, whereby the Assembly would be given the right to discuss any matter within the sphere of international relations.

Following the detailing of this list of problems, The Secretary then made the point that the Conference had been in session for five weeks and that the three major powers—the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States—had not made up their minds as to exactly what they wanted the proposed international organization to be. He stressed the fact that in his opinion the remaining issues should be decided quickly and that he wanted Ambassador Gromyko’s help in resolving these issues. Therefore, he asked Mr. Pasvolsky to review in detail each of these problems that were confronting the Big Five so as to point up the issues.

Interpretation of Voting Procedure

Mr. Pasvolsky said that in the question of the interpretation of the voting procedure, the issue had narrowed down to two points, namely, (a) the question as to which places in the charter it should be specified that the Security Council should act by a procedural vote, and (b) the question of the type of vote by which the Security Council should determine whether a matter was of a procedural or of a non-procedural character. This latter point involved an answer to question no. 19 in the list of questions that had been submitted to the Big Five covering the interpretation of the Yalta voting formula.

He said that there was no doubt in his own mind that the determination of whether a matter was of a procedural or non-procedural nature would have to be taken by a qualified majority vote in the Council, but that in this event it would be necessary to specify the Charter the other instances in which an unqualified majority Vote did apply. In the statement which had been drafted for the consideration of, the four Delegations, it was clear that all items under Chapter VI, Section D, would be determined by a procedural vote of the Council as well as the question as to whether a matter should be discussed and considered by the Council. Moreover, if it were specified in the Charter that (a) Chapter VI, Section D, (b) the right to discuss and consider questions in the Security Council, (c) the convocation of the General Assembly, and (d) the calling of a conference for revision of the Charter, all were to be decided by a procedural vote of the Council, then the sponsoring Governments would be in a strong position to state the answer to question no. 19 along the lines he had indicated.

On the other hand, if it were merely stated in the Charter that the determination as to whether a matter was of a procedural or nonprocedural nature was to be made by a qualified majority vote, then the sponsoring Governments would be in a very weak position in so far as defending the Yalta formula was concerned.

Mr. Pasvolsky stressed the fact that, in his opinion, the Conference was not against the Yalta formula as a whole, but that it opposed the application of that formula on some of the smaller points. He compared the Yalta voting formula with the voting procedure in the Council of the League of Nations, pointing out that fundamental differences between the two made off-hand comparisons of them somewhat difficult. He said that, ‘since under the Yalta formula unanimity among the permanent members is required only under certain circumstances, it was important to show clearly where the unanimity rule would apply and where it would not apply. If it were to be left to the future for the Security Council to determine this question, there was the risk that the Council might be practically immobilized in an effort to settle it.

Therefore, to summarize, Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that it should be a matter of agreement now among the sponsoring Governments that a procedural vote applied to: (a) Chapter VI, Section D, (b) the right to discuss and consider any matter before the Council, (c) the convocation of a General Assembly or of a General Conference for revising the Charter, and (d) the election of judges to the Court.

Election of Judges

In connection with the election of judges, Mr. Pasvolsky said that since the Court did not have compulsory jurisdiction, he did not feel that the election of judges should be subject to the veto of any one of the permanent members of the Security Council.

Election of Secretary General and Deputies

With regard to the election of the Secretary General, Mr. Pasvolsky said that there was agreement with the Soviet Delegation that the unanimity of the five permanent members of the Security Council was needed in this election. Also, he said that the United States Delegation had expressed a willingness to go along with the proposal to elect the deputies by the same? process. However, he pointed out that the selection of the deputies could be made by a different process.

He suggested that the five deputies might be appointed by the Secretary General, with each of the deputies subject to the approval of the organ or agency of the proposed international organization which that deputy would serve. Thus, the deputy to serve the Security Council would be approved by the Security Council on a qualified majority vote; the one for the Economic and Social Council by that body; the one for the Trusteeship Council by that body; the one for the General Assembly by that body; and, finally, the fifth deputy, in charge of general administrative matters, might not need the approval of any particular one of the organs.

In carrying his suggestion further, Mr. Pasvolsky said this proposal recognized that while the Secretary General would serve all the organs of the proposed organization, it also made clear that he would have to have a deputy to serve as an alternate in helping him manage the secretariat work for each one of the organs. Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that the Deputy Secretary General who would deal with the Security Council could properly be made the ranking deputy so that in the event the Secretary General was absent, this ranking deputy would then serve as Acting Secretary General.

Amendment Process

Mr. Pasvolsky next turned to the subject of the Conference discussions on the amendment process in the charter. He said that there was no question that the five major powers must retain their right of vetoing any amendment that might be proposed for ratification. The Secretary stressed the fact that on this point the five major powers must stick together and Ambassador Gromyko vigorously assented.

Mr. Pasvolsky continued that, however, there could be some concessions made in the amendment process. He suggested that the question of calling a conference to consider the revision of the whole Charter might be undertaken by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly instead of the three-fourths vote as proposed in the Big Four amendment. He also suggested that any proposal to specify that such a conference should be convened within a stated time period, e.g., seven or ten years, might be agreed to since it was a small matter and no revisions of the Charter emanating from such a revision would become effective without the concurrence of all of the five major powers.

However, he said that the proposals to eliminate the action of the Security Council with respect to the calling of such a revision conference should be resisted.

The Secretary said that in his opinion the question of a time period for the calling of such a conference was a small matter and that we ought to yield.

Mr. Pasvolsky then pointed out that there was one serious problem arising. Many countries felt that they could not accept as an obligation in the Charter the fact that they would be bound in the future by amendments to which they had not agreed. Accordingly, these countries wished to specify that fact in this section of the Charter. He said that all such proposals could be met with an argument along the following lines, similar to that argument which had been used in resisting attempts to write withdrawal provisions into the Charter: If the situation should arise in the future, it should be dealt with by the international organization at that time and in light of the circumstances; that no provision should be written into the charter which would provide for the automatic right of rejection of future amendments.

Expulsion

As regards expulsion, Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that although this had been voted down and the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals on this question had been eliminated from the Charter, the question ought to be raised again and the Big Five should adopt the attitude of adhering to the Dumbarton Oaks text in this matter.

Agreements for Armed Forces

The amendments covering Chapter VIII, Section B, paragraph 5, fell into two categories, Mr. Pasvolsky explained: (a) those proposed by the Frenqh Delegation which had not so far been accepted by the Soviet Union, and (b) those clarifying the provisions as to the making of agreements so as to give the Security Council the power to conclude those agreements with the member states. He said that he felt that the Committee of Deputies of the five Foreign Ministers would be able to work out a flexible formula on this latter point which would be satisfactory to the five Delegations.

French Amendment on Regional Arrangements

The proposed French amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 3, had not yet been agreed to by the United States Delegation, Mr. Pasvolsky reported. Consequently on this matter it was the United States Delegation which was causing a delay in further action.

Preparatory Commission

Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out thatdhe question of a preparatory commission had not yet been discussed: in the Subcommittee of Deputies. The Secretary said that in his opinion this should cause no problem, since it was a comparatively simple question and could be handled in a routine fashion. Mr. Pasvolsky added that this question would be discussed later on in the day in the Subcommittee.

Trusteeship

Mr. Pasvolsky said that the discussions on trusteeship appeared to be progressing satisfactorily and that no great issues seemed to be arising among the Big Five which would block further progress on this item.

Chapter XII

As regards Chapter XII, Mr. Pasvolsky said that it was his judgment that the Big Five should stand on the Dumbarton Oaks text with the addition of France as one of the Governments referred to in the first paragraph. While he understood that some clarification in the language was being requested, he thought that it would be best if the Big Five were to await definite proposals from the Canadians as to the manner in which they wished the text clarified before any further action was taken.

Powers of the General Assembly

Mr. Pasvolsky said that the remaining problem covered the three questions with respect to the powers of the General Assembly. On these he commented as follows:

1. The revised text of Chapter V, Section B, paragraph 1, as agreed to by the Big Five, should be maintained and the present amendments to that text as agreed to in the Committee should be reconsidered at a higher level, possibly in the Steering Committee.

2. The question as to whether the General Assembly could approve or disapprove reports of the Security Council did not appear to be a serious matter and for that reason he felt that no special stand need be taken on this issue by the Big Five. He pointed out that this right resided in the powers of the General Assembly whether or not it was specifically stated in the Charter.

3. The question as to whether the General Assembly could supervise the activities of the Security Council to assure that the Council did not exceed its powers was a more serious one. In his opinion, he felt that all attempts to write such a provision into the Charter should be resisted.

The Secretary said that he especially agreed with Mr. Pasvolsky’s suggestion with respect to the latter point. Messrs. Gromyko and Sobolev then pointed out that the United States Delegation in the Conference Committee had instead voted to give this right to the General Assembly and in the Committee vote of 40 to 3, the only opponents were the three Soviet Republics. The Secretary stated that he was sure that this was a matter of inadvertence on the part, of the United States representative at the Committee, since the question had not been discussed in the Delegation meetings. Consequently, he assured Ambassador Gromyko that he would look in the Question at once and see that the United States representative clarified his stand on this question.

Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that this concluded the list of problems still before the Big Five and his comments on these questions. The Secretary said that he hoped that with this statement before them, it might be possible for Ambassador Gromyko and himself to dispose of some of these issues in order that they could jointly press forward to make the Conference a success.

Position of the Soviet Delegation

Ambassador Gromyko opened his statement by saying that he was unable as yet to give a final answer on the proposed Four-Power statement interpreting the voting procedure in the Security Councils that he was still studying the matter but that he hoped; to be able to give his reply very soon. However, he pointed out that he could not agree to the interpretation of the voting procedure; which was set forth in the third paragraph of that statement, namely, that since the Security Council would have the right to determine its own rules of procedure by a procedural vote, it would follow that it could determine by a procedural vote as to whether it could discuss and consider a matter brought before it.

Ambassador Gromyko then said that his Delegation believed that questions which might be raised requiring a vote as to whether a matter before the Security Council should be settled by a procedural or a non-procedural vote should themselres be decided by the Council by a vote of a qualified majority. Moreover, he said that he did not believe it was now necessary or possible to work out a full list of questions on which a procedural vote of the Security Council should govern beyond those items listed in Chapter VI, Section D. He said that he felt that in the work of the Security Council there would be hundreds of questions which it Would have to answer and that the manner in which the Security Council should vote on these questions could not be determined at this time.

Ambassador Gromyko continued that it was obvious now, however, that political questions should not be determined by a procedural vote but that he felt that they could not go much beyond such an interpretation at this time.

The Secretary then inquired as to how Ambassador Gromyko’s present interpretation would affect the right of the Security Council to discuss and consider a question brought before it. Ambassador Gromyko replied that his interpretation would not affect the right but that in his view, under the Yalta voting formula, the only place that a procedural vote would rule would be under the provisions of Chapter VI, Section D. Again, Ambassador Gromyko stressed the fact that in his opinion it would be impossible to go beyond that Section in covering at this time a list of questions on which a procedural vote should rule.

Ambassador Gromyko next mentioned the fact that the situation with respect to the election of the Secretary General was somewhat confusing; that Representative Bloom of the United States Delegation did not correct that situation as the Soviet Delegation had been promised; and that as the provision now stood, the recommendation of the Security Council on the Secretary General would be taken by a vote of seven without a qualified majority. However, the Ambassador said, he was glad now to learn that the United States Delegation supported his view that the recommendation of the Security Council on the Secretary General should be taken by a qualified majority vote.

Mr. Pasvolsky explained that, in the Conference Committee, Representative Bloom had tried to avoid a situation under which a provision would have been adopted which would have specified that a vote of only six members of the Security Council would be required, and, consequently, he had obtained a compromise whereby a vote of seven was specified without its being indicated as to whether that seven would be a qualified or an unqualified majority. He said that it was the plan that the question as to the type of a majority that would be required would be settled in Committee 1 of Commission III, where all questions of voting in the Security Council should be discussed and agreed to.

Mr. Sobolov stated that the British Delegation interpreted the majority vote of seven as being an unqualified one. Mr. Pasvolsky said that this was certainly not the interpretation placed upon it by the United States Delegation and that this matter would have to be clarified by taking it up to the Steering Committee, if necessary. Ambassador Gromyko said that it was quite possible that it would not be necessary to take it to the Steering Committee at this time, but that by “freezing” the question, it could remain for final decision in Committee 1 of Commission III when the entire question of voting procedure in the Security Council was settled. Nevertheless, he suggested that this question should be discussed in the next meeting of the Big Five in order that the position of the British Delegation could be clarified. The Secretary agreed that this would be done.

Ambassador Gromyko said that it was their view that the same procedure covering the election of the Secretary General should also cover the election of deputies. He pointed out that these deputies would occupy very important posts, and that their prestige would be higher if they were confirmed by a procedure which had the weight of both the Security Council and the General Assembly behind it. Especially, he stated, would this be true if they were assigned regularly to one of the organs of the proposed organization as Mr. Pasvolsky had suggested.

Mr. Pasvolsky replied by pointing out that if this prestige factor were to be considered, it appeared more necessary than ever that the deputy assigned to each one of the organs should be one which it would trust, and in which it had a voice in selecting. Mr. Pasvolsky continued by restating the proposal which he had made earlier, stressing the fact that the prestige of the deputies would be considerably enhanced if they were approved by the organ which they served. The Secretary suggested that Ambassador Gromyko might wish to consider this proposal further and to give his opinion on it later.

Ambassador Gromyko said that he was glad to hear so clearly stated the United States position with respect to the amendment process and Chapter XII. Especially did he feel that the proposal to adhere to the Dumbarton Oaks text of Chapter XII was a good one. He also stated that he was pleased to learn that the situation with respect to the powers in the General Assembly which he had mentioned was going to be changed and he hoped that the United States Delegation would take the necessary steps to correct it. The Secretary promised him that this would be undertaken in the next meeting of the Big Five, and that the situation must be straightened out.

Mr. Pasvolsky then asked Ambassador Gromyko’s opinion as to the two suggested modifications in the amendment process covering the change in the Assembly vote from three-fourths to two-thirds vote, and specifying a time limit for the calling of a conference for revising the Charter. Ambassador Gromyko said that he would study these suggested modifications. His first reaction, he reported, was that it would be inadvisable to set such a time limit since it would tend to make the charter less flexible and such a revision conference might be convened when there were no questions for it to discuss. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that it was not our proposal that such a modification be advanced by us but that we would agree to it as advanced by the smaller powers. Ambassador Gromyko said that he would consider this question along with the proposed modification in the voting majority in the General Assembly.

The Secretary inquired as to how long it would be before the Soviet Delegation could make its position clear on this and similar points. Ambassador Gromyko replied by stating that he wished to make one fact clear: that the Soviet Delegation was not always responsible for delaying Conference action or decisions among the Big Five; that there are two sides to every question and that they had their own position in these matters as well as each of the other Delegations had its own. He said that he agreed with the Secretary that the major powers must show leadership in this Conference and that, in his opinion, they could best do this by adhering to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, supplemented by the Yalta voting formula, and as subsequently modified by the Four Power amendments submitted early in this Conference. He pointed out that it had been part of the Four Power agreement that they would consult with each other when issues arose at the Conference which were contrary to this position, but that if the representatives of the five Delegations worked at cross purposes in the technical committees, then leadership would certainly drift away from the Big Five.

Proposed Big Five Meeting

The Secretary suggested that it might perhaps be well to have a meeting of the five Foreign Ministers later in the afternoon to consider whether or not it might be well to close the Committee discussions at the end of this week and then to put before the Steering Committee the questions yet unsettled by the technical committees. Ambassador Gromyko said that while he would have no objection to such a meeting of the Big Five later in the afternoon, he wondered what they could discuss, since the Soviet Delegation was still considering several of the problems. Mr. Pasvolsky said that in his opinion such a meeting might not be fruitful at this time until the question of the interpretation of the voting procedure could be settled.

The Secretary then asked Ambassador Gromyko whether he would be ready to discuss the voting procedure on Friday. The Ambassador replied that perhaps he would be in such a position although he would advise the Secretary later. The Secretary emphasized that it was not possible to let matters drift, but that we must move ahead rapidly. Ambassador Gromyko said that in his opinion the decision on the interpretation of the voting procedure was not the “bottleneck” of the Conference. The Secretary said that he disagreed; that the small countries were awaiting a statement from the sponsoring Governments as to their interpretation of the procedure.

The Secretary said that if they could not agree at this time that a meeting of the Big Five should be held later in the afternoon, perhaps they could agree on a procedure which could be undertaken as soon as Ambassador Gromyko was in a position to give his opinion on the questions yet remaining. Accordingly, the Secretary suggested that the first step would be to have a meeting of the Big Five to settle the issues yet remaining before them. Thereafter, he proposed that the Big Five place before the Steering Committee a proposal that the work of the technical committees cease as of a certain date early next week and that the questions yet remaining open before the technical committees would then be placed in the Steering Committee.

Ambassador Gromyko and Mr. Sobolev suggested that a better approach would be through the Executive Committee rather than the Steering Committee, and the Secretary agreed. Mr. Pasvolsky again called attention to the fact that before this procedure could be undertaken, the Big Five must be in agreement and that the biggest of the issues yet unsettled was the interpretation of the voting procedure.

The discussion ended, with Ambassador Gromyko promising that as soon as he had reached a decision on the question of the statement interpreting voting procedure, he would get in touch with the Secretary in order that a meeting of the Big Five could be arranged immediately. As he was departing, Ambassador Gromyko mentioned the fact that the question of the revision of treaties would be up in Committee 2 of Commission II later in the afternoon, and that he hoped that some steps could be taken to defeat any such proposals. He said that Brazil seemed to be most active in sponsoring such amendments. The Secretary assured him that he would look into the matter.