Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 96: U.S. Cr. Min. 59

Minutes of the Fifty-Ninth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Franscisco, Thursday, May 31, 1945, 9:02 a.m.

San Francisco, May 31, 1945, 9:02 a.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of names of persons (38) present at meeting.]

The Secretary convened the meeting at 9:02 a.m.

Syria and Lebanon

Secretary Stettinius announced to the Delegation that at that very moment the Department of State in Washington was issuing the text of a note which had been delivered to France on the question of Syria and Lebanon. The Department, he said, was issuing a “very strong” note which was a “very direct statement” of this Government’s position that France should withdraw its troops from the Levantine states. The Secretary expressed the hope that this strong measure would be successful in bringing to an early close the serious situation existing in the Middle East. He hoped that the British and the United States together might be able to impress the French. The situation was so serious, he declared, that some of the Arabs were coming to the point where they were considering rejecting the Charter. The Secretary remarked that he would have to leave the meeting early in order to put through a phone call to Washington.

Senator Vandenberg remarked that the Arabs might also press for recognition of the Arab League as a regional organization under Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2, if that paragraph were to be left open any longer.

Amendment Procedure

The Chairman declared that Mr. Armstrong had an urgent matter to take up with the Delegation on the subject of amendment procedure. Mr. Armstrong declared that he had two points he wanted to bring to the Delegation’s attention, one a specific question and the second a general situation requiring consideration.

Mr. Armstrong declared that the subcommittee of Committee I/1 was going to vote that day on a British amendment to revise the Four-Power amendment to Chapter XI in order that it should be specifically provided that a conference on revision should be held not later than seven years after the coming into effect of the Charter. The British Delegate,⁹⁴ Mr. Armstrong remarked, had made his proposal without previously consulting the other members of the Big Five and had placed the United States in an embarrassing situation. Actually, Mr. Armstrong said, the British suggestion had been that a conference be held ten years after the entry into force of the Charter, but the Canadians had specifically suggested seven years and had made a formal motion. As originally presented, the Canadian amendment provided that final ratification of any changes resulting from a revisionary conference would be subject to the unanimity requirement. This procedure, however, did not suit Mr. Evatt of Australia who did not want any control over amendment procedure by the Security Council. Mr. Evatt had succeeded in postponing the decision overnight in order to rally forces behind his suggested change and to convince the Dominions to ask for a further limitation on the powers of the Big Five. This matter was to be the first order of business at the morning’s meeting.

Mr. Armstrong referred the Delegation to the document, Situation Regarding Chapter XI, Amendments. Behind the specific Australian amendment was the general situation to which Mr. Armstrong had referred. Mr. Armstrong declared that Mr. Evatt and his cohorts had been circulating from committee to committee and had been making short speeches in opposition to the Charter. In Mr. Armstrong’s hearing Mr. Evatt had remarked to a Brazilian Delegate that he favored the Lippman proposal that the Organization be regarded as a transitional organization until such time as it could be thoroughly revised. Mr. Armstrong was of the opinion that there was great importance to this matter because if the middle powers succeeded in pressing their position, a complete revision of the Organization would be necessary within a relatively short time.

Mr. Evatt had indicated the attitude of the small and middle powers when he insulted the Chinese and French Governments by referring to them as second-rate powers. The Ecuadorian Delegate had not helped the situation any when he referred to the lack of free speech in Russia in connection with a statement by the Russian Delegate that this was to be a democratic organization. Mr. Armstrong declared that it was becoming apparent that a number of states did not intend to ratify the Charter as it stood and he cited the Dutch as an example. Mr. Pasvolsky urged that if this was their position they should be allowed not to ratify the Charter. Secretary Stettinius urged that the Delegation collect itself and consider the matter more calmly. The Secretary declared that it was to have been expected that there would be hurdles of this nature and he was confident that they could be taken in stride.

Mr. Armstrong declared that he was not a defeatist but that in his opinion the battle was three-fourths lost. It was necessary, he maintained, for strong collective action to be taken by the Big Five. Mr. Dunn declared that the British action in proposing the revision of the Four-Power amendments was contrary to the decision of the sponsoring governments to stand by their original proposal. Mr. Notter said, however, that the British representative, Mr. Mabane, was too clever to have formally proposed this amendment. Actually, he had made the proposal but he had not done so formally. Therefore, his action could not be held against the British Delegation. Mr. Notter remarked that the issue had been shifted since the Delegation had last considered the problem of the amendment. He thought that the small powers would now be willing to vote for ratification of amendments under the unanimity procedure. However, they were now lining up behind the proposal for a revisionary conference.

Mr. Hackworth remarked that he would have to leave the meeting shortly and he wanted to get in “a few licks” on this question. Mr. Hackworth declared that the Colombian Foreign Minister⁹⁵ had spoken to him recently and had expressed discontent with the existing amendment, procedure. The Colombian Foreign Minister had indicated the impossibility of gaining acceptance for the Charter on the part of the Colombian legislature unless the provision for amendment were changed. Similarly, the absence of any specific provision for withdrawal had been most confusing to the Colombian Delegation. The Colombian Foreign Minister expressed the opinion that the absence of a provision made withdrawal difficult, if not impossible. Mr. Hackworth had pointed to the statement made by Representative Eaton in the Committee⁹⁶ to the effect that if the Charter were silent on the question of withdrawal it would mean that that decision would be taken according to the circumstances in each instance. But the chief point that the Colombian Foreign Minister had made was that his government could not be bound by something which was contrary to the Colombian constitution. He had declared that his Delegation would be satisfied if the Committee went on record to the effect that states had the right to withdraw from the Organization if it could not accept any amendment which was ratified without its consent. As an alternative, the Colombian Foreign Minister had suggested that the right to make reservations to Chapter XI be recognized. Senator Vandenberg agreed that this was a perfectly proper position. A state should be able to withdraw from the Organization or have a final say on amendments.

The Secretary asked Mr. Dunn for his opinion as to the course to take on this matter. Mr. Dunn urged that the Big Five take a strong position on this matter. In his opinion it would be impossible to make the Charter a provisional document. The Secretary remarked that he was going to speak to a number of foreign ministers some time during the morning and he asked how the Delegation felt on the question of calling a meeting of the Committee of Five. Mr. Dulles said that very firm measures would have to be taken in order to accomplish anything. He thought that the five powers should agree to the Charter which they wanted to accept. All discussion should be stopped and the document should be ratified. Anyone who did not want to sign the Charter under these circumstances should be permitted to “go home”. This position, Mr. Dulles admitted, sounded drastic but he was of the opinion that public debate would not work because of majority opposition. In the final analysis a number of the measures which were supported by the Big Five could be justified only on the grounds of the necessity for accomplishing the most that could be achieved. The Big Five, he thought, must take firm leadership from this point on. There were, he said, too many issues coming up which could disrupt the Conference unless there were strong leadership on the part of the major powers.

Senator Connally was in agreement with this position of Mr. Dulles. There would probably be, he declared, a great deal of “howling” but there would be “howling” under any circumstances. Senator Connally pointed out that the Conference had been called to consider drafting a Charter based on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. If the other nations did not accept Dumbarton Oaks as a suitable basis for a Charter, Senator Connally was of the opinion that they should have stayed home. It was necessary, he thought, for the Big Five to say, in effect, “take it or leave it”.

Commander Stassen urged that this matter should be considered in the Steering Committee. He pointed out that few heads of delegations attended the meetings of the technical committees and hence there was no one with sufficient authority to slow up the firebrands who did make a practice of attending the committee sessions. The questions at issue on which the big powers were insistent should, he thought, be considered by the heads of delegations where the influence of the major powers could effectively be brought to bear. It was obvious, Commander Stassen thought, that the Big Five could not carry their decisions through thirteen technical committees. The Secretary agreed with Commander Stassen and suggested as the appropriate procedure that a meeting of the Committee of Five should be called to reach an agreement on the convocation of the Steering Committee. The Steering Committee should then agree on a final date for the submission of committee reports, and after that it would be up to the steering group to reach decisions on all the outstanding questions. Commander Stassen added that this procedure should be followed even if it became necessary for the Steering Committee to meet continuously for two or more consecutive days.

Mr. Armstrong declared that Mr. Evatt had not taken the position “that the big powers had not had an opportunity to become familiar with the viewpoint of the smaller powers but rather that the small states had no indication of what the major powers wanted. It was the lack of agreement among the Big Five on questions such as voting arrangements which had caused the loss of confidence on the part of the small powers. Secretary Stettinius remarked that the Big Five had been able to agree to 27 amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals in two days and he added that it had been the major powers acting jointly which had won the war. Mr. Notter expressed the opinion that the loss of confidence had been caused primarily by the failure of the Big Five to submit the answers to the questionnaire on voting arrangements. The Secretary remarked that this question was to be considered later on in the morning.

Mr. Rockefeller expressed the opinion that the situation was not really as serious as might appear on the surface. There was, he thought, a crystallization of views taking place, especially among the Latin-American states. There was no doubt in his mind that the United States could line up the support of the smaller nations on the veto question. He urged that the Big Five had an opportunity to achieve a very desirable situation in Mr. Armstrong’s committee⁹⁷ by fixing a sense of responsibility upon the small powers. This could be accomplished, he thought, by setting a definite date for a revisionary conference. In this way he was certain that the veto provisions would be carried. The small powers would think that they had made an important contribution to the establishment of the world organization and would be of the opinion that the United States had made a substantial concession. Actually, he said, it would not matter very much to the United States if the proposal for a revisionary convention were to be carried because the United States would still have a veto over any amendments suggested at such a conference.

Secretary Stettinius urged once more that a final date must be established for committee discussions and he thought that a Steering Committee meeting would be necessary. Mr. Rockefeller agreed with this proposed procedure. The Secretary asked whether there was any chance for delaying the vote on this question of a revisionary conference. Mr. Armstrong replied that there undoubtedly would be a vote on the British proposal as amended by Australia. Mr. Rockefeller reiterated that he was certain of the position that the Latin-American nations would take. They would accept the veto power if they were guaranteed that a revisionary conference would be held at some definite date. He did not think the matter was as serious as it had been painted and he announced that he would be glad to attend Mr. Armstrong’s committee and work with him in insuring support for the United States position. Mr. Armstrong said that Mr. Rockefeller’s presence would make “defeat much pleasanter”.

Mr. Pasvolsky declared that he was still opposed to a change which would set a definite date for a revisionary convention. But the Secretary replied that if the United States were to oppose this measure, it would be out-voted. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the Delegation must determine which states would vote against the position of the United States in order that the Delegation might work on them to change their votes. In his view it was impossible to accept this amendment. Mr. Dunn asked whether the Delegation thought that it would be possible to accept a provision that a conference should be held at the end of a ten year period, provided that the unanimity rule with respect to ratification were to be maintained. The only disadvantage of the specific date being set, Mr. Dulles declared, was its psychological effects. Mr. Dulles reminded the Delegation that such a provision had been voted down during the preliminary discussions in Washington. Mr. Dunn reiterated the importance of maintaining a unanimity requirement with respect to ratification of amendments. Mr. Dulles declared that in that case it would be necessary to grant the right of withdrawal to states which were unable to accept amendments passed without their approval.

The Secretary asked Mr. Armstrong whether the proposal advanced by Mr. Dunn would relieve the situation any. Mr. Armstrong declared that it certainly would have been invaluable on the previous evening⁹⁸ but he was not so certain now since Mr. Evatt was attempting to line up support for his amendment. Mr. Rockefeller declared that in his opinion the matter would turn out in favor of the United States.

Mr. Armstrong urged that this proposed change in the attitude of the United States should first be cleared with the U.S.S.R., and pointed out that a difficult situation had been created when the British had made their proposal without first consulting with the other members of the Big Five. Mr. Notter remarked that Ambassador Gromyko had declared that any change would have to be considered by the Big Four. Mr. Rockefeller suggested that a special meeting of the Committee of Five be called and Commander Stassen urged that Mr. Armstrong reserve the position of the United States and declare that a new formula was being worked out. Mr. Dunn declared that he was opposed to such a procedure because it would put the United States on a spot. He suggested that the United States reserve its position on the proposal just agreed upon by the Delegation. He urged that Mr. Armstrong should present to the Committee the necessity for a consultation among the Big Five.

Mr. Pasvolsky asked what the vote would be on. Mr. Armstrong replied that it would be on the proposal that reference to a seven year period be made in Chapter XI, Paragraph 3. Mr. Evatt, he declared, would try to amend this proposal or defeat it and introduce a separate amendment eliminating the second half of the paragraph concerning the unanimity requirement for ratification. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that it would be impossible to accept this amendment and that the Delegation must mobilize support for its position. Commander Stassen urged that Mr. Armstrong pass the word in the Committee that the United States was willing to accept a specific reference to the holding of a conference after ten years if agreement could be reached on this among the other members of the Big Five. However, the United States’ position must be made clear on the unanimity requirement. Mr. Rockefeller urged that Mr. Armstrong take a positive stand and act aggressively. The Secretary reminded the Delegation that the proposed revision would have to be cleared first with the other members of the Big Five. Mr. Rockefeller suggested that some other nation be influenced to move the United States proposal. In that way the necessity for first consulting among the Big Five would be avoided.

Senator Connally asked whether the convention would be automatic at the end of the period established or whether there would be a vote on the question of submission. Mr. Armstrong declared that under both the Canadian and Australian proposals the convention would be automatic, although Mr. Evatt had been more specific in asking that the convention be held on the seventh anniversary of the opening of the United Nations Conference.

Mr. Sandifer was of the opinion that since Australia had been able to postpone the vote on the previous evening, the United States should be able to postpone the vote at the next meeting. Mr. Rockefeller thought the meeting should be called off entirely because it would be difficult to attend the meeting without voting on the question. The Secretary agreed with Mr. Sandifer’s proposal and suggested that Mr. Armstrong rise at the opening of the meeting and urge postponement of the vote on this question. If Mr. Armstrong could do this, The Secretary declared that he would meet with the Big Five that afternoon and reach an agreement. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that this was definitely a proper procedure. Mr. Armstrong remarked that such an auction would be contrary to the demands of the major powers that committees speed up their work but Secretary Stettinius replied that it was necessary to take this action anyhow. Mr. Armstrong thought that the Costa Rican Chairman of the Committee⁹⁹ might not agree to postponement but Mr. Rockefeller indicated that the Chairman would agree and that he would attend the meeting to assist Mr. Armstrong.

The Secretary asked the Delegation whether it was agreed to establish a specific ten-year period after which a revisionary conference should be held. Dr. Bowman submitted that he was opposed to such a specific proposal because at the time established, the Security Council might be in the midst of a dispute which would prejudice the work of the Conference. This objection could be met, he declared, by establishing a minimum and a maximum date within which period the Conference should be held. The Secretary declared that he accepted Dr. Bowman’s objection as being sound and asked whether the Delegation agreed. There was unanimous agreement that a period of seven to ten years should be established. The Delegation was agreed that a conference should be called after seven to ten years on the condition that the veto power over any amendments passed by the convention should be maintained by the permanent members of the Security Council.

Invitation of Denmark

Secretary Stettinius instructed Mr. Dunn to acquaint the Delegation with the situation with respect to inviting Denmark to participate in the Conference. [At this point, 9:40 a.m., Mr. Hackworth left the meeting.]¹

Mr. Dunn reported that Ambassador Gromyko had requested that a meeting of the Steering Committee be held that day and Mr. Dunn remarked that this body would have to meet anyhow in order to consider the question of the election of the Secretary-General^1a which had been referred to it by Commission II.

… The Secretary declared that he would reluctantly go along on inviting Denmark but was definitely opposed to the admission of any other states. Mr. Dunn pointed out that an agreement had been reached with Ambassador Gromyko concerning, Denmark and it would be impossible to withdraw at this time. The Secretary reiterated that “the flood gates” must not be opened.…

Mr. Dulles observed that the Organization was based on the premise of quick action by the five major powers This Conference seemed to be demonstrating that the Big Five could not work together effectively. Mr. Dulles declared that it was imperative that a situation be reestablished whereby the Big Five could get measures through. The small states, he said, were very much alarmed over the inability of the Big Five to run the Conference. The big problem, in Mr. Dulles’ mind, was the delays occasioned by the U.S.S.R. He urged that the Secretary talk with the Russian Relegation and make the situation clear to them, and The Secretary replied that he was having a talk with the Russian representatives later in, the morning.²

Senator Vandenberg asked whether it would not be possible to postpone consideration of the invitation to Denmark. Mr. Dunn remarked that the Chairman would be placed in a very difficult situation if he asked for postponement of this question when the United States was already committed to accepting the proposal. Mr. Dunn was of the opinion that it would be necessary to go through with the matter and face the other possibilities. The only way this could have been avoided was by opposing Norway in the first instance. The United States was now definitely committed to accepting the Norwegian proposal.

Mr. Rockefeller asked how much pressure of time there was on this matter and Mr. Dunn replied that it would be considered in the next meeting of the Steering Committee that afternoon. The Secretary remarked that he had not been consulted on this matter yet and hence could not call a meeting. The Secretary was of the opinion that the only course available to the Delegation was to accept Mr. Dunn’s recommendation since there was nothing else to do. He declared that if any other nations were proposed for admission the matter should be referred to the sponsoring governments for their consideration. He thought that one of the small states should make this suggestion. Mr. Dunn declared that this course of action would open the way for a “licking”. The small states would all ask why the matter should be decided by the major powers without their participation. This position had become, he declared, a state of mind among the smaller nations. Mr. Rockefeller urged that the Delegation should make up its mind in advance on what other nations it would accept. The Secretary declared that he would oppose inviting any other Government. Mr. Rockefeller urged that in any event the agreement of the Russians would be necessary and The Secretary agreed that the Big Five must reach an agreement.

Representative Bloom expressed the opinion that the Delegation must look beyond the immediate situation. If the charge of discrimination were to be raised by any group in this country the result, he thought, would be an awful fight in Washington when it comes to ratifying the Charter. Senator Connally suggested that, at the meeting of the Committee of Five, the Secretary should canvass the entire situation and “turn the heat on”. An impasse had been reached, Senator Connally declared, which could be broken only by decisive action.… The Secretary asked whether any one on the Delegation had any objection to the plan to have a meeting of the Committee of Five that afternoon. No objection was raised.

[Here follows discussion of issues pending.]

Voting Procedure

Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the position of the Delegation on this matter had been clarified in previous meetings and needed no further exposition at this time.

Amendment Procedure

Mr. Pasvolsky asked if he had interpreted correctly that the Delegation favored a provision for a revisionary conference after seven to ten years with the proviso that the unanimity rule be maintained. Mr. Pasvolsky also thought that the Delegation had decided to accept a two-thirds vote instead of the three-fourths requirement which had previously been decided on. Mr. Rockefeller added that the Delegation’s position also indicated a willingness to accept the interpretation that the states members of the Organization had the right to make reservations when their respective legislatures were unwilling to ratify the amendments proposed. Mr. Hickerson thought that withdrawals from the Organization might also be made possible.

Election of Secretary-General and Deputy Secretaries-General

The Secretary asked whether the Delegation had any recommendation with respect to the problem of electing the Secretary-General. Mr. Pasvolsky expressed the opinion that Russia would adhere to its stated position that the Secretary-General should be elected by majority vote of the General Assembly and by a qualified majority of the Security Council. Mr. Pasvolsky did not think the United States should oppose the Soviet Union on this matter. The question, he thought, was what position the Delegation should take on the election of the Deputy Secretaries-General. Mr. Notter did not think the United States should oppose the Russian stand on this matter either. Representative Bloom thought that the Deputies should be appointed by the Secretary-General. The Chairman asked whether the Delegation favored giving in to the Russian position. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that substantial opposition would develop to the Russian stand and Mr. Notter thought that Russia was already “licked” on this matter. Representative Bloom concurred and pointed out that the small powers wanted election of the Deputies by an unqualified majority of seven. Mr. Pasvolsky urged that the Delegation would have to make up its mind on this issue and Senator Connally pointed out that in his opinion it would be necessary to insure compatibility among the five Deputy Secretaries-General and the Secretary General. Mr. Pasvolsky agreed that this was the argument advanced by the opponents of the four power proposal. Commander Stassen asked the Delegation whether it would be possible under our constitutional system to allow for the election of the President and five members of the Cabinet. Commander Stassen thought that the Secretary General should be elected and that he should be allowed, at the very least, to select his Deputies in conjunction with the Security Council. The offices of Secretary General and his five assistants would be the one point in the Organization, Commander Stassen urged, where administrative coherence could be achieved. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that at one time he had proposed a compromise to the effect that the Secretary General should be elected by a qualified majority. The Deputies should be appointed by the Secretary-General and should be subject to the approval, one each, by the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the General Assembly. The fifth Deputy, who would be the Secretary General’s chief administrative assistant, should be appointed without the approval of any part of the Organization. The Delegation received this proposal favorably and it was agreed that the United States should adopt this position.

Election of Court Judges

Mr. Pasvolsky urged that the Delegation stand on a procedural vote for the judges of the World Court. This, he pointed out, had already been approved in one committee³ but the Russians had been of the opinion that the vote was improperly taken because the subject was not within the competence of the committee which reached the decision.

Expulsion

Mr. Pasvolsky expressed the view that the United States was committed to supporting a provision for expulsion. He thought that the United States should assist the U.S.S.R. in fighting this question through. The matter had been discussed, he declared, at Dumbarton Oaks⁴ and the decision had been reached that there should be a clause providing for expulsion of members who did not fulfill their obligations under the Charter. The United States, he declared, had opposed this position as had Great Britain, but both countries had given in to the Russian request and Mr. Pasvolsky was of the opinion that the United States should maintain unanimity with the U.S.S.R. on this matter. The original technical committee could not reopen the question and Mr. Pasvolsky thought that the matter should be brought before the Steering Committee,⁵ at which point the United States could support the Russian demand. Mr. Rockefeller thought that it would be advisable to defer this question until the others had been settled, inasmuch as the Big Five would be open to criticism if they insisted upon reopening a question which had been already settled in committee. Mr. Pasvolsky replied, however, that all these questions would come up at the same time.

Supply of Forces

Mr. Pasvolsky reported to the Delegation that with respect to the question of supplying forces to the Organization, the language considered on the previous day, making possible either agreement among the member states themselves or agreement with the Security Council, had been changed slightly for the purpose of simplification. Mr. Pasvolsky reported that Russian agreement to the final wording had not been received as yet but he thought it probably would be received later in the day.

At this point, Secretary Stettinius pointed out that there was three hour communication between San Francisco and Moscow by means of the radio on board the Russian ship anchored in the harbor. The Delegation had been informed that it required seventy-two hours to establish communication with Moscow. President Truman had received a response to a communication with the Kremlin within three hours.

Preparatory Commission

Mr. Pasvolsky declared that no decision was necessary on this question because the United States was holding up further consideration of it.

Economic and Social Council

Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the questions at issue with respect to Chapter IX, on the Economic and Social Council, were highly important and he expressed the opinion that it would be necessary to obtain agreement on these matters. Mr. Pasvolsky wondered whether the words “collectively and severally” might not prove acceptable with respect to the Australian pledge amendment. However, Dean Gildersleeve declared that this wording had not received a favorable reception by Committee II/3.⁶ The Secretary asked what had happened to the phraseology “victor and vanquished” in the amendment on raw materials. Commander Stassen declared that this question had already been defeated although no vote had been taken as yet. Russia and the United Kingdom had made strong statements and the only question before the Delegation was whether or not the United States should also make a statement.

Representative Bloom asked whether it would not be best to bring up the question of the Secretary General in the Steering Committee meeting. He thought “this matter should be held up and expressed the view that it Would not be necessary to bring the matter up in a meeting of the Committee of Five. This, he thought, was especially true since the question had been referred to the Steering Committee. Mr. Dunn replied to Congressman Bloom that this was part of the over-all picture which would be considered at the same time.

The Secretary declared that he had to leave since he was half an hour late with his phone call to Washington. He asked whether the Delegation agreed to 3 p.m. as the time for a Big Five meeting in the penthouse.⁷ There seemed to be agreement and The Secretary declared that unless notified to the contrary, the members of the Delegation should be ready to attend a 3 o’clock meeting. The Secretary instructed Mr. Sandifer to contact each of the Delegates after the Secretary confirmed the time in his 1:30 meeting. The Secretary then left the meeting.

French Amendment

Commander Stassen declared that he would have to leave for an important Trusteeship meeting. Before he left he was anxious to make a statement on the French treaty question. He referred the Delegation to the May 31, 1945 draft⁸ of the “Proposed Change in Sponsoring Governments’ Amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2”. Commander Stassen declared he still wished that it was not necessary to change this paragraph. However, he was of the opinion that the new language was a definite change for the better and Commander Stassen declared that he would not oppose this wording if the other members of the Big Five would agree. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that he had discussed the new language with the other four members and they had indicated their willingness to accept.

Senator Vandenberg asked whether the Russians were really willing to accept this wording which he thought meant that all the United Nations would have to join in the request for the Organization to assume responsibility for preventing further aggression by a state enemy of the United Nations in this war. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that this was not necessarily so; it might mean that all the United Nations would have to join in the request or only a few on behalf of the rest. Senator Vandenberg asked whether Mr. Pasvolsky would explain the meaning of the new language. Mr. Pasvolsky referred to the incorporation in the new paragraph of reference to Chapter XII, Paragraph 2, and asked which would be the parties concerned. Senator Vandenberg replied that the signatories of this Charter would be the parties. Mr. Dulles remarked that the French had insisted upon the deletion of the word “concerned”. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that if it should be decided to delete Chapter XII, Paragraph 2, it would then be logical that action only by the parties to the regional agreement concerned would be necessary for the Organization to exercise the function of preventing aggression by an enemy state. However, if the United States wanted to insure its participation in decisions concerning Europe, it was necessary to retain Chapter XII, Paragraph 2. Senator Connally asked whether the Security Council would be obligated to assume this responsibility under the new wording.

Commander Stassen urged that the danger against which the United States must safeguard was the possibility of individual action, such as the French had taken in Syria and Lebanon. If regional arrangements were left entirely free of control by the Security Council, a very dangerous situation would be established. If a nation did not want to arbitrate, there could be no compulsion under the previous draft of this paragraph. Commander Stassen declared that even under the new draft he contemplated many future headaches and he would accept the wording only because of the realization that it was necessary to make concessions to avoid a break-up of the Conference. Mr. Pasvolsky indicated that he would be willing to delete the phrase “at the request of the governments having responsibility for the taking of measures provided for pursuant to Chapter XII, Paragraph 2.” The United States, he thought, was adequately protected by the existence of the paragraph referred to in this phrase without specific reference being necessary in the paragraph under consideration. However, Mr. Pasvolsky declared that he thought the inclusion of this phrase would take care of the objections raised previously by Commander Stassen.

Mr. Dulles declared that the object of this Delegation with respect to this paragraph was to insure that the authority of the Security Council should be established at the earliest possible moment. Mr. Dulles was of the opinion that to make necessary the consent of more states as the present draft did, would be to make the establishment of the authority of the Security Council more difficult. The earlier draft, he thought, limited the number of states whose “request” was required to a small number, the parties to regional arrangements. Commander Stassen declared that the number was kept small only at the cost of cutting the United States out. Mr. Dulles asked why the United States should want to be included in the group which would prolong the establishment of the authority of the Security Council. Commander Stassen replied that under the new arrangement the United States could participate, if it so desired, in the initiation of the action which would make possible the assumption of this authority by the Security Council. Under the earlier draft there was no assurance, Commander Stassen declared, that this initiative would ever be taken. Mr. Dulles declared that under the earlier draft it would have been possible for the Security Council to take the initiative but Mr. Sandifer thought that this was not the case and he agreed with Commander Stassen that the new draft gave the United States the right to take part in the initiation of action to establish the authority of the Security Council. Mr. Dulles repeated that in his opinion what the wording accomplished was to enlarge the group of states whose concurrence was necessary for the assumption of the jurisdiction under question by the Security Council. Commander Stassen declared that the group was enlarged only by one state, the United States, the one state whose inclusion the Delegation must be in favor of. Mr. Dulles asked why this new wording would not include Belgium and some of the other European states in the group whose assent would be necessary. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that all of the European states would be expected to have concluded regional agreements anyhow which would bring them in under the other part of the clause. Mr. Pasvolsky admitted, however, that China would be included in the group under the new wording and Mr. Dulles remarked that Brazil also and the other South American states as well would be included under the new phraseology. Mr. Sandifer disagreed and declared that the South American states would not have “the responsibility for the taking of measures …” with respect to Europe. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that Australia would probably be brought in under the new wording. Mr. Dulles urged that he could not see the necessity for China, which was an Eastern Power, having the authority to veto the assumption of authority by the Security Council over the prevention of aggression in Europe.

Trusteeship

Commander Stassen declared he would have to leave the meeting shortly and asked whether the Delegation was agreed that he should stand firm on maintaining paragraph 5 in the Trusteeship chapter. The USSR had proposed the deletion of this paragraph. The Delegation agreed to this position.

French Treaty Question

Mr. Pasvolsky asked Commander Stassen whether he would not agree to dropping this section of new language which was under discussion. Mr. Dulles reiterated that in his opinion the new wording would admit all the United Nations to the decision as to whether the Security Council should assume jurisdiction over the prevention of aggression by enemy states. Commander Stassen declared that the wording referred to the governments which had the responsibility for such action and he asked Mr. Dulles what interpretation he gave to Chapter XII, paragraph 2 from which the wording was drafted. Mr. Dulles declared that Chapter XII, Paragraph 2 was worded “enemy states” and he was of the opinion that this would include Japan. Mr. Pasvolsky agreed with Commander Stassen that the new wording would insure American participation in the decision as to whether the Security Council should assume the necessary jurisdiction and he also agreed with Commander Stassen’s interpretation of the meaning of the new phraseology. Senator Vandenberg asked once more whether the Russians would agree to this new wording and Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the Russians had already agreed to the earlier wording “measures against enemy states in this war provided for pursuant to Chapter XII, paragraph 2.” The new wording merely carried out this wording further, and Mr. Pasvolsky was certain the Russians would accept it. Senator Vandenberg voiced the opinion that the new wording did more than that. It added to the number of consents required for the assumption of jurisdiction by the Security Council. He thought that the Russian interpretation must have been that the wording referred only to those states which were signatory to regional arrangements.

Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the Security Council would not take over the functions exercised by states signatory to such regional arrangements upon their agreement that the arrangements were no longer essential unless the United States approved of the assumption of such jurisdiction under Chapter XII, Paragraph 2. These functions, Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out, were very important ones and he thought that the United States should be a party to the decision. Senator Vandenberg suggested that if Mr. Pasvolsky managed to achieve agreement on the phraseology he should then come down and explain its meaning to Committee III/4, on Regional Arrangements. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that the matter would be simplified greatly by substituting the word “or” for “and” in the fifth line from the end of the paragraph. This, he declared, would indicate clearly that two separate groups of states were indicated by the two clauses. Mr. Dulles agreed that that substitution would make all the difference in the world but Mr. Pasvolsky observed that “or” would not adequately cover the situation because it would make possible the elimination of the parties to the regional arrangements.

Mr. Dulles declared that it had been his interpretation that authority over the control of enemy states would be granted to the Security Council on the “request” of any two parties to a regional arrangement. He asked why Australia should have the right to prevent the United Kingdom and Russia from turning over their authority under a regional arrangement to the Security Council. Senator Vandenberg declared that he was dumbfounded by the interpretation given to the original language by Mr. Pasvolsky. He still found it difficult to believe that “consent of the governments concerned” meant all the United Nations. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that under the original draft, it had been considered a great victory to have achieved mention of Chapter XII, Paragraph 2. Once this reference had been included in the paragraph, all the states concerned with the interim arrangements for the supervision of enemy states became concerned with the matters involved in Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2. The Russian delegates, he declared, had accepted this interpretation and it had been universally assumed that the wording referred to both types of arrangements, the bi-lateral regional pacts as well as the arrangements whereby certain states would be charged with the responsibility for supervising enemy nations during the interim period. Senator Vandenberg asked whether Mr. Pasvolsky would inform him as to which governments would be concerned in turning over the responsibilities involved in an Anglo-Russian treaty to the Organization. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that Great Britain and Russia could stop exercising their powers over such a treaty at any time they so desired. However, Mr. Pasvolsky declared that that did not mean that Great Britain and Russia could have the Organization take over those powers. When the Organization assumed jurisdiction over the matters previously under the jurisdiction of a regional arrangement, no such treaty would any longer be consistent with the powers of the Security Council. However, when two parties to such a regional arrangement give up their treaty, the powers under that treaty would pass not to the Organization but to those nations responsible for exercising control over enemy states during the interim period. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that it was not the case that the number of states whose consent was necessary for the assumption of jurisdiction by the Organization was reduced by the relinquishment of any bi-lateral treaty. Mr. Dulles said that he could understand that the Security Council might have to reach an agreement to assume jurisdiction but he could still not see the necessity for bringing in Australia on that decision. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that Australia would already be in by virtue of Chapter XII, Paragraph 2, and Mr. Dulles added that this might be true insofar as Australia was responsible for maintaining the surrender terms. Mr. Dulles declared that obviously it was necessary to have an agreement by the parties to each regional arrangement that the Organization should assume jurisdiction as they recognized that there was no longer any need for the bi-lateral pact. However, Mr. Dulles reiterated that he could not see why Australia should have any relation to an Anglo-Russian treaty.

Mr. Kane declared that if Mr. Pasvolsky were correct in his interpretation and that was the way the U.S.S.R. interpreted Chapter XII, Paragraph 2, then consideration should be given to the advisability of revising Chapter XII, Paragraph 2. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that the matters considered in the Chapter on Interim Arrangements were actually outside the scope of the Organization. Then he asked what other interpretation could be given to this Chapter. Mr. Dulles declared that states having responsibilities under Chapter XII should have a voice in the determination of policies under that Chapter, but he could not see why these powers should be able to affect in any way the decisions which were concerned only with the regional pacts. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out, however, that the exception had been made in the paragraph under consideration, Paragraph 2, of Section C of Chapter VIII. Having won the victory in including a reference to Chapter XII, Paragraph 2, the United States must now accept it. Mr. Pasvolsky then asked the Delegation if anyone could answer who would have the right, under, the surrender terms, to recognize a new German Government. This, he declared, was a question which could not possibly be answered at this time and explained that that was the reason that the question of who were the responsible powers had been left open. Mr. Dunn declared that he could answer Mr. Pasvolsky’s question in terms of an Anglo-Russian treaty. Under such a treaty Germany could not possibly have any authority. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that that was not the point at issue. He asked, rhetorically, when do regional agreements become inconsistent with the terms of the Charter and declared that they would become inconsistent at the point when the Organization were to take over the function of dealing with the enemy states. This, he declared, was dependent upon Chapter XII, Paragraph 2. No matter what language were to be used, he declared, the situation would still remain just as he had described it. The problem was one of consistency of treaties with the terms of the Charter. It was not a question of when the functions established under these treaties were taken over by the Organization. Mr. Dulles replied that in his view the question was one of when the states powers to regional agreements thought it was safe to give up these bi-lateral arrangements. He asked why it was necessary to “cut in” all the nations in the world in this decision. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that he was perfectly willing to accept the original French amendment. Admiral Hepburn declared that the question in his mind was one of parties to bi-lateral arrangements retaining their powers or turning them over to the organization, and Mr. Dulles remarked that the more nations there were whose consent was necessary for this transition, the more difficult it would be to conclude the transaction. Admiral Hepburn declared that the decision would be made in the surrender terms under which he thought the major powers would be designated as the states responsible for policing the enemy nations. Mr. Sandifer asked whether it would be necessary for all the parties to Chapter XII, Paragraph 2, namely, all the signatories to the Charter, to consent under the latest language of Paragraph 2 of VIII, C. Admiral, Hepburn replied that it would be possible for the four major powers to be designated as having the responsibility and hence their consent alone would be necessary under the new language. Senator Vandenberg asked whether, when the wording “by consent” had been agreed upon, it was meant that “everybody” was signified. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that the meaning had been that any State with an interest in either of the two situations, responsibility under Chapter XII or regional agreements, would have been a party under the original language. Mr. Dunn indicated that he had been of the opinion that only the parties to regional agreements were implied and that that was why he had favored the original language. Mr. Dulles indicated that it would be much easier, in his opinion, to influence two parties to a regional arrangement to give up that arrangement. But Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the Security Council could not accept the responsibility despite the willingness of parties to a regional arrangement to relinquish their rights under that agreement. Mr. Dulles asked whether he was correct in understanding Mr. Pasvolsky to have said that it would be impossible for the parties to a regional arrangement to give up that arrangement without the consent of all the responsible parties under Chapter XII, Paragraph 2. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the parties to a regional arrangement could relinquish that pact any time they so desired; however, the functions of supervising enemy states could be turned over to the Council only by the nations concerned with that supervision during the interim period. These nations would be refined under the surrender terms. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that a serious mistake had been made in not incorporating in Chapter XII specific provision that the powers referred to should be turned over to the Organization. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that if the exception established in paragraph 2 of VIII, C were not taken advantage of, the Organization would have authority over preventing further aggression by enemy states. However, this exception related, under the present wording, to the two separate spheres, states responsible for supervision of enemy territories and parties to regional arrangements.

Mr. Dunn declared that he understood the distinction drawn between the two areas; however, he thought that the parties to a regional arrangement could relinquish to the Security Council the functions provided for under the treaty, provided that the Security Council was willing to accept these functions, without the responsibilities involved in the sphere of supervision of enemy territories being relinquished. Senator Vandenberg asked that Mr. Pasvolsky admit that somebody in addition to Mr. Pasvolsky and Commander Stassen should be able to understand the wording. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that he would admit that perhaps he himself did not understand the wording. Mr. Pasvolsky went on to declare that the Subcommittee of Five had agreed on the previous day that responsibility for turning over functions previously exercised under regional agreements resided in all those states having responsibility for the administration of enemy territories. The right to take advantage of the exception established in Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2 could be relinquished at any time by the two parties to a regional arrangement but to turn over all the functions under such an arrangement would require the assent of all those nations responsible for the supervision of enemy territories. Senator Vandenberg challenged Mr. Pasvolsky to present a list of the nations which would fall under this category. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that he would be perfectly willing to do so and would even present the list in Russian. Senator Vandenberg declared that Mr. Pasvolsky might just as well present the list in Russian. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the powers responsible for the supervision of’ enemy territories might include the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom and France, in addition to thirty or forty other members of the United Nations “technically at war” with the enemy powers. The United Nations of today, Mr. Pasvolsky declared, would have to make up their minds as to who would control the enemy states. If agreement should be reached that this authority should reside in the Principal United Nations, only the five states mentioned specifically would fall under the category of states whose assent would be required for the submission of the additional functions to the Security Council. If this arrangement could not be achieved, it would be necessary for all the United Nations, or as many of them as were designated as responsible for the supervision of enemy states, to give their assent to the assumption of the jurisdiction in question by the Security Council.

Mr. Kane declared that when four or five states signed surrender terms in the name of the remainder of the United Nations, those four or five would have the responsibility for the occupation of the enemy territories involved. Contemporaneously, there might be bi-lateral treaties designed to prevent the resurgence of those enemy powers. At the end of X years, the occupation would end with the four responsible powers withdrawing whenever they felt that the Security Council should assume jurisdiction. Mr. Kane thought that it did not necessarily follow that all the nations in whose name the four powers were acting would have anything to do with the two parties to a regional agreement giving up their treaties. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that that was a correct interpretation. Mr. Kane then urged that the language did not say that. Mr. Pasvolsky reiterated that the parties to a regional treaty could not give up their functions to the Security Council unless the responsible governments under Chapter XII, paragraph 2 would agree.

Mr. Pasvolsky declared that it was obvious he could not take up this draft with the Subcommittee of Five. He asked whether Senator Vandenberg would accept the earlier French proposal. Senator Vandenberg declared that this was agreeable to him, with Mr. Dulles and Mr. Dunn concurring. Mr. Pasvolsky then suggested that Senator Vandenberg get Commander Stassen to change his mind. Senator Vandenberg declared that he would leave the matter to Mr. Pasvolsky and Commander Stassen.

Preamble

Dean Gildersleeve referred the Delegation to the latest Progress Report of Work in Commissions and Committees (US Gen 201, Page 1).¹⁰ Dean Gildersleeve declared that a drafting committee of Committee 1/1 had adopted a Preamble¹¹ which did not seem to be very satisfactory, from a literary point of view. Dean Gildersleeve had been unable to have the language changed and declared that her problem was how such a change could be effected. Dean Gildersleeve declared that the Ukrainian chairman and the Syrian Rapporteur of the committee had disagreed on the language. Dean Gildersleeve remarked that the Syrian seemed to be rather good, and wondered whether it was within the competence of the Rapporteur to polish up the language.

Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the Rapporteur could take such action, provided that the finished draft made sense; otherwise, the Coordinating Committee would have to refer the matter back to the committee. Dean Gildersleeve inquired whether there wasn’t some parliamentary procedure that could be taken in order to change the language. This, she declared, was an “historical document” and she was afraid it would go to posterity as a “flop”. Dean Gildersleeve remarked that a clause had been inserted guaranteeing equal rights for men and women and declared she herself had opposed the measure and had been commended as being a “very brave woman” by the South African Delegate.

Dr. Bowman voiced the opinion that it would be necessary to have special arrangements to draft a suitable Preamble. The Delegation, he declared, had not taken any position on this matter. No delay on the technical level could improve the text sufficiently. Dr. Bowman urged there should be established a committee at a high level to draft a Preamble for submission to the Conference as a whole. He thought that the additional confidence in the personnel of such a committee, plus the more persuasive language that could be adopted by such a committee was of sufficient importance to recommend the adoption of such a procedure. Senator Vandenberg declared that what was needed in order to draft a Preamble was a special committee aided by Alexander Hamilton. Dean Gildersleeve remarked that some way had to be found to stop this wording from going through but Mr. Dulles expressed the opinion that it was not too bad as a starter. Dr. Bowman reiterated that no worthwhile results could be achieved by further consideration of this matter on the technical level. Mr. Dulles commented that a Preamble could not be drafted until the drafting committee had some idea of what they were drafting a Preamble to. This, he thought, should be done on a high level after the rest of the document had been approved. Dr. Bowman declared that the procedure he had suggested would have the additional advantage of avoiding the many political attempts to get in the Preamble what had been lost in committee discussions on other parts of the document. Dean Gildersleeve remarked there would still be British obligation to the Union of South Africa to support Marshal Smuts’ wording. Dean Gildersleeve reported that she had commented on the poor literary style of the draft to the Russian Delegate who had replied that literature was not important—the important matter was politics. Senator Vandenberg declared that this reminded him of an anecdote: There had once been, he declared, a reading clerk in the Senate who would always pronounce the name of Senator Root as if it were spelled “Rut”. At one meeting Senator John Charles [Sharp] Williams, “tighter than usual”, arose on a point of order and asked [if] “Root” was pronounced “Rut”, why wasn’t “Smoot” pronounced “Smut”?

Dr. Bowman declared that in his opinion the agenda of one of the Committee of Five meetings in the near future should contain an item to the effect that agreement was necessary in a committee to state and prepare a Preamble.

The meeting was adjourned at 10:57 a.m.

94. William Mabane, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food; assistant delegate, British delegation. At the second meeting of Subcommittee I/2/E, May 30, 8:30 p.m., Mr. Mabane submitted a proposal that “such a conference shall be held not later than . . . . . years after the entry into force of the Charter.” Lester B. Pearson, Senior Adviser of the Canadian delegation, moved the adoption of Mr. Mabane’s motion with the proviso that the period be not more than seven years after the entry into force of the Charter. The vote was postponed in order to permit consultation. (US I/2/E Doc)
95. Alberto Lleras Camargo.
96. See minutes of the fiftieth meeting (Executive Session) of the United States delegation, May 22, 10:50 a.m., p. 847.
97. Committee I/2 (Membership and General) and Subcommittee I/2/E, including as members those who had submitted proposals for the amendment of chapter XI.
98. Record of second meeting of Subcommittee I/2/E at 8:30 p.m., not printed.
99. Alvaro Bonilla Lara (Committee I/2).
1. Brackets appear in the original.
2. Doc. 719, II/8, May 31, UNCIO Documents, vol. 8, p. 33.
2. Memorandum of conversation, May 31, 12:25 p.m., infra.
3. Doc. 581, IV/1/44, May 26 (UNCIO Documents, vol. 13, p. 208); Doc. 558, IV/1/C/1, May 25 (ibid., p. 549); Doc 608, III/1/35, May 30 (ibid., vol. 11,. p. 421); and Doc. 666, II/1/26(1) (a), May 30 (ibid., vol. 8, p. 456).
4. See memorandum of November 20, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 901.
5. See proposed agenda for sixth meeting of the Steering Committee, Doc. 853, ST/13, June 8, UNCIO Documents, vol. 5, p. 248.
6. Doe. 684, II/3/38, May 29, UNCIO Documents, vol. 10, p. 130.
7. This meeting apparently was not held.
8. Not printed.
10. Not printed.
11. WD 62, 1/1/A/18, May 31, UNCIO Documents, vol. 6, p. 694.