RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 96: U.S. Cr. Min. 43 (Exec.)
Minutes of the Forty-Third Meeting (Executive Session) of the United States Delegation (B), Held at San Francisco, Thursday, May 17, 1945, 10:20 a.m.
Deputies, Secretary General
Mr. Bloom proposed that there be “not more than five” deputies, rather than “four”. He indicated that there was very little likelihood of a proposal for four deputies being accepted in his Committee. Mr. Armstrong agreed that the presidium system implied in the provision for four deputies was most distasteful and should be strongly opposed. Mr. Pasvolsky said the system contemplated was somewhat analogous to the system for a Secretary of State and Assistant Secretaries. Mr. Armstrong indicated that the Soviet Union had in mind a system of rotating the four deputies and the Secretary General among the five powers. This, Mr. Armstrong felt, would be intolerable. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that an unfortunate element in the situation was that the proposal for four deputies was the agreed proposal of the sponsoring governments. The Secretary stated that his view corresponded with that of Mr. Armstrong.
Mr. Pasvolsky stated that he would discuss this question which had been before the Committee of Five quite frankly here. When Mr. Molotov had first discussed the proposal for four deputies91 he [Page 775] had proposed that the four deputies and the Secretary General be chosen from the five members with permanent seats on the Security Council. After being pushed on this question Mr. Molotov had said he would not insist on this, and it was now [not?] clear why he would not insist. If this was definitely agreed to, it was quite possible that there would be no Secretary General of the Organization. The Security Council would put up a list of nominations and the General Assembly would knock it out. Mr. Pasvolsky reported that this question had been discussed in detail in the Subcommittee of Five with no conclusion reached.
Mr. Pasvolsky added that he had explained to the committee why it was not possible for us to go along with the proposal that the five major powers should occupy all the leading positions in the Organization. Our proposal was that they would have the leadership in the organization in matters relating to security, but beyond that that the major powers should have no status that went beyond the status of others. Mr. Pasvolsky thought there was a great disadvantage in naming the exact number of deputies, since an amendment would then be required to increase the number. Mr. Armstrong suggested the formula four or more deputies or five or more deputies. He added that if the Security Council with the present arrangement was in a weak position with relation to the Assembly, then we should strengthen the present provisions to meet the requirements of the Assembly.
Mr. Bloom pointed out that there was no possibility in his view of getting the present provision for four deputies by Committee II/1. The Secretary agreed that it would not be very easy to get it by. Mr. Armstrong suggested that we should oppose any effort to inflict a presidium on the Organization and that our strategy could well be to state to the other four powers that the proposal we had originally suggested in the sponsoring government amendment was not going to get through the committee. Mr. Bloom urged that the question be taken up with the Subcommittee of Five. Mr. Pasvolsky agreed that this was the sound procedure and stated that he would know tonight what that Committee would recommend. He added that he would take the position that the proposal for four deputies would probably not get by the Committee II/1.92
Progress of Meetings of Subcommittee of Five—Regional Problem
The Secretary asked Mr. Pasvolsky to indicate the general progress of the consultations with the Subcommittee of Five. Mr. Pasvolsky reported that there were supposed to be two meetings [Page 776] yesterday, but that because of the necessity of discussing the regional problem only one meeting had been held, two hours having been spent on the discussion of regional amendments. He indicated that some progress had been made and that we could tell better what the situation would be when we saw Sobolev. The Soviet representatives, he said, were objecting to the word “collective”. Mr. Holmes asked why they objected to that word. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that they were just stalling. Their argument was that they were not sure the word collective conformed to the conception of Dumbarton Oaks. They were willing to accept the provision for the right of self-defense, since they thought this was covered in Dumbarton Oaks. They now were arguing, however, whether the principle of collective self-defense was covered there.
The Secretary asked Mr. Pasvolsky what he thought. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that he thought it was covered. He believed that if any right of self-defense is implied, then the right remains in any form. He stated that the other three governments were in agreement with him on that view, and the Soviet representatives he thought were awaiting instructions. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that the Soviet Union was putting up a smoke screen while waiting for instructions and compared the situation to Molotov’s refusal to accept the revision of Chapter V, Section B, paragraph 6 until he had received his instructions. Mr. Pasvolsky stated he was sure this question had been referred to Moscow.
The Chinese, he said, had raised the question whether our proposal on the right of self-defense did not open the matter too widely. We said “when the Security Council does not maintain peace and security …”. They wanted to make the statement more precise to read “if in any particular instance the Security Council does not maintain peace and security and an armed attack occurs …”. Senator Vandenberg opposed making any change in our proposal, feeling that we should stand our ground. Mr. Pasvolsky said the Chinese might accept our proposal, but that he felt in fact the Chinese wording was an improvement. Mr. Dulles questioned whether any real change was involved, since our proposal also had the provision if an armed attack occurs. Senator Vandenberg opposed again the reopening of the formula, pointing out that we would then have to consult widely with our South American friends and with everybody else. He thought we should stick to our stated position. The Secretary agreed that we had stated our position and that that was our policy.
[Here follows discussion of powers of Executive and Steering Committees.]
[Page 777]Chapter II, Principles: Atlantic Charter: Freedom of Information and Communication
Mr. Pasvolsky stated that the Delegation had yesterday decided not to oppose addition of principles of free communication and specific mention of the Atlantic Charter in the Charter.94 At the meeting of the Subcommittee of Five the British had stated that they would oppose both of these amendments and the USSR indicated the same policy. Mr. Pasvolsky stated that he had told the Subcommittee of Five that the United States wishes to be in a position not to oppose these amendments. The question was then how the United States, should vote in the committee. Should it vote affirmatively or abstain?
The Secretary thought we should vote affirmatively. Mr. Dunn agreed that this was probably what we wanted to do. Mr. Dulles said it would be more difficult to take an affirmative stand for the inclusion of mention of the Atlantic Charter than to vote affirmatively on the inclusion of the principle of freedom of information, since, in discussing Senator Vandenberg’s proposal, we had agreed to omit any reference to the Atlantic Charter. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that if we voted in favor of the proposal for freedom of information and communication the Soviet Union would certainly include their proposals for the right to work and the right to education. Miss Fosdick stated that the decision with respect to freedom of information and communication had been that we would not oppose such a principle as long as we did not have to accept with it a further enumeration of fundamental freedoms. Mr. Hartley suggested that there had been an inconsistency in the decision of the Delegation which had voted on the one hand against any amendment and had voted on the other hand to favor the addition of a principle of freedom of communication and information. Mr. Pasvolsky said he thought the Soviet Union might get through the acceptance of the principle of “right to work”. If so, we would have to see that other fundamental freedoms were enumerated. Mr. Notter commented that the situation was rather complicated. In the committee, if the Soviet Union opposed and Great Britain opposed all we could do would be to say that we wanted this one freedom enumerated, but that we did not want anything more enumerated. Mr. Dulles thought our position should be that we are against any enumeration, but that if there was to be any enumeration it should include freedom of communication.
Senator Vandenberg pointed out that the question would probably come up “shall we put a principle of freedom of information and communication in the Charter.” He asked how we would vote on this question. The Secretary replied that he would favor not voting on this question until the prior question was decided whether there should [Page 778] be an enumeration. If so, we would propose freedom of information and communication. Mr. Pasvolsky thought this was a tenable position. Mr. Notter then stated that the policy would be to vote against enumeration. Mr. Pasvolsky added that if we lost on that vote we would then go in for a full enumeration of freedoms.
The meeting was adjourned by the Secretary at 10:50 a.m.