Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 96: U.S. Cr. Min. 43

Minutes of the Forty-Third Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Thursday, May 17, 1945, 8:30 a.m.

San Francisco, May 17, 1945, 8:30 a.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of names of persons (41) present at meeting.]

The Secretary welcomed the group representing agriculture, business, labor and education …

[Here follow statements by five consultants and comments by the delegates.]

This part of the Delegation meeting concluded at 9:15 a.m., at which time the representatives of agriculture, business, labor and education, left the meeting, together with the advisers and technical experts on economic and social questions.

The second part of the meeting was opened by the Secretary at 9:20 a.m.

Election of the Secretary General

Representative Bloom said that he had been embarrassed in relation to the delegates of the other sponsoring governments in connection with the vote on the method of electing the Secretary General.⁸¹ In supporting in Committee II/1 the modified Mexican amendment⁸² relative to the election of the Secretary General, he was voting in accordance with the instructions of the Delegation and asked that this be made clear to the other sponsoring governments. Accordingly, The Secretary asked Mr. Pasvolsky to explain the basis of Representative Bloom’s vote in the Subcommittee of Five.

Procedural Questions

Senator Vandenberg drew attention to the unsatisfactory coordination of the positions of the Five. He said that he had been in the position of offering an amendment in Committee to which the Soviet Delegate subsequently took exception, saying that it was their understanding that Mr. Pasvolsky had undertaken to inform the American Delegation of their dissent. Mr. Pasvolsky said that coordination in the Committee of Five was difficult because conclusions reached there were referred back to the respective delegations and that the point at which final agreement could be assumed was frequently not clear. He hoped that coordination among the Five Powers might be improved.

Dean Gildersleeve objected to the procedure followed in her Committee and suggested that the Steering Committee might do something further to clarify this whole problem. She referred to the adoption in Committee II/3 of an amendment containing the phrase “full employment”⁸³ without adequate previous notification and during her absence. The American position in this case had been in favor of the phrase “high and stable levels of employment”. Mr. Bloom suggested that in the circumstances she could ask for a reconsideration of the action; and it was further pointed out that the Commission as a whole would have to review the decision. Regret was expressed that in the circumstances this issue would become the focus of exaggerated attention.

Mr. Notter reported that the Russians had expressed concern to him with respect to the practice of appointing subcommittees with only one or a few of the major powers represented. Governor Stassen expressed the view that it was desirable, in the interest of Five Power unity, that the membership of all subcommittees should include the Five Powers. The Secretary said that he would take these matters up with Mr. Hiss immediately.

Discussion of Questions Pending Before Committee III/1

The Delegation now proceeded to a discussion of pending questions before Committee III/1 on the basis of US Gen 120.⁸⁴

3. Should the General Assembly participate in decisions of the Security Council with respect to coercive measures? In view of the action of Committee III/3 in defeating amendments to VIII–B–4 offered by New Zealand, Mexico, and Egypt,⁸⁵ it was agreed that participation by the Assembly in such decisions was no longer an open issue.

4. Should the Yalta decision stand which allows a permanent member to veto peaceful settlement of a dispute to which it is a party? General dissatisfaction was expressed with respect to the applicability of the veto to procedures for peaceful settlement. Pointing out that fifteen amendments had been proposed with respect to this matter, Governor Stassen took the position that a change would be highly desirable and suggested that the American Delegation take the position that decisions relative to peaceful settlement should be made by a majority of seven, including at least three of the permanent members of the Council. It was further suggested that the question should be taken up in the Subcommittee of Five. In response to a query from Mr. Dunn, Governor Stassen said that he thought that the Yalta formula was subject to an interpretation which would exempt procedures of peaceful change from the veto and directed attention to Mr. Eden’s recent press statement which seemed to support such a position. Mr. Dunn , however, took the view that it was not just a matter of interpretation but of change in the Yalta formula and pointed out that the British had issued a correction regarding Mr. Eden’s reported statement. After Mr. Blaisdell drew attention to the Department’s press release of March 24 on this subject,⁸⁶ the view was accepted that the proposal would clearly involve a departure from the Yalta decision. It was agreed, furthermore, that in no event would this Government take a position independent of the other four powers.

While agreeing unqualifiedly with the necessity for Five Power unity, Governor Stassen thought it would be desirable to have our dislike for the Yalta formula in this particular application to be on record, a position in which Mr. Dulles concurred. However, Senator Vandenberg took the view that the Russians would not recede in this matter and that, therefore, it would be pointless to bring the matter up and thus jeopardize the success of our views in other connections. He thought it was important for the record to show that we had lived up to the Yalta agreement unequivocally.

Mr. Pasvolsky expressed the opinion that if the matter were to be opened, it should be done at a higher level than the Subcommittee of Five. He said that the question had come up in that Committee as to whether paragraph 1 of VIII–A constituted an exception to the unanimity rule and that the Russian representative had taken the position that, although this possibility did not present a serious problem in this particular connection, to open the Yalta formula at this point would encourage pressure for further concessions. Mr. Pasvolsky said that the distinction between procedural and substantive questions was difficult to make and that the Russians were of the view that paragraph 2 of the Yalta formula refers exclusively to VI–D. He said that it was very interesting, in view of China’s experience in the Manchurian affair, that the Chinese representative took the view that investigation was a substantive matter. It was after this statement of the Chinese representative that the French representative announced the intention of his Government to withdraw its amendment relative to VI–C.⁸⁷

Senator Connally said at this point that, although he would like to see a change made in the Charter in this connection, he felt nonetheless that some defense could be made for holding to the rule of unanimity. He pointed out that if there were a split among the great powers concerning measures of peaceful settlement that it would certainly carry over into any subsequent question of the application of sanctions.

Mr. Johnson raised the tactical question of what should be done if the Yalta formula fails of acceptance in Committee III/1. Mr. Rockefeller felt that it might be unwise to exert undue pressure on the Latin American countries because of the added support this would give to the opinion that an American bloc exists. At the same time he felt that if the Latin American countries understood that peaceful settlement on a regional basis were exempted from the veto their objection to it would be mitigated.

Governor Stassen said that he would like to have the question raised at both levels. He thought it was important for us to go on record against the veto of procedures of peaceful settlement in order to keep our moral leadership. He pointed out that there would seem to be no hesitance on the part of Russia in seeking the approval and support of liberal opinion on the trusteeship question. He did not want this Government maneuvered into a position where it would seem to take the illiberal view.

At The Secretary’s suggestion, it was finally decided to instruct Mr. Pasvolsky to take the question up in the Committee of Five, the problem to be posed as one of strategy rather than as one of substance.

5. Proposals of Economic and Social Consultants. At this point, Dean Gildersleeve raised the question as to when the Delegation would consider the proposal prepared by the consultants with reference to economic and social matters. Mr. Sandieer’s suggestion that the proposals be taken up at the evening meeting of the Delegation was agreed to.

6. Voting Procedure on Enforcement Action. It was agreed that proposed changes in the Yalta voting arrangement, contained in the amendments of other countries, as regards the existence of a threat to the peace or the taking of enforcement action (the latter including the case of regional action) should be opposed.

7. Voting Procedure with Respect to the Secretary General. It was agreed that all questions involving voting in the Security Council should be referred to Committee III/1 for decision. Mr. Bloom pointed out that this had been the action of his Committee with respect to this matter.

8. With respect to the Voting Status of Non-Members of the Council When Sitting with the Council, it was agreed that, in general, the voting privilege should not be extended, but that the Canadian proposal concerning the specific question of decisions involving the contribution of forces be considered in the sub-committee of Committee III/3 appointed for this purpose.

9. Action of the Delegation with respect to other amendments pending with respect to Chapter VI⁸⁸ was as follows:

Chapter VI, Section B

a. To refer the Norwegian proposal to eliminate the word “principal” from the title of Section B to the Coordination Committee as a drafting matter.

b. To take the position that Norway’s proposed addition to paragraph 2, which is in the nature of an injunction against appeasement is covered by the four power amendments to Chapter I.

c. To refer Norway’s proposal relative to the enforcement of judicial decisions to Committee III/3.

d. To refer Norway’s proposal with respect to the role of the Council in the election of court judges to Committee IV/1.

e. To take the position that Uruguay’s recommendation relating to government monopoly of arms production is unsuitable for incorporation in the Charter.

Chapter VI, Section C

a. To oppose Norway’s proposal requiring a vote of 8, instead of 7, on Section C–3 matters.

b. To oppose the Netherlands proposal requiring a majority vote of non-permanent members in connection with Section C–3.

c. To oppose all other proposed amendments to Section C as definitely beyond practical limits.

Chapter VI, Section D

a. To oppose Brazil’s proposal requiring quarterly and extraordinary sessions of the Council as not taking into account the conception that the Council is in continuous session.

b. To regard Norway’s argument that regional military collaboration must be defined by the agreement(s) under VIII–B–5 as a matter for discussion in III/3.

c. To oppose the Mexican and Venezuelan proposals for determining when a member or non-member shall be called in by the Security Council.

d. To oppose the disqualification of any member of the Security Council involved in a dispute from participating in the taking of decisions, as proposed by Liberia and Guatemala.

10. Action of the Delegation with respect to amendments pending in connection with VIII–A⁸⁹ was as follows:

a. With respect to the authority of the Security Council to recommend terms of settlement, it was agreed that the only question remaining was one of drafting. It was decided to oppose any amendments which would give to the Security Council the power to impose, rather than recommend, terms of settlement.

b. With respect to the question whether the Security Council should be obligated to submit justiciable questions to the Court, it was decided that the Delegation would stand on the present wording of paragraph 6. In case of a conflict between Committees III/2 and IV/1, a joint subcommittee would be appropriate.

c. With regard to the power of the General Assembly (or other international organ) to request an advisory opinion from the Court, it was decided to pass the matter over, since this question will not be reached in Committee III/2 for several days.

d. It was decided to oppose the removal to VIII–A of paragraphs 1 and 2 of VIII–B, relating to the determination of threats to or breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression, because this would constitute a change in the Yalta formula. It was decided that the Delegate of the United States in Committee III/2 take the view that III/2 has no competence until III/3 has acted, and that the amendment be opposed in the latter Committee.

e. It was decided that any amendments providing for participation by the Assembly in pacific settlement should be opposed on the ground that the point is adequately taken care of by the five power amendment.

f. It was decided to oppose the inclusion of any reference to territorial integrity and independence in VIII–A, and it was pointed out that Committee III/2 had approved of the Australian amendment on this point, which is to be incorporated in II–4 of the Charter.⁹⁰

g. It was decided to take up in the Subcommittee of Five the question as to whether the words of XII–2 are adequate for excluding an appeal by an enemy state to the Security Council under VIII–A–2.

The meeting adjourned into Executive session.

81. Doc. 328, II/1/13, May 16, UNCIO Documents, vol. 8, 331; see also Doc. 238, II/1/8, May 11, ibid., p. 502.
82. Doc. 294, II/1/10, May 14, ibid., p. 323.
83. Doc. 381, II/3/16, May 17, ibid., vol. 10, p. 39.
84. Not printed.
85. Doc. 289, III/3/11, May 13, and Doc. 355, III/3/17, May 16, ibid., vol. 12, pp. 602 and 326, respectively.
86. For statement by Acting Secretary Grew on operation of the proposed voting procedure in the Security Council, see Department of State Bulletin, March 25, 1945, p. 479.
87. UNCIO Documents, vol. 13, p. 384.
88. Doc. 360, III/1/16, May 15, UNCIO Documents, vol. 11, p. 767.
89. Doc. 207, III/2/A/3, May 10, UNCIO Documents, vol. 12, pp. 179 ff.
90. See ibid., p. 185, for Iranian proposal regarding the inclusion of reference to territorial integrity or independence in VIII, A (4); p. 181 for amendment of the four Sponsoring Powers, VIII, A(4), which was approved by Committee III/2 on May 17 (Doc. 433, III/2/15, May 19, ibid., p. 48); p. 185 for Australian-proposed amendment of VIII, A(5); Doc. 20, P/6, April 28 (ibid., vol. 1, pp. 173–174) and Doc. 2, G/14(1), May 5 (ibid., vol. 3, p. 543), for Australian-proposed amendment of II(4); and Doc. 382, I/1/19, May 17 (ibid., vol. 6, p. 303) for discussion in Committee I/1 of the question of inclusion of reference to territorial integrity and political independence in II(4).