Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 96: U.S. Cr. Min. 18

Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, April 26, 1945, 9:30 a.m.

San Francisco, April 26, 1945, 9:30 a.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of names of persons (19) present at meeting.]

Senator Connally presided during the absence of Secretary Stettinius²⁶ and called the meeting to order at 9:30 a.m. Senator Connally called upon Mr. Pasvolsky to present the business that should come before the Delegation.

Chapter II—Principles, Paragraph 8²⁷

Mr. Pasvolsky said that before taking up the deferred items on the agenda for the meeting, he wanted to bring before the group two points raised by the military advisers. The first one referred to Chapter II, paragraph 8. He reminded the group that it had been agreed to support the sense of this paragraph, but it had not yet been adopted in final form. The military advisers thought it would be better to omit the phrase “and treaty obligations”. They thought it would be enough to stick to “respect international law …²⁸ and promote its development and adaptation to changing conditions”.

Senator Vandenberg asked why the omission was suggested. Senator Connally remarked that it was desirable to leave in the reference to law, but it might not be desirable to leave the guarantee of treaty obligations. Senator Vandenberg asked if it was not desirable to respect treaty obligations. Mr. Sandifer commented that it was self-evident that as long as treaties were in force, they should be respected. Senator Connally said that the proposed Charter did not, however, admit that obligations to support treaties were assumed everywhere.

Chapter III—Membership, Paragraph 1

Senator Connally said further that he wanted, himself, to raise a question about Chapter III, “Membership”, paragraph 1, especially the phrase “all peace-loving states”. He would like to have a definition of what is a state. He wondered, for example, whether India could be considered a state. It was true that this matter could be considered later. Mr. Bowman remarked that a memorandum on the status of various political units²⁹ had been prepared, and Senator Connally said he would like very much to have a copy. He then asked Mr. Pasvolsky to proceed.

Chapter V—The General Assembly, Section B, Paragraph 1

Mr. Pasvolsky said that the second point arose out of Chapter V, Section B, paragraph 1. He recalled that the Delegation had agreed to support, although not to take the initiative in proposing, the amendment of the last clause of the first sentence to read: “and to formulate treaties embodying such principles and their application for submission to the member states for ratification”. The military advisers objected to this provision on the grounds that the job of planning for the regulation of armaments was given to the Security Council under the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.³⁰ If, however, the General Assembly begins to formulate a draft convention and insists on carrying through its application, there could be a conflict between the two bodies. Mr. Pasvolsky was inclined to think that this proposition should be dropped. He thought it would be better to take out at this point any reference to the power of the General Assembly to draft treaties or conventions for submission to the members. This power would be applicable to other aspects of the General Assembly’s responsibility, but it might be handled at more appropriate points. Senator Connally said that under the present provisions and on the principle of differentiation between the Security Council and the Assembly, the latter body could discuss these matters but could not compel the states to comply with its suggestions. He thought this was a very important point. Mr. Pasvolsky stated that all the Security Council could do in the regulation of armaments was to propose plans for acceptance by the member states.

Mr. Pasvolsky asked Senator Vandenberg if he was satisfied that the language was clear enough. Mr. Stassen asked exactly what it was that would be struck out. Senator Connally said that if the Security Council had already been given the power to prepare draft agreements on the regulation of armaments, it would probably not be good to have this power vested in the General Assembly. Mr. Pasvolsky said that the United States all along had wanted all the power relating to armaments assigned to the Security Council. The Soviet Union, however, had wanted it assigned to the General Assembly and wanted the Assembly to discuss disarmament as well as regulation of armaments. The text incorporated in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals was a compromise. The General Assembly was given the right to discuss principles but without power to do anything more than make recommendations. It was true that somewhere in the Charter it should probably be recognized that it was within the field of operations of the General Assembly to formulate treaties for submission to the member states. However, it would be better not to include it at this point. Moreover, he thought it would be best for the United States not to take the initiative, but to wait to see what other countries had to propose on this point.

Mr. Notter commented that under the present language the General Assembly had the power to consider without the power to put recommendations into effect. The General Assembly could state principles without imposing an obligation to live up to them. If the General Assembly had no power to formulate treaties for submission to the members, then it could only talk and not really do anything. He was under the impression that the American Delegation meant to try to build up the power of the General Assembly, but he thought that could not be done if the Assembly was restricted merely to general discussion.

[At this point the Secretary entered the meeting, and the discussion of the points raised by Mr. Pasvolsky was suspended while he consulted the delegates about two matters that he had discussed with the President, namely, the status of the two Soviet Republics and the position of Argentina.]³¹

Position of Argentina and Admission of Two Soviet Republics

The Secretary said it was reported that Perón resigned the previous evening.³² The President had agreed that the United States might approve an invitation to Argentina to attend the Conference at a later date if this invitation was understood not to include Argentina’s signing the United Nations Declaration. As to the Soviet Republics, the President was willing to have the United States support actively the request of the Soviet Union that the Ukraine and White Russia be included among the initial members. He was also willing to have us support a move to have representatives of the two Soviet Republics seated in the Conference, but only at a later date. The Secretary said that he had to go immediately to see Molotov about the question of the two Soviet Republics, and he wanted to be able to assure him that the request would be granted when it was raised. He said he did not intend to discuss the question of Argentina with Molotov. Others might do it, but the United States would not. Before going, however, he needed the quick reaction of the American Delegation.

Representative Bloom said that he had understood from Assistant Secretary Rockefeller that the South American Republics wanted Argentina to sign the United Nations Declaration. The Secretary said he had information today that they were willing to drop that part of it. Mr. Stassen asked whether it would not be necessary as a preliminary step to Argentina’s being invited to sit in on the Conference. The Secretary replied that Argentina would be satisfied with this arrangement. Senator Connally asked why the United States was so opposed to having Argentina sign the United Nations Declaration. The Secretary replied that sentimentally we oppose it. We just cannot let Argentina come in at the last minute on a Declaration pledging full support to the war against the Axis when the Argentines had not given such support. It would spoil the spirit of the Declaration and would not be well received by a great many of the countries that had signed it in good faith.

Mr. Dulles asked whether the admission of Argentina without its signing the United Nations Declaration would open the way to demands from the other states that had not been invited to the Conference. The Secretary replied that it undoubtedly would have that result. He was sure, for example, that Representative Marcantonio³³ would make a long speech in the House about the fact that Italy was left out. There might be serious repercussions on American public opinion. Mr. Dulles said that he personally would not oppose having the Conference at the end become more universal in its membership. The Secretary said that it would be difficult to do that because if Switzerland and Portugal were invited, for example, the U.S.S.R. would object strongly. Moreover, he said that there was a distinction—that Argentina had declared war and was not a neutral country.

The Secretary then asked each of the Delegates for concurrence in the decisions about Argentina and the Soviet Republics. Senator Vandenberg said that the Secretary should proceed as he thought best, although his own position remained as it was. Mr. Stassen said it would be very important to delay the matter of inviting the Ukraine and White Russia to the Conference in order to give time for the preparation of American opinion. Senator Vandenberg asked what we were going to get in exchange for our concession on this point, and Mr. Stassen replied that we would get the basis for insisting that the Soviet Government should follow through on Poland. Senator Vandenberg said he hoped we would not go through the same process with regard to Poland, of giving in at the last moment. The Secretary said that he thought there was no danger of that, especially since he had seen the President’s telegram on Poland.³⁴ He stated that there was a serious crisis now, in which the United States had to make this concession in order to keep the Soviet Government in the Conference. Mr. Armstrong said he thought it would be most important to get a delay on the request for seating representatives of the two Soviet Republics in the Conference. The Delegates agreed to the position that the Secretary had stated on the questions of Argentina and the Soviet Republics.

[The Secretary left the meeting to speak to the Consultants Group for a few minutes and then to see the Soviet Foreign Minister.³⁵]

Chapter V—The General Assembly, Section B, Paragraph 1

Senator Connally suggested that the group resume its consideration of paragraph 1 of Section B in Chapter V. Mr. Pasvolsky said that if the clause in question was taken out, the power of the General Assembly to make recommendations on the general principles of cooperation and the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, would be restored. Senator Connally said that if there was no objection, this clause would be struck out. There being no objection, he stated that the Delegation had agreed.

Chapter VIII, Section B, Paragraph 1

Mr. Dulles said that he wanted to raise one question before the discussion turned away from this paragraph. According to the language now proposed, the General Assembly does not have the power to make specific recommendations for the settlement of a dispute, and the Security Council does not have that power either. It seemed to him that the revised text of the Proposals did not permit any action on the merits of a dispute, and there was no real conflict on this matter between the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Mr. Pasvolsky said that under paragraph 1, Section B of Chapter VIII the authority to recommend procedures and terms of settlement would lie in the Security Council if it was determined that a threat to the peace exists. The Security Council under this paragraph would have unlimited powers to avert a threat to international peace and security and could even impose the terms of settlement. Perhaps this provision goes too far, but this is a possible interpretation.

Mr. Dulles said that it was a sweeping power, and Mr. Pasvolsky replied that if there was a threat to the peace the Security Council had to have very wide powers of action. Mr. Dulles said that under this power the Security Council could give the Sudetenland to Germany or could give Alaska to Russia in order to keep the peace. Mr. Bloom and Mr. Stassen said simultaneously that it must be remembered that the five permanent members would have to agree in order to impose terms. Mr. Dulles said that because of the veto power the United States would not be subjected to the imposition of terms of settlement, but that it would be terrific to put the small powers under such a threat. Mr. Notter commented that two of the non-permanent members of the Council would have to agree.

Mr. Dulles stated that he thought that the provisions of VIII, B 1 [It should take any measures necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization.] referred to policing measures, such as economic sanctions and military enforcement. He did not think it was intended to decide such matters as revision of immigration or tariff policies or territorial revisions. Mr. Bloom asked if domestic questions could be subjected to the action of the Security Council. Mr. Dulles replied that the exemption of domestic affairs from the jurisdiction of the Organization applied only to the measures outlined in Section A of Chapter VIII. Mr. Pasvolsky observed that the Security Council could do anything and take any steps if peace and security were affected. Representative Bloom said that undoubtedly the immigration policy of the United States had been considered by Japan a threat to peace, and Mr. Pasvolsky answered that Japan had never given any indication of wanting to go to war over it. Representative Bloom said that in his opinion this provision went very far.

Mr. Sandifer said that this provision applied to an actual threat to or breach of the peace. If domestic affairs were excluded in such a situation, it would be difficult for the Organization to preserve peace under all circumstances. Certainly if there was an actual threat to the peace, the Organization must deal with it. Mr. Notter remarked that this provision would not come into operation until the parties had failed to settle a dispute by means of their own choosing and until the Security Council had failed to get them to settle their dispute peacefully. Finally, the Security Council might determine in such a case that the continuance of the, dispute was a threat to the peace and that, if peace was to be maintained, the Council must have the power to deal with the dispute. Representative Bloom said that only Congress can regulate domestic matters.

Senator Connally said that, while it was true that the, United States had a veto power in the Security Council, it seemed to him to be putting too much power and responsibility in the hands of one man to decide when that veto should be exercised. Mr. Dulles commented that if we should have as President or as delegate to the Security Council someone who believed that the immigration or tariff policies of the United States should be changed, then by not exercising the veto he could enable the international organization to force the United States to change them. Mr. Stassen said that this pointed up another problem, and he thought it most important: that when Congress decides about the position of the delegate to the Security Council, it must restrict his powers very carefully. Mr. Dulles said that if paragraph 1 means what Mr. Pasvolsky says it does, Congress will certainly act to restrain the American delegate, and Mr. Stassen said that it should certainly do so. Representative Bloom queried why some such restriction should not be put in here.

Mr. Pasvolsky asked the group how the matter should be handled. Mr. Dulles said he thought that the word “measures” should be read in the context of the next paragraphs. He could see that it would include invoking sanctions in order to prevent nations from going to war, but he thought it would be going too far to decide substantive questions and remake the world economically and socially. He suggested that the phrase be amended to read: “measures of the character hereinafter referred to”. Senator Connally thought this would be too broad because it might be taken to refer to all the rest of the Charter. Mr. Dulles said that in that case it could be restricted to the measures hereinafter referred to in this Chapter. [Mr. Pasvolsky left the meeting at this point.] Mr. Stassen said he thought that the experts had better confer on this matter and readvise the Delegates with regard to the interpretation of paragraph 1 and any possible revision that should be proposed or supported.

Mr. Dulles said that measures of pacific settlement would already have been attempted, and when those had failed, the dispute would come under the provisions of Section B. He thought it right to say to the member states, “If you go to war, the Organization will impose diplomatic and economic sanctions or call out the contingents of armed forces to bomb your cities.” Senator Connally added that this was, however, wholly different from settling disputes. Mr. Dulles thought that the measures referred to ought not to include that. There would certainly be discrimination if the Security Council could impose settlements. It put too great a power in the Security Council, and it was not fair to subject small countries to it. Mr. Stassen said he thought that the measures referred to in this paragraph involved alternative means of action if disputes were not settled on the recommendations of the Organization or on some other basis. He did not think the Security Council could create substantive changes unless the disputants agreed, although they might be made to agree under pressure.

Mr. Notter said that in drafting the Proposals one theory had been followed. The International Organization is being created because the nations want peace. It is not basically concerned with just settlements. It says to the nations, “You cannot fight”, and in Section A many procedures are offered for settlement without the use of force. Under Section A the Security Council has no right to recommend the terms of settlement. Under paragraph 1 of Section B, however, as a very last resort to keep the peace the Security Council would have the power to recommend terms of settlement in order to prevent a given dispute from continually threatening the peace of the world. Mr. Bowman said it was his recollection that there had originally been a provision for the Security Council to recommend terms of settlement, and Mr. Notter added that that was before the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations.

Mr. Notter said it was conceivable that the Security Council would apply force in order to preserve peace, and then, when the immediate crisis had passed, the parties might again threaten war, and it might be necessary to achieve a settlement in order to keep them from starting over again. If they do threaten to start over again, the Organization is in a dilemma as to whether to keep on applying force or to try to settle the matter itself. Mr. Sandifer said that if the Organization is to maintain peace, it must at some point be able to establish terms of settlement, and if it has that power, it would come in at this point in the Charter. Such a provision would not be unusual, however. Under the League of Nations Covenant, Article 11, if the Council voted unanimously to approve the terms of settlement the parties had to accept them.³⁶ Mr. Dulles said that he did not recall this part of the Covenant. However, it was important to remember that the League of Nations did not impose obligations as far reaching as those involved in this Organization. Moreover, the Council’s vote would now be seven out of eleven—not unanimous.

Mr. Armstrong asked whether anyone had ever suggested that the powers of the League of Nations were too broad because of the power of the Council to impose the terms of settlement. Mr. Gerig said that in the Covenant there had been no limitation on the power of the League in this respect. Senator Connally said that there would be serious difficulty in the Senate if paragraph 1 were construed to give the Security Council the power to impose terms of settlement.

Senator Vandenberg asked whether the power to take any measures necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security was not qualified by the clause “in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization and the provisions of this Charter”. Mr. Bowman said that this was the only place in the Proposals where the ultimate possibility of action was referred to. Mr. Bowman said that under the League of Nations and in the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations this was really a key question and that the language to cover it had not yet really been devised.

Senator Vandenberg asked if Mr. Dulles would be satisfied if the word “measures” were construed to cover the provisions of paragraph 3. Mr. Dulles replied that paragraphs 3 and 4, to his mind, were included under the word “measures”. Mr. Notter added that the provision would mean, then, that the Organization would have no power to recommend terms of settlement. Mr. Dulles said that the power to make recommendations had been taken from the Assembly. He thought it strange that if the Organization was to recommend terms of settlement, the power was not included in Section A, which deals with the situation before the fighting starts.

Mr. Notter said that the Assembly can still make recommendations if the Council does not act on a dispute. Senator Connally said that if the Security Council, acting under Section A, had already tried to bring about a peaceful solution but had failed, then the word “any” in paragraph 1 of Section B means something more than has already been attempted. This constituted a very wide sweep of authority. Mr. Bowman suggested that the measures contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 defining the powers of the Security Council were really paralyzing powers and that if thoroughly applied they could stop unlawful action by the offending states. He doubted that it was necessary to assume that some ultimate great last resort has to be spelled out here. It seemed to him that peace would be restored and the dispute settled long before the states would let themselves be driven to that point.

Mr. Armstrong observed that before Munich, Czechoslovakia would have been delighted to have an International Organization take the measures foreseen in paragraphs 3 and 4, but it would certainly not have agreed to the terms of the Munich settlement. Mr. Dulles said he feared that the World Organization, in a second Munich, could say to the disputing states, “If you do not accept the terms here laid down the enforcement measures such as economic sanctions and military pressure will be applied against you.” It would become too easy to give away the territory and the rights of the small nations in order to appease possible aggressors. This would be a far greater power than ought to be given to the World Organization.

Senator Vandenberg asked Mr. Notter if he believed that this was meant by the wording of paragraph 1. Mr. Notter replied that respect for the sovereign equality of the members included respect for their territory, and he did not see how the Organization in that case would have a right to impose settlements involving the giving up of territory by any state. Mr. Armstrong commented that many modifications of sovereignty had been accepted in these Proposals, and that as a matter of fact every obligation that was undertaken by a state modified its sovereignty. Mr. Notter added that these obligations were, however, freely given and defined. Mr. Stassen said that this paragraph was open to the interpretation that it did not give the Security Council the power to change territories or matters within domestic jurisdiction without the consent of the states involved.

Senator Connally commented that if there was as much difference of opinion elsewhere as there was in the American Delegation about the interpretation of this paragraph, it should be more clearly defined. Mr. Stassen said he believed that the Advisers should discuss the matter thoroughly and report back the result of their discussion. Mr. Dulles said that he would like to know more clearly the views of the Delegation as to what should be incorporated here, and then the Advisers could find the language to reflect their views, but he felt that the Advisers needed an indication of policy.

Senator Vandenberg asked if the question would be covered by stating that the Security Council could take such measures as are described in Section B of Chapter VIII. Mr. Stassen said that since the Principal Advisers seemed to disagree in their interpretation of the paragraph, he believed that they must go over it again and reach some agreement. Mr. Bowman said that the matter had been discussed endlessly in the State Department, and then the question had been taken to Dumbarton Oaks and the controversy had raged again there.³⁷ It was his belief that the problem would still come up in the Organization if it were not clarified in the Charter. Now it was facing the American Delegation, and we would have to take some decision on it. He wanted to know the judgment of the Delegation as to whether an attempt should be made to deal with the last, ultimate consequences, assuming that such a point must inevitably be reached. Perhaps another position would be feasible, and he thought that the Advisers must be guided by the political judgment of the Delegates on this point.

Senator Vandenberg said that he proceeded on the assumption expressed by Mr. Bowman that the measures described in paragraphs 3 and 4 could be so totally paralyzing that it is needless to go beyond them in the document. Mr. Gerig said that it must be kept in mind that many of the other countries wanted to have a phrase guaranteeing territorial integrity and political independence. This guarantee had been left out of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals deliberately.

Mr. Bowman added that while everyone would like to have boundaries drawn so that they could be permanent as well as possible and ideal, we cannot let boundaries be broken down continuously and cannot allow indiscriminate free migration across them. There are some boundary disputes in the world that are not yet settled, and we do not want to give the interpretation that all the treaties governing boundaries will be torn up on every complaint. There will be some cases, for example, the eastern boundary of Poland and the boundaries of Southern Albania, where there will be frequent disputes. We do not want to shut off every chance for adjustment, and we should leave it open to the Council to make some investigations and assist in the ultimate settlement of these problems.

As to the matter of sovereign equality and the integrity of states, the memorandum prepared by Mr. Gerig³⁸ indicates how the relationships of certain states to others vary, and it is difficult to define their exact degree of sovereignty and independence. The number of these political units goes up to about 70. The first 45 or so can be considered fully independent, but the sovereignty of the remainder is qualified in some degree. We have to leave out of the Charter any attempt to define a state or to guarantee boundaries, but we should come as close as possible to maintaining the integrity and independence of political units by regulating their behavior and preventing aggression. The question is likely to be discussed in the Conference and to rage in the Senate. On the one hand, we cannot guarantee boundaries. On the other, we cannot proceed to tear them up constantly. In order to make an adjustment a state must have a real case. In the matter of relationships of states, we must start where we are and work out from this point. We cannot jump to the millenium.

Representative Bloom said he was somewhat concerned about the matter of guaranteeing all the new boundaries that would be made at the end of this war. Mr. Bowman said we would have no difficulty with the enemy states, since they were not signing this document, but there might be troubles with many of our present allies.

Senator Connally stated that paragraph 1 of Section B would come into play if a dispute cannot be settled even though every attempt has been made to settle it under paragraphs 3 to 5 of Section A.

• [3. The parties to any dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security should obligate themselves, first of all, to seek a solution by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of their own choice. The Security Council should call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.
• 4. If, nevertheless, parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in paragraph 3 above fail to settle it by the means indicated in that paragraph, they should obligate themselves to refer it to the Security Council. The Security Council should in each case decide whether or not the continuance of the particular dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, and, accordingly, whether the Security Council should deal with the dispute, and, if so, whether it should take action under paragraph 5.
• 5. The Security Council should be empowered, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in paragraph 3 above, to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.]

It was his interpretation that the word “any” in Section B, paragraph 1, meant additional powers.

Mr. Bowman said he agreed with the suggestion made by Mr. Dulles and would subscribe to it, since he thought it was better not to attempt to meet the ultimate possible crisis. He could see that there might be many questions coming up on the imposition of settlements and that such a provision would mean all things to all men. Mr. Dulles said that we face a dilemma. The small states are clearly afraid that under paragraph 1 of Section B another Munich could be imposed and there could be a new wave of appeasement. That is why they want to guarantee territories and boundaries. Such a guarantee, in his view, was not the answer, and he thought it would certainly produce war if the Organization attempted to guarantee boundaries in perpetuity. He would advocate making it clear that the provisions of paragraph 1 do not extend to giving the power to the big nations to sacrifice small ones but only to preventing changes through violence.

Senator Vandenberg asked what language could be used to clarify this matter. Mr. Sandifer suggested empowering the Security Council to take any means “as hereinafter specified in this Section”. Mr. Notter suggested examining just what that would mean. After all of the conditions foreseen in Section A had been dealt with, we passed, in Section B, to the first stage of enforcement measures. He called attention to paragraph 2 of Section B, which he thought made it clear that the Security Council should have the power to recommend terms of settlement but not to impose them.

[2. In general the Security Council should determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and should make recommendations or decide upon the measures to be taken to maintain or restore peace and security.]

He thought it most important that the Security Council should be enabled to mediate adjustments, and if it could make recommendations regarding terms of settlement, it might not have to use force in order to preserve peace. Senator Connally said that paragraph 2 would undoubtedly have to be adapted also. Mr. Dulles said that these two paragraphs could not be redrafted extemporaneously but would require a little more study. Mr. Stassen said he thought that the Advisers should consider the matter carefully in the light of the discussion.

Mr. Bowman said he felt the Delegates had now given the necessary guidance, and he wanted only to be sure that it was agreed that we would not pursue all the ramifications of the theory of maintaining peace. He believed that the intention of the Organization to encourage peaceful settlement was spelled out in paragraph 3 of Section A. Section B, however, described the working of the Organization in case these efforts at peaceful settlement were to break down. Mr. Gerig said that paragraph B, 2 was really sufficient without paragraph 1, and he recalled that at one time paragraph 1 was actually the last paragraph in Section A. When the possible voting formula had been discussed at Dumbarton Oaks, it was decided that it would be better to have this paragraph under Section B. He thought that paragraph 2 covered everything that was important in paragraph 1.

Mr. Bowman commented that there were many people who wanted a complete and perfect system of philosophy, and others wanted to implement a philosophy. It was difficult to attain a perfect system in the present world with all its interconnections. He thought that the Charter should be short and to the point and should indicate a wide range of means, powers, and procedures for accomplishing the basic purposes. He thought it unnecessary to fill out all the corners. If the Delegates were agreed on their point of view, the Advisers could develop the text.

Senator Connally asked if the Delegates agreed that the Advisers should reconsider paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section B. Senator Vandenberg said he was willing to have them proceed on that basis. Senator Connally added that the Advisers should consider paragraph 2 together with paragraph 1 and recommend a revision of the text to limit the word “measures” to the enforcement action envisaged in paragraphs 3 and 4. Mr. Bowman said he was sure that the Advisers could bring the text into harmony with the views of the Delegation.

Chapter II—Principles, Paragraph 4 and the Problem of Self-Defense

Mr. Sandifer called attention to the items on the agenda for this meeting. The first of the deferred items was Chapter II, paragraph 4. Mr. Sandifer read the text with the proposed amendments: “All members of the Organization shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Organization and the provisions of its Charter”. He stated that the question was whether the phrase “and principles” and the “and the provisions of its Charter” should be included.

Mr. Stassen said he objected to the new language because if Russia vetoed action by the Organization, he wanted it to be possible for the United States to take whatever action was necessary, consistent with the purposes of the Organization. He believed the original language, confining the obligation to refraining from the use of force in a manner inconsistent with the purposes, was preferable.

Senator Vandenberg said he was nervous about the problem of self-defense in view of the long arguments that had occurred in the Senate when the Kellogg-Briand Pact³⁹ came up. The Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate had never been willing to yield until a reservation on the subject of self-defense was made.⁴⁰ Mr. Dulles said he thought it would be better to go back to the original language. Senator Vandenberg, rereading the original language, said he would support it. Senator Connally stated that the Delegation had now agreed to support the text of this paragraph as it stood in the Proposals.

Senator Connally said he would appreciate it very much if he could have a statement on the subject of self-defense to use when the Charter comes before the Senate. Mr. Sandifer said he agreed with the importance of a statement on this point, especially since there was nothing in the Proposals. Mr. Gerig commented that the problem of self-defense could be looked at in the light of Section A, paragraph 3, which describes the measures to which parties to a dispute are expected to resort for peaceful settlement. If, in spite of the willingness of a state to resort to these measures, it is attacked by military force, then clearly such a state has the right to defend itself. Mr. Stassen said he thought that interpretation was sound, but that it would still be useful to have an authoritative explanation that could be used when necessary.

Senator Connally asked Mr. Sandifer to proceed with the agenda of the meeting, and Mr. Sandifer called attention to the unnumbered paragraph proposed for inclusion in Chapter II, “Principles”.

[The Organization should insure that states not members of the Organization should not interfere with action taken by the Organization, in accordance with these principles, for the maintenance of international peace and security.]

Senator Vandenberg said he hoped someone would give him and Senator Connally a statement of the State Department’s conception of the answer to the argument on self-defense. Mr. Notter said that such a statement had already been drafted and would be available if needed. Senator Connally said he believed that if a dispute was not settled by peaceful means, and an innocent state was attacked, it could still act with its own forces. Senator Vandenberg said he was concerned with the intermediate situation between the failure of peaceful means of settlement and a decision on the part of the Security Council to use the armed forces at the disposal of the Organization. Mr. Sandifer said he believed that the test was whether the use of armed force was in accordance with the purposes of the Organization and that the individual use of armed force by a state might on occasion be construed as serving the purposes of the Organization and at the same time constitute self-defense.

Representative Bloom said that he was interested also in having a statement on the right of self-defense because the House of Representatives would want such a statement, and in general he wanted to get a copy of everything the Senators obtained.

Senator Vandenberg read the second paragraph of the report of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on the Kellogg-Briand Pact⁴² to illustrate the attitude that must be faced when this Charter comes up for discussion.

Representative Bloom asked why it would not be a good idea to repeat the qualification about self-defense in the Charter. Mr. Bowman said that it was questionable whether the Charter should go so far as to acknowledge the right of each state to “judge its own measures”. Mr. Stassen said that the Charter should be drafted in such a way as to take cognizance of this problem and that he for one would welcome a memorandum on this subject.

Mr. Notter asked if the Senators thought that a reservation on this subject would be made by the Senate if the Charter did not mention it specifically. Representative Bloom asked if it was the intention to foreclose all possibility of reservations to the Charter. Mr. Notter said that there might be a movement in the Conference to say something about the right of self-defense in the Charter, and Senator Connally commented that, if it was not included in the Charter, the Senate would certainly make a reservation. Mr. Notter and Senator Vandenberg simultaneously queried whether it would not be better, then, to have some statement included in the Charter.

Representative Eaton inquired what was the use of all the provisions of the Organization if the right of self-defense under all circumstances remained fundamental. Senator Vandenberg said he disagreed with this position. Representative Eaton asked what all the machinery was for if it was intended that each state would still have the right to use military force whenever it thought necessary in its own defense. Mr. Sandifer said he thought it might be better to make some statement about self-defense in general language. The test could still be whether action when taken was in accordance with the purposes of the Organization. A state might have the right to act in an emergency, and, if there was an allegation that this action was contrary to the purposes of the Organization, the Security Council might review it.

Mr. Stassen said it might be assumed that the right of self-defense was inherent as long as it was not taken away by the language of the Charter. Mr. Dulles said it could be resorted to in order to repel invasion. Senator Vandenberg commented that the proposed Charter certainly involved approval of the use of force to maintain or restore peace and security, but required that such use should be regulated. Mr. Dulles said there was no prohibition on the individual use of force if it was done for the purposes of the Organization. Senator Vandenberg said he thought we needed an affirmative statement, and Senator Connally asked to have a draft prepared, which Mr. Notter said the Advisers would take up.

Chapter II—Principles, Unnumbered Paragraph

The group returned to its discussion of the proposed unnumbered paragraph of Chapter II. Mr. Sandifer asked what the Delegation had agreed to do about paragraph 8. Senator Connally said, and the other Delegates confirmed the statement, that it had been agreed to take out the phrase “and treaty obligations” and to support the remainder of the paragraph if some other Delegation proposed it in the Conference. Senator Connally stated that the unnumbered paragraph involved the question of imposing on non-member states the obligations of members of the Organization. Mr. Sandifer read the original text.

[The Organization should insure that states not members of the Organization act in accordance with these principles for the maintenance of international peace and security.]

Senator Connally thought this form was better. Senator Vandenberg said he thought this had already been agreed upon and asked why it was included in the deferred items. Representative Bloom asked whether this paragraph was to be proposed by the United States Delegation or supported by it. Mr. Sandifer said that the final decision on it had been deferred.

Mr. Stassen commented that it would be of great importance to keep non-members in line so that they should not interfere with enforcement action by the Organization, since, if non-members were free to act as they wished, they might greatly weaken the Organization. Mr. Armstrong said he thought that the suggested new wording would make the provision more palatable to non-members. Mr. Sandifer pointed out that the new form was stated in the negative. Mr. Stassen said that the ultimate objective of the Organization was to have all decent states as members. The outlaws have to be kept in line, however.

Mr. Notter said that the original language could be objected to on the ground that it gave the Organization the power to exert compulsion on non-member states, on an undefined basis. Senator Vandenberg said that actually the Organization should not police non-member states until a specific instance arose requiring such policing. Mr. Notter said that the purpose was to make the non-member states conform their actions with that approved by the Organization. Senator Vandenberg said he thought about all that can be done is to arrange it so that non-member states will not interfere with action taken by the Organization. Senator Connally said he thought the negative language was better and that the Organization certainly had a right to protect itself against interference. Representative Bloom commented that this was important, since it could be done for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

Mr. Stassen observed that of course the ideal situation would be to have all states within the Organization, where they would all have a right to vote and to take part in the work of the Organization. Senator Connally said that this would amount to a world state. Mr. Bowman said it would be inadvisable for the states in the Organization to try to make all other countries conform to the provisions of the Charter. Senator Connally said that we want to get them in voluntarily. Mr. Bowman said it was important to keep in mind what Mr. Stassen had said about wanting to bring in all peace-loving states. Therefore, it was important to write the obligations in broad terms and make it clear that one of the main purposes was to prevent threats to peace and security.

Senator Connally said that under this paragraph, if the Organization took enforcement measures, then states neighbors of the one against which enforcement action might be taken could be prevented from giving assistance that would undermine the efforts of the Organization. Mr. Notter said he was of the opinion that it would be better to have the action that might be taken by the Organization against a member state directed toward preventing interference than to try to force such a state to act according to the provisions of the Charter.

Mr. Sandifer asked whether the Delegation wished to propose or support this paragraph. Senator Connally said that he thought the United States should propose it. He considered that the sense of the paragraph was implicit in the document. The unnumbered paragraph with the language proposed in the April 16 document was approved by the Delegation for proposal to the Conference if no other Delegation brought it up.

Chapter X—Secretariat, Paragraph 1

Mr. Sandifer said that the next item of business was to discuss Chapter X, The Secretariat, which had not yet been considered by the Delegation at all.

Senator Connally said he was still concerned about Chapter III, Membership, especially the phrase “all peace-loving states”. He wondered if it would not be a good idea to define what a state is. Mr. Dulles said that any definition would exclude some political unit already taking part in the Conference, for example, India. He thought the important thing to do was to agree on who would decide whether a given political unit had enough of the characteristics of a state to be entitled to membership in the Organization. Mr. Bowman said the General Assembly should decide it in the light of conditions.

Mr. Sandifer presented Chapter X to the Delegation. Mr. Gerig opened the discussion on paragraph 1.

[Suggested Revised Text:

1. There should be a Secretariat comprising a Secretary-General and such staff as may be required. The Secretary-General should be the chief administrative officer of the Organization. He should be elected by the General Assembly on recommendation of the Security Council with the concurrence of the Security Council for such term for a period of five years and Under such conditions as are specified in the Charter and should be eligible for re-election. He should be subject to removal for cause by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly.]

Mr. Gerig noted that the first suggestion was that the Secretary General should be elected by the General Assembly with the concurrence of the Security Council rather than on the recommendation of the Security Council. This revision would emphasize the position of equality between the two bodies. Senator Vandenberg thought this was an improvement. Mr. Gerig said that there were two other proposals in this paragraph, first, that the Secretary-General should have a term of five years and should be eligible for re-election, and, secondly, that he should be subject to removal for cause.

Senator Vandenberg asked what “for cause” meant and said he thought it was not necessary to include these words. Senator Connally commented that concurrence of the two bodies in the election of the Secretary-General must mean that they would vote separately. Mr. Gerig agreed and said that they would vote by their ordinary votes. Senator Connally said that this would mean that seven votes would be required in the Council. Mr. Gerig agreed, saying that this was not a procedural matter. Senator Connally stated that in that case any one of the permanent members could veto the choice of the Secretary-General. Mr. Gerig said that it was important for the successful operation of the Organization that the Secretary General be acceptable to the great powers. Representative Bloom said that there could be a situation in which one state by voting against the candidate could prevent any election. Then there was a question as to whether the Secretary-General already in office would just continue, or whether the office would become vacant.

Senator Connally said he thought that the question of voting in the Security Council as applied to the election of the Secretary-General was extremely important. Mr. Notter stated that, if the permanent members were to have a veto power, perhaps it would be better for the Security Council to decide first on its choice for Secretary-General. He liked the suggested revision better, except for the possibility of the veto, because it would be most unfortunate if two-thirds of the Assembly were committed to a given candidate, and then one great power could block that decision. Mr. Dulles said that it would create a very bad situation if the Assembly took action which was then vetoed by one member of the Security Council.

Senator Connally suggested that the Secretary-General be elected by the General Assembly with the concurrence of the Security Council by a vote of any seven members. Mr. Notter said that this would amount to having the General Assembly cast its tightest vote, namely, two-thirds, and the Security Council its loosest vote. Mr. Armstrong suggested that this be considered a procedural matter. Senator Connally said that perhaps this would be the way out and reiterated his objection to the possibility of a veto by one great power. Mr. Dulles said that this possibility might block the entire functioning of the Organization.

Representative Bloom commented that the Organization had to have somebody in charge of its administration before it could actually get started. Senator Vandenberg said that of course there would have to be some sort of temporary organization. Mr. Sandifer noted that this would be taken care of by an agreement here at the Conference and that there was a plan for an Organizing Committee, which was not in the Dumbarton Oaks document. Representative Bloom asked what would happen if the temporary Security Council did not agree on the choice of a Secretary-General.

Mr. Gerig referred to the experience of the League of Nations in electing judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice. He said that election of the judges had required the unanimous concurrence of all members of the Council. No difficulty had ever arisen, and two panels of judges had been elected. Senator Vandenberg commented that that was before Stalin had taken over. Mr. Gerig observed that the position of the Secretary-General of the Organization would be very difficult if he was persona non grata to any of the principal states.

Senator Connally said he had liked Mr. Armstrong’s suggestion that the Secretary-General be elected by the General Assembly with the concurrence of the Security Council, both bodies acting under their respective procedural authority. Mr. Notter said that another possibility would be to provide that the Secretary-General should be elected by the General Assembly unless the Security Council by its procedural vote interposes an objection. Mr. Sandifer suggested the possibility of going back to the original language. Mr. Armstrong said he thought that was still bad because one of the permanent members could still impose a veto. Senator Vandenberg said we must be very careful about the total veto power of the permanent members.

Mr. Gerig stated his opinion that the new language gave the Assembly more power. Mr. Armstrong said that it would put more heat on the Assembly to take initiative in organization matters and put the responsibility on the Security Council for blocking any decisions. Senator Connally said that if there was a choice between the two bodies, the Security Council should have the primary power to choose the Secretary-General. He did not want the General Assembly to impose a Secretary-General on the Security Council, but he thought that if any seven members wanted a Secretary-General, that person should be elected.

Mr. Notter said he had been checking over the probable membership of the General Assembly to estimate what states would hold the balance of power under a rule requiring a two-thirds majority for electing the Secretary-General. The Western Hemisphere states and the British Dominions would amount to more than one-third of the Assembly. In the Security Council there would undoubtedly be some of these states represented, and he thought that for Britain and the United States the arrangement that any seven could vote on this matter would be perfectly safe. Representative Bloom asked if the suggestion was that any seven members of the Council would be required to approve the action of the Assembly in its choice of a Secretary-General.

Mr. Dulles said that he thought Mr. Armstrong’s suggestion should be adopted in some form. Senator Connally stated that he thought some such plan would be desirable. Mr. Dulles said that the veto power as exercised by the U.S.S.R. might be dangerous in this situation. Senator Vandenberg said that perhaps it would be exercised so as not to let a provision be incorporated permitting the Secretary-General to be elected without the veto right.

Mr. Armstrong suggested providing that the Secretary-General should be elected by the Assembly and the Security Council acting under their respective procedural authorities. Mr. Sandifer amended this to “respective procedural votes”. Senator Vandenberg called attention to the fact that in the General Assembly the procedural vote is a simple majority. Mr. Notter said it was provided in Section C of Chapter V that a two-thirds vote was required in the General Assembly for elections. There would be less safety in a simple majority. Senator Connally said he did not intend that a simple majority should suffice in the General Assembly. Mr. Sandifer said he concluded, then, that only the Security Council should vote in this instance by its procedural formula. Mr. Stassen suggested that it be provided that the Secretary-General be elected by the General Assembly with the concurrence of the Security Council acting under Section C, paragraph 2 of Chapter VI. The Delegates agreed.

Mr. Gerig pointed out that the next proposed revision was to prescribe a five-year term instead of leaving the term to be determined by the General Assembly. It was not desirable to have the term too long, but if the Secretary-General was good, it should be possible for him to be re-elected. Senator Connally asked what the provision had been under the League of Nations, and Mr. Gerig replied that the Secretary-General had been elected for a first term of seven years with the possibility of re-election for three years. Senator Connally asked if the Delegation agreed to including the provision about the term of office for the Secretary-General, and the Delegates replied in the affirmative.

The Delegates agreed to the suggested provision for removal by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly with the words “for cause” left out. Mr. Sandifer asked if this was to be proposed or supported by the American Delegation. Representative Bloom said that if we wanted it in the Charter, we should propose it. Mr. Stassen said it would be better, however, if others proposed it. Senator Vandenberg said he thought the American Delegation should support it for the time being, and this view received general assent.

Chapter X—Secretariat, Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6

Mr. Gerig called attention to the proposed changes in paragraph 2 of Chapter X.

[Suggested Revised Text:

2. The Secretary-General or his representative should act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, and of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council and should make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.]

He noted that if it was desired to assign trusteeship functions to the Organization, an organ would have to be provided to handle the matter, so that it would have to be listed at this point. It would be more efficient if the Secretary-General could designate a deputy to attend meetings, since there would undoubtedly be a great many of them. Senator Connally stated that in the absence of objections the Delegation would approve this revision for support.

Mr. Gerig presented the suggested amendment of paragraph 3.

[Suggested Revised Text:

3. The Secretary-General should have the right to bring to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly any matter which in his opinion may threaten international peace and security or impair the general welfare.]

He commented that this involved a substantive addition to the text. At present the Secretary-General has the right to call the attention of the Security Council to any matter threatening peace and security. Therefore, it seemed necessary to empower him to call to the attention of the General Assembly any situation which might impair the general welfare. This provision would give him a similar right to that which he would have in relation to the Security Council. Representative Eaton commented that the Secretary-General is an agent of the General Assembly as well as of the Security Council. Mr. Gerig pointed out that this suggestion gave the Secretary-General some discretion in deciding what matters to bring up and to which body to refer them.

Mr. Notter suggested it be provided that the Secretary-General have the right to bring to the attention of the Security Council and the General Assembly any matter within their respective competencies. Mr. Bowman asked if it was necessary to spell out the respective fields of jurisdiction. Mr. Notter said perhaps it would be better to hold back the tendency to obscure the differentiation between the two bodies. Senator Connally said there might be considerable discussion as to where a given dispute or situation should be referred. Mr. Sandifer said there were two different kinds of situations: (a) those which might threaten peace and security, and (b) those which might impair the general welfare. Representative Bloom objected to the phrase “in his opinion”. Senator Vandenberg said that situations tending to impair the general welfare might also threaten international peace and security. Mr. Stassen suggested taking out the phrase “in his opinion”.

Senator Vandenberg read the revised suggestion, which was approved for support.

[3. The Secretary General should have the right to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which may threaten international peace and security, and to the attention of the General Assembly any matter which may threaten or impair the general welfare.]

Mr. Gerig presented a suggested new paragraph 4.

[4. The Secretary-General should appoint such officers and other personnel as may be required. The appointment of principal officers should be subject to confirmation by the General Assembly.]

Representative Bloom asked how “principal officers” should be defined. Mr. Gerig said that in practice there was a pretty clear understanding that the Deputy Secretary-General, Under Secretary-General and Assistant Secretaries-General, and Directors of Divisions and Departments would be considered principal officers. This would conform to the practice of the International Labor Office and the League of Nations. Mr. Dulles suggested amending the text to make the appointment of principal officers subject to such confirmation by the General Assembly as it may require or specify. Senator Connally asked if there was any objection, and, since there was none, he declared that the Delegation agreed.

Mr. Gerig presented the suggested new paragraph 5.

[5. Subject to the requirements of technical or administrative competence and experience, officers of the Secretariat should be recruited on the widest practicable geographical basis.]

He said this was intended to give satisfaction to all countries and make the provisions for the Secretariat more acceptable to the small states. Senator Connally asked if the Delegation approved it, and the Delegates gave their assent. Senator Vandenberg asked why it would not be a good idea for the United States to propose it. Senator Connally answered that we would probably not catch many flies that way, and it was agreed that the United States should support it if proposed by other Delegations.

Mr. Gerig presented the suggested new paragraph 6.

[6. In the performance of their duties, the Secretary-General and the staff should be responsible only to the Organization. Their responsibilities should be exclusively international in character, and they should not seek or receive instructions in regard to the discharge thereof from any authority external to the Organization. The members should undertake fully to respect the international character of the responsibilities of the Secretariat and not to seek to influence any of their nationals in the discharge of such responsibilities.]

Mr. Dulles said he thought this provision extremely important. Senator Vandenberg said that having such a statement in the Charter would not stop the nations from trying to influence their nationals on the Secretariat. Mr. Bowman said it had worked quite well in the League of Nations except for the Axis countries. Senator Connally asked if there was any possibility of removing officials who would violate such a provision. Mr. Gerig said that the principal officers of the Organization would have the authority to remove members of the staff in such a case. Senator Connally said it was worth thinking about making some clear provision for removing officials who violated this provision of the Charter. Mr. Bowman observed that the League of Nations had had a scheme for retirement and that it would be possible to work out the necessary regulations. Mr. Dulles said that normally the officials of the Organization would be removable for violations. Senator Connally remarked that he thought a penalty was needed in addition to the general policy.

Mr. Gerig called attention to the fact that in the draft constitution for the Food and Agriculture Organization there was a provision similar to the suggested new paragraph 6.⁴³ Mr. Dulles said it might be suggested that the Assembly would have a general power to remove any official who violated this provision. Mr. Stassen said it would be important not to interfere with the authority of the Secretary-General as the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

Mr. Armstrong suggested that there should be some discussion of the responsibility of the member states to grant immunities and privileges to the officials of the Organization, and members of its organs and other bodies, especially since it was contemplated in some quarters that the Organization might meet from time to time in different countries. Mr. Gerig said there was a section on that point in the proposed new chapter on juridical status. Mr. Armstrong read the proposed new chapter on juridical status, paragraph 3.

[3. The members of the Organization should accord diplomatic privileges and immunities to persons appointed by other members as their representatives in or to the Organization, and to the higher officials of the Organization, not being their own nationals. Immunity from jurisdiction shall be subject to waiver by the members of the Organization in the case of their representatives in or to the Organization, and by the Organization in the case of higher officials of the Organization.]

Mr. Sandifer said that this chapter together with the ones proposed on the registration of treaties and on inconsistent obligations had been left for Mr. Hackworth’s committee⁴⁴ to consider. Mr. Armstrong said he just wanted to open up the question whether it would be suitable to have such a provision in the chapter on the Secretariat if there were no separate chapter on Juridical Status. Mr. Stassen said that in Chapter X only the members of the Secretariat were involved, but that in the proposed separate chapter all officials and representatives of the Organization could be included.

Senator Vandenberg asked how it would be possible to exempt officers of the Organization from taxation of their salaries. Mr. Sandifer said that it could be taken care of by a treaty regulating the legislation of each country. Senator Connally said that the Charter could exact a promise from each country not to levy taxes on the salaries of the nationals of other states working in the Organization Secretariat.

Mr. Stassen asked if it was desirable to support or propose the suggested new paragraph 6. The Delegates agreed to support it. Mr. Gerig said that it was important to make sure that it gets into the document. Mr. Stassen said in that case the United States should propose it, and the Delegates agreed.

Chapter XI—Amendments, New Paragraph 2

Mr. Sandifer presented the suggested new paragraph of Chapter XI, Amendments.

[2. A general conference of the members of the United Nations may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly with the concurrence of the Security Council, for the purpose of reviewing the Charter. Each member shall have one vote in the Conference. Any alterations of the Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the Conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by the members of the Organization having permanent membership on the Security Council and by a majority of the other members of the Organization.]

He said that at the last meeting in Washington⁴⁵ the substance of this paragraph had been discussed, and it had been suggested that there should be a new provision to provide for a constitutional convention at a later date. This draft had been prepared subsequently but had not yet been considered by the Delegation. Senator Connally commented that this proposal would make the Charter more liquid. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the adoption of a new Charter would be accomplished by the same process as the adoption of an amendment. Mr. Stassen said he was willing to agree to this formulation, although he preferred to say that there must be a constitutional convention within twelve years. Senator Vandenberg said that this proposal was all right as far as he was concerned.

Mr. Notter pointed out that the Soviet Union could still prevent the calling of a conference for revision of the Charter. Mr. Dulles said that the Soviet Government would have the power to veto amendments also and that this was the same as the amending process. Mr. Notter said that this differed from the amending procedure, which did not require the prior approval of the Security Council before an amendment could even be considered by the member states. Mr. Sandifer said that the United States was protected either way.

Mr. Dulles was in favor of classifying as a procedural matter, covered by the provisions of paragraph 2 of Section C, Chapter VI, the concurrence of the Security Council in the call for a general conference. Since this was not a matter involving the use of enforcement measures, he thought it would be better to consider it a procedural question. Mr. Sandifer said it was a more important matter than electing a Secretary-General. Under the provisions of a procedural vote, a conference could be called against the opposition of four permanent members, and he thought that would be going too far. Senator Vandenberg asked if it was not procedural to call a convention. Mr. Sandifer said he thought not. Mr. Armstrong said that many of the smaller” Governments would say that apparently nothing was procedural under the Charter. Senator Connally said that he agreed that this was a more fundamental matter than a question of procedure.

Representative Bloom asked whether it would not be desirable to require a larger vote in the Assembly. Then if there was a deadlock in the Security Council, the Assembly might break it. Senator Vandenberg commented that that would give the Assembly an overriding veto. Mr. Notter said the matter might be taken care of by requiring a higher vote in both the General Assembly and the Security Council, but no veto for the permanent members. For example, there could be a requirement for a three-fourths vote in the General Assembly and ten members of the Council. Representative Bloom said that some way should be provided to take the matter out of the hands of the Security Council if one of the permanent members tried to block the obvious desire of all the rest of the Organization. Dean Gildersleeve said it was terrific to think that any one member could block the will of the whole Organization.

Mr. Sandifer said that any provision other than the one mentioned here would involve a new type of voting in the Security Council. Representative Bloom commented that the call for a conference would be merely to consider matters of general concern to the Organization in connection with the Charter. Mr. Notter said that this was, however, a fundamental matter which opened the door to a far-reaching revision of the Charter. Dean Gildersleeve said that the actual amending power would be left as it stands. Senator Connally said that the ordinary amending processes could still be used. Mr. Sandifer added that two-thirds of the General Assembly could adopt amendments, which would come into force only when ratified by all the permanent members and the majority of the other members of the Organization.

Mr. Dulles observed that this provision was more liberal than the proposed second paragraph. He did not think, in fact, that the proposal added anything that could not be done much more easily under paragraph 1. In the first paragraph the Assembly can take the initiative and does not need the concurrence of the Security Council. Mr. Sandifer asked whether this country would be willing to have a constitutional convention called by two-thirds or three-fourths of the General Assembly, without requiring the concurrence of the Security Council.

Senator Vandenberg said there might be some advantage in having the same process for both amendments and the calling of a constitutional convention. Mr. Sandifer said this could be much more serious than a single amendment, and the situations would not be parallel. He thought it should require a minimum of a three-fourths vote in the General Assembly. Mr. Dulles said that if the great powers lose their influence to such an extent that they cannot block the will of three-fourths of the Assembly, then the Organization has come to a sad pass. Mr. Bowman said he doubted whether it was good judgment to provide for a general revision of the Charter, especially since there is provision for amendments.

Representative Bloom asked whether there was any limit on the time in which amendments are to be adopted. Mr. Bowman said he did not like the proposed paragraph 2. Senator Connally said that by setting a date for a constitutional convention, the United Nations would be admitting at the start that the Organization as constituted now is likely to fail. If the Organization is confronted by a demand for amendments, then it could start work on revisions, but it would not invite some 30 or more dissidents to start agitating right away for revisions. He thought that it would be within the competence of the Organization to undertake drastic revision of the Charter if necessary. Mr. Bowman said he thought this was implicit in the Charter. Mr. Stassen said that in that case the provision concerning a call for a conference would show the intention of the Organization. Mr. Bowman doubted the wisdom of inviting the member states to plan to call for a conference to revise the Charter before this one has had an opportunity to work. Mr. Stassen said it had not worked out that way in our Constitution. Representative Bloom said that if the provision is to be included, it should be made flexible. Mr. Bowman said that we already have the amendment provisions of paragraph 1. Mr. Stassen thought that too remote a means of dealing with the matter. Representative Bloom felt there should be a way to call a conference if necessary to revise the Charter and referred to the fact that in New York State there was a provision for constitutional conventions.

Mr. Bowman asked why it would not be satisfactory merely to indicate the process by which the matter of a thoroughgoing revision could be approached and leave it in a two or three line formula. Mr. Dulles said he thought there should be much less formality and procedure, and he thought the suggested provision actually did not give any fresh implementation. The General Assembly could meet and consider the revision of the whole document itself without calling a special conference, and this would be a more flexible arrangement. Mr. Bowman said that the Assembly could amend everything. Mr. Dulles said he thought it a question of policy whether there should be a paragraph explicitly recognizing the need for subsequent revision. He himself thought it might be desirable to recognize that the Charter is inadequate as it stands and that it would be a good idea to improve it later. Mr. Stassen said it would make it clear that we did not presume that all wisdom had been accumulated here. He thought the whole discussion had been a wholesome one and that it would be good to have some such provision in the Charter. Senator Vandenberg said the psychological value would be very great.

Mr. Notter suggested that it would be making the draft a little too loose to incorporate a thoroughgoing revision by the same process as the making of amendments. He thought it might be possible to empower the General Assembly, at “a time and place which it should determine”, to convene in special session for a thoroughgoing reconsideration of the Charter. Mr. Bowman asked what vote would be required and whether the Security Council should have some check on such a determination in the interests of security. Mr. Armstrong said it would be important to avoid having the threat of such a move hanging over the Assembly. He thought it probably desirable to have some sort of provision but not so imminent as this.

Senator Connally asked if it would be acceptable to provide that “a general conference of the members of the United Nations may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a three-fourths vote of the General Assembly with the concurrence of the Security Council by a vote of seven members”. Mr. Stassen said he agreed, and Mr. Bowman added that he was satisfied. Mr. Notter estimated that there were eleven small Eastern European states that could be considered as coming within the orbit of the Soviet Union. While this was close, it was still not enough to block a three-fourths vote of the General Assembly. Senator Connally said that with a majority as high as three-fourths, there would be more stability. He foresaw that the smaller states might be dissatisfied with the Charter, and if they were agitating for changes all the time, it would weaken the effectiveness of the Organization. Mr. Bowman said he was now prepared to agree with this paragraph. Mr. Stassen said that he would accept the incorporation of this paragraph with the suggested amendments, and he thought that the American Delegation should propose it to the Conference. The Delegates agreed that a constitutional conference could be called by a three-fourths vote in the Assembly with the concurrence of the Security Council acting under the provisions of paragraph 2, Section C, Chapter VI. Senator Connally commented that the United States would be protected in the provisions for ratification.

Mr. Gerig asked if the last four lines of the suggested paragraph should be eliminated, since it was merely a repetition of the description in the previous paragraph. Mr. Stassen said he thought it would be better to keep it as it is, as it is a complete statement. Senator Connally stated it was agreed by the United States Delegation to keep the last four lines and that the whole paragraph as revised should be classified among the items to be proposed.

withdrawal provision

The group turned to the next item on the agenda: the question of a provision for withdrawal. Mr. Sandifer read the following proposal, which had been drafted but not yet considered:

“Any member may withdraw from membership in the United Nations for stated cause and upon six months’ notice, during which period its rights, privileges, and obligations of membership with respect to the functions allocated to the Security Council shall be suspended automatically. Any provisions of the Charter relating to voting that may be affected by the withdrawal of any member shall be adjusted accordingly by the General Assembly, subject to amendment of the Charter.”

Senator Connally asked for an explanation of the last phrase “subject to amendment of the Charter”. Mr. Sandifer said that it meant pending the amendment of the Charter. Since the withdrawal of a permanent member; of the Security Council would affect the voting provisions of the Security Council, Representative Bloom said it was reasonable that a member of the Council should not vote if it had announced its intention to withdraw.

Mr. Notter explained that the withdrawal problem would affect the Organization seriously only if one of the great powers should go out of the Organization. The first question was how quickly a state could withdraw if it was permitted to do so at all. If a member of the Security Council decided to leave the Organization, it would want to do so quickly, and it would not want to be held to the obligation to join in the use of force. Therefore, a short period was desirable. There was also a question of how quickly such a state could drop its responsibilities. If the United States were to withdraw, it would certainly not want to have any responsibility for the work of the Security Council any longer. Therefore, the rights, privileges, and obligations of membership with, respect to the functions allocated; to the Security Council should be suspended automatically for a state, upon its giving notice of intention to withdraw.

Senator Connally said that under this provision any nation could withdraw whenever it was called upon to use force and did not wish to comply. Mr. Sandifer said this was an important question; it should be given sufficient time for careful consideration, and he would like to have an opportunity to circulate the draft of the proposal he had read to the group. He thought a prior question was whether it was desirable to have any provision for withdrawal in the Charter and that could be considered at a later meeting the same day.

. . . . . . .

Senator Connally said that in the few moments remaining he would like to discuss the general attitude of the United States Delegation toward the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. It was his impression that except for the items which the United States Delegation had agreed to propose as amendments, or those which they had agreed to support if amendments were offered, the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals should stand as the framework of the Charter that we would like to see adopted. Mr. Bowman said that many of the American proposals reflected the views of other governments, which had been taken into account in the drafting of suggested alterations. Senator Vandenberg said it would not be desirable for the United States to take a hard and fast position of refusing to consider any other amendments. Miss Gildersleeve said the Delegation could not really decide until it had had an opportunity to hear what the other Governments expected to bring up. She thought the group might wish to alter its position after hearing other proposals.

Senator Connally said that of course it might be necessary to accept amendments offered by other countries. What he was trying to get at was a view of our main objectives. Miss Gildersleeve said she thought the Delegation should agree in the first instance to adhere to the position defined in these meetings. If other proposals are made with good arguments to back them up, then the Delegates should come back and report to the whole group. Mr. Bowman said that other Governments might have later thoughts than those that were incorporated in memoranda circulated before the Conference, but he thought it advisable to have a general attitude defined.

Senator Connally said that there should be a meeting of the Delegation every day, with the members of each Commission reporting on the most important items that came up in their respective groups. Mr. Bowman said that is where any revisions of the American attitude would be worked out. Mr. Stassen said he thought that would give the group a stable basis for its work.

Mr. Sandifer pointed out that there were still several items on the agenda, especially the Preamble; Chapter IX; Chapter VIII, Section A; and trusteeship. It was agreed that a meeting would be held at 8:30 on the evening of the same day to complete this agenda. Mr. Sandifer suggested that the order of business be Chapter IX; Chapter VIII, Section A; trusteeship withdrawal, and the Preamble. Mr. Stassen asked that the subject of trusteeship be considered first, and the group agreed to this arrangement. Representative Bloom said that it would be a safeguard to provide a 24-hour legislative day for the Delegation to consider amendments.

The meeting was adjourned at 1:00 p.m.

26. Mr. Stettinius was attending a meeting of the Heads of Delegations to organize the Conference; see doc. 29, DC/4, April 26, UNCIO Documents, vol. 5, p. 50.
27. The draft entitled “Tentative U.S. Revisions of the Proposals”, (April 16–27, 1945), discussed herein, is not printed (U.S. Doc. Und. 1); see minutes of twelfth meeting of the United States delegation, April 18, 9:10 a.m., p. 330.
28. Omission indicated in the original minutes.
29. Not printed.
30. Chapter VI, section B, paragraph 5.
31. Brackets throughout remainder of this document appear in the original.
32. Col. Juan Perón was Vice President, Minister of War, and Minister of Labor of the Argentine Republic; he did not resign until October 9, 1945.
33. Representative Vito Marcantonio, of New York City.
34. Message of April 23 handed to Mr. Molotov by President Truman for transmission to Marshal Stalin, vol. v, p. 258.
35. See memorandum of conversation by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, infra.
36. For the Covenant of the League of Nations (Part I of Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, signed at Versailles June 28, 1919), see Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, p. 69.
37. See progress report on Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, September 19, 1944, and memorandum of November 20 analyzing the Proposals, Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, pp. 824 and 901, respectively.
38. Memorandum on political units of the world, not printed.
39. Treaty providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, signed at Paris on August 27, 1928, Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. i, p. 153.
40. See minutes of sixth meeting of the United States delegation, April 10, 10:15 a.m., p. 227.

42. Preceding the vote of the United States Senate (legislative day Monday, January 14, 1929) giving advice and consent to ratification of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Committee on Foreign Relations submitted a report which contained the following statement:

    “The treaty in brief pledges the nations bound by the same not to resort to war in the settlement of their international controversies save in bona fide self-defense and never to seek settlement of such controversies except through pacific means. …” (Ex. Rept. No. 1, 70th Cong., 2d sess., in Congressional Record, vol. 70, pt. 2, p. 1730; for the voting on adoption of the Senate resolution of ratification, see ibid., p. 1731.)

43. See Article VIII (Staff), paragraph 2, First Report to the Governments of the United Nations by the Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture (Washington, August 1, 1944), p. 44.
44. Commission IV (Judicial Organization).
45. Twelfth meeting of the United States delegation, April 19, 9:10 a.m.; for minutes, see p. 330.