EUR Files
Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Pasvolsky)1
Subject: Voting Formula for Security Council
| Participants: | The President |
| The Secretary of State | |
| Mr. Dunn | |
| Mr. Pasvolsky | |
| Mr. Bohlen |
Copies to: S, U, A–D, SPA, Mr. Bohlen
At the meeting today in the White House, the Secretary emphasized to the President the urgent need for reaching agreement on the voting formula at the forthcoming meeting with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. Otherwise, the United Nations conference might be delayed for a long time to come, with resultant slackening of interest and possible growth of opposition.
The President said that he was determined to go forward vigorously and to press for a decision. He said that he was clear in his mind as to how he would handle the matter of initial membership for the Soviet Republics, but that he was puzzled as to how to approach the matter of voting procedure. He said that he was still worried as to what the situation would be if a controversy arose between, say, the United States and Mexico, and the matter was taken up by the Security Council without the United States having a vote in whatever decisions might be taken. He inquired whether, in view of the fact that Marshal Stalin has turned down the formula which we have proposed to him, we have succeeded in finding another formula.
In a reply to the President’s question, Mr. Pasvolsky said that in studying the question we have listed the substantive decisions on which the Council would have to vote. They fall into seven categories. In six of these categories the rule of unanimity of the permanent members [Page 67] would, under our proposed formula, prevail throughout. Only in the category of decisions relating to peaceful settlement of disputes would there be an exception to the effect that a permanent member, when a party to a dispute, would not cast its vote. In this manner no member of the organization would be above the law in any quasi-judicial procedures employed by the Council, while, at the same time, the special position of the permanent members would be amply safeguarded in all political decisions calling for action by the Council.
Our discussions with Congressional leaders, with many individuals and groups thoughout the country and with representatives of the American Republics and of other United Nations have convinced us that the unanimity rule needs to be modified at least to this extent. Otherwise, we run the risk at home of alienating some of our supporters and of providing powerful ammunition for the opponents of international organization, as well as of getting into trouble with the Latin American countries and the other United Nations.
As regards the possibility of a dispute between us and Mexico coming before the Council, we would abstain from casting our vote only in such decisions as might be involved in the investigation of the dispute, in calling upon the parties to settle it peacefully, and in making recommendations as regards methods and procedures of settlement. No decision for action could be made without our affirmative vote.
The President inquired as to what would happen if there developed a dispute between us and Mexico over oil. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that the Council would presumably go through the conciliation and peaceful settlement procedures without the benefit of our vote, but would not be able to take any substantive action without our consent. He recalled the manner in which an oil dispute between Great Britain and Persia was handled by the Council of the League of Nations.
Reverting to Soviet Russia’s position, Mr. Pasvolsky said that in our opinion her case against the formula is extremely weak. Under the formula, she would have veto power—just as would we and each of the other permanent members—in the following decisions of the Council:
- 1.
- Admission, suspension and expulsion of members;
- 2.
- Determination of the existence of a threat to the peace or of a breach of the peace;
- 3.
- Use of force or the application of other measures of enforcement;
- 4.
- Approval of agreements for the provision of armed forces;
- 5.
- All matters relating to the regulation of armaments;
- 6.
- Determination of whether a regional arrangement is consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.
We are, therefore, not really asking much of Soviet Russia, from the point of view of her interests and desires, when we propose that the permanent members abstain from voting in the Council’s decisions [Page 68] on peaceful settlement of disputes to which they happen to be parties.
The President then said that he was satisfied that something like our formula was necessary, and that he would make every effort to convince the Russians that it was essential from the point of view of our position. He said that he thought he knew Molotov well enough to speak plainly to him, and was sure that he could work out with him a satisfactory solution to take care of our situation.
Mr. Dunn called the President’s attention to the fact that the Russians might be more receptive to our ideas because of what has just happened on the Polish question, on which there is a split among the great powers. The President agreed that the provision of opportunity through constant contact in the new organization to prevent such an occurrence might emphasize to the Russians the need for an international organization.
He also agreed that our proposed formula should take care not only of our position, but of the Soviet position as well, since, as was recalled to him, the original Soviet document called for the unanimity rule only on the kind of questions for which that rule is now proposed in our formula.
The President directed that there be prepared for him a memorandum embodying the main ideas brought out in the discussion, and that some emphasis be put on the reasons why the Latin American countries are objecting to the straight unanimity rule.