500.CC/12–2844: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 29—8:15 p. m.]
5043. With the thought that it might be of some use in connection with future discussions with the Russians on the voting procedure of the international security organization, I will give below my present impressions of why the Soviets are insisting on their right to veto consideration by the council of all matters, even peaceful procedures. (ReEmbs 5012 December 26, midnight).1
[Page 65]One. On analyzing reactions of the Soviets, one must bear in mind that since the revolution the nations of the world have been hostile to or suspicious of them and their objectives. Although the Russians realize that they are now accepted as a powerful world power, they are still suspicious of the underlying attitude of most of the nations toward them.
Thus they lack confidence that the members of the council would be impartial in dealing with disputes in which the Soviet Government might be involved.
Two. The Soviets have definite objectives in their future foreign policy, all of which we do not as yet fully understand. For example, while they have recognized the right of the states bordering the Soviet Union to have their independence, they insist upon “friendly” governments. From Soviet actions so far, the terms “friendly” and “independent” appear to mean something quite different from our interpretation. It is interesting to note that in Iran they appear to justify their recent actions by explaining that they know better what the Iranian people want than the Iranian Government, which does not represent the majority of Iranian opinion. Any political figure, in Iran and elsewhere, who disagrees with Soviet policies is conveniently branded as a “Fascist”. The same sort of thing can be said about the Polish situation. It would seem probable that the Russians are as conscious as we are of the difference of interpretation of terms and of concepts. They thus probably come to the conclusion that if their actions are subjected to scrutiny by the representatives of nations with different concepts, their actions and objectives will in all probability be condemned and they will therefore be subjected to public criticism supported by the world’s highest authority.
Three. It would appear that they look upon the international security organization as a method by which the Soviet Union can be protected against aggressor nations, but it seems doubtful whether they believe that it can be useful to them in settling disputes between them and other countries through mediatory or judicial processes. The court, they believe, is packed against them. They appear, therefore, to be insisting upon the right of unilateral action in settling disputes of this character.
Four. I fear that we are faced with a very fundamental question of what the effect on the international security organization will be with most of the nations looking to it to develop mediatory or judicial procedures in the advancement of international relations, whereas the Soviet Union appears to view it from a much narrower perspective.
Thus, I believe, the Soviets have made up their minds in regard to their position on voting procedure and the only possibility of getting them to change their position would be if we and the British were prepared to take a firm and definite stand, supported by widespread [Page 66] reluctance on the part of the smaller nations to join the organization on the Soviet conditions. It would seem that we should face realistically the far-reaching implications of the Soviet position and adjust our policies accordingly.2