500.CC/1–1145
Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State ( Pasvolsky )
Memorandum of Conversation
Subject: Conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on the Dumbarton Oaks Document
| Participants: | Ambassador Gromyko |
| Mr. Pasvolsky |
Copies to: S, U, A–D, Le, SPA, Mr. Bohlen
Today I had a long talk with the Ambassador which grew out of a conversation we had on New Year’s Day at Blair House. The discussion centered primarily around the question of voting procedure in the Council.
The Ambassador said that, as he saw it, the President’s proposal to Marshal Stalin represented no change in our position as compared with what had taken place at Dumbarton Oaks and that, as Marshal Stalin indicated in his reply, the Soviet position on this subject remains unchanged. He explained again at great length that what [Page 69] they are primarily interested in is to avoid even an appearance of disagreement between the great powers, because the whole process of maintaining peace and security must rest upon continuing and unimpaired unity of these powers. He felt that a rift among the great powers might develop from a situation before the Security Council in which, even under the functions of the Council with respect to peaceful settlement of a dispute, one or more of the great powers would be prevented from full participation because it happened to be involved.
I said that from our point of view the President’s formula represents a substantial modification of the position which we took at Dumbarton Oaks. While it is true that the President’s formula is very similar to the formula which was tentatively worked out at Dumbarton Oaks, the latter formula did not represent an accepted position on our part. The whole idea of differentiating between various categories of voting procedure as regards unanimity of the great powers did not become our accepted position until the President put his proposal before Marshal Stalin.
I said that we have now accepted the proposition that, as a practical matter, it is necessary that the unanimity of the great powers in voting be maintained whenever the Council deals with matters of action. But it is clear to us that the whole organization would be much stronger if the great powers agreed to put themselves on exactly the same footing as all other member states as regards decisions involved in peaceful settlement of disputes. This, I pointed out, relates only to the Council’s decisions to investigate a situation or dispute and to determine whether or not its continuation is likely to lead to a threat to the peace, whether or not to call upon the parties to a dispute to settle their differences by peaceful means of their own choice, and whether or not to make a recommendation to the parties. The rule of unanimity, I made clear, would be maintained as regards decisions relating to admission, suspension and expulsion of members; restoration of privileges of suspended members; determination of a threat to the peace or breaches of the peace; the taking of measures to maintain or restore the peace; approval of special agreements for the provision of armed forces and all matters relating to regulation of armaments.
I summarized for the Ambassador the results of our discussions with numerous individuals and groups in this country and with representatives of other United Nations. I said that in all of these discussions the question of voting inevitably came up. As a result we have become even more convinced than we were at the time of the Dumbarton Oaks discussions that in order to obtain whole-hearted support for the projected organization, both in our country and in the smaller United Nations, it is necessary for the great powers to accept at least this much of a modification in the otherwise general unanimity rule.
[Page 70]The Ambassador repeated the arguments which he has so often given us: that what the small countries are primarily interested in is peace; that peace is unobtainable unless unity prevails among the great powers; and that unity among great powers will inevitably be impaired if the unanimity rule is not maintained throughout in the voting procedures of the Security Council. He said that the difference between our two positions, as he saw it, lay in the fact that we are trying to draw a line between the various functions of the Council for the purpose of applying different voting procedures, whereas their position is that no distinction whatever should be made between the functions. After all, he said, the very first decision to be made by the Council—i. e. whether a particular situation or dispute is of such a nature that its continuation may result in a threat to the peace—is of such great importance that, if there is a cleavage of opinion on that question between the great powers, the whole condition of unity among them will be impaired. He thought that we were emphasizing too much moral, juridical, and organizational issues, and paying too little attention to the political side of the question.
I replied that we were, of course, immensely interested in the moral and juridical aspects of the problem, but that we, no less than they, were fully conscious of the political side of the question. We want the organization to succeed. It is clear to us that the organization will succeed only if the great powers have confidence in each other and act in unity. But it is equally clear that it is also essential to the success of the organization that the smaller powers have confidence in the great powers. These are basic political issues, and the real question is whether confidence will be better promoted by: (a) insistence on the part of the great powers that they must retain a veto privilege throughout in any disputes in which they themselves might be involved; or (b) a system under which they would be willing to place themselves, at least as regards judicial or quasi-judicial procedures, on an equal footing with the others. I said that it is difficult for us to see how the appearance of unity would help its substance, or how even the appearance of unity could be guaranteed. After all, even if we adopt the unanimity rule throughout, that would merely mean that no decision would be valid without the concurring votes of all of the permanent members. But there is no device by which the fact of voting or the fact of disagreement in voting could be prevented. We may, therefore, easily run into a situation in which there would be a series of votes on which the great powers would be divided. Obviously, when a question is raised before the Council, a discussion needs to take place and even if the discussion does not result in a vote, the representatives of the great powers might easily take opposite views. And then when some nation asks for a vote, there would have to be a decision as to whether or not to take a vote. Perhaps the only way in which all this [Page 71] could be avoided would be if the President of the Council were to permit no discussion to take place and to permit no vote to be taken unless he himself were convinced that there will be no disagreement among the great powers in the discussion and no chance of a vote not being unanimous. I said I was sure that this would be putting much too much power in the hands of the President of the Council, and that neither his country nor mine would agree to any such procedure.
From the point of view of maintaining the unity of the great powers, what is really important is that they should take every care not to bring to a vote any questions on which they are really divided, but to try to adjust and harmonize their differences by discussion both inside and outside the Council.
The Ambassador said that he agreed, of course, that no such powers as I described could or should be put in the hands of the President of the Council. On the other hand, he cannot escape the fear that, if we are all to acquiesce in what he considers as “unrealistic” demands of the small powers (i. e. the great powers should abstain from voting in matters which concern them) that would be tantamount to admission that no trust can be put in the declarations and intentions of the great powers. This would merely emphasize suspicions and might discredit the whole idea on which the proposed organization rests.
I replied by saying that we have to consider seriously whether more suspicions will be created by that procedure or by one under which the great powers insist on putting themselves in a position in which none of their acts could be questioned and in which each of them, when involved in a dispute, could put a stop to any public discussion of the matter, thus giving the impression that it was really afraid to face the bar of public opinion. I said that as far as we are concerned, we are impressed not only by the position taken by the smaller countries but also by the fact that in our own country there are large groups of people who find a cause for apprehension in the possibility of the acceptance of a straight unanimity rule. For these reasons, we have come to the conclusion that the strength and effectiveness of the organization, from the point of view of the great powers themselves, would be enhanced rather than diminished by our type of formula.
The Ambassador then said that an idea occurred to him as a result of our discussion which he would like to express personally rather than in any official capacity. That idea was that perhaps a distinction could be drawn between discussions in the Council and formal action involved in voting, and that, perhaps, the situation could be taken care of by some provision under which any matter, whether or not it involves the great powers, could be freely discussed in the Council, while still providing that no decisions of the Council would be valid without the unanimous vote of the great powers.
[Page 72]I said that this was an extremely interesting idea, but that if we go as far as that, why not go one step further and combine it with the kind of voting rule that we proposed. I again emphasized the point that there is no way to prevent, even under their formula, the registering of a disagreement among the great powers, whereas our formula would have a great psychological and, therefore, political importance and would certainly make for better relations and greater confidence. He said that, while he still thought that we are exaggerating this point, the point itself had not occurred to him before and he would like to give it further consideration.
As I had promised him at our earlier meeting, I gave the Ambassador a copy of our translation of excerpts from the Mexican memorandum and a summary of the principal points which had emerged in our discussions with the other American Republics. He was greatly interested in the two documents1 and asked me if it would be possible for him to have the full English text of the Mexican memorandum and also the full texts of such other memoranda as we felt we could properly place at his disposal. I promised to look into the possibility of our doing so.
He then went on to suggest that it would be a very useful thing for us to exchange such comments as might come our way in order to keep each other better prepared for the eventual conference. We are doing that sort of thing in connection with peace feelers, and this is a comparable case. I said that I was sure that it would be a useful procedure and we ought to talk about it at greater length on another occasion. I said we might also think about the advisability of setting up some informal machinery for that purpose. Such machinery might well be in the form of some sort of preliminary preparatory group for the conference. He was very much interested in the idea, and we agreed that the question might be taken up again after the meeting of the Big Three and after we know more definitely as to when the conference will take place.
He asked me whether we have given any further thought to the question of the representation of the sixteen Soviet Republics. Most of them, he said, are much more important than, say, Liberia or Guatemala. They have their own constitutions and deal independently with their own foreign affairs. I asked him whether he really thought that they are independent countries as we commonly understand the term. He said that, of course, they are, even though they are also very intimately connected as members of a federation. I said that that was obviously a question which would have to be discussed [Page 73] at the meeting of the Big Three. He readily agreed, but repeated that from their point of view it was an extremely important matter.
He then went back to the question of voting, which was apparently very much on his mind. He asked whether we had heard from the British and recalled that at Dumbarton Oaks Cadogan personally favored the compromise. I said that we had not heard from the British, whereupon he said, smilingly, that perhaps the British will find a way out for us.
The conversation was in Russian throughout and was extremely friendly. As we were saying good-bye, he remarked that he was very grateful, because, although, in large measure, we went over old ground, there were many new aspects brought out which were extremely suggestive. He asked whether I would be willing to have another talk, if any new thoughts occurred to him. I said I should, of course, be delighted.
- Not printed. Regarding discussions with the American Republics, see Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 399–401. The second document is a two-page memorandum dated January 5, 1945, and entitled “Summary of Principal Comments and Suggestions So Far Made by the Latin American Governments with Respect to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposais” (copy in UNA Files).↩