767.68119/7–1545
No. 709
The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern
and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State
(Dunn)
Memorandum
. . . . . . .
Montreux Convention
The British regard as reasonable the Russian demand for the right to send Russian warships through the Dardanelles in time of war as well as in peace.
The Turkish attitude on this point has always been that in time of war, Turkey must have the right to exclude all warships from the Dardanelles, in order to prevent Turkish waters from becoming the scene of hostilities and to prevent Turkey from becoming involved in the war. However, the Suez Canal is open to the passage of warships in time of war, and we permit belligerent warships to pass through the Panama Canal while the United States is neutral. Russian desire for free passage of her warships through the Dardanelles at all times is fully understandable, and it seems to me that the United States Delegation should express concurrence in this Russian desire. We might even agree to inform Turkey that we consider this Russian desire a reasonable one.
It would be more logical, however, to extend the privilege to all Black Sea riparian powers and not merely to Russia. This would have the advantage of avoiding the appearance of great power pressure on Turkey, and would make easier the inclusion of another provision which seems to me desirable. Provision should be made, in any revision of the Montreux Convention, that Turkey may be called on by the Security Council of the United Nations Organization to restrict the passage, in either direction, of the warships of a state branded as an aggressor.
In brief, I suggest concurrence in the British proposal1 with the addition of two provisions: (1) that the right of passage of warships be extended to all Black Sea riparian powers, and (2) a provision be included to envisage action by Turkey under the direction of the Security Council.
Bases
The British position in this matter is of particular interest. The British consider not only that Russian bases are unnecessary, but add [Page 1054] that, from Britain’s own strategic point of view, the Russian demand must be resisted strongly. This is a return to Britain’s traditional position regarding the Straits and is quite contrary to the British-Russian secret agreement of 1915.2
The British … [indicate] that if Russia persists in a demand for bases, Britain will insist that the question be discussed by the “Four Great Powers” or by the United Nations Organization. I am unable to understand the reason for suggesting a reference of the matter to “the Four Great Powers”, which presumably includes China, although France may be intended as the fourth. (The British may count on a vote of 3 to 1 against Russia, in any Big Four decision on this point.) China has no particular interest in or concern with the matter and I see no point in including France. I would suggest our concurrence in the second British alternative (i. e. reference to the United Nations), particularly in view of the Turkish Foreign Minister’s recent statement that if Russia persists in a demand for bases, Turkey will appeal to the United Nations anyway.
The British also wish to specify that the question of bases is not a matter for bilateral settlement between Russia and Turkey. It would be difficult for the United States to concur with this British position, in view of our bilateral negotiations for bases with Brazil, Ecuador, Portugal, etc. I think we will have to admit that if Russia and Turkey are able to reach an amicable agreement on this question, we will interpose no objection. I am confident that no such amicable agreement can be reached, but it would be awkward for us to attempt to prevent Russia from negotiating directly with Turkey on this subject.
We should insist however that the negotiations be conducted in a friendly manner without the use or threat of force, and we should attempt to obtain assurance from Russia that any bilateral negotiations with Turkey will be conducted in this manner, in my view. We might let the Russians know now, in all frankness, that we consider that Turkey would be justified, under the provisions of the Charter,3 in referring the matter to the United Nations and that the latter organization should take cognizance of the question in view of the important bearing of the Straits on international security.
- Not printed.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1917, supp. 2, vol. i, pp. 494–497; Woodward and Butler, eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, 1st series, vol. iv, pp. 635–638; Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, vol. ii, pp. 7–11.↩
- Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031.↩