J. C. S. Files
No. 608
Memorandum by the Secretary of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McFarland)
[Editor’s Note.—The statements recorded below were made in the context of a full discussion of plans for the invasion of Kyushu and of the casualties anticipated in such an invasion. For a much more complete record of the discussion, in that context, see document No. 598.]
top secret
Minutes of Meeting Held at the White House on Monday, 18 June 1945 at 15301
| Present[:] | The President |
| Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy | |
| General of the Army G. C. Marshall | |
| Fleet Admiral E. J. King | |
| Lieut. General I. C. Eaker (Representing General of the Army H. H. Arnold) | |
| The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson | |
| The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Forrestal | |
| The Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy |
Secretary
- Brig. General A. J. McFarland
l. details of the campaign against japan
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… He [ General Marshall] then read, as an expression of his views, the following digest of a memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for presentation to the President (J. C. S. 1388):2 [Page 930]
We are bringing to bear against the Japanese every weapon and all the force we can employ and there is no reduction in our maximum possible application of bombardment and blockade, while at the same time we are pressing invasion preparations. It seems that if the Japanese are ever willing to capitulate short of complete military defeat in the field they will do it when faced by the completely hopeless prospect occasioned by (1) destruction already wrought by air bombardment and sea blockade, coupled with (2) a landing on Japan indicating the firmness of our resolution, and also perhaps coupled with (3) the entry or threat of entry of Russia into the war.
With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japs in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalize the Chinese to a point where, with assistance of American air power and some supplies, they can mop out their own country.
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An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan.
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General Marshall said that he had asked General MacArthur’s opinion on the proposed operation and had received from him the following telegram, which General Marshall then read:
“I believe the operation presents less hazards of excessive loss than any other that has been suggested. …The hazard and loss will be greatly lessened if an attack is launched from Siberia sufficiently ahead of our target date to commit the enemy to major combat. …
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Admiral King agreed with General Marshall’s views. …
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General Eaker said that he agreed completely with the statements made by General Marshall in his digest of the memorandum prepared for the President. He had just received a cable3 in which General Arnold also expressed complete agreement. …
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The President stated that one of his objectives in connection with the coming conference would be to get from Russia all the assistance in the war that was possible.4 To this end he wanted to know all the decisions that he would have to make in advance in order to occupy the strongest possible position in the discussions.
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Admiral King said he wished to emphasize the point that, regardless of the desirability of the Russians entering the war, they were not indispensable and he did not think we should go so far as to beg [Page 931] them to come in. While the cost of defeating Japan would be greater there was no question in his mind but that we could handle it alone He thought that the realization of this fact should greatly strengthen the President’s hand in the forthcoming conference.
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