Department of the Army Files
No. 540
The Secretary of War
(Stimson) to the
Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Secretary: This acknowledges receipt of [a] letter of 9 June 1945 from Mr. James A. Maxwell to General E. S. Greenbaum1 inclosing a draft of the proposed cable from the President to the Prime Minister2 in response to the Prime Minister’s cable of May 28,3 and requesting comment on this draft.
Yesterday I received from the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion a letter dated 13 June 1945, copy of which is attached. The proposed cable appears to the War Department to be consistent [Page 815] with the direction contained in that letter. If the cable is to be sent, it is believed that its accuracy would be improved by making the second sentence read as follows:
“We intend to furnish lend-lease during the Japanese War in accordance with the general policy discussed between you and President Roosevelt at Quebec on September 14, 1944, and that was the basis for the discussions between American and British representatives in Washington in October and November 1944 in regard to lend-lease requirements for the first year following the defeat of Germany.”
It should be noted, however, that the War Department’s requests for appropriations for military lend-lease were arrived at, and have been presented to the Congress, under policies considered appropriate by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which contemplate, among other things, the furnishing by the War Department of only those materials which are not available to, and cannot otherwise be provided by, the British Empire on the premise that the Empire will maintain its forces for the war against Japan to the fullest possible extent from its own stocks and production.
This policy is not in accord with the implications of the proposed cable. It may be necessary, therefore, for the War Department to request the Congress for funds for the specific purpose of carrying out the direction contained in the letter of 13 June 1945.
Sincerely yours,
- Not printed.↩
-
The draft referred to reads as follows (Department of the Army Files):
“I have gone into the question that you raise in your message of May 28 in regard to lend-lease during the Japanese War. We intend to furnish lend-lease during the Japanese War in accordance with the understanding reached between you and President Roosevelt at Quebec on September 14, 1944, and that was the basis for the discussions between American and British representatives in Washington in October and November 1944 in regard to lend-lease requirements for the first year following the defeat of Germany. In the light of the anticipated war strategy lend-lease will be furnished on the [a?] basis that will permit a partial and equitable reconversion in the United Kingdom, and plans for reconversion [sic] have been worked out here for your representatives on the CPRB to make available full information on the British reconversion program to American officials responsible for the administration of lend-lease.
“You, of course, realize that the policy I have indicated does not necessarily mean that either the military or the non-military program for the coming year will be equal to the lend-lease requirements as estimated in the meetings of last October and November. Those estimates were subject to changing strategic demands as well as to supply considerations and considerations of procurement and allocation, and to the provision of the necessary funds by Congress. I have requested Congress to appropriate funds that will make possible lend-lease deliveries to the British Commonwealth in accord with the spirit of these earlier understandings, and I am confident that lend-lease will continue to be a powerful weapon in bringing the war to a speedy and victorious conclusion.”
- See document No. 537, footnote 5.↩
- Not printed as a whole. Cf. footnote 5, infra.↩
- The reference is to the following passage in Stimson’s letter of May 15 (Department of the Army Files): “… it appears to me desirable that materiel already in the possession or control of the British Empire be employed to the maximum possible extent in satisfaction of its requirements and that remaining requirements which may be referred to the War Department be considered for supply from combat serviceable stocks or new production only if such requirements (1) appear necessary in order to carry out our agreed strategy, (2) are beyond the supply capabilities of the British Empire, and (3) can be obtained only from United States sources.”↩