760C.6215/7–1345
No. 518
Memorandum by the Chief of the
Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)
[Washington,] July 13,
1945.
Memorandum of Conversation
Subject: British Proposal to Settle Western
Frontier of Poland
| Participants: |
Mr. George
Middleton, British Embassy |
|
Elbridge Durbrow,
Chief,
Eastern European Division
|
Mr. Middleton called today
and left the attached aide-mémoire
outlining the British Government’s proposal to settle the
western and northern frontiers of Poland at the Berlin
Conference.
The aide-mémoire states that the British
Government is of the opinion that it is advisable to settle the
northern and western frontiers of Poland as soon as possible
since any delay will only mean that the Soviet Government and
the Polish Government will consolidate their position along the
Oder–Neisse Line which would mean the incorporation into Poland
by unilateral action of approximately one-fifth of pre-war
German territory. The British Government suggests that efforts
be made at the Berlin meeting to fix the Polish-German frontier
[Page 778] as follows: The
Free City of Danzig, East Prussia east [south] and west of Koenigsberg, Oppeln, Silesia
(German Upper Silesia) and most of the eastern portions of
German Pomerania. The aide-mémoire states
that if it proves impossible to reach an agreement as outlined
above the Soviet Government should (1) be informed that the
British and ourselves would give our formal consent to the
transfer to the administration of the Polish Provisional
Government of National Unity [of] only such territories as all
four controlling powers are prepared to grant to Poland, (2) if
the Soviet Government insists on turning over German territory
up to the Oder–Neisse Line the British and American Governments
should insist upon a proportionate reduction in the Soviet share
of reparations from Germany since the turning over of this large
section of Germany to Poland would reduce German capacity to pay
reparations. The aide-mémoire adds that
the British Government would, if necessary, be prepared to
inform the Soviet Government that they will not allow it any
reparations deliveries from the American and British zones in
Germany unless this territorial question is settled
satisfactorily.
I informed Mr. Middleton
that the territorial proposals suggested by the British almost
coincided completely with the recommendations the Department
proposed to the President.1 I
explained that we had given very careful study to this question
and felt that the proposal was the only just one which could be
made. Mr. Middleton
explained that the British delegation would discuss this matter
with the American delegation at Berlin. …
[Attachment]
Aide-Mémoire
His Majesty’s Government have given careful consideration to
Sir A. Clark
Kerr’s arguments in favour of reaching a
provisional Agreement among the three major Allies in regard
to Poland’s Western frontiers, at the forthcoming meeting of
heads of Governments. His Majesty’s Government agree with
him that the Poles and the Russians appear now to have
committed themselves regarding the line of the Oder–Western
Neisse as the Western frontier of Poland and that the
passage of time will only assist the Poles, with Russian
support, in consolidating their hold over all territory to
the East of this line. If the British and United States
Governments allow the permanent settlement of the frontier
to be postponed indefinitely, only putting their views on
record for the present, the difficulties of settlement at a
later date [Page 779] will be
aggravated; and meanwhile they will be permitting the Soviet
Government to flout the authority of the Allied Control
Council over Germany, and hence to establish a precedent for
creating all manner of difficulties at a later date.
- 2.
- On the other hand, His Majesty’s Government see
serious objection to accepting the Oder–Neisse Line here
and now as the frontier between Poland and Germany. To
precipitate a concession of the maximum Soviet Russian
claims might be regarded as a sign of weakness and
provoke other excessive demands elsewhere. His Majesty’s
Government have always doubted whether British public
opinion would lastingly support a settlement involving
the amputation of about one-fifth of the total area of
Germany normally inhabited by over ten million persons
of undisputably German stock, and such a settlement
might prove a formidable obstacle to the maintenance of
European peace. Moreover, the immediate transfer of
these territories to Poland would withdraw them from the
authority of the Allied Control Council in Germany, and
also from the fields of German reparation and supply and
from the total area from which the British and United
States authorities might hope to obtain food supplies
for the feeding of Western Germany, thus giving a
proportionate advantage to Russia and Poland in excess of their
fair share. In this connection, His Majesty’s Government
note that at the Tripartite Military Meeting to discuss
the Military Government of Berlin held at Marshal Zhukov[’]s
Headquarters on the 7th July, Marshal Zhukov stated,
when the question of food supplies was under discussion,
that territory East of the Oder and the Neisse was under
Polish control and not in his zone, and again, in regard
to fuel supplies, that Silesia was not available to him
as the Eastern frontier of his zone was the Oder and the
Neisse “as agreed at the Crimea Conference.”2
- 3.
- In these circumstances the assurance given by M.
Vyshinsky3 to the effect that the
presence of Polish Administration does not prejudice the
fate of German territory, which is for discussion at the
Peace Conference, is of little practical value. That
assurance is in any case rendered nugatory by the
preceding passages in M. Vyshinsky’s letter, the effect of which
is to place the territories in question completely in
the hands of the Polish authorities without supervision
by, or responsibility to the Soviet Government, and
without the agreement of any other of the Allied
Governments represented on the Control Council for
Germany. While His Majesty’s Government agree that there
are certain matters in each zone in Germany in which the
Allied authority in that zone may act independently,
they can neither accept the claim made in M. Vyshinsky’s letter that
the [Page 780] Supreme
Authority of the Allies in Germany extends over the
separate zones only in respect of questions common to
the whole of Germany, nor admit the right of the Soviet
Government to place a part of their zone outside the
authority not only of the Control Council but also of
the Soviet Commander-in-Chief in that zone. The Soviet
Government would indeed certainly object were His
Majesty’s Government and the United States Government to
hand over the Ruhr or the Rhineland to the French on
similar conditions.
- 4.
- His Majesty’s Government therefore consider that, if
the United States Government agree, it should be made
plain at Terminal that His
Majesty’s Government and the United States Government
cannot acquiesce in the Soviet Government’s
interpretation of the situation. For the reasons stated
in para 1 above, His
Majesty’s Government are of the opinion, however, that
the two Governments should not be content with merely
going on record as withholding their consent to the
present situation. His Majesty’s Government therefore
propose that the two Governments indicate their
willingness (i) to reach an understanding with the
Soviet Government on a reasonable Western Frontier for
Poland (which will necessarily be well short of her
present claims and should in the view of His Majesty’s
Government not exceed the Free City of Danzig, East
Prussia south and west of Koenigsberg, Oppeln, Silesia
and the most eastern portion of Pomerania) and; (ii) to
agree, subject to the necessary concurrence of the
French Provisional Government to the transfer of the
territories to the East of such a frontier to permanent
Polish Administration, subject to ratification when the
final Peace settlement on this question is made.
- 5.
- His Majesty’s Government further propose that if it is
not possible to reach agreement with the Soviet
Government on an acceptable compromise on these lines,
the two Governments should indicate:
- (i)
- That they will be willing to give their formal
consent to the transfer to the Administration of
the Polish Provisional Government of National
Unity only of such German territories as all Four
Controlling Powers are prepared to allow Poland to
acquire permanently;
- (ii)
- That if the Soviet Government insist
nevertheless upon handing over parts of Germany to
Poland without the consent of the other
Governments principally concerned, thus reducing
the capacity of Germany as a whole to pay
reparations, His Majesty’s Government and the
United States Government will be obliged to insist
upon the proportionate reduction in Russia’s share of
reparations from Germany. [Page 781] His Majesty’s Government would,
if necessary be prepared to inform the Soviet
Government that they will not allow them any
reparations deliveries from the American and
British zones in Germany, unless these issues are
settled to the satisfaction of the Governments
concerned. His Majesty’s Government propose to
seek the concurrence of the United States
Delegation in acting on the above lines upon
arrival at Terminal.
Washington, July 13th,
1945.
