I also wish to call your attention to page 4 of Mr. Rainey’s report, where
reference is made to the organization of the North German Coal
Control under Military Government, British 21st Army Group. You
will note that British 21st Army Group officers have agreed that
German management and organization must be utilized to run the
Ruhr mines under military supervision. This reverses the policy
of the recently dissolved Rhine Coal Control, which was opposed
to the use of over-all German management organizations.
It is my intention from this time on to forward a weekly summary
of the coal situation in Germany.
[Enclosure 1—Extracts]
Mr. Froelich G. Rainey, of the
Office of the Political Adviser in Germany, to the
Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) and the
Director of Political Affairs, United States Group,
Control Council, Germany (Heath)
Subject: German Coal.
. . . . . . .
2. The impending coal famine. The
attached report of the Potter–Hyndley Mission is a more authoritative and
effective summary of [Page 616] the coal situation in Northwest Europe than I could hope
to give. I can only add that my own observations and
conversations (in the same area and generally with the same
field personnel) lead me to believe that the critical nature
of the coal problem is not overdrawn in that report. The
following clear-cut facts stand out: With any sizeable
imports of coal from UK and
US to Western Europe highly unlikely after August 1945, with
coal production in France, Belgium, and Holland not more
than 50% of normal, and with negligible production in
Scandinavia, Northwest Europe must look to Western Germany
for coal to fill its absolute minimum requirements. But coal
production in Western Germany, rising from 3 to 5% of normal
during June, provides for an almost negligible export at the
moment. The most optimistic do not see a Western German
production more than 25% of normal by the end of the year
and even if this rate is achieved there still remains a
deficit in Western Europe which will have far-reaching
repercussions on the social, political, and economic
stability of the continent. Under these circumstances
Western Europe unquestionably faces a very grim winter in
1945–1946.
The seriousness of the situation was underscored at the
London Coal Committee meeting where Lord Hyndley and Dr.
Potter vied with
each other in painting an increasingly gloomy picture. Both
men, impressed by the enormous destruction in the Ruhr and
Saar areas, see little hope for an adequate recovery of
Western German coal production in time to meet the urgent
demands. Mr. Eaton
Griffith (Ministry of Fuel and Power) took a
slightly more optimistic view but recognized the necessity
for almost superhuman effort on the part of the Allied
Control Authority and specifically the British Army of
Occupation in the Ruhr Area if a chaotic situation in
Western Europe is to be avoided. All of the officers
assigned to SHAEF
G–4 Solid Fuels who have been
working in Germany, Belgium, France, Holland, Denmark, and
Norway are extremely pessimistic about achieving sufficient
production to meet the absolute basic minimum requirements
in Western Europe this winter and they feel that no matter
what steps are taken the coal deficiency will cause extreme
hardship and increasing political unrest.
3. Production in Germany. …
. . . . . . .
One point which was not clearly emphasized in the Potter–Hyndley report is the
fundamental question as to whether it is possible to raise
coal production greatly in excess of general economic
rehabilitation in the Ruhr and Saar areas. It is my
impression that the signers of this report do not entirely
agree on this point. Most of the technical [Page 617] men in the field believe that
general economic rehabilitation must be carried out in order
to raise coal production materially. Whether the rate of
coal production can greatly exceed the rate of
rehabilitation remains one of the most discussed problems in
the field. I have the impression that most of the British
personnel who will be engaged in managing coal production in
the Ruhr, such as Brigadier
Marley of the British Element Control
Council, will bring about great pressure to favor
rehabilitation in the industrial Ruhr. Thus another
important political decision is involved.
Dr. Potter takes the
point of view that many of the mine supplies required to
operate the Ruhr mines can be produced in Belgium, France,
and the Netherlands, and that there is no need for
rehabilitating factories in Germany to produce these things.
Many other men concerned believe that these must be produced
by German factories and the German Sub-Section has already
made a survey of potential mine supply production in the
area. There was a similar question with regard to
reconstruction of housing, transportation, etc.
Most of the men in the field agree that during the next few
months the German miners will work for the bare necessities
of life and that the manufacture of consumer goods in order
to provide an incentive for miners is not necessary at the
moment. However, these bare necessities of life are numerous
under the present circumstances, following the enormous
destruction in the Ruhr area, and if we may judge from
conditions in Belgium, Holland, and France, mine labor
cannot long be maintained unless consumer goods are made
available. With fixed food prices and with a growing feeling
among the miners that paper marks will be worthless, there
would be no incentive for the miners, once they earn enough
money to supply themselves with the little food they can
buy. Mine operators in the Ruhr already describe this
condition as partly responsible for the high rate of
absenteeism in the Ruhr mines. This fact, coupled with the
general feeling of uncertainty and insecurity, brings about
a condition in which the miners work only long enough to
supply themselves with rationed food and then absent
themselves from the mine in order to repair their houses or
care for their garden plots. Attempts to penalize the
workers and to force them into the mines have not been
successful. Men in the field believe that adequate labor
supply can be obtained only after some semblance of normal
conditions are achieved.
There are no reports of resistance in the Ruhr, Saar, and
Cologne mining areas. Everyone emphasizes the fact that the
Germans appear to be extremely tractable and cooperative,
realizing that their only salvation is to produce as much
coal as possible during the next year.
[Page 618]
4. Allocations. …
. . . . . . .
The most difficult problem will be a decision as to how much
coal is exported from Germany. The Potter–Hyndley report takes the
natural position that large quantities of coal must be
exported from Germany, regardless of the effect upon German
economy. On the other hand, the occupying forces and the
Allied Control Authority, concerned with maintaining civil
order in Germany, will present demands for large quantities
of German coal for military and essential civilian
requirements within Germany. It is clear that no one of the
organizations referred to above can make a decision as to
what part of the coal produced in Germany shall be exported.
In the last analysis this decision must be made by the
highest authorities in Great Britain and the United States,
at least until Russia
is brought into an operating Allied Control Authority. The
difficulty in determining coal exports from Germany is
emphasized by the coal requirements for Germany submitted by
the Production Control Agency. These requirements exceed the
probable production of German coal during the rest of the
year and thus it is obvious that some very high level policy
decision must be reached as to the degree of reactivation of
German industry in view of the urgent demands for German
coal in the liberated countries. A further and purely
technical question arises as to how much coal can be
exported without crippling the German coal industry
itself.
Under Combined Command, coal production and movement in
Western Germany, and to a large extent in all North West
Europe, has been controlled jointly by U. S. and U. K. personnel serving under
the Supreme Commander. Most of these individuals, both
British and American, have come to think in terms of Western
Europe including Germany up to the Russian Zone of
Occupation. All of their studies of coal requirements,
supply, and movement have been limited to Western Europe and
all their calculations are based upon a knowledge of the
transportation and production possibilities in Western
Europe alone. There have been no detailed investigations of
the extensive brown coal fields of Central Germany (largely
included in the Russian Zone) and there are no adequate
reports of conditions in the Silesian and Polish hard coal
fields. There has been a tacit assumption, following
Russia’s failure to
participate in the European Coal Organization, that the
critical coal problem must be solved by the Western nations,
together with British and American forces of occupation in
Germany, without taking into account the coal resources and
coal demands of the East.
This Western orientation has been natural under SHAEF authority and under war
conditions when transport and coal distribution were [Page 619] military
responsibilities, but it continues into the post-defeat
period because of the present uncertain relations with
Russia.
Now, with the termination of Combined Command, the
Governments of the liberated nations take over control from
SHAEF within their
respective boundaries; the British 21st Army Group takes
over the primary supervision of coal production in and
movement from the Ruhr; and in effect, France, Belgium,
Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, and even U. S. forces
in Germany, must look to British-controlled sources (U. K. and the Ruhr) for coal
imports to maintain their essential industry and transport.
Some coal is being imported to France and Scandinavia from
the U. S. but this is an emergency measure which probably
cannot be expected to alter the basic situation. This
condition will continue to exist unless, or until, a strong,
integrated Allied Control Authority succeeds in establishing
quadripartite supervision over all German coal resources in
Silesia and Central Germany as well as in the Ruhr and the
Saar. With joint four-power control over these major sources
of European coal, the tendencies toward a Western European
economic orientation, which are now inevitable, can be
avoided.
The recently established Combined Resources Allocations
Board, which provides for Russian participation on an Allied
Control Authority level at the earliest possible moment, may
succeed in counteracting, or at least delaying, the present
tendency to think in terms of Western Europe alone until
Allied economic perspective is broadened by a functioning
Allied Control Authority.
