As a “hedge” against the possible failure of Big Three collaboration in
the post-war world, the British are following the policy recommended by
General Smuts of
strengthening their position by drawing the nations of Western Europe
into closer association with the Commonwealth. They have taken pains to
affirm that such an arrangement would be within the framework of the
World Security Organization, and to assure the Russians that the policy
is not directed against them. They have also called attention to the
fact that the Russians are following a similar line in Eastern
Europe.
The Russians are opposed to the plan, seeing in it primarily an attempt
by Britain to strengthen her sphere of influence as against Russia. It is the British claim, and they
have so informed the Russians, that it is directed against Germany.
Russian opposition has led the British to “pull in their horns”, but
they will undoubtedly try to achieve as many as possible of the
objectives of the plan by one means or another as additional security
insurance.
The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in a letter to the Secretary of
State written March [May] 16, 1944 (excerpt
attached) stated:
However, it must be recognized that the Russians have
already gone far to establish an effective sphere of influence in
Eastern Europe.
[Page 257]
Our definitive
position with respect to a British sphere in Western Europe must await
further clarification of the Soviet Union’s intentions. In the meantime
our policy should be to discourage the development of rival spheres of
influence, both Russian and British. Our attitude toward any regional
political arrangements should be determined by our estimate of: (1)
whether they will contribute toward the maintenance of peace; (2)
whether they will be subordinate to and in accordance with the purposes
of the United Nations Organization; and (3) whether there is danger that
they will stimulate the development of competitive regional
arrangements. In the economic field we should at all times oppose any
features which would place additional restrictions on trade, run counter
to the principles of free access to foreign markets and raw materials,
or tend to divide Europe into rival economic spheres.
We should direct our best efforts toward smoothing out points of friction
between Great Britain and Russia
and fostering the tripartite collaboration upon which lasting peace
depends.
British Plan for a Western European Bloc
On September 29, 1944, Eden
informed the House of Commons1 that the Government had embarked on a policy of
drawing the countries of Western Europe into a closer association
with the British Commonwealth of Nations, thereby giving official
approval to the ideas enunciated by General Smuts in 1943.2
Eden emphasized that the plan
was in no wise contrary to the principles of Dumbarton Oaks, that it
was merely an “element in the general international system”, and
that it would be a buttress to strengthen the general world
structure. He has also taken pains to assure the Russians that a
Western Security bloc would not be directed against them, but rather
against a resurgent Germany, and through his Ambassador at Moscow
has said that provided, in fact, regional arrangements are
definitely made subordinate to a World Organization, he could not
imagine that the Soviet Union would have any objection to their
establishment either in the West or in the East of Europe.
Traditional British policy in Europe has been, of course, that of
preventing any one state from dominating the continent. The weakness
of Britain’s geographical position has always been that some nation
would unite the countries of Europe against her. To combat this
danger, Britain has thrown her support first to one and
[Page 258]
then to another, thereby
maintaining the balance of power necessary to her interests.
Heretofore there have always been several strong European powers
providing the basic elements for this policy. Upon the ending of the
war, however, this situation has completely changed in that
Russia is left as the sole
great power on the Continent—a position unique in modern history.
Britain accordingly feels that Russia will dominate the Continent (including
Germany) and she therefore finds that her political thinking must be
thoroughly revised. There is no longer power to balance.
Far from holding the key as being the determining influence in the
picture, therefore, Britain perforce now falls into a secondary
role, and she must look to her security in other ways. She hopes to
find it first in a strong and effective international organization
backed by force. As the weakest of the three major powers, and as
one occupying an exposed position, she could not logically adopt any
other course even if she did not in fact possess the sincere desire
to see established an organization capable of maintaining peace.
However, the effectiveness of cooperation between the great powers
and of an international security organization remains to be seen,
and it is not a characteristic of European politics to place sole
reliance on untried methods and means. Furthermore, Britain
entertains grave doubts as to the intentions of the Russians in the
whole scheme of things, and questions the sincerity of their
expressed willingness to settle European problems through agreement
between the parties concerned. The British are afraid that the
Russians may play a lone hand—which they are in a position to do if
they so desire, and which they already have shown positive signs of
doing in matters affecting the countries on Russia’s borders. Britain would
prefer to cooperate, but realizes that she may have to compete.
The Russians have taken steps to solidify their control over Eastern
Europe. They have concluded bilateral treaties of alliance with the
Lublin Poles (in spite of our objections) and with the Governments
of Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia.3 They have taken unilateral action with respect to
the formation of an Austrian Government,4 and have
acted independently in Rumania,
Bulgaria, and Hungary
without consultation with the American and British representatives
in those countries.5 An
exclusive economic agreement has been concluded with Rumania6 which makes
possible extensive Soviet control
[Page 259]
over Rumanian industry and which may virtually
cut off Rumanian trade with the rest of the world. The Russians have
rejected British and American proposals that discussions should take
place regarding the political situation in Rumania and elections in Bulgaria.7 These actions are not in accordance
with the Crimea Declaration on liberated Europe8 whereby the Big
Three agreed to concert their policies in assisting the liberated
peoples to solve their pressing political and economic problems by
democratic means. Eastern Europe is, in fact, a Soviet sphere of
influence.
In view of these circumstances, it is to be expected that the British
will “hedge” against a possible unsuccessful outcome of
international collaboration, and will attempt at the same time to
strengthen their position by the old power politics system. We can
hardly blame them for seeking any additional means of making
themselves secure—they who through bitter personal experience know
the grim realities of war and the ever-present danger of it—and, as
previously indicated, they have already adopted the plan as basic
policy.
Since there is no longer power to balance in Europe, Britain would
logically turn to the United States as the greatest potential source
of support in developing an adequate counterpoise to Russia. Without the assured support
of the United States, any combination of powers which Britain might
be able to assemble would still leave Russia preponderantly strong. The British know that
we have always regarded them as our first line of defense and that
any threat to their security would most likely cause armed
intervention on our part. However, they are also aware of our
traditional antipathy to power politics, and naturally discount the
possibility of getting from us an advance commitment to protect the
security of the British Isles. In any event, she will at all times
follow a policy of seeking such assistance and support from us as we
will be willing to give.
The next best “hedge” would be to strengthen the bonds of the
Commonwealth. Lord Halifax in
his Toronto speech9 developed the thesis that
the mother country and the Dominions should speak “with one voice”
in international affairs. As desirable as this might be from the
point of view of the mother country, there is but little chance of
the Dominions’ falling in with the idea, judging from the reception
which the speech had in the several Capitals, the opposition
expressed at the meeting of the Prime Ministers,10 and the
divergence of views which has been apparent at recent international
conferences. The interests of the Dominions are very often different
from those of the
[Page 260]
mother
country, and the inability of the mother country to defend them has
been demonstrated. If anything, the political ties are becoming
weaker rather than stronger. Here again, however, Britain will do
what she can to draw strength to herself in this way.
The policy of drawing the nations of Western Europe into close
association with the British Commonwealth is in furtherance of this
same end. General Smuts was
the first prominent official to give expression to the idea, which
he did in a speech before the Empire Parliamentary Association on
November 25, 1943.11
Smuts recommended that the
Western European nations align themselves with Britain—for their own
good as well as Britain’s. The countries involved would be, at
first, France, Belgium, Holland and, possibly, Norway and Denmark.
The precise nature of the alignment has never been defined, and in
fact most of the talk about it has been done in unofficial
circles—doubtless purposely so. It has nevertheless caused official
repercussions in the countries concerned, as well as in Russia. Generally speaking, the idea
appears to be to offer these countries something in the nature of
dominion status in the British Commonwealth. It might properly be
regarded as an extension of the Halifax thesis of “one voice being the unison of
many”—the intention being to get more voices in the “unison”. One
exponent of the plan has said:
“Complete coordination of foreign policies is perhaps too
much to expect. But the British Government should cultivate
the habit of consulting as regularly with Paris, Brussels,
the Hague, Copenhagen and Oslo as it already does with
Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington and Pretoria. And in the one
case as in the other such consultation will almost always
result in an agreed policy.”
In addition to establishing a common foreign policy it has been
pointed out by those favoring the plan that in the field of strategy
the war has shown how many other different forms of collaboration it
is possible to achieve without an official abatement of sovereignty.
They cite the Combined Chiefs of Staff now linking the American and
British Forces as an example, and state that something like it might
be reproduced in a more permanent form to insure the strategic unity
of Western Europe. They also note the Combined Boards—each dealing
jointly with a specific problem—finance, transport, supplies,
production, resources, raw materials, et cetera. They point out too
that types of weapons might be standardized, as could instruction in
staff colleges—thereby building up a “staff mind”.
The possibilities of collaboration in the economic field are
discussed in more vague terms—most probably because considerable
opposition
[Page 261]
would doubtless
develop both at home and abroad. The potentialities, however, are
great. A customs union is suggested—presumably an extension of
Imperial Preference—and one author states:
“The creation of such a union—a unified market of 115,000,000
people not counting any of their colonial dependencies—would
be an immense benefit to its members and to the world at
large.”
Currency agreements are spoken of, and civil aviation is cited as a
field in which the countries have a community of interest. Mention
is also made of the fact that these powers have common colonial
problems, which might be treated on a regional scale. One British
commentator states:
“Such suggestions may sound revolutionary. But the Lancaster
bomber and the assault craft and the duck and the doodle are
all revolutionary. The environment of peaceful living in
Europe has changed drastically in the last twenty years, and
unless the nations are prepared to alter their habits as
drastically, they will go the way of all those who have
failed to adapt themselves to their environment—they will
not survive.”
The plan has had a varied reception in the countries concerned.
Belgium seems to be the most enthusiastic about it; Holland less so,
but still not unfavorably disposed. France has been more cool to the
idea, but although Anglo-French relations are very strained at the
present time and bid fair to lack cordiality as long as de Gaulle remains in power, in the
long run France will probably not be averse to making bilateral
agreements with Britain on “equal” terms, provided they can be made
in such a way as not to weaken the Security Organization or appear
to be directed against the Soviet Union. France is the cornerstone
of the plan, and without her support the idea will not advance very
far. An improvement in Anglo-French relations is a necessary
prerequisite to any possible concrete results along these lines. It
should be noted, too, that France has aspirations of regaining her
former “greatness” and doubtless has ideas of her own of taking the
lead in Western Europe. In this connection mention should be made of
the statement to Caff ery by the Russian Ambassador in Paris to the
effect that his Government was opposed to the formation of a Western
European Bloc under British leadership, but had no objection
whatever to France’s being the principal nation among a group of
free and prosperous European nations. This was just after de Gaulle’s visit to Moscow last
year. However, Franco-Russian relations have cooled somewhat since
that time.
The Russians are suspicious of the British move, and the British
Ambassador to Moscow reported that Molotov was obviously “relieved” by his statement to
him on November 28, 1944 that the object of any so-called “Western
European Bloc” would in no wise be to
[Page 262]
form a counterpoise to the Soviet Union.
Clark Kerr also assured
Molotov that in
accordance with the established policy of his Government the
Russians would at all times be kept fully informed of any
developments along these lines. It is deemed most likely that he
attempted to convey to Molotov the idea that the motive which impelled the
British to adopt this policy in Western Europe was the same which
led the Russians to take an interest in Finland, the Baltic States,
Poland, and Rumania.
At the time when the formulation of the European Economic Committee
was under consideration, the British led the countries of Western
Europe to believe that they regarded it as a part of a larger
project for Western European collaboration along political as well
as economic lines. This point was not brought out at the time, and
apparently the British had not contemplated informing the Russians
of the proposal to create such a Committee, the approach to the
Soviets having been made by others, much to British annoyance. In
any case, Russia, for various
reasons, refused to participate in the European Economic Committee,
as well as in the European Inland Transport Organization and the
European Coal Organization, all of which have consequently become
organs of Western European cooperation only, and which may therefore
be interpreted as being a small step along the path toward the
British goal. The inference which may be drawn from the Russians’
attitude thus far is that they are not too greatly concerned about
developments in Western Europe so long as the Western European
countries do not show signs of ganging up on them.
recommendations
Spheres of influence do in fact exist, and will probably continue to
do so for some time to come. Regional arrangements are recognized as
necessary and legitimate features of international security,
provided they are subordinate to the General Security Organization.
In view of the actual Eastern European sphere and the Western
Hemisphere bloc (Act of Chapultepec),12 we
are hardly in a position to frown upon the establishment of measures
designed to strengthen the security of nations in other areas of the
world. However, such measures represent power politics pure and
simple, with all the concomitant disadvantages. The only hope of
their resulting in lessening the chances of war in the future lies
in their being subordinated to the General Security
Organization.
Basic United States policy has been to oppose spheres of influence in
Europe. Claiming military necessity, the Russians and the
[Page 263]
British made an agreement
in the spring of 1944 whereby Rumanian affairs would be the “main
concern” of the Soviet Government, while Greek affairs would be the
“main concern” of the British Government. Subsequently the
arrangement was extended to include Bulgaria as a Soviet “concern”, with the British
receiving roughly an equal position with the Russians in Yugoslavia. Our assent was requested
to these arrangements. It was reluctantly given solely in
consideration of war strategy and for a three months’ trial period
only. At the same time we made known our apprehension lest the
arrangement lead to the division of the Balkan region into spheres
of influence.13
The critical importance of taking this stand and of preventing an
intensification of British-Russian rivalry is made clear in the
attached excerpts from a letter addressed to the Secretary of State
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Our primary objective should be to
remove the causes which make nations feel
that such spheres are necessary to their security, rather than to
assist one country to build up strength against another. Such an
objective would probably be more susceptible of realization if quid pro quo reductions of the dominant role
each plays in its area could be devised—i. e. a lessening of the
influence of one pari passu with the other.
An agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, the
Soviet Union, and France in the form of a treaty or an advance
commitment in the Security Council to use force to effect and
maintain the demilitarization of Germany or to suppress future
German aggression, would go far to weaken British and Soviet
justifications for the maintenance of spheres of influence in
Western and Eastern Europe respectively.
A proposal14 has also been made for the
creation of a Council of Foreign Ministers of the Big Five which
would settle on an ad hoc basis particular
problems growing out of the war and which would replace a formal
peace conference. Such a Council would tend to reduce the
possibilities of unilateral action by either the Russians or the
British and would serve as a useful interim
means through which the United States could work for the liquidation
of spheres of influence. For a more permanent arrangement
consideration might be given to the British suggestion made some
time ago for creating a “Council of Europe”, as a permanent part of
the machinery of the International Security Organization.
Since the San Francisco Conference is over, the British will
doubtless go ahead with their attempt to carry out the Smuts proposal. The matter has
been left more or less in abeyance pending the determination as to
what part regionalism would play in the General Organization.
[Page 264]
Before long Britain will
probably initiate treaty negotiations with France, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Denmark, and Norway. In general, we should neither endorse
nor oppose such political arrangements as are
in fact subordinated to the General Organization. In the economic
field, however, we should at all times strongly oppose any features
which would place additional restrictions on trade and run counter
to our announced principles of free access to foreign markets and
raw materials.
The need of the moment is to promote understanding between Great
Britain and Russia on all
matters in dispute. We should do all we can in this connection and
direct our best efforts towards smoothing out the points of friction
between the two, thereby fostering the tripartite collaboration so
necessary to lasting peace. However, American policy must be attuned
to events in Europe as a whole and to the
consequences of general European conditions on the stability of
Great Britain. Specifically, it is not in our interest to deny to
the United Kingdom protection against possible dangers from the
Soviet Union, especially since the Soviets have established
domination of Eastern Europe and since the International Security
Organization would not be effective in case of a clash between the
Soviet Union and Great Britain. Until it is determined which course
events in Europe will take—i. e. whether Russia will collaborate or not—we should not take a
positive stand one way or the other on this proposal to draw the
nations of Western Europe into closer association.
[
Washington
,] June
28, 1945.
[Attachment]
Excerpts From a Letter From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State, Dated March [May]
16, 194415
top secret
“From the point of view of national and world-wide security, our
basic national policy in post-war settlements of this kind
[disposition of Italian colonies] should seek to maintain the
solidarity of the three great powers and in all other respects to
establish conditions calculated to assure a long period of peace,
during which, it may be hoped, arrangements will be perfected for
the prevention of future world conflicts. The cardinal importance of
this national policy is emphasized by a consideration of the
fundamental and revolutionary changes
[Page 265]
in relative national military strengths that
are being brought about in Europe as a result of the war.
“It would seem clear that there can not be a world war, or even a
great war, which does not find one or more of the great military
powers on each side. At the conclusion of the present war, there
will be, for the foreseeable future, only three such powers—the
United States, Britain, and Russia. Since it would seem in the highest degree
unlikely that Britain and Russia, or Russia alone, would be aligned against the United
States, it is apparent that any future world conflict in the
foreseeable future will find Britain and Russia in opposite camps.
“In appraising possibilities of this nature, the outstanding fact to
be noted is the recent phenomenal development of the heretofore
latent Russian military and economic strength—a development which
seems certain to prove epochal in its bearing on future
politico-military international relationships, and which has yet to
reach the full scope attainable with Russian resources. In contrast,
as regards Britain several developments have combined to lessen her
relative military and economic strength and gravely to impair, if
not preclude, her ability to offer effective military opposition to
Russia on the continent
except possibly in defensive operations in the Atlantic coastal
areas. In a conflict between these two powers the disparity in the
military strengths that they could dispose upon that continent
would, under present conditions, be far too great to be overcome by
our intervention on the side of Britain. Having due regard to the
military factors involved—resources, manpower, geography and
particularly our ability to project our strength across the ocean
and exert it decisively upon the continent—we might be able to
successfully defend Britain, but we could not, under existing
conditions, defeat Russia. In
other words, we would find ourselves engaged in a war which we could
not win even though the United States would be in no danger of
defeat and occupation.
“It is apparent that the United States should, now and in the future,
exert its utmost efforts and utilize all its influence to prevent
such a situation arising and to promote a spirit of mutual
cooperation between Britain, Russia and ourselves. So long as Britain and
Russia cooperate and
collaborate in the interests of peace, there can be no great war in
the foreseeable future.
“The greatest likelihood of eventual conflict between Britain and
Russia would seem to grow
out of either nation initiating attempts to build up its strength,
by seeking to attach to herself parts of Europe to the disadvantage
and possible danger of her potential adversary. Having regard to the
inherent suspicions of the Russians, to present Russia with any agreement on such
matters as between the British
[Page 266]
and ourselves, prior to consultation with
Russia, might well result
in starting a train of events that would lead eventually to the
situation we most wish to avoid.”
