Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume I

Truman Papers

No. 181
The Chairman of the President’s War Relief Control Board (Davies) to the President

Washington, July 3, 1945.

My Dear Mr. President: Here is the memorandum which I spoke to you about this morning. I think it will give you a reasonably comprehensive perspective, in short compass, of what the agenda might cover.

It was good to see you looking so well this morning.

You are on the verge of great decisions. Your high purpose and dedication to our country, and to a peaceful world, will surely be crowned with success.

With great respect [etc.]

Joseph E Davies

[Enclosure]

Memorandum Re Coming Conference of Big Three in July, 1945¹

purpose

This memorandum was prepared to give a perspective upon matters which may be included in the agenda or in the discussions of the coming Conference.

unfinished old business

At the Crimean Conference, according to the published report² (February 12, 1945), eight matters were specifically covered by agreements. Some have been executed and are closed. As to others, there still remain matters for further consideration and possible agreement.

The following is an analysis of that report with comment as to possible unfinished business.

I. Agreements for Joint Military Operations.

1. Timing of attacks against the enemy.

2. Zones of occupation agreed upon.

3. Coordinated administration of occupied Germany through a Central Control Commission.

4. Purpose—The destruction of Naziism.

Comment:—Only #3 of the foregoing, “Coordinated administration, etc.”, will probably involve matters to be settled by the higher political levels. Numbers 1, 2, and 4, will have been executed and disposed of by the Joint Allied Command, or by agreements through the European Advisory Council [Commission].

II. Agreements as to Reparations—extent and methods of—Commission to function in Moscow.

Comment:—There will probably be differences developed at the Reparations Commission in Moscow which may require settlement in principle at Berlin.

III. Agreement to promote “International Organization to maintain peace and security”.

Comment:—There will probably be no unfinished matters connected with the International Peace Organization.

IV. Agreement as to Liberated Europe—Agreement “when in their judgment conditions require it”, to assist the peoples of Europe by democratic means to solve their political and economic problems—for the purpose of:—

1. To establish Internal Peace.

2. To carry out Emergency Relief.

3. To assist in creation of Interim Governments “broadly representative of democratic elements,[”] etc.

4. Facilitate “where necessary” free elections, etc.

Comment:—This will be one of the thorns. It is most important and must be settled and defined. Before that can be done, our own policy must be settled as to Europe. (See subsequent discussion.)

V. China and France,

Comment:—As to China and France, there will undoubtedly be some questions left for consideration by the Conference, both as to France in connection with Austria, and as to China in connection with Japan.

VI. Agreement as to Poland—Recognizing the Curzon Line, Establishing Commission to project Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

Comment:—After the establishment of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity there will remain questions as to the recognition of the new government, the time thereof, the rectification of the Curzon Line, the evacuation of Soviet troops, the determination of eastern and northern boundaries, elections—time of, etc.

VII. Yugoslavia—Agreement that Tito’s Government should be formed along certain lines.

Comment:—Assuming the Trieste situation to be temporarily disposed of, the principal question as to territorial adjustments and boundaries still remains.

VIII. Balkan Questions—General Review of.

Comment:—The Balkan situation—Clarification of the functions of the Allied Control Commissions—the matter of recognition of Rumania and Bulgaria, will be among the most important of unfinished business matters to be considered. This is tied up with the general question of policy as to the Yalta Declaration as to Liberated Europe. (See IV—above).

IX. Periodic meetings of Foreign Secretaries for consultation agreed upon, “about every three of [or] four months”.

Comment:—The only question remaining is whether it might not be advisable to have periodic meetings definitely fixed.

specific matters, included in above or new

The following is a list of matters generally which might be placed on the agenda.

i

germany

I Determine the date of retirement to, and occupancy of zones. This will probably be settled before meeting by Joint Chiefs of Staff.

II Allied Control Council in Berlin.

(a) Settle and define the organization of the Council itself, and the machinery for joint administration, officers, etc. (unless already done by the Commission).

(b) Secure definite understanding and specific agreement, as far as possible, as to the general policies to be projected, and also policies as to respective zones. Are the policies in each zone to be determined by the several occupying governments or is there to be a uniform policy prescribed by the Control Council, applicable to all as to such matters as: control of the civilian populations—fraternization—feeding of populations—character of local administrations to be used—attitude toward civilians—public relations—admission of the Press, etc., etc.?

The question is whether it is to be a joint policy, agreed upon, or a unilateral policy in the respective zones.

Comment:—Much of this may have been already determined. But it is of paramount importance that the situation should be defined as clearly as possible. It is a field most fertile for future trouble affecting essential future unity, and will probably be a critical situation for some time, in spite of all that can be done. There will inevitably be suspicions and fears as to both the Soviets and Britain and France, that each is building up an ally for the future as against the other. To preserve unity, which will give the Peace Organization a chance to function, there should be agreement as far as possible, now, as to just what the Russians consider a sine qua non to their security in handling the zone which they occupy. Suspicions which were generated, despite the character of “joint and coordinated” military operations in Germany, where the parties were bound together by need for military victory, indicate clearly what may develop to disturb allied unity for peace, from here on. Clear, definite, facing-up to the necessities which each side regards as vital, now, will save future trouble.

Here again is the question of what is our policy going to be as to Europe.

III Other matters connected with Germany, and [which] will probably come up are:

1. Differences as to matters concerning Reparations—Labor—Capital goods—machinery, etc.—Soldier labor, etc.

2. Will food in the eastern zone (Germany’s “granary”) be available also for populations in the other zones of occupation?

3. What portions of Germany are to be turned over to Poland, and when

ii

austria

I Settlement of the following matters, unless disposed of, will be required.

1. The question of the constitution and junction of the Allied Control Commission.

2. The question of the recognition of the Renner Government.

3. The determination of the respective zones of occupation.

4. The demarcation of the zone for France.

5. The question of the feeding of Austria.

iii

italy and greece

I The following matters will require settlement.

1. The question of conclusion of Peace Treaty with Italy, and its terms.

2. The redefinition of policy toward and interest in these countries to avoid future conflict of interest.

3. General clarification of understandings with reference to the general or specific relations of the Allies to them.

iv

the balkans—rumania, Bulgaria, yugoslavia, and hungary

I Unquestionably, one of the major problems confronting the Conference arises here. If trouble is to be avoided between the Powers because of continued bickerings and disputes, which will arise here, the situation has to be clarified and defined by specific agreement.

The questions presented are: whether Allied Control Commissions are to continue to function; and, if so, the extent of influence or control which the British and American members are to exercise; or whether the dominant Soviet interest in control exercised during war conditions shall continue in the reconstruction of the interim governments.

Unless there is clear definition here, there will be constant charges of unilateral action, etc., to disturb Allied unity.

Comment:—The determination of this question involves the formulation of our own policy in connection with the European situation. It is really the same question that is presented in connection with Germany.

The Balkans will continue to be the breeding place of future trouble. Rumania has a population of approximately twenty million, Bulgaria—eight million, Yugoslavia—sixteen million—a total of approximately forty-four million. Their peoples are intensely race conscious. Their hatreds are bred on centuries of conflict. Their nationalisms, chauvinisms, and political concepts are all extreme. Democracy does not mean the same thing in the Balkans as it does to us, or to England.

The Balkans border on the Black Sea, the Dardanelles, the Suez Canal, and are the focal point of the old empire ambitions of centuries. England has had an historic interest in the Balkans because of India and its desire to maintain its Mediterranean lifeline. The Soviets are also deeply concerned with the Balkans. First, there is their racial interest—the Slavs. Second, there is their vital interest in the control of the Dardanelles, not only as an outlet for Russian ships to the Mediterranean, but also as a protection against attack upon Russia by water, through the Dardanelles to the Black Sea.

The Soviets also regard a friendly Rumania as vital to their physical security. It has been used in the past as an avenue for aggressive attack from Europe. Their foreign policy desires to prevent such recurrence.

Bulgaria is generally friendly to the Soviets, as is Yugoslavia. Rumania, however, has been generally considered to be hostile, in a class with the old Polish Government. Between the two wars, Rumania and Poland had a military treaty,³ the main purpose of which was directed against Russia. The Soviets require that Rumania, first, be a friendly neighbor and, second, that their Government there shall be stable.

In the conduct of the war, the civil, as well as the military administrations of countries, generally have been vested completely in the control of the Military Command of the various areas. Greece, for instance, was under the British High Command, and General Eisenhower controlled western Europe in his area.

With the invasion of the Balkans last year by the Soviets, they insisted upon similar controls. I am informed that in October of last year, this was one of the main topics of discussion between Churchill and Stalin, and a loose arrangement was made whereby the British were to exercise practically exclusive control in Greece; but that in Rumania and Bulgaria there was to be a predominant Soviet control, with a British participation of practically roughly 20 per cent. In Yugoslavia, the basis was 50 per cent, so far as the British were concerned.⁴ This arrangement was, I understand, translated into the Armistice Agreements⁵ incident to Soviet victories. Allied Control Commissions were set up pro forma. They have not worked satisfactorily, either in Rumania or Bulgaria. The dominant interests of Britain were asserted in Greece, and in Italy, and recognized. The Soviets had insisted their dominant interest in the Balkans required similar recognition. In Rumania, the Soviets apparently became convinced that the interim government, as originally created, could not be relied on, and they insisted upon a new government which they believed they could rely on.

Apparently some things were done which members of the Allied Control Commission did not approve of. In any event, they were overridden, on the assumption that there was a carry-over of the War Controls. That has induced criticisms of alleged unilateral action and violations of the so-called Declarations of Yalta as to Liberated Europe.⁶

The Crimean Declaration declared that the parties were

“to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated …⁷ to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems”[.]

It also provided that

“the three governments will jointly assist the people … where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements … and pledged” to free elections and to facilitate the holding thereof.

It is also provided that

“when in the opinion of the three governments conditions … make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration”.

It will be noted that the language is broad. It might permit of the construction that before any such consultation, there had to be unanimous agreement that the conditions “required such action”, or that “conditions made such action necessary”.

This very question has arisen in connection with the proposed recognition of the governments of Rumania and Bulgaria, recently suggested by the Soviet Government. It is clear, therefore, that if trouble is going to be avoided, either this tripartite arrangement will have to be abandoned, or it will have to be clarified by specific agreements as to the exact function of the other than Soviet members of the Control Commission. Difficulty was had with reference to a similar situation in the agreement as to Poland.

A “meeting of the minds” should be arrived at in the interest of the preservation of unity for peace.

II The question of concluding peace treaties with the enemy states, and having understandings with reference to the withdrawal of the Allied Armies of occupation applies also to these situations.

III In Rumania there is also the question of removal by the Russian Armies of industrial oil equipment belonging to nationals other than Rumania—Reparation therefore [sic]. The question of what is booty and what is property which should be not removed, but held for the joint account of the Allies, may have been disposed of before the meeting. If not, it should be considered.

v

Turkey

I The relations between Russia and Turkey, and the relations of England and Europe to Turkey, should be explored and, if possible, settled, by common agreement.

II The old question of the Dardanelles—the Montreux Convention⁸—the question of Russian participation in the military protection of the Straits, etc., should be discussed and agreement arrived at.

(Note:—A separate memo on the question of the Dardanelles is available, if desired).⁹

vi

finland and the baltic

I The Conference, with reference to the above, will probably consider:

1. Russian access to warm water ports and freedom of access to the Atlantic.

2. The recognition of Finland in relation to time of recognition of Rumania and Bulgaria.

3. Russian relations to and interest in the ports and islands on the northern coast of Germany, within its zone of occupation.

4. What entrances to the Baltic will the Russians require?

These questions will be natural corollaries to the question of the Dardanelles.

vii

persia and the near east

I Questions attaching to oil. Disparity in proportion of beneficial output as between the three great Powers now existing—Russia’s vital interest both as to possible share in oil, and in security from attack in the Near East and from Persia.

Comments—The Near Eastern oil reserves are estimated at 15,000,000,000 barrels, as contrasted to 20,000,000,000 barrels of the United States. They constitute about one third of the world’s supply. Of this oil in the Near East, England now controls 74 per cent, while American interests control 24 per cent.

So far as the Soviets are concerned, the Near East is in her immediate “military security” zone, and oil is a vital military protection.

We should be prepared for an assertion by the Soviets that with the United States controlling 57 per cent of the world’s oil resources, and Britain 27 per cent, the Soviets are equitably entitled to more than its [sic] present 11 per cent.

The Near East is rapidly developing into one of the vital danger spots in world relationships.

II The question of the time of the withdrawal of Russian and British Troops from Persia. The British promised to evacuate simultaneously with the Soviets, six months after the war. Clear understanding as to the attitude of ourselves, Britain and Russia to Iran, and to Iranian oil.

viii

china and japan

Undoubtedly there will be discussions as to the relationship between the Soviet Government and the Chinese. This, it is necessary to clarify in connection with our war against Japan.

ix

war crimes, etc.

In addition to the foregoing there will probably be questions raised which should be settled either by the Council of Foreign Ministers or by the principals at the Berlin Conference with reference to procedure in punishment of War Crimes—Feeding the populations in Europe—by whom, UNRRA, or military, and how—Release of German soldiers for farm work in Germany—The restoration and handling of displaced persons—etc., etc.

In addition to the foregoing there are the following considerations which are pertinent in connection with this meeting.

principal threats to world peace and security

I Obviously, the most serious threat to world peace and security would be the destruction of unity by the withdrawal or action of any of the three.

1. Russia

(a) Classic suspicions and distrust, if revived and fortified by facts which the Soviets would construe as indicative of an implacable hostility and enmity on the part of the Western World because of ideological, political, economic, racial, or religious hostility, might result in the withdrawal and isolationism of Russia, which would inevitably destroy peace.

(b) So might also the rise of a Soviet Napoleon, and dreams of empire and conquest, if he were able to overthrow and destroy the present altruistic, ideological purposes of peace and brotherhood, which the present Government avows, and, in my opinion, sustains.

(c) Clashes of interest due to British interests in regions vital to Soviet security, or vice versa, such as the Balkans, the Dardanelles, the Near East, and the British lifeline to Egypt.

(d) Suspicion or fact that the Soviets were faced with a hostile working coalition of Britain and the United States.

Any one of the foregoing would be serious threats to peace.

2. The British Empire

(a) Competitions and economic needs, or dreams of a restoration of empire by the British, might impair or destroy unity in Europe; or destroy unity as between the United States and Britain in struggle over South American and world trade.

(b) Because of the fact that England and the British Empire does not have the power which it had, and which it deserves, either politically, because of lack of solidarity of the Dominions, or economically, because of the great wastage of war, it has lost both prestige and power. They are down but not out, and driven by necessity they will be very energetic in projecting a comeback. That, if it gets out of hand, may constitute a very real threat.

(c) So, too, conflict for control of Europe between England and Russia might induce a conflagration in Europe, which would be disastrous.

3. The United States

(a) Justified suspicion as to the good faith of either the Soviet Union or of Britain.

(b) Breach of clear and specific agreements with the United States by either of its principal associates.

(c) Competitive rivalries and unfairness in trade relations which affected our standard of living seriously.

4. France, because it asserts its importance, and because it fails to realize its weakness, may precipitate trouble, and threaten peace because of its relation to Europe, its imperial ambitions, and the mercurial and sometimes paranoiac attitude of its leadership. It is particularly disturbing that de Gaulle, or some similar [person], could exercise the veto in the Security Council.

5. Conflict of Racial, Ideological, and, Very Important, Religious Interests, and their capacity through the Press to sway large sections of democratic opinion, after the physical danger of immediate war no longer threatens.

6. The Medium Sized and Smaller Nations may, because of their lack of responsibility, incite public opinion on issues which have much emotional appeal, and even appear to be ethically right, but which from the point of view of relative values should not be employed to break the peace.

Men of intellectual stature in smaller countries, because of personal ambition for publicity or other reasons, might galvanize the smaller nations into a bloc which might make practical united action impossible.

Nationalisms, paranoiac concepts of greatness, dreams of empire in the leadership in smaller countries has, in the past, brought on great wars. They might again.

“Because nations are small, they may not necessarily be virtuous”.

7. Failure of the Leadership of the Big Powers to exercise tolerance, patience, and size, in granting to each other what they assume for themselves—good faith. If in their dealings with each other there is a desire to compose differences for the paramount purpose of preventing war, then peace may be kept. It is a large order, but not too much to hope for, or even to expect.

II Most Important, in My Opinion, as a Threat to the Future Peace, would be the lack of clear definition of basic foreign policy of the three Great Powers, and particularly that of the United States. A clear definition of just what we would exact for our own protection and which we would be prepared to fight for, if necessary, would do as much to maintain peace as any single thing. To illustrate, in my judgment and experience in Europe, lack of a clear definition and agreement upon a basic and specific foreign policy on the part of France and England, brought on the war with Hitler. When they should have fought, at the time of the occupation of the Ruhr, they didn’t. When they should not have fought, because they were not ready, they did. If Hitler had been advised clearly and specifically as to the exact conditions under which Britain and France would consider it vital to their security that they fight to sustain it, the present war might possibly have been avoided. In any event, it certainly would have been delayed. Agreement between the political parties of our country as to what we are ready to fight for, and a clear declaration that we would fight, if need be, together with such declaration to the world, would be a most potent and important factor in the preservation of future peace for at least a time. That should be coupled with a statement that this attitude is not in derogation of, but in support of the freedoms of the Atlantic Charter,¹⁰ and our classic policy of the good neighbor live-and-let-live policy in world affairs.

1. Davies submitted a copy of this memorandum to Byrnes, together with copies of documents Nos. 33 and 34, on July 3, 1945.
2. Document No. 1417, printed in vol. ii .
3. Signed at Bucharest, March 26, 1926. Text in British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxxv, p. 981.
4. See Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 104–105.
5. i. e., the Armistice with Rumania, signed at Moscow, September 12, 1944 (Executive Agreement Series No. 490; 59 Stat. (2) 1712), and the Armistice with Bulgaria, signed at Moscow, October 28, 1944 (Executive Agreement Series No. 437; 58 Stat. (2) 1498).
6. For the full text of the declaration referred to, see vol. ii, document No. 1417, section v .
7. Ellipses throughout this document are in the original.
8. Signed at Montreux, July 20, 1936 (League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii, p. 213).
9. See document No. 697.
10. Of August 14, 1941 (Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1603).