333. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Research and Development Board
(Bush) to Secretary of
Defense Forrestal0
Washington, December 5, 1947.
SUBJECT
- Central Intelligence Agency
It became evident this morning when you and I were before the Joint
Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, that that Committee is
[Page 818]
going to delve into the
intelligence situation vigorously. I indicated, and I judge that you agreed,
that in this connection they should turn to the Central Intelligence Agency,
and I believe they will do so soon.
Now I fear the CIA is not yet in a good position to meet this call. They have
been studying the situation of directives, and particularly their
relationships with the Atomic Energy Commission. In this connection, they
have an Intelligence Advisory Committee which meets next Monday, but it
seems to be quite divided. As to the question of whether CIA should be a
small coordinating body or should be itself operating widely, I attach two
memoranda from my staff which indicate to me that there is a considerable
amount of confusion present as things now stand.
The CIA takes its instructions from the National Security Council. In view of
what occurred this morning and the imminence of vigorous inquiry, I believe
that Mr. Souers probably should be
alerted and that the Security Council ought soon to pass on some of the
policy questions involved. If you agree, then I suggest that it might be
well to pass this memo on to him with your comments. Of course, I shall be
glad to aid in any way that the Research and Development Board may be
involved in this whole matter.
Enclosure 12
Washington, December 3, 1947.
Memorandum From the Director of the Programs Division
(Clark) to the Chairman
of the Research and Development Board, Department of Defense
(Bush)
SUBJECT
- 1.
- With further reference to attached memorandum, Mr.
Beckler, Dr.
Brode,3 and I had
lunch with Mr. Evans of the State Department to
discuss this subject.
- 2.
- Another meeting of the IAC is to
be held on Monday, 8 December, to discuss these directives and
indications are that no agreement will be reached. The difficulty
seems to be fundamental differences in philosophy between the two
groups in that the heads of the intelligence operating agencies feel
that CIA should be a small, high-level, strategic intelligence
integrating organization, evolving what they call “national
intelligence” from information supplied by the operating agencies,
while CIA proposes to be a conglomerate of operating and evaluating
functions with considerable authority over the other operating
intelligence agencies.
- 3.
- The Intelligence Advisory Committee mentioned in Mr.
Beckler’s memorandum is, of course, not
provided for by law, but in the original draft directives prepared
by CIA it was proposed to have the Director of CIA reconstitute it
as an advisory committee to the Director of CIA. The committee
proposed by the present IAC would be
established by Executive Order almost in the form of a governing
committee for CIA. An Executive Order would be required as it is
contended that the Security Council has no authority to establish
such boards or committees. The Intelligence Advisory Committee
proposed by the heads of the operating agencies would possess a
great deal of power to influence the actions of the Director of
CIA.
- 4.
- Someone at the highest level should define the objection of CIA in
relation to the production of strategic intelligence in support of
the activities of the Security Council and delineate relationships
between CIA and the operating agencies in such manner that the work
of producing information, detailed intelligence, and integrated
strategic intelligence can proceed.
- 5.
- The situation has Dr. Brode completely
stymied. It is blocking his attempts to recruit and organize his
staff, and preventing RDB from
obtaining any useful intelligence from CIA.
[Page 820]
Enclosure 25
Washington, December 2, 1947.
Memorandum From the Chief of the Intelligence Section
(Beckler) to the Director of the Programs
Division, Research and Development Board, Department of Defense
(Bush)
SUBJECT
- The Critical Situation with Regard to Atomic Energy
Intelligence
Explanation: The information contained in this
memo is based on conversations with responsible members of the Atomic
Energy Commission Intelligence Division. It points out the present
awkward position of AEC in the field of
atomic energy intelligence, which at present is handled almost
exclusively by CIA.
- 1.
- The Central Intelligence Agency has been directed by the National
Security Council to prepare suitable NSC directives to implement the National Security Act
of 1947. Four basic directives and a number of Implementing
Supplements thereto have been prepared by the CIA Planning Staff and
were submitted by the Director of Intelligence to his Intelligence
Advisory Committee6 at a meeting
held on 30 November 1947.7
- 2.
- The proposed basic directives have not been submitted to RDB for comment. However, the tenor of
Implementing Supplement IAC/4 (which
was submitted to the Board) indicates that the directives place
considerable authority and responsibility in the hands of the
Director of CIA at the expense of the Departmental Intelligence
Agencies as well as the AEC and
RDB. The IAC members strongly opposed these directives and an ad
hoc committee was formed to draft a new set for IAC consideration.
- 3.
- The ad hoc committee, under State Department leadership, prepared
a set of revised directives which placed considerably more authority
in the IAC
and less in the Director of CIA than was
proposed in the earlier directives. According to the revised
directives, major recommendations of the Director to the NSC must be accompanied by the
concurrence or dissent of the IAC.
Further, under revised Directive No. 1, CIA
[Page 821]
would not engage in basic intelligence
research in those fields in which the Departmental Intelligence
Agencies are engaged. In short, the original and revised directives
embody totally different philosophies. Under one, CIA would be
almost completely self-sufficient. Under the other, CIA would be a
small coordinating body surrounded by strong Departmental
Intelligence Agencies.
- 4.
- Regardless of the merits of one set of directives vs. the
other—the present confusion is causing considerable embarrassment to
the newly created Intelligence Division of the AEC, and greatly impedes its
operations. Since the directives as finally decided upon may affect
the nature and scope of AEC
intelligence operations, the Army, Navy, and Air Departments as well
as CIA—while agreeing in principle to cooperation with AEC—are deferring actual exchange of
information until the AEC-CIA
relationship is crystallized. Considering the conflicting directives
which have been proposed—this may take considerable time.
- 5.
- Dr. Brode has not been officially advised
with respect to these negotiations and has not been consulted in
connection with the problem of AEC–CIA cooperation.
- 6.
- Conclusions:
- (a)
- There is considerable difference of opinion as to the type
of CIA organization that would be best suited to implement
the provisions and spirit of the National Security Act.
Until CIA specifically delineates its objectives and
responsibilities and defines its terms and mission, it is
doubtful that the best organizational pattern can be decided
upon.
- (b)
- RDB is greatly concerned
with the present attempts to formulate directives. It is
completely dependent upon CIA for strategic as well as
scientific intelligence which are the sine qua non for
carrying out Board responsibilities under the Act. The
extent of CIA’s ability to produce such intelligence will
largely be determined by the outcome of the present
negotiations.
- (c)
- Atomic Energy Intelligence is in a critical
situation.
- 7.
-
Recommendations:
- (a)
- That RDB determine the
nature and type of intelligence it requires from CIA.
- (b)
- That RDB suggest
directives to CIA that are best calculated to effect
(a).
- (c)
- That RDB request CIA to
keep the Board informed as to the status of directives under
consideration with the view of commenting thereon.
