324. Minutes of the 16th Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board0
- Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair
- Members Present
- Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
- Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
- Major General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of Air Staff–2
- Rear Admiral John E. Gingrich, Director of Intelligence and Security, Atomic Energy Commission
- Brig. General Walter E. Todd, Deputy Director of Intelligence, WDGS
- Also Present
- Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group
- Colonel Merritt B. Booth, Department of State
- Captain R. K. Davis, USN
- Colonel E. P. Mussett, AAF–2
- Colonel G. C. Nye, AAF–2
- Lt. Colonel Edgar J. Treacy, WDGS
- Capt. Patrick Henry, USN
- Mr. J. S. Earman, Secretary, N.I.A.
1. Action by the Intelligence Advisory Board on Matters Submitted to the National Intelligence Authority (CIG 24/2)1
Admiral Hillenkoetter stated that the ad hoc committee appointed to prepare recommendations on the subject paper to the Intelligence Advisory Board was in agreement with the recommendations contained in the enclosure to CIG 24/2, with the exception that the member from the Intelligence Division, WDGS, and the member from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff–2 did not concur in the inclusion of paragraph 4 in the enclosure to CIG 24/2.
Admiral Inglis stated that he wished to recommend that the fourth sentence of paragraph 1 be amended to read as follows:
“If the IAB proposes to refer any such recommendation to a special study group or otherwise to delay the presentation of the recommendation to the NIA (NSC), but the Director of Central Intelligence considers such delay inadvisable, the IAB members shall have seven working [Page 794] days, after receipt of the views of the Director of Central Intelligence regarding such delay, for the submission of any desired statement of non-concurrence, the basis of which will accompany the recommendation to the NIA (NSC).”
Mr. Eddy stated he wished to recommend the insertion of the following sentence between the second and third sentences of paragraph 1:
“Substance of the statement of the non-concurrence shall accompany the statement to the NIA (NSC).”
General McDonald noted that it seemed advisable to him to delete paragraph 4, since the contents of that paragraph presented a special problem in itself.
After some discussion the Intelligence Advisory Board approved the enclosure to CIG 24/2 with the following exceptions:
- That paragraph 4 thereof be deleted.2
- That the changes recommended by Mr. Eddy and Admiral Inglis, as indicated above, be adopted.
2. Coordination of Intelligence Production (IAB 1, IAB 1/1 and IAB 1/2)3
The Director requested comments on the recommendations contained in IAB 1/2.
Admiral Inglis stated that the Chief of Naval Operations felt that in view of the National Security Act of 1947, which established naval aviation as an integral part of the Navy, the position of the Navy should be made clear in all papers which dealt with the jurisdiction, cognizance, or responsibility on the subject of naval aviation. The Navy had, in cooperation with the Intelligence Division, Army Air Forces, an agency called the Air Intelligence Division which has been serving both the Army and Navy and Army Air Forces under instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Navy wanted nothing to occur which would interfere in any way with the present effective operation of the Air Intelligence Division, and further that unless paragraph 4 of the proposed NIA Directive on the coordination of intelligence production was changed as recommended in IAB 1/2, some day after the present incumbents were gone, controversy might arise as to the interests of the Navy in air intelligence and, [Page 795] therefore, a change in the wording of this paragraph as recommended by the Navy was not only advisable and desirable, but necessary to recognize the interest of the Navy in air intelligence.
General McDonald stated that on the subject of the Strategic Vulnerability Branch which is in existence—this Branch was authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to function within the framework of A–2. However, the National Security Act of 1947 does define to some general extent areas of responsibility for the ground, sea and air forces. He had coordinated with the Air Staff the proposed change recommended by the Navy on the subject paper, and as a result the Air Forces recommended that paragraph 4 remain as written.
General Todd stated that General Chamberlin thought that the subject paper was not the paper in which to try to define fields of dominant interest, since, if it was attempted to define one field, an attempt should be made to define, for example, military intelligence. General Chamberlin felt that there should follow in a subsequent paper, defined in greater detail, fields of dominant interest. However, he felt that the fields of dominant interests as outlined in the subject paper were generally satisfactory. General Chamberlin felt that he did not believe dominant interest could be shared, since each of the member IAB agencies certainly had a great deal of interest in the other fields.
Admiral Inglis stated that he agreed with General Chamberlin’s thoughts and was willing to make some alteration in the wording of his recommended change to the proposed directive in question. For example, the Navy and Army Air Forces to share air intelligence each to their respective needs.
Colonel Mussett stated that he thought this was taken into account in the definition of staff intelligence. He said that A–2 recognized that each Department must produce all intelligence that was necessary to its own needs.
Admiral Inglis stated that he did not quite agree with the A–2 viewpoint, since the Navy’s need for air intelligence went beyond the question of staff intelligence. He said that naval air intelligence goes into the field of impact of foreign aviation on naval operations, not necessarily air operations, but the naval surface, submarines, amphibious, transports, logistics, and supply, and for that reason the Navy felt that it did have an interest in air intelligence which they believed had to be recognized.
After further discussion, the Intelligence Advisory Board agreed to forward the proposed directive on the coordination of intelligence production to the NIA, together with the non-concurrence of the Navy member and the comments of the Air member. (Note: The non-concurrence of the Navy member and the comments of the Air member are to be submitted to the Secretary, NIA, within seven working days after date of this meeting.)[Page 796]
3. Reorganization of Central Intelligence Group
The Director of Central Intelligence stated he was withdrawing the memorandum to the individual members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, dated 15 August 1947, subject—“Reorganization of the Central Intelligence Group”,4 and would submit new recommendations on this subject.
4. Transfer of the Janis Program to CIG
Admiral Inglis asked the status of the proposed transfer of the Janis program to the Central Intelligence Group.
The Director replied that CIG had received a request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assume responsibility for this program and that necessary action was being taken to effect the transfer of functions and personnel of this activity to the Central Intelligence Group.
5. Overall Policies and Objectives for the Coordination of Intelligence Relating to Foreign Industrial Establishments (CIG 22)5
Admiral Inglis asked the status of CIG 22.
Mr. Edgar replied that further consideration of this paper was being held pending approval of the proposed directive on the coordination of intelligence production.
6. Exploitation of Enemy Document Repositories (CIG 21 and CIG 21/1)6
Admiral Inglis asked what had been decided by the Director of Central Intelligence on the recommendations contained in the enclosure to CIG 21/1.
The Director replied that there was some question as to his authority to expend the sum of approximately $82,950 to carry out the recommendations contained in the enclosure to CIG 21/1.
After some discussion, the Director agreed to request formal approval from the National Intelligence Authority that authority be granted to the Director of Central Intelligence to expend approximately $82,950 of funds allotted to CIG to carry out the recommendations contained in enclosure to CIG 21/1.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–281. Secret. The meeting was held at the North Interior Building.↩
- Dated August 12. (Ibid., HS/HC–276) See the Supplement.↩
- Paragraph 4 of CIG 24/2 required the DCI to notify the IAB in writing of any actions planned under paragraph 3 of NIA Directive No. 5 (which authorized the DCI to coordinate all U.S. foreign intelligence activities) and provided for IAB members to express concurrence or non-concurrence in such actions.↩
- IAB 1 is Document 195. IAB 1/1 and IAB 1/2, dated July 15 and September 5, are not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–280, and HS/HC–276, respectively) See the Supplement. IAB 1/2 consisted of a proposed NIA directive on coordination of intelligence production and a memorandum from the Chief of Naval Intelligence asking that the allocation of subjects by agency according to “dominant interest” be changed to reflect that the Air Force and the Navy had a shared interest in air intelligence.↩
- Memorandum from Hillenkoetter to Eddy et al., August 15, not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–208, Item 36) See the Supplement.↩
- Not found.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 323.↩