323. Minutes of the 15th Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board0
PARTICIPANTS
- Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair
- Members Present
- Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
- Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, WDGS
- Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
- Maj. General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of Air Staff–2
- Also Present
- Brig. General Geo. F. Schulgen, AAF–2
- Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group
- Mr. Park Armstrong, Department of State
- Capt. R. K. Davis, USN
- Lt. Colonel Edgar J. Treacy, WDGS
- Major W. C. Baird, AAF–2
- Secretariat
- Mr. J. S. Earman, Secretary, N.I.A.
1. National Security Council
The Director of Central Intelligence requested the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board that a letter be written to the National Security Council, when formed, recommending that all directives, under which the IAB and the CIG now function, remain in full force and effect until such time as that Council may desire to make such changes as it sees fit in these directives.
After some discussion,
The Intelligence Advisory Board
Concurred in the request of the Director as outlined above.1
2. CIG Representation On U.S. Government Missions Abroad (IAB 4)2
Upon being asked for comments, Mr. Eddy stated that the State Department did not favorably consider the recommendations contained [Page 791] in the subject paper. He said that this paper introduced CIG into the collection of overt and positive intelligence abroad which had already been divided by fields of dominant interest within the membership of the IAB.
After some discussion, wherein the Director and the members of the IAB stated they concurred in Mr. Eddy’s statement,
The Intelligence Advisory Board
Agreed to withdraw the recommendations contained in IAB 4.
3. Coordination of Intelligence Production (IAB 1 and IAB 1/1)3
The Director stated that he felt that the IAB would be getting into difficulties if they changed the definitions of basic, current, and staff intelligence as approved by the IAB at its 13th meeting since he felt that the recommendations of the Lexicographer of the Library of Congress were a play on words.
Mr. Eddy stated that he thought the changes recommended by the Lexicographer lacked conviction.
Admiral Inglis stated that he believed that the changes recommended were good and, while it was not a matter of great moment, it was his belief that they gave a clearer meaning to the definitions.
General Chamberlin stated that he felt very strongly that the action of the IAB in regard to this matter should be interpreted by the spirit of the definitions in question and not by a play on an individual word. He went on to say that if the changes recommended by the Lexicographer were accepted, immediately the idea of “time evaluation” was given up.
Admiral Inglis asked General Chamberlin if he was referring to basic intelligence.
General Chamberlin replied that his remarks referred to both basic and current intelligence. He pointed out that distinction had been made on time and evaluation in the definitions of basic and current intelligence, as previously approved by the IAB.
General Chamberlin went on to say, however, that he felt that the changes recommended by the Lexicographer in the definition of staff intelligence made that definition read much better without changing its original meaning.
Mr. Eddy said he felt that the recommended changes in basic and current intelligence changed the meaning of these two definitions. He noted, however, that the change recommended in the definition of staff intelligence was an improvement.
[Page 792]General McDonald stated that he agreed with Mr. Eddy.
The Director stated that he agreed with General Chamberlin that the IAB’s action in this matter should be governed by the interpretation of the spirit of the definitions in question and not by a play on an individual word.
Admiral Inglis stated that he thought it quite important that the IAB have an unmistakable understanding of the meaning of basic, current, and staff intelligence, and he was not inclined to belittle the importance of definitions. He went on to say, however, that in this particular case he did not think the recommended change in the definitions of basic and current intelligence were of any great substance or consequence and he was willing to accept these two definitions as previously approved, and the definition of staff intelligence as rewritten by the Lexicographer. He noted, however, that he preferred all of the changes recommended by the Lexicographer in the definitions of basic, current, and staff intelligence.
After some discussion,
The Intelligence Advisory Board
- a.
- Agreed to leave unchanged the definitions of basic and current intelligence, as previously approved by the IAB at its 13th meeting.
- b.
- Agreed to change the definition of staff intelligence to read as follows: “Staff intelligence is that intelligence prepared by any department or agency through the correlation and interpretation of all intelligence materials available to it in order to meet its specific requirements and responsibilities.”
4. Exploitation of Enemy Document Repositories (CIG 21 and CIG 21/1)4
Admiral Inglis stated he would like to inquire as to the present status of the subject paper since he had recently received several requests from the Navy Department as to what action was to be taken on this matter. He said that the Director of Central Intelligence, at a previous IAB meeting, had stated that at that time CIG was unable to consider the recommendations contained in CIG 21/1 due to budgetary problems. He went on to say that it was his understanding that since that meeting CIG’s budgetary problems had been settled.
The Director noted the remarks of Admiral Inglis and stated he desired to make a further check of the funds available to CIG which might be allocated to carry out the recommendations contained in CIG 21/1.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–281. Secret. The meeting was at the North Interior Building.↩
- The letter was first addressed to the National Intelligence Authority (Document 220). Another version was subsequently sent to the NSC upon its establishment (Document 222).↩
- Dated July 7. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–280) See the Supplement.↩
- IAB No. 1 is printed as Document 195; IAB 1/1, July 15, is not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–280) See the Supplement.↩
- Dated November 21, 1946, and April 10, 1947. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–276) See the Supplement for both.↩