159. Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board0


  • Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair
  • Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, former Director of Central Intelligence
  • Members Present
  • Dr. William L. Langer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
  • Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.
  • Commodore Charles J. Rend, USN (Representing Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence)
  • Colonel E. P. Mussett (Representing Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of Air Staff–2)
  • Also Present
  • Mr. Park Armstrong, Department of State
  • Captain R. K. Davis, USN, ONI
  • Colonel Joseph A. Michela, G–2
  • Secretariat
  • Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National Intelligence Authority

1. Functions of the Director of Central Intelligence (C.I.G. 10)1

General Vandenberg expressed regret that the original version had caused such turmoil. He explained that his primary purpose was to get the people necessary to do the job of assisting the three departments. He wants these people to try to find out where, because of lack of people or money, the departments have to stop their intelligence activities short of national requirements. General Vandenberg explained that he was not trying to unsurp any departmental prerogatives. He realized that C.I.G. cannot do its job unless there is an intelligence system within State, War and Navy which is as strong as possible. He wants to find out where the departments have to stop and thus where there are deficiencies or holes in our intelligence organization. General Vandenberg stated that he had talked with the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and with Fleet Admiral Leahy, and they were all in agreement with his concept. He would, however, welcome any comments or criticism on the subject paper.

Dr. Langer explained that he was very interested in making C.I.G. a real going concern, including provision of the necessary money and people. His chief objection to the paper was that it was rather loose in [Page 388] places and would subsequently give rise to suspicions. The State Department had no objection to a large part of the paper. It did object, however, to paragraph 2 of Appendix “A”. Dr. Langer felt that this paragraph went beyond the provisions in the President’s letter. He doubted that it was necessary for C.I.G. to undertake extensive research and analysis. He felt that if the departments showed themselves unable to do the job for C.I.G., specific authorization for C.I.G. to perform such functions could be given at that time. Dr. Langer also felt that it would be extremely difficult to define what fields were of primary or secondary interest to the departments.

General Vandenberg felt that point would be covered, since he was required to obtain the concurrence of appropriate members of the Board in any given case.

Dr. Langer noted that the decision as to which member was appropriate in any case was left to the discretion of the Director. He felt that setting up the proposition of negotiating with individual members would cause the Board to pass into eclipse. He would be very sorry to see that happen, since solidarity of the Board gave necessary moral support to the Director. Dr. Langer explained that it was only because of the interest of State in C.I.G. that he would like to avoid unnecessary debate, acrimony, or any suggestion that would break down the solidarity of the Board. He thought that paragraph 2 should be more specific, and therefore circulated an alternative paragraph 2.

General Vandenberg thought the alternative paragraph would tie his hands unnecessarily. If he is to produce national intelligence he must fill the holes as rapidly as possible. If he has to obtain approval by the entire Board in each case, it will become a debating society and no action will be taken.

Dr. Langer pointed out that the departments have definite functions and responsibilities which must be recognized. He noted that the Secretary of State has the responsibility of informing the President regarding the foreign situation and advising him of what should be done in that field.

General Vandenberg stated that one of the main purposes of this paper was to enable C.I.G. to define precisely the fields of primary interest to the departments.

General Chamberlin expressed his regret that he had to leave the meeting at this point, but stated that Colonel Michela could vote for him unless there were particularly controversial issues involved. General Chamberlin then left the meeting.

General Vandenberg said that he must prepare a supplementary budget within the next few days or C.I.G. would be without necessary funds during the fiscal year 1947. He was therefore anxious to obtain N.I.A. approval of the concept of this paper to enable him to secure the [Page 389] necessary funds. He felt that C.I.G. would be unable to find the gaps in the intelligence situation unless it was able to perform the research and analysis operation.

Dr. Langer expressed the understanding that the Central Planning Staff was designed to find the gaps.

General Vandenberg thought, and Admiral Souers agreed, that this was a problem for research and not for planning. Unless C.I.G. actually performed research functions, it would not know where the gaps were.

Dr. Langer asked whether C.I.G. intended to have so large a staff that it would be able to take care of any conceivable emergency.

General Vandenberg explained that he wanted only enough experts to find the holes. It would then be necessary to determine whether those holes could be filled by one of the departments or whether, in each particular field, the research and analysis should be centralized in C.I.G. In other words, he did not want to do the work now being done in the departments, but rather to find out what the departments cannot do.

Dr. Langer agreed with this concept, but felt that a revision of the wording of paragraph 2 was necessary.

After further discussion, a revision of paragraph 2 was accepted by the Board.

Commodore Rend was concerned about the wording of paragraph 3 of Appendix “A”, since it seemed to infringe upon the responsibility of each Board member to execute approved N.I.A. recommendations within his department.

The Board agreed to a re-wording of paragraph 3.

Commodore Rend suggested that paragraph 4–a make it clear that C.I.G. would conduct such operations only outside the limits of the continental United States.

General Vandenberg noted that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had suggested a similar revision of paragraph 4–a, and this revision was accepted by the Board.

Colonel Michela suggested re-wording the last two lines of paragraph 5 of Appendix “A”, and a revision was subsequently agreed upon by the Board.

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Concurred in C.I.G. 10 subject to the following amendments to Appendix “A” thereto and appropriate changes in Appendix “B”:

Revise paragraph 2 to read:

“2. In performing the functions specified in paragraph 3–a of the President’s letter, the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby authorized to undertake such research and analysis as may be necessary to [Page 390] determine what functions in the fields of national security intelligence are not being presently performed or are not being adequately performed. Based upon these determinations, the Director of Central Intelligence may centralize such research and analysis activities as may, in his opinion and that of the appropriate member or members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, be more efficiently or effectively accomplished centrally.”

Revise paragraph 3 to read:

“3. In addition to the functions specified in paragraph 3–b of the President’s letter and in accordance with paragraph 4 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby directed to act as the agent of this Authority in coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities related to the national security to ensure that the over-all policies and objectives established by this Authority are properly implemented and executed.”

Revise paragraph 4–a to read:

“a. Conduct of all organized Federal espionage and counter-espionage operations outside the United States and its possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the national security.”

Revise the last two lines of paragraph 5 to read:

“herein, in addition to the appropriations which can be made available for this purpose by the State, War and Navy Departments.”

(Enclosure to C.I.G. 10 as amended subsequently submitted for N.I.A. consideration as N.I.A. 4.)2

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–281. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. The meeting was held at the War Department building.
  2. Document 156.
  3. The NIA apparently did not meet as a body to discuss the draft directive. On July 8 the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy approved Enclosure A to NIA 4 without change. Admiral Leahy, however, objected to the use of the word “agent” in paragraph 3 of Enclosure A because it might imply unwarranted freedom of the Director of Central Intelligence to act for the NIA. Vandenberg agreed that the language was subject to such an interpretation and stated that he had only intended that the Director of Central Intelligence would implement NIA policies. (NIA 4/1, Memorandum from Lay to NIA, July 8; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 132) The paragraph as revised is printed as paragraph 3 of NIA Directive No. 5, Document 160.