839.00/9–544
The Ambassador in the Dominican Republic ( Briggs ) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 9.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my secret despatch No. 70 of July 5, 1944 setting forth my estimate of the situation in the Dominican Republic. As stated in that despatch, my policy recommendations were based
“on the premise that although Trujillo’s dictatorship represents the negation of many of the principles to which the United States subscribes, promotion of his overthrow is not the responsibility of the American Government nor would such action be consistent with our present commitments with respect to non-intervention. Trujillo is primarily a Dominican problem, for solution by the Dominican people.… However, we should decline to endorse Trujillo’s dictatorship or to permit ourselves through misinterpretation of our policies to become identified with it.…”11
At the conclusion of that despatch it was suggested that the policies outlined should constitute my terms of reference at this post. In the absence of word to the contrary, I hope I am correct in assuming that my views have merited the approval of the Department.
I now wish to invite the Department’s attention to the fact, which has grown increasingly clear to me since my arrival here, that certain officers of our military establishment in the Caribbean do not share either my estimate of the situation or my views concerning policy. What is more, they are apparently prepared to undertake on their own initiative steps which run counter to that policy. If my interpretation of the views of our military is correct, they regard President Trujillo and his Government with great favor, which they often make no effort to disguise. They are inclined to view Trujillo’s many substantial achievements—maintenance of order, “making the Dominicans work,” et cetera—as indicating that Trujillo is operating the best possible government in the best of all possible Caribbean worlds, but apparently to ignore or belittle the importance of factors on the other side of the picture, including the suffocation of liberty, the maintenance of innumerable “Trujillo rackets” (please see despatch no. 139 of July 2113), and Trujillo’s indifference to many of the principles for which our own country stands and to preserve which we are fighting a world war.
The military are entitled to their private opinions on these matters. I desire to point out however that in the exercise of those opinions they are providing Trujillo with the material of misrepresentation, and that he has already utilized it.
There was, for example, the recent visit of Lieutenant General Brett, Commanding Officer of the Caribbean Defense Command, with very extensive and elaborate publicity staged by President Trujillo. The visit was arranged by direct personal correspondence with President Trujillo, without reference to this Embassy until two days prior to the General’s arrival, which was subsequent to acceptance of the invitation. (Please see my secret despatch no. 250 of August 25, 1944.13) During the visit there was apparently discussion with Dominican officials of various matters not previously cleared with the Embassy or reported to it thereafter, as set forth in the enclosed memorandum. It was followed by a newspaper interview in Panamá on General Brett’s return there, praising the Trujillo Government in enthusiastic terms. A copy of this interview, appearing in the Panamá Star & Herald of August 24, 1944 is also enclosed.14
This visit, the second by General Brett to Ciudad Trujillo within four weeks, presented Trujillo with a ready-made opportunity to [Page 1023] emphasize here and abroad his personal and official intimacy with our Government, as well as to “prove” to the Dominican opposition (which if a secret ballot could be taken would probably include a substantial proportion of the population of this country), the futility of any efforts to unseat this “favored friend” of the United States. In other words the visit, as utilized, was directly contrary to the policy recommendation already quoted “that we should decline to endorse Trujillo’s dictatorship, or to permit ourselves through misinterpretation of our policies to become identified with it.”
While I have a high personal regard for General Brett and moreover do not wish to over-emphasize the definitive character of such a visit, the cumulative effect, should calls here be continued, might well be very substantial.
I am prepared to endeavor to handle this particular situation, 1) by discouraging an early repetition thereof through personal letter (as mentioned on page 3 of my despatch no. 250 of August 25), and 2) by requesting General Brett (or any other military commander coming here) immediately upon his arrival to discuss no subjects with Dominican officials without prior clearance thereof with me.
The general problem however is one of considerably broader implications than the relationship between a single chief of mission and a commanding general in this area, and furthermore I have gathered from various conversations which I have had with our military authorities since my arrival in the Dominican Republic last May that their views, if not emanating directly from the War Department, find substantial support there.
If foreign policy aspects of our relations with Caribbean republics are to predominate now that any major threat to the security of this region has been removed, it behooves the Department of State itself to re-assert its authority over the conduct of foreign relations in this area, and to see to it that appropriate directives are issued to the War Department, and by that Department to officers concerned. In addition to stating the general thesis, such directives should in my judgment include the following:
- 1.
- Visits to the Caribbean republics, other than purely routine stops in specific connection with United States military matters, should in no circumstances be made unless they have been approved in advance by the Chief of Diplomatic Mission in the country concerned. In no circumstances should direct correspondence be undertaken by officers in our military service with Chiefs of State or other high officials of foreign governments.
- 2.
- Regulations covering the acceptance by our military authorities of “political decorations” should forthwith be revised (please see my despatch no. 250 of August 25). The seeking of autographed photographs from foreign Chiefs of State might likewise well be discouraged.
- 3.
- Military authorities in this area should be enjoined from discussing pending business, including military business, with foreign officials—unless such discussions have first been approved by the Chief of Mission in the country in question.
- 4.
- Military officers should be forbidden to make public statements concerning conditions existing in the other American Republics. (I again call the Department’s attention to the enclosed copy of the clipping from the Panamá Star & Herald.)
- 5.
- Directives to Military Attachés should be completely revised, to the end that such attachés shall be responsible in every particular to Chiefs of Mission, and prohibited from interfering with the work of diplomatic missions by engaging in all sorts of extraneous reporting and investigative activity. (In this connection I refer to my confidential despatch no. 234 of August 1815 and previous correspondence.)
The foregoing appears to me to be a minimum statement of requirements designed to avoid further interference by our military authorities in the field of Caribbean foreign policy. It is of course equally applicable to our naval authorities, although thus far I have seen nothing to indicate that the Navy Department is seeking to encroach on that field.
There are of course occasions when the utilization of our military facilities may be both useful and important in the promotion of political objectives, including the promotion of good will. For example, utilization of military air transportation last month to take the Peruvian Ambassador, who was seriously ill, from Ciudad Trujillo to Lima, had an altogether useful effect, albeit perhaps diminished somewhat by the awareness on the part of the Peruvian Embassy here that it took five weeks to arrange this transportation, whereas when minor motor trouble developed in General Brett’s plane on the morning of his departure for Panamá, a substitute airplane was obtained within three hours, and a second plane, bringing a spare part, arrived within two hours. Such matters as “good will transportation” should however be sponsored by the Department of State or its senior representative in the country concerned, and favorable action on such recommendations should be routine and prompt, rather than “granted as a favor” after long and embarrassing delay.
In my opinion the matters discussed in this despatch should not be permitted to drift on the theory that as the war draws to a successful conclusion, there will be a normal diminution of War Department activity in the Caribbean area. I gather that that is by no means the idea of the War Department, which I am informed proposes in peacetime to maintain a considerably larger military establishment in the Caribbean than it does at the present time. The size and extent of our post-war military establishment is clearly a matter of high policy [Page 1025] in which the security aspects may be uppermost, but unless and until such time as the Caribbean may again face a potential menace, the conduct of foreign relations there should be the primary duty and responsibility of the Department of State.
My views concerning the proposed staff conversations are contained in my secret telegram no. 396 of September 5, 11 [10] a.m.16
Respectfully yours,