Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The American Republics, Volume VII

839.00/7–544

The Ambassador in the Dominican Republic ( Briggs ) to the Secretary of State

No. 70

Ciudad Trujillo , July 5, 1944.
[Received July 10.]

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following estimate of the situation prevailing in the Dominican Republic, together with my conclusions and recommendations with respect to the policy which I believe our government should follow. There is enclosed in this connection a memorandum² on which the conclusions are based. I have now been at Ciudad Trujillo for four weeks, and while I realize that this is insufficient time in which to familiarize myself with details, I believe that the main outlines of the situation are clear and that there is an advantage in making an appraisal when one’s perspective has not been foreshortened, and when it is easier to be objective with respect to personalities.

1. The Trujillo dictatorship, as an operating entity, is the most efficient government the republic has ever known, and more overall material progress has been achieved during the past 14 years than during the preceding 438 years since the discovery of the Island by Columbus. Trujillo takes a genuine patriotic pride in these achievements.

2. Notwithstanding Trujillo’s dedication of his Government—internationally—to the principles of liberty, justice and democracy, his administration of the country—domestically—shows a cynical disregard for most of those principles. His regime is an enterprise operated primarily for the personal enrichment of himself, his relatives and his satellites. His greed results in the impoverishment of the Dominican people, economically and morally. The dictator’s vanity, which not infrequently dictates his course of actions, is colossal.

3. During the 86 years between independence from Haiti and the advent of Trujillo, the Dominican people showed little talent for meeting the responsibilities of representative government. That period is a tragic recital of incompetence, venality, foreign intervention, bankruptcy and repeated chaos. Were Trujillo, a strong character and a born leader, to be removed from the scene, a repetition of those conditions might ensue. A substantial proportion of Dominican citizens would welcome his downfall, but barring assassination of the dictator, the chances at this juncture do not appear to favor a successful revolution. It is believed, however, that opposition to Trujillo is increasing. (Please see Secret Airgram no. 297, June 28, 10:30 a.m.)

4. The most important problem facing the Dominican Republic is that of its relations with Haiti. The Presidents of Haiti and the Dominican Republic have been put on notice by President Roosevelt that they are expected to keep the peace.³ President Roosevelt’s communications of last February undoubtedly had a sobering and beneficial effect on them. Nevertheless, Haitian-Dominican relations are susceptible of sudden deterioration, and conflict might break out at any time. Antipathies—racial, historical, and economic—are profound, and produce continuing pathological manifestations in the Dominican Republic. With a static land area unequally divided, and with Haiti’s population density and multiplication rate, indications point to eventual conflict.

The recommendations that follow are based on the premise that although Trujillo’s dictatorship represents the negation of many of the principles to which the United States subscribes, promotion of his overthrow is not the responsibility of the American Government nor would such action be consistent with our present commitments with respect to non-intervention. Trujillo is primarily a Dominican problem, for solution by the Dominican people.

My recommendations are based, however, on the premise that we should decline to endorse Trujillo’s dictatorship, or to permit ourselves through misinterpretation of our policies to become identified with it. Sooner or later American public opinion will interest itself in the kind of governments existing in the other American republics and demand that, without interfering in their internal affairs, we nevertheless take cognizance of conditions and base to a larger degree than heretofore our attitude toward them on the conduct of those governments toward their own people. The question of “favors to dictators” will inevitably arise in that connection.

Finally, my recommendations are based on the premise that honesty is more important than the ideology to which the people of the Dominican Republic at a given moment subscribe; an honest Dominican administration would be capable of developing in the direction of greater liberty for the individual, and conversely a dishonest administration probably would not.

It seems self-evident therefore that we must be scrupulously honest in all our government dealings with the Dominican Government and people, and that we must insist on honesty on the part of American citizens and companies operating in the Dominican Republic, as well as upon non-participation by them in the domestic affairs of the country. (The record of our citizens in those particulars during recent years has reportedly been good.)

But we must also insist upon honesty on the part of the Dominican Government in all its dealings with the American Government. This insistence may require a greater degree of positive action on our part than has heretofore been exercised, which may in turn be resented by President Trujillo, with possible effects on relations with the United States.

By way of explanation, it may be recalled that during the war emergency our Government has been supporting the economy of the Dominican Republic in various ways—through credits, through making supplies and equipment available, and through American Government purchases of Dominican commodities at prices favorable to producers.⁴ While in some respects (utilization of credits for example) the performance of the Dominican Government appears to have been satisfactory, that has not always been the case with respect to utilization of equipment, and it has not thus far been the case regarding the food purchasing program, the benefits of which are not being extended to producers (i.e., the Dominican people) but are being siphoned off by middlemen headed by the President and other high officials of the Dominican Government, who control original purchases from farmers, as well as processing and distribution. For instance, the Dominican Government has consistently declined to publish the price schedule to be paid by the American Government, notwithstanding its commitment to do so in the purchase agreement, and it deliberately maintains producers in ignorance of such prices, apparently for the purpose of permitting middlemen to buy as cheaply as possible. This results in limiting production of foodstuffs for export, and hence runs counter to the purposes of the program.

We should insist upon fulfillment by the Dominican Government of all its undertakings with us, and unless the Dominican Government makes good, our collaboration should be made contingent upon performance with regard to unfulfilled existing commitments.

(Note: I do not criticize past collaboration, economic or otherwise, that we have extended to the Dominican Government. I realize that during the period between Pearl Harbor and our invasion of North Africa—during which a German attack on the New World was a real possibility—the security of the Caribbean was a matter of supreme importance, overshadowing all other considerations. That, however, was two years ago.)

I wish to repeat that in my opinion insistence upon honesty on the part of the Dominican Government in its dealings with us is absolutely essential to our relations, and to our self-respect, but that this may perhaps prove irritating to Trujillo, whose personal pocketbook might be the first to suffer. While I am inclined to think that Trujillo will accept with reasonably good grace insistence on our part on fulfillment by the Dominican Government of specific existing commitments, it is prudent to examine the possible moves Trujillo might make if he wanted to make trouble.

A. Trujillo might withdraw his support from various inter-American or international policies in which we are interested, or delay, temporize, or criticize such policies, in contrast to his present ready acceptance of our lead. (Such support currently costs him nothing, and we would be well advised to bear that in mind in our evaluation of it.) If sufficiently aroused, Trujillo is capable of exchanging support for denunciation, and of intriguing against the United States in inter-American matters. He could easily have declined for example, in recent weeks to go along with the United States on such questions as Bolivian recognition or relations with Argentina.⁵

B. Trujillo could adopt a policy of pin-pricks and petty irritations with respect to our Embassy in the Dominican Republic, simultaneously attempting through his representation in Washington to undermine confidence in this mission or discredit it.

C. Trujillo could begin harassing American business enterprises, and this could be accomplished in ways difficult to counter, under a cloak of constitutional procedure—higher taxes, nationalistic legislation, increased wages, et cetera.

In these and other ways Trujillo could, if so minded, change the ambiente almost overnight from one of warm, if superficial friendliness, to an irritating unfriendliness. He could produce a whole series of headaches. His nuisance value, in the short run, might be considerable. On the other hand, Trujillo would, in those circumstances, incur certain risks, the realization of which could act as a deterrent; for instance, Trujillo reportedly weighs all situations in terms of the possible advantage (or comfort) that Haiti might derive therefrom. Moreover, he knows that anti-Trujillo elements scrutinize the course of Dominican-American relations, would be quick to note a changed ambiente, and might attempt immediately to profit from it.

In the event of hostilities between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, a quarantine of both countries should be established. Should relations appear to be entering a critical phase, opportune warnings would be in order, and the other American republics might well be informed thereof.

(Note: American policy with respect to furnishing arms and munitions (through Lend-Lease or otherwise) is of major importance to Dominican-Haitian relations. We should be guided by the assumption that such arms as reach Hispaniola are likely to be used by Dominicans against Haitians, or vice versa.)

The possibility of a Washington visit by Trujillo may again arise. I do not believe it would be desirable to promote such a visit, which could be interpreted locally (and might be so interpreted abroad) as placing a seal of American approval on Trujillo and all his works. On the other hand, we cannot go on receiving Lescot⁶ and refusing to receive Trujillo, without nourishing with unfortunate consequences criticism of our “partiality”.

Should Trujillo again put out feelers about a visit, he should be informed that he would be received in Washington as President of the Dominican Republic, with the ceremony and honors accorded to other Chiefs of State. There is even a remote chance that such a visit, if appropriately timed and carefully handled, might have beneficial results, for the reason that Trujillo is certainly not without patriotism and he is ambitious for the continued material progress of his country. By playing on his patriotism and on his legitimate ambitions, some profit might be obtainable, although I repeat that the prospect of success seems at this writing somewhat remote. But in any case, it is not believed that we should lend further substance to the local belief of “favoritism”, with possible repercussions on Dominican-Haitian relations which result from continuing to receive Lescot and not receiving Trujillo.

The foregoing estimate and recommendations have been set forth in some detail for the reason that I believe stock-taking of Dominican-American relations is in order, and because the small Caribbean countries and our relations with them constitute a sort of show-window through which our inter-American relations are carefully examined by other—and more important—nations with which we are dealing. Trujillo is a dictator, indifferent to or even hostile to many of the fundamental principles for which our country stands. The fact that Trujillo has declared himself to be “on our side” in this war, and that he is collaborating with us in certain international matters, should not blind us to the realities of his domestic administration nor to the implications within the important area of our general international relations, of our doing business with Trujillo on any except our own carefully considered terms.

Those terms should be based on fair and honest dealings and on unwavering insistence upon reciprocal integrity in the dealings of the Dominican Government with us. In that way we shall also be of the greatest benefit to the people of the Dominican Republic.

It is respectfully recommended that the policies outlined in this despatch constitute my terms of reference at this post.

Respectfully yours,

Ellis O. Briggs

2. Not printed.
3. For President Roosevelt’s letters of February 22 and March 4 on this subject to President Trujillo and President Lescot, see pp. 184 and 185.
4. For texts of the 1941 Lend-Lease Agreements, signed August 2 and August 6, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. vii, pp. 253 and 256. For correspondence concerning 1942 agreements on financial aid for road construction, see ibid., 1942, vol. v, pp. 269 ff.; for a 1943 agreement on food purchase, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 350, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1142.
5. For correspondence on the United States position toward the recognition of the Argentine and Bolivian regimes, see pp. 252 ff. and pp. 427 ff., respectively.
6. Elie Lescot, President of Haiti.