811.516 Export-Import Bank/7–744: Airgram
The Ambassador in Cuba (Braden) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 10—8 a.m.]
A–1493. For Warren Pierson, President Export-Import Bank. Reference your telegram No. 569, July 4, 8 p.m., 1944. I am in general agreement that all agencies of the United States Government should do everything possible to assist reorganized Commission in carrying out its work. To this end Embassy has been approving all applications for automobiles, trucks, and other equipment referred to us by Washington and approved by Consulting Engineers. Embassy has likewise supported applications of Commission to ORPA12 and Cuban Import and Export Agency for gasoline, gas-oil, tires and tubes but we have pointed out that these Cuban agencies must assist the Commission within the regular Cuban allotments. However, unless the Commission makes forceful presentation of its case before these agencies, it is unlikely to receive the materials which it needs.
I am informed by Consulting Engineers that the following projects have been approved and allocations made by the Bank:
[Here follows a statement of Export-Import Bank credit approved for nine projects financed through the $25,000,000 credit plan, and a list of the credits already allocated, contracted for, and spent.]
As you will recall from my letter of June 24,13 Grau has already been informed that only $11,000,000 of the credit will have been allotted when he takes office and only $3,000,000 expended. On this basis, he was anxious to have the credit continued. If the Bank now makes further allotments under the present administration, Grau could with much justification complain that we were arbitrary and not playing entirely fair with him.
Also, if the Bank now goes ahead and approves contracts for Guantánamo and additional contracts for some of the other projects, it will be increasingly difficult to cancel the credit if the Commission again falls down on the job. At the present time the Commission and [Page 983] the new General Manager appear to be working hard to straighten out some of the delinquencies of the past. However, it should be observed that Montoulieu and Garcia Montes aside from their other non-commission duties are now absent from Habana representing the Cuban Government at Bretton Woods14 and that as a consequence the Commission is in charge of one of its newest members, Ruiz Williams, who necessarily is largely unfamiliar with the full details of the work. You will recall that one of the main reasons for the old Commission to fail was the fact that Lopez Castro15 was absent so much of the time from Habana, thereby leaving the Commission without a head. This situation can easily result again if the President of the Commission is too long or too often absent.
In addition, we have the uncertainty of the coming change of government, with the probability that an entirely new Commission will be designated by Grau. We have no idea who these will be and, in any event, the change-over will of necessity bring about a slow-up in the work.
Under these circumstances, I question the advisability of letting any new contracts. The Commission has plenty of unfinished work (including contracts for Santiago, but none for Guantanamo) to put its teeth into, if it so desires, and I think that we should first see clear results on the contracts which have already been let before letting any new ones. While I appreciate that we should not be in the position of impeding sanitation improvements in Santiago de Cuba and Guantanamo, I may point out once more that the income of the present government has been and is more than sufficient to carry out this work without recourse to the credit.
- Cuba’s Office of Regulation of Prices and Supply.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Reference is to the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference which met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944. For correspondence regarding this Conference, see vol. ii, pp. 106 ff.↩
- Amadeo López Castro, former President of the Commission.↩