837.248/169
The Ambassador in Cuba (Braden) to the Secretary of State
[Extracts]
No. 6969
Habana, May 23,
1944.
[Received May 30.]
[Received May 30.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s airgram No. A–795 of May 16 [13],31 and to submit the following observations in respect to the operation of Lend-Lease for Cuba:
- 1.
- No one could be more enthusiastic than I concerning the remarkable accomplishments and the vital role of Lend-Lease in the success of the United Nations’ war effort. Likewise, I fully recognize how imperative it was from the aspect of hemispheric defense to extend Lend-Lease aid to the other American republics. This assistance was essential so that some of them, such as Brazil, might be enabled in case of need actively to participate in military and naval operations, and it was desirable with others to build morale, enhance continental solidarity, and give them a sense of partnership in the cause for which we are fighting.
- 2.
- On the other hand, it is of paramount importance for the good of our future relations with the American republics that we face facts, deceiving no one and least of all ourselves. The facts are that millions of dollars worth of Lend-Lease matériel has been distributed without our respective diplomatic missions (including the Military and Naval Attachés accredited therein) being informed or consulted. As a result equipment, which presumably might have been better employed on the fighting fronts, has been handed over to some of our neighbors who have not and could not employ it competently, even had their countries been invaded by the enemy. Some of this equipment was both unsuited to the needs and conditions of the particular country and not requested or desired by the Governments of the beneficiaries themselves. In this manner millions of dollars and, what is perhaps more important, long manpower hours were dissipated without benefit to the war effort or to the countries involved. On the contrary, there is a latent danger that at some time the use of this equipment by one republic against another or in internal revolution may prove destructive to hemispheric unity and to our friendly relations with the other American republics.
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- 5.
- … It evidently the opinion of the War Department that there remains little danger of attack on Cuba’s coasts by enemy submarines [Page 908] or other naval vessels, as is demonstrated by the recent decision of the War Department to withdraw artillery protection from the important United States Government $35,000,000 project at Nicaro (Oriente Province), where the war essential metal, nickel, is being produced. Under these circumstances, it would be an utterly indefensible wastage of manpower and money and a misapplication of equipment which might better be employed elsewhere to deliver further Lend-Lease equipment to the Cuban military forces. Thus to squander a valuable matériel would not in the slightest assist hemispheric defense and would inevitably lay all concerned open to criticism. The Navy Department in its recent decisions not to accord further Lend-Lease assistance to Cuba even in those cases recommended by the Naval Mission has clearly indicated that it is likewise of the opinion that Lend-Lease to Cuba can no longer be justified on a military basis.
- 6.
- Subject to the approval of the United States Navy it would be proper to continue under Lend-Lease to make fuel and other supplies available to those Cuban vessels which may be engaged in joint operations with and under the command of our Navy. Similarly, if it is eventually decided to train and incorporate certain Cuban aviators (or other troops) into actual combat units to be sent to the battle fronts, the requisite Lend-Lease assistance approved by the United State War Department would be in order. Otherwise there is absolutely no justification on a war essential basis any longer to consider Lend-Lease to this country. If it can no longer be considered from a war essential basis it becomes a purely political question and as such should be subject, in final decision, to the Department of State, guided by the recommendations of this Embassy, which in turn will, of course, always consult with the Military and Naval Attachés, the Military Attaché for Air, the Commander of United States Army forces at Batista Airport, and the Chief of our Naval Mission.…
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Respectfully yours,
Spruille Braden
- Not printed.↩