825.24/1750
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Liaison Officer With the War and Navy Departments (Wilson)
| Participants: | Admiral Spears |
| Colonel Hertford | |
| Colonel Doyle20 | |
| Mr. Bonsal—BA21 | |
| Mr. Wilson—U–L | |
| Mr. Key—U–L22 |
It was explained to Admiral Spears and to Colonel Hertford and Colonel Doyle that the Secretary felt that the situation that has arisen in Argentina might have extremely harmful effects in Uruguay and in Chile resulting possibly in a change in the governments of those countries which are friendly to us and should therefore be supported. It appeared that a satisfactory way to accomplish this would be to expedite shipments of lend-lease equipment for which commitments had already been entered into by the War and Navy Departments. It would not, however, be necessary to increase the total amounts allocated to those countries in the respective Lend-Lease Agreements. [Page 678] Uruguay is in a particularly difficult position owing to its proximity to Argentina and its military weakness. The Uruguayan Ambassador23 has made frequent calls at the Department in order to explain his country’s position.
Admiral Spears said that naval material, consisting apparently of equipment for naval arsenals and replacement parts for Chilean war vessels, is going forward steadily to Chile and that the Chilean naval authorities appear to be satisfied. With reference to Uruguay the patrol vessel requested by that Government is ready for delivery as soon as the crew can be sent to Miami for training. He indicated, moreover, that it would not be feasible to speed up delivery of naval equipment to these countries as it is the Navy Department’s practice to give naval matériel destined for the other American Republics the same high priority accorded to equipment required by our own Navy.
Colonel Hertford expressed the opinion that the Department’s suggestion did not go far enough. Proper assistance to the two countries in question and possibly to Peru and Ecuador did not consist in sending small quantities of lend-lease material, or of speeding up their delivery in order to meet sudden emergencies. Aside from the fact that it was difficult if not almost impossible to arrange for spot shipments of arms (usually about six months are required in order to make a delivery), it is well known in Argentine military circles that the Uruguayans and to a lesser extent the Chileans would not know how to maintain and operate equipment such as tanks, military planes and other paraphernalia of modern war even if the latter were made immediately available. He advocated the prompt resumption of staff conversations24 to be conducted by high-ranking officials such as a General and an Admiral which would explore the larger questions of defense and endeavor to set up a long-range plan and policy to govern arms shipments to these and other American Republics. This could include the construction of airfields at strategic spots. In return for this the War Department would require a suitable quid pro quo in the form, for instance, of military missions which would train the troops of the respective countries in the proper handling and upkeep of the equipment which shall be sent to them. The amount and character of this equipment would be specified by the War Department and not be left to the whims and fancies of the respective republics or be subject to constant variations owing to changing political factors, although, of course, they would be consulted before the programs would be compiled. Such conversations, he felt, would [Page 679] cause the Argentine Military to take notice far more than would sporadic shipments of military matériel.
Mr. Bonsal pointed out to Colonel Hertford that it would be extremely desirable to receive a communication on this subject from the War Department at the earliest moment preferably on Saturday.