825.24/1751
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations (Duggan)
Participants: | Rodolfo Michels, the Chilean Ambassador |
General Oscar Fuentes, Chief of the Chilean Military Mission in Washington | |
Commander Raul Gonzalez, Chief of the Chilean Air Force Commission | |
Mr. Laurence Duggan, PA/LD | |
Mr. Cecil B. Lyon, RA2 |
After a few brief remarks in regard to the Bolivian situation,3 the Ambassador said that referring to our previous conversation in regard to lend lease equipment4 (December 27, 1943) he had brought General Fuentes and Commander Gonzalez to discuss the question of lend lease purchases for Chile. The Ambassador explained that as he was not conversant with the desires of the Army and Air Force he thought it best to let General Fuentes and Commander Gonzalez, the experts in these matters, carry on the conversation.
General Fuentes then took up the conversation and said that arrangements under the original agreement entered into with General Marshall,5 Chile was to receive some $20,000,000 worth of equipment. However, to date they had received but $3,000,000 worth. In fact the amount which Chile was now receiving was so little that there was really no reason for General Fuentes to be here in this country. He was constantly receiving instructions from the Chilean Ministry of War to obtain more supplies. The supplies received to date the General stated were so few and so inadequate that they did not permit the equipment of even one regiment. This prevented his carrying [Page 674] out his hopes of reorienting the views of the Chilean Army which was accustomed to German equipment. He would like to see it equipped entirely with American material. He had consequently prepared a memorandum of the minimum equipment which Chile needed to take her part in the continental defense. General Fuentes then handed me the attached memorandum6 of required equipment. He said that it might appear that there was a considerable amount of artillery but this was absolutely essential to defend Chile’s long coast. He added that under present circumstances an attack might come at any point. It might be an attack by Japan. “In these days an attack might come from the Atlantic or the Pacific,” he said. Chile needed to defend the Straits of Magellan, Antofagasta, Arica, in fact the whole stretch of coast he reiterated. He stated emphatically that the material desired was only to maintain continental defense as Chile wished to fight with no one.
After I had read through the list of Army requirements, Commander Gonzalez took up the conversation. He said that next week 12 Douglas A–24 planes would depart for Chile. It is now the view of the Air Force after having made a thorough study of the subject with the United States Air Mission to Chile7 that they should limit their requests to the following:
- 1.)
- Training planes. Chile has not nearly enough training planes in accordance with the 5-year plan which had been worked out when our Air Mission first went to Chile in 1941. They now have many more trained pilots than they have planes for them to use, and it is necessary to receive more pursuit and training planes in order to keep up the excellent work being done by our Air Mission. Commander Gonzalez said that he realized that our Army’s needs must be taken care of first but he did hope that Chile could get more training planes. Commander Gonzalez said that the Lend Lease Administration had informed him that 12 Curtis P–40’s which had been assigned to Chile had been cancelled and he hoped that instead of these Curtis planes, pursuit and training planes might be provided.
- 2.)
- Bases. One of the most important phases in Chile’s defense program was to build several air bases with adequate fields for large landing forces. The Army and the public realized that this was necessary and he had received instructions from the Commander in Chief of the Army8 to initiate discussions along these lines. Naturally, these air fields would not be anything elaborate but must be adequate for landing large numbers of planes. He mentioned the Straits of Magellan and Antofagasta as possible locales. Obviously certain equipment will be needed for these fields.
- 3.)
- National Air Line. The Chilean National Air Line has recently received four Lockheeds. However, these are not sufficient to handle all the traffic and they very much need two more Lockheeds. Commander Gonzalez is in charge of the National Air Line matters [Page 675] in this country and is authorized by the Chilean Government to negotiate for the new planes.
- 4.)
- Amateur Flying Clubs. The Amateur Flying Clubs have funds (about $50,000) which were collected in a public collection, with which they hope to be permitted to purchase some planes. Our Air Mission is in favor of this project, realizing that it is the best way to make Chile air-minded and to train prospective Army pilots.
- 5.)
- Gasoline. With the additional planes Chile will require more gasoline and Commander Gonzalez hopes that we will be able to arrange this.
I assured the Ambassador, General Fuentes, and Commander Gonzalez that we would go into this matter very carefully and take it up with the appropriate authorities. I said that I did not know what their views with regard to these matters were at the present but that we would do whatever possible in regard to the Chilean request.
- Division of the American Republics.↩
- For correspondence on the problem of recognizing the new Bolivian junta, see pp. 427 ff.↩
- For correspondence on the negotiation of a lend-lease agreement between the United States and Chile, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. vi, pp. 571 ff.↩
- Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army.↩
- Not printed.↩
- For the agreement, dated April 23, 1940, establishing the mission, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 169, or 54 Stat. (pt. 2) 2282.↩
- Maj. Gen. Arturo Espinosa Mújica.↩