711.3227/7–1344: Telegram
The Ambassador in Brazil ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:16 p.m.]
2509. As the Department is aware when I undertook the negotiations for the military aviation agreement with the Brazilian authorities, it was assumed that President Vargas would ask for a definite quid pro quo. He did not do so; he preferred to rely on our good faith and good intentions. In other words having in mind the fact that by authorizing Aranha to sign the military aviation agreement with me, he ran the risk of definitely alienating Argentina, Vargas confidently believes that we will furnish the necessary equipment for his Army, ships for his Navy and planes for his Air Forces to enable him to stand firm in the face of Argentine endeavors to line up the Southern countries against him.
[Page 586](In this connection had President Vargas requested the well-known “surplus equipment” as a quid pro quo, he could have had it for nothing: as set out in my despatch number 16381 of June 13, 1944, the prices being asked for the surplus equipment are very high).
In my telegram 2493, July 12, 4 p.m.,1 I reported that President Roosevelt’s recent letter created a very favorable impression on President Vargas as well as on the National Security Council, and that the top Brazilian authorities are prepared to go ahead on the basis of that letter; and that President Vargas will communicate with me in pertinent connection in the near future.
The Brazilian authorities were particularly impressed with the first two sentences of the third paragraph of President Boosevelt’s letter which they believe will take care of the situation mentioned in the first paragraph of this telegram. Obviously they count on receiving that equipment under conditions at least as favorable as those under existing Lend-Lease arrangements.
They are also interested in a security agreement (third sentence of the third paragraph) “to assure cooperation against aggression directed against either country, or the hemisphere”, but they would highly resent any endeavor to put them in the same category with other Latin American countries as they believe that by allowing us to do as we please in northeast Brazil: To send planes, to maintain and operate our air bases; by cooperating with us in regard to naval bases, naval controls, convoys, air patrols, et cetera; by sending troops overseas; and by signing the military air agreement, they are entitled to be put in a category apart.
They are also, of course, interested in the fourth paragraph of the President’s letter having to do with Brazilian participation in extra continental arrangements.
- Not printed.↩