824.00/3023: Telegram
The Chargé in Bolivia (Woodward) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:06 p.m.]
954. In the conversation reported in this Embassy’s 953, April 27, 2 p.m.72 Baldivieso73 told me that he was very discouraged because he had become convinced that our Government is hoping for the overthrow of the Bolivian Provisional Government. He repeated this [Page 454] several times and said that was the only way he could interpret the “glacial” silence of our Government.
Baldivieso said that the most unfortunate aspect of this situation from the viewpoint of the Provisional Government is that the Bolivian people as a whole now appear to be convinced that the current [counter?] revolutionary plotters have the approval of the Government of the United States. He said that the Provisional Government is following very closely the development of the plans of three separate revolutionary plots and that the Provisional Government receives information almost every day that a revolutionary attempt is about to break out that day or the next. The findings of the Government indicate however that while the revolutionists would have considerable financial support and a fairly large following among the citizenry, they do not have adequate military support or military leaders.
He said that while Villarroel is following the policy of jailing key plotters from time to time in order to prevent an outbreak and bloodshed, he, Baldivieso, has been disposed to favor a relaxing of preventative measures so that there will be an outbreak which can be dealt with directly. He said that on the other hand he is sincerely afraid of a revolution under present circumstances because he fears that there might be continuous fighting for 8 or 10 days with a great deal of bloodshed amounting to civil war. He thought the fighting might be extensive because he did not think the would-be revolutionists would make an attempt until they were fairly confident of their strength but he is nevertheless sure that the determination of the young military officers at present in power and their fear of possible reprisals in the event they are defeated will impel them to make a very firm stand. Baldivieso is quite certain that the military element at present in power cannot be thrown out by force.
Baldivieso also commented to me twice that he considers there is a very real danger of this sort of “civil war” becoming contagious in nearby countries but he did not develop this thought to possible cause and effect.