835.50/169: Telegram
The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State
[Received 3:39 p.m.]
729. Embassy feels strongly, in answer to Department’s 413, March 10, 10 a.m., that Argentine situation is such that either all out measures should be undertaken or our present economic policies left substantially unmodified. Halfway measures would play into hands of present regime and furnish it with grounds for charging external pressure and infringement of sovereignty, and could result in the various groups which are today at swords points being forced into a semblance of unity under banner of nationalism. Even an all out program should be carefully implemented and designed to encourage better elements in Argentina to clean house and have available a face saving solution which would not compromise their national dignity. Furthermore, if action is to be taken measures should be instituted promptly since the irresponsible and self-seeking military and nationalist [Page 414] elements which are today in control of this government are seemingly gambling on fact that neither Britain nor the United States will adopt any serious economic sanctions in face of imminent invasion of Europe.
If it is possible for Britain and the United States to adopt measures indicated in Department’s 413 following program is submitted for consideration:
- 1.
- FEA to announce transfer of consignee control from Buenos Aires to Washington.
- 2.
- American, British, and Allied controlled ships to stop calling at Buenos Aires, but no announcement to be made with respect to this decision.
- 3.
- Agency in the United States of Argentine flag vessels to be unofficially advised that Allied bunkerage facilities would not be made available until further notice.
- 4.
- Suggestion contained in item 6 of Embassy’s telegram 105, January 13, 3 p.m.1 to be fully implemented.
These measures would impose a practical embargo on bulk of Argentine international trade. While they would lack the dramatic and immediate effect which would be given them by public announcement, following reasons counsel procedure suggested:
- a.
- No threats or ultimatums having been made, shipping could be resumed without undue embarrassment if Allied authorities later felt that war effort was being seriously handicapped.
- b.
- Present Argentine regime would find it more difficult to charge foreign interference in Argentine affairs.
- c.
- Purchases from Argentina and sales to Argentina would be automatically restricted by lack of shipping facilities.
- d.
- Emergency war requirements could be used as reason for diversion of Allied shipping and refusal of bunkers and would assist in following course outlined in (a) above if this should prove necessary.
It will be noted that suggestions made above differ radically from those outlined in Embassy’s 105, January 13, 3 p.m. At that time the utilization of purchases from Argentina as basis for action did not appear possible, and entire program was built around Argentine neutrality. Measures which could logically be taken with respect to neutral state would today appear punitive if taken against a country which had broken relations with Axis, unless our government were prepared to give lie direct to public statements made by officials of Ramírez and Farrell regimes. In category of punitive measures, general freezing of Argentina is included. Embassy does not recommend this measure at present time, since it would provide present regime with evidence that punitive action is being taken and this disadvantage outweighs economic warfare advantages of measure.
[Page 415]While Embassy has always felt that no Government in Argentina could withstand more than few weeks suspension of meat and other Allied purchases, we wish to point out that today we are dealing with government composed largely of undisciplined army officers, self-seeking army politicians and fanatic nationalists. Situation is dangerous both internally and externally.
Should Department decide to adopt a program along lines indicated herein, it will undoubtedly give consideration to possibility of obtaining support from other American Republics either in form of an announcement by them or through recall of their representatives in Buenos Aires, in event that British and American Ambassadors were recalled.2