Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The American Republics, Volume VII

835.01/10–1044: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

Washington, October 10, 1944—6 p.m.

8320. An officer of the British Embassy has informed the Department that the Foreign Office would be greatly aided in its consideration of our request for collaboration in economic measures with respect to Argentina by a clear statement of our objectives. It is difficult for us to believe that the Foreign Office has any doubt about our position, which has been clearly set forth on several occasions in recent months. (Reference is made to the Secretary’s public statement of July 26;⁹⁵ his note of August 30, in reply to the British note of August 4 on the Argentine situation; his statement to the press on September 7;⁹⁶ and the President’s statement to the press on September 29.) In deference to the Embassy’s suggestion, however, it appears advisable for you to transmit the following message to Mr. Eden:

1. The power which in the final analysis controls the Government of Argentina today is vested in the Campo de Mayo and Club del Plata military-Fascist combine. This group is pro-Nazi, anti-United Nations and is determined to stimulate the formation of the same type of government in other South American republics. No competent or well-informed person or authority denies this fact. The British Government has never disputed the charge.

2. The same military-Fascist group has definite expansionist plans for the domination of South America and is working feverishly to develop a military machine powerful enough to support arbitrary political and economic demands upon its neighbors. It is planning for and anticipates assistance from refugee Nazi technicians, economists and military personnel after the war. If this group is permitted to stabilize and solidify its position through the political tolerance and helpful trade of the principal United Nations it will threaten the peace of South America as soon as its strength permits.

3. So long as this group is in control of any Argentine Government, the Government of the United States will refuse to accredit an ambassador to Buenos Aires and will do everything possible to prevent such government from gaining strength through commercial intercourse with the United States.

4. It is the judgment of the Department of State that wholehearted political and economic collaboration by Great Britain would soon mean the end of this sinister control over Argentine affairs and would thus terminate a situation which otherwise may continue for years to come. The Government of the United States is doing everything possible, without prejudice to the main war effort, to combat this situation. It is our considered judgment that Great Britain in not following a similar course and particularly by its actions in the economic field, is inevitably encouraging the present regime to believe that it can ultimately divide Great Britain from the United States.

Since receiving the text of Eden’s letter of September 7, relative to the Argentine meat contract (reference Embassy’s Cable 7352, September 7 [8]⁹⁹) the Department has made several representations to the British Government in which it has questioned the need for signing any contract at all in the immediate future and has unqualifiedly opposed the conclusion of a long term contract. On September 16 I presented the matter to Halifax in the strongest possible terms and later summarized my statements in a memorandum transmitted to the British Embassy on September 25.¹ I again reviewed the situation with Halifax on September 30 and reiterated our views on the desirability of continuing spot purchases and on the lack of need for a contract at this time.

I believe that our representations, which have been supported by the President with the Prime Minister, have been so expressed as to make it clear beyond question that this Government considers the Argentine problem one of major policy.

Notwithstanding the clear expression of our position, the Foreign Office has manifested almost complete indifference to our views and has apparently permitted the Ministry of Food and other agencies in London to give the Argentines ample ground for the belief that a four-year contract is an ultimate certainty. The British Government has, at least indirectly, been responsible for news despatches which have undermined our position in Argentina and throughout the hemisphere.

In your most recent cable on this subject (Embassy’s 1879 [8179], September 30, 4 p.m.)⁹⁹ you state that the Ministry of Food, apparently continuing to proceed without regard to our position and the questions raised by our highest authorities, intends to sign a contract which would be directly opposed to our political position.

There is no justification for a four, three, or even two year contract from the standpoint of the emergency war situation. Ten months elapsed before the last contract was signed in July 1943 and there is no reason whatever to believe that a program of spot purchases for the same period would not obtain all the meat supplies which England requires.

As you were informed in the Department’s instruction no. 4602 of October 3,⁹⁹ and as I advised the British Embassy in our memorandum of September 25, the Army has cancelled its order for 43,000 tons Argentine canned meat. The effect of this action, however, would be completely nullified by a British purchase of the entire Argentine exportable surplus.

All reports that we have with regard to the anxiety of the Argentines to conclude a meat contract with England, for psychological and political reasons, as much if not more than for economic reasons, demonstrate that there is little danger that continuation of spot purchases would result in reprisals in the form of an embargo on meat.

In presenting the foregoing views to Eden, please inform him that we cannot divorce our consideration of this matter from our consideration of British requests for our cooperation and assistance on a much more substantial scale in other areas. What we are asking could at worst involve only a minor sacrifice and no serious hazard to British interests.

Hull

95. Department of State Bulletin, July 30, 1944, p. 107.
96. Secretary of State Hull indicated in a press conference in response to a question that evidence would be needed to dissuade him from believing that Argentina would provide an asylum for Nazi war criminals.
99. Not printed.
1. Not found in Department files.
99. Not printed.
99. Not printed.