835.01/8–444

The British Chargé (Campbell) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]
No. 487

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6.
The Argentine Government, having fulfilled these requests65 to our satisfaction, would no doubt expect recognition. His Majesty’s [Page 339] Government take the traditional view of the act of Recognition. Except on very rare occasions, it is to them not a moral approval of the Government in question, but an act of well established international procedure. Generally they do not believe that it should or can in fact be used to effect a change of Government. But experience has shown that in exceptional circumstances it can be used effectively as a bargaining instrument, and they believe that now it could and should be used quite plainly to extract certain concrete contributions to the common effort on the matters recommended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. They believe too that this use would be approved generally by the public opinion of the United Nations. The more so because His Majesty’s Government must frankly admit to serious misgivings as to the effect on the Latin-American temperament of the Argentine nation of ostracizing that country’s Government.
7.
Nor, they feel bound to say, would they find it easy to justify before public opinion a situation in which Sir David Kelly was kept away from his post for an indefinite period of time, if invidious comparisons were to be drawn, in Parliament and elsewhere, between the lack of diplomatic protection from which important British interests are likely to suffer at the hands of an ultranationalist Government and the continued presence in Buenos Aires of United States Service missions advising the recalcitrant Government. Still less would Parliament approve of British participation in an economic embargo which would involve harsher steps against a country, that has, at least in appearance, severed diplomatic relations with the Axis, than have been enforced by the United States or British Governments against the Government of Eire.
8.
You will, His Majesty’s Government feel convinced, further appreciate the desire of His Majesty’s Government to consult in this matter Latin-American States such as Brazil, Uruguay and Chile, with which they have long standing ties of friendship and common interests sufficiently close to warrant their raising the status of their diplomatic missions to the highest level. Such requests as that of Uruguay for assurances of assistance in case of attack have somewhat reinforced the views recently expressed to His Majesty’s representatives by leading men in Latin-American countries with regard to a prevalent uneasiness as to the effect upon Argentina of further pressure, such as a public remonstrance or embargo. Of the countries concerned you will be aware that several are also most intimately linked with Argentina both economically as well as geographically. It would, therefore, be the desire of His Majesty’s Government that the line of policy which they feel should now be adopted towards Argentina should be brought to the notice of, and discussed with, some at least of these Latin-American associates in the United Nations’ cause before any final decisions are taken as to further moves.
9.
His Majesty’s Government would be glad to receive a full and frank expression of the views of the United States Government on the foregoing; to the end that the collaboration, which His Majesty’s Government greatly value in all matters of high policy may continue to be reinforced by consultation at every step taken to deal with this international question. In the meantime, His Majesty’s Government take the liberty to suggest the advisability of avoiding all public statements; so that Argentina may have time to reflect upon your clear indictment of the Argentine Government, and His Majesty’s Government may equally have an opportunity to discuss future policy.
10.
The statement made this week by the Prime Minister to the House of Commons will have demonstrated once more to all concerned that His Majesty’s Government are above all desirous of finding, in common with the United States and their other Allies, a just and lasting solution for the Argentine problem. Nor are they backward in warning the Argentine Government of the results of their waywardness.

I have [etc.]

Ronald I. Campbell
  1. In omitted paragraphs the British Chargé suggested that requests for positive contributions to the war effort by Argentina be made when it was determined the extent of the injury done to the United Nations, the help given the Axis by Argentina, and what further assistance Argentina could give the Allies.