Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The American Republics, Volume VII

800.20235/6–2444

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs (Duggan)

[Extracts]

[Washington,] June 24, 1944.

Argentina

I

At Rio de Janeiro the American Republics agreed to combat Axis activity in all of its phases within the hemisphere. The most dangerous form of this activity to the actual military prosecution of the war was that relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive undertakings, et cetera.

On March 16, 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested to advise whether enemy activity in Argentina of this kind was dangerous to any military plans, preparations, or operations.

On March 30, 1944, the Joint Chiefs replied that they were not. They stated that there was far greater enemy activity in Argentina than in any other American republic but that it was less than two years ago.^42a Their conclusion was that enemy activity in Argentina was a “potential” rather than “actual” danger.

The Joint Chiefs’ conclusion cannot be lightly brushed aside. It is based upon all the evidence available to this Government. It must merit respect and guide our action.

The political moral to be drawn from the Joint Chiefs’ finding is clear enough—the stamping out of the minor enemy activity in Argentina is not worth risking damage to the Good Neighbor Policy. An understanding of this is basic to the pursuit of a realistic policy with respect to Argentina, as well as to the other American republics.

Since the finding of the Joint Chiefs in March 1944, has come the capture of Rome, the retreat of Germany to the north of Italy and the invasion of France.…

Since our attitude towards Argentina is premised on hemisphere defense, we may soon be deprived of the cornerstone on which non-recognition rests.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

V

A decade of the Good-Neighbor Policy has produced remarkable confidence by the other American republics in the United States. Indeed, our history has no parallel for the present situation.

Why?

The United States achieved this position by openly and frankly laying the Big Stick on the shelf and relying instead upon the development of a community of interests that would produce common attitudes and unity of action. We abjured force, economic and military, to attain our ends. We withdrew our marines. We undertook treaty commitments, without reservation, not to intervene in the affairs of our neighbors. As a result, little by little there abated the distrust of the United States caused by a policy of pressure and force. Slowly confidence was built up. The other American republics came to see that Uncle Sam was not going to bash them over the head when he became annoyed or when he wanted something they were not prepared to give. They respected our restraint when we were provoked by those who sought to take advantage of the Good-Neighbor Policy.

The test of the new policy came with Pearl Harbor. In the darkest moment of the war—at a time when the Japs were running amok in the East Indies and Rommel⁴³ was striking in Tripoli—they threw their lot with us.

Why did the Good Neighbors come to our side?

They acted not because Uncle Sam raised a menacing finger but because they thought it was the thing to do in their own interests (which were identical with our interests).

This asset can be as important to us in the days ahead as it has been in the past.

Yet it is this asset that we are risking by our present policy with Argentina.

VI

The present moment calls for a high level of statesmenship. We have, beginning with the Rio conference, created an Argentine bogey which is now returning to haunt us. If we are not careful we will dissipate our energies in chasing this phantom and thereby waste our strength needed in the pursuit of our main objective, namely, the creation of a decent postwar order.

The United States will emerge from this war with power mobilized to a degree heretofore unknown. This fact, already realized by some of the Good Neighbors, will soon be crystal clear to all. They will judge us in the future by the wisdom and restraint with which we use our power.

If we now recognize that the Argentine situation no longer presents the threat that it may have been at an earlier stage and act accordingly we will add to, not detract from, our prestige with the other American republics.

This will be the more true if concomitantly we immediately consult with the other American republics about the general international organization. Much of the present restlessness arises from our failure to take any steps—even to make a gesture towards seeking the views of the other countries regarding postwar political problems. As a consequence, they are deeply hurt. They interpret our continuous talk of responsibility by the four major powers as an indication that we don’t care what they think. Unless immediate steps are taken, this feeling will deepen into a real distrust, which in turn may be capitalized upon by some other great power.

VII

Although this memorandum is not concerned with strategy and tactics, the suggestion is reiterated that we could not only solve the present impasse with Argentina but immeasurably improve the chances of success of our postwar plans by holding immediately a meeting of Foreign Ministers. Argentina, of course, would have the same right to attend a meeting of Foreign Ministers as it does to representation at the Governing Board of the Pan American Union. Furthermore, the possibility of extending into the immediate postwar era the life of those inter-American organizations which have been so useful in meeting economic problems of general interest might well appeal to the other countries as a reason for holding a meeting at this time.

The Argentine problem would not appear as an item on the agenda of the conference. It might be taken up in the conference under some general heading relating to hemisphere security or disposed of outside of the formal sessions of the meeting.… Precisely because it would not be the prime focus of the meeting but a subordinate theme it would be vastly easier to find a satisfactory solution. Indeed, with careful advance planning and management of the meeting a reasonable solution could be presented in such a way that Argentina could not decline its acceptance.

The convocation of such a meeting is the type of bold, imaginative step necessary to break the Argentine impasse. It would definitely appeal to all the other governments. Its chances of successfully solving the Argentine problem are believed infinitely greater than any other course yet suggested.

1. The Department of Defense has supplied the following correction: “The JCS reply of March 30, 1944, contained no indication that enemy activity in Argentina was less than two years ago’. It did state that ‘these activities in Argentina are of lesser danger today than previously, in consequence of the general improvement in our military ‘situation.’”
43. Gen. Erwin Rommel, commander of German forces in Africa.